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REVIEW
OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

POONA

Vol I

1930

REVIEW
OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Being the Journal
OF
The Academy of Philosophy and Religion
Vol. I
1930

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Printed at the Aryabhushan Press House No 936/2 Peth Bhamburda
Poona City by Anant Vinayak Patwardhan and published by
Parashuram Krishna Gode, M A Secretary, at the Branch Office
of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion Poona 4

Annual Subscription Rs 4 - (Inland), 7s 6d (Foreign)

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Vol. I.

SEPTEMBER 1930

No. 2.

REVIEW
OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Being the Journal
OF
The Academy of Philosophy and Religion

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Managing Editor

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Printed at the Aryabhushan Press, House No 936/2, Peth Bhamburda,
Poona City, by Anant Vinayak Patvardhan, and Published by
Parashuram Krishna Gode, M A Secretary, at the Branch
Office of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion
near the Bhandarkar Institute, Poona 4

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THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

DR. S. K. MAITRA, M. A., Ph. D.

I

The metaphysical and ariological approach to the problem.

The problem of value is perhaps the main philosophical problem of the present day. As Urban says, "during the last quarter century all the resources of psychological and logical analysis have been brought to the solution of problems of the relation of value to existence and reality, problems which, if not new in their essence, are new in their manner of formulation"¹. The cause of the shifting of the philosophical centre of gravity from being to value is, as I have pointed out in my book, 'The Neo-romantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy', the growth of the romantic movement. The growth of philosophical interest in the problem of value is, therefore, a symptom of the same tendency which we notice in Bergsonism, pragmatism, vitalism and energism and the romanticism of Dilthey and Keyserling.

The problem of value, as Urban has shown in his article on *Value* in the Fourteenth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, is a fivefold one. The questions which it raises are (1) What is the nature of values? (definition), (2) What are the fundamental values and how are they to be classified?; (3) How may we determine the relative values of things and what is the ultimate standard of value?, (4) Are values merely subjective, satisfying merely subjective desires, or are they objective?, (5) What is the relation of value to reality?

If we examine these questions we find that questions 2 and 3 can be summed up in the single question: Is there a plurality of values, and if so, is there a scale of values, or are all values co-ordinate in rank? The fourth question, again, must necessarily arise in any discussion of the first or the fifth question. For practical purposes, therefore, the five questions can be reduced to three, namely, (1) What is a value?;

1 Vide "*Value Theory and Aesthetics*" (*Philosophy of To-day*, edited by L. E. Schaub, p. 54).

2 Vide *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th edition, Vol. XXII, p. 961.

(2) Is there a plurality of values, and if so, what is the relation of the values to one another?, (3) What is the relation of value to reality?

All the different types of value-philosophy have got their own special answers to each of these three questions. The theoretically best way to classify them, therefore, is to arrange them according to the answers which they give to these three questions. There is, however, one difficulty. The classification based on this principle is apt to be overlapping. For, theories which give the same answer with regard to one of these questions, and which therefore will have to be classed together, may give a different answer with regard to the other questions. Thus, the theories of Munsterberg and Rickert which have to be classed together, so far as their attitude to reality is concerned, will have to be put under different classes when we arrange them according to their answers to the question, What is a value?

I have, therefore, thought it better to classify the value-theories from the point of view of the method which they severally employ in attacking the problem of value. These methods are mainly two, namely, metaphysical and axiological, and psychological. I class the metaphysical and axiological methods together, for although in some cases either the metaphysical or the axiological method predominates, we find in general that the two are combined.

The most systematic philosophy of values which has approached the problem of value from the point of view of metaphysics and axiology is undoubtedly the system of Munsterberg which is sketched in his work, *Eternal Values*. Munsterberg bases his philosophy of values upon a voluntaristic standpoint. Value is what is created by an act of the will. Whatever is not a creation of the will belongs, according to Munsterberg, to the valueless domain of facts. Nature is the name for this valueless region, whereas History is the domain where values rule. The Ahura Mazda and the Ahri-man of Munsterberg's philosophy are respectively History and Nature.

What, however, is a value? To this question Munsterberg's answer is that a value is an over-personal satisfaction of the will. Satisfaction of the will alone does not constitute a value. In order that it may give rise to a value, it is necessary, Munsterberg thinks, that it should also be over-

personal. That is to say, it should not be merely a private satisfaction of the individual. If this condition had not been there, a pleasure could become a value. But Munsterberg asserts very strongly that pleasures are absolutely devoid of value. "Satisfaction of the will", he says, "is independent of pleasure and displeasure, satisfaction of the will results from the realization of the anticipated stimulus. Pleasure and displeasure express only the relation of the stimulus to the personality without being themselves sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction."³

The question now arises. What is the nature of this satisfaction of the will? Munsterberg's answer is as follows.⁴ "That which fulfils our will brings us satisfaction and is thus valuable for us. But what does it mean to fulfil our will? We say our will is fulfilled when the idea which we try to maintain becomes realized. We must elaborate that statement further. What does this realization mean? We may say, in the first place, it means the identity of content between the preceding and the resulting experience." In other words, discovery of identity is the essential characteristic of satisfaction of the will.

Herein lies, however, the weakness of Munsterberg's position. If the maintenance of identity is the fundamental characteristic of satisfaction of the will and consequently defines a value, wherein does value differ from reality? For the essential characteristic of reality, as conceived by the rationalist, consists in the maintenance of identity. The highest reality, as conceived by the rationalist is an all-embracing unity. This is, for instance, the conception of reality which Bradley gives us. The Absolute, or all-comprehending reality, is a perfectly coherent whole. Whatever is less than this is an appearance, that is, a partial reality, the grade of reality depending upon the amount of coherence that is present.

Moreover, if maintenance of identity defines a value, what becomes of the volitional basis of value? Is not maintenance of identity the essential characteristic of the logical Reason? The predominant feature of the will is never the maintenance of identity, but rather the presence of caprice or arbitrariness, that is to say, inexplicable difference.

The entire scheme of values of Munsterberg is based upon this principle of identity. His system of threefold eight values

3. *Eternal Values*, p. 70.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

rests upon this principle. How essential this principle is for the whole development of his theory of values will be evident from the following quotation —

"If the experiences are to assert themselves as a self-dependent world, and are to realize themselves in new and ever new experiences and are to remain identical with themselves, we must demand a fourfold relation. First, every part must remain identical with itself in the changing events, secondly, the various parts must show in a certain sense identity among themselves, and thus show that they agree with one another and that no one part of the world is entirely isolated thirdly, that which changes itself in the experience must still present an identity in its change by showing that its change belongs to its own meaning and is only its own realization. But if the world is completely to assert itself, that is, to hold its own identity, these three values must ultimately be identical with one another, one must realize itself in the other " "

Why should the will, however, be so anxious to maintain identity? The nature of the will, as we understand it, does not seem to be consistent with this constant demand for the maintenance of identity. Apart from Schopenhauer's blind will, the will of which we have direct experience rather acts on the principle of selection and preference than on the colourless principle of identity. The activity of the will manifests itself in the manner in which it selects one out of a number of identical relations, ignoring the others. It does not show any scrupulous regard for consistency, it is guided by aversions and preferences which it is impossible to reduce to logic. The will may not be blind or even unconscious, but the principle of its operation is certainly not the same as that of Reason.

Moreover, if the object of Munsterberg was only to show the all-pervading character of the principle of identity, there was no need whatsoever for propounding with a great flourish of trumpets a new metaphysical standpoint. The Hegelian logicism would have more than sufficed. The much-vaunted 'new' standpoint turns out, on examination, to be nothing else than the old Hegelian intellectualism. Munsterberg has, in fact, done nothing but pour old wine into new bottles.

Indeed, except at the very beginning, when the Ego posits itself and by positing, creates a world, the will is suspended in mid-air. Munsterberg, in fact, does nothing but lip-service

to voluntarism. The key-note of his philosophy is not voluntarism but intellectualism. The division of values into three groups—outer, follow, and inner—reminds one strongly of the Hegelian triadic scheme. Indeed, as Ludwig Stein points out⁶ “the triadic rhythm of Hegel is strictly adopted. And if an impulsive scoffer says of the Hegelian tripartite division that it suffers from ‘gout,’ one must admit that Munsterberg’s three-fold division is employed much more naturally and developed much more clearly than the many-sided system of Hegel. Only while the Hegelian *logos*, the world-spirit, marches like a god, with measured steps and solemn grandeur through the stages of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, indicated in the self-unfolding of *logos*, as measured by the time of three crotchets, Munsterberg’s ‘will to the world’ gallops spirited, though not with such impetuosity and unruliness as the blindly ‘world-will’ of Schopenhauer, through the three regions, nature, history and reason, in order finally to return to itself much enriched, as once did the *logos* of Hegel.”

Munsterberg’s insistence upon the over-personal character of value is capable of justification from the rationalistic, and not from the voluntaristic standpoint. From the point of view of voluntarism, over-individuality, far from heightening the will-character, rather tones it down. When the will is over-personal (if, indeed, it can ever be so), it takes the character of reason and ceases to be will.

The intellectualistic character of Munsterberg’s theory of values is most strikingly evident in the last chapter of his book where he deals with metaphysical values. These values are over-experienceable values which take us beyond experience. The highest of these metaphysical values is the Over-Self. The Over-Self is “the blending allness of values, as soon as the boundaries of the self begin to disappear.” In reaching the Over-Self Munsterberg says, “We have reached the highest point from which the meaning of eternity unveils itself. And through it we recognize the deepest aiming of the Absolute.” The close resemblance of this conception of the Over-Self to that of the Hegelian Absolute is very striking.

Regarding the question of the relation between value and reality, we find Munsterberg oscillating between the view that the two are entirely different and the view that they are capable

⁶ *Philosophical Currents of the Present Day*, English edition, Vol. I, p. 40

of being united in a highest unity. The latter view ultimately triumphs, and in Münsterberg's conception of the Over-Self we have an Absolute which unites value and reality.

So, too, the final answer of Münsterberg to the question whether there is a plurality of values is the direct contradiction of his original answer. Originally Münsterberg divided values into four broad classes—logical, aesthetic, ethical and metaphysical, which were co-ordinate to one another. But, as I have already pointed out, Münsterberg felt the call of Hegel, with the result that in the end he tried to subsume all values under one highest value, namely the Over-Self. But such a solution, as Urban has pointed out, 'means sacrificing all other values to logical values. Indeed here we have a further confirmation of the intellectualistic bias of Münsterberg.

The intellectualistic bias of Münsterberg is continued in the other great system of value philosophy which is associated with the name of Rickert. Rickert begins by distinguishing between value and reality. The starting-point of the theory of values is the perception that there are regions which are outside the real but which at the same time must be said to be something. He, however, understands by the real only the existing. Thus he says, 'The World-whole is not only the really existing which splits itself up into the subject and the object but goes beyond all reality.' He further says "The 'existing' includes not only the sensuous reality but also the non-sensuous ideal. Secondly, the World-whole means much more than the 'existing', even when the 'existing' includes the non-sensuous ideal."

The distinction between value and reality is seen very clearly in the case of negation. Negation has only one meaning in connection with existence, but a double meaning in connection with values. 'The negation of the existent, or more precisely, of an existent 'something' produces the not-something or nothing. The negation of a value, however, gives us something positive, and not negative.' We thus get a very good criterion, by which we can distinguish value from existence.

7. *Value Theory and Aesthetics* (*Philosophy To-day*, edited by E. L. Heid, p. 13)

8. *Gegenstand der Philosophie*, p. 102

9. *Ibid.*

10. Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, p. 230

There can be no 'negative existence' which we can oppose to the 'positive existence,' but there can be a 'negative value' which we can very well set against a positive value¹¹

Rickert evidently is not satisfied with this merely negative criterion of value, and so says, "What *value in itself* is, cannot be defined"¹² This statement, however, he immediately afterwards explains as meaning 'that we have to do here with the final and most fundamental concept with which we think the world'

This *Value in-itself* (Wert an sich) Rickert distinguishes from the real, sensuous good with which it is often confused. He also distinguishes it from the end which lies in the future whose realization we strive after. The end is not itself a value, but is only a *bearer of values*. It is the same with *purpose* and *means*, neither of which is a value but only a bearer of values. Value can in no way be 'realized,' and when we speak of "the realization of value", we are using words which have no meaning¹³

The value-in-itself is a pure form, devoid of any matter and is the subject-matter of transcendental philosophy. Rickert frankly believes that Kant's transcendental philosophy does not deal with reality, but only with forms, and thus with values. We shall see presently that Windelband also takes a similar view of the Kantian philosophy. This seems rather strange in view of the explicit statement of Kant, that transcendental logic deals with objects and not with pure forms.

Transcendental philosophy which treats of the value-in-itself, investigates systematically the transcendental meaning of judgment. It is concerned exclusively with what *does not exist*. It has to do neither with the physical nor with the psychical existence, neither with a real nor with an ideally existing, neither with the sensuous nor with the over-sensuous reality, but only with the meaning (which is non-existing) of propositions and with the forms which as values constitute this meaning¹⁴

11 Ibid. p. 241

12 Rickert, *System der Philosophie*, p. 116

13 "Werte lassen sich als Werte nicht verwirklichen, und wo wir von 'Wertverwirklichung' sprechen, ist das stets *cum grano salis* zu verstehen" (*System der Philosophie*, p. 113)

14 Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, p. 238

This not-real form or value is the Kantian *a priori*. It is the truth-value of all propositions concerning reality. The *a priori* is no psychical reality, no 'certainty,' no 'disposition' or 'power,' but it is a form of sense, a theoretical value which is valid transcendently.

The value-in-itself, therefore, is the pure logical value and is pure form without matter. If this is not logicism, we do not know what logicism is. From this point of view, the philosophy of values becomes a pure logic of forms. Rickert in this matter seems to go further than Husserl, whose logic also, as we shall presently see, gives us nothing but forms, for he criticizes Husserl for not being wholly free from traces of the ontological view of values.

As Picard has shown¹⁵ Rickert has not been able to maintain this doctrine consistently. He points to pp 88-89 of Rickert's "*Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*", where Rickert states that we must start with certain existential facts in order to obtain a basis for consideration of the judgment. This, however, is an admission of the priority of reality—an admission which is the reverse of the main thesis of Rickert, namely, that ontology rests upon epistemology.

Rickert, however, has to depart from this standpoint of the contentless value when he deals with the values of life—the moral, the aesthetic or the religious values. Here he introduces the element of subjectivity which is lacking in the logical value. Thus he says, with regard to the 'ought' or moral value, "The 'ought' is not yet the pure value. It indicates the unreal as a prescription and refers it to a subject from which it demands obedience, recognition and subjection."¹⁶ Rickert, however finds fault with Munsterberg for drawing a sharp line of demarcation between value and 'ought'. According to Rickert, the moment a value is referred to the subject, it becomes an 'ought'.¹⁷ The touch of the subject changes the theory of knowledge which is only a theory of a theory, into a normative discipline.¹⁷

After this principle of subjectivity is introduced, there is a gradual change in Rickert's standpoint without his being aware of it. Thus, he says, "When we use the expression 'transcendental value', it is only the word 'transcendental'.

¹⁵ Maurice Picard *Values Immediate and Contradictory*, pp 24-25

¹⁶ *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, p 242

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p 243

which denotes freedom from subjectivity, the word 'value' indicating a reference to the subject, not indeed, in the sense of the 'individual' but in the sense of 'over-individual epistemological subject'"¹⁸ If, however, we accept this view, what becomes of Rickert's emphatic assertion that value-in-itself is a pure form without any content? Do we not see here the innate weakness of the position which founds a theory of value upon pure logicism?

In fact, Rickert gradually tries to purge his system of its extreme logicism. The abstract epistemological view with which he starts is gradually replaced by a more conciliatory attitude towards reality. This is due to a growing recognition on the part of Rickert of the untenability of the distinction between value and reality.

In the end we find Rickert combining value and reality and Subject into one all-comprehensive World-Whole. This World-Whole consists of two kingdoms—the kingdom of the 'Erlebte' which, again, is subdivided into the domains of reality and value, and the kingdom of the 'Erleben' which combines the real and the unreal.¹⁹ It is in this kingdom of the 'Erleben' that we find the Subject. "The characteristic of the Subject is "immediate livingness" (unmittelbare Lebendigkeit)

The notion of the Subject plays a very important part in the metaphysics of Rickert. It is, in fact, the link between value and reality. The Subject introduces a new conception, which is not present either in the notion of value or in that of reality, namely that of the living, or, as Rickert puts it, "the living in its livingness" ("das Lebendige in seiner Lebendigkeit")

Rickert thus gives us ultimately a fourfold realm, composed of the Real, the Value, the Subject and the Absolute or the World-whole, which is the ultimate unity of the Real, the Value and the Subject. Value, therefore, is not his ultimate, it is not even his penultimate, which position is rather given to the subject, but is only one of the two regions of which the 'Erlebte', or the world of experience, is composed.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 247

¹⁹ "Das All zerfällt in das Reich des vom unmittelbaren Erleben abgerückten Erlebten einerseits, das aus realen und irrealen oder werthhaften Gegenständen besteht, und in das Reich unmittelbaren Erlebens andererseits, das Reales und Ireales zusammenkält" (*System der Philosophie*, p. 313)

Such is the fate of value in Rickert's system! And it points to the extremely intellectual or logical character of Rickert's metaphysics

The main weakness of Rickert's position lies, I think, in his insistence upon keeping the realm of value absolutely distinct from that of reality. This absolute distinction has for its immediate effect the degradation of reality to the position of a mere existence. This degradation of reality has, by way of reaction, led to the restoration of reality in other forms. The degraded reality takes its revenge upon Rickert's system by reappearing first in the form of a Subject and then in the form of the World-whole, which is the Rickertian Absolute. The logical Absolutism of Rickert is, therefore, itself a product of the absolute distinction between reality and value.

This weakness in Rickert's system has also been noticed by Aliotta. "If," he says, "value be non-existent, if it absolutely transcend consciousness, no dialectic effort will enable me to pass from one term to the other, but this concept of a *value-in-itself*, without any reference to consciousness, is not thinkable, still less is it possible to think of a value which *does not exist* either actually or ideally."²

The Rickertian logicism or axiological epistemologism we notice also in Windelband, who also, like Rickert starts with the distinction between fact and value. In his "Preludien", Windelband says that there are two kinds of judgment, the judgment of fact and the judgment of value. The former is what is called in German an 'Urteil,' and the latter, what is called a 'Beurteilung.' There is a fundamental distinction between the proposition 'This thing is white,' and the proposition 'This thing is good,' although the two propositions have the same grammatical form.²¹ All predicates of an 'Urteil' are of the nature of generic concepts, properties, states, relations, etc. a thing, for instance, is big, hard, soft, etc. All predicates of a 'Beurteilung,' on the other hand, are expressions of the approval or disapproval of the representing consciousness: thus, a thing is pleasant or unpleasant, a concept is true or false, an action is good or bad, a landscape is beautiful or ugly, etc.

The importance of this distinction lies chiefly in the circumstance that philosophy is concerned with the judgments

²⁰ *Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 213

²¹ *Preludien*, 5th edition, Vol. I, p. 29

of value²² But it deals with these judgments of value very differently from the manner in which the descriptive and explanatory sciences deal with their objects Philosophy neither describes nor explains the judgments of value That is the business of psychology and of culture-history Every judgment of value is the reaction of a willing and feeling consciousness against a determinate conceptual content "It is a phenomenon of the soul-life which necessarily results from the state of need, on the one hand, and the content of the conception on the other But the content of conception, as well as the state of need, is a necessary product of the total life-movement."²³

But philosophy deals not only with these isolated Beurteilungen, but with the "*normal consciousness*, which is true not in the sense of factual cognition but which *shall be true*, which is no empirical reality but an ideal by which the value of all empirical reality is measured"²⁴

We are in presence here of what Kant calls 'Bewusstsein überhaupt,' whose laws are not natural laws which hold good under all circumstances, but norms which *shall be valid* and whose realization determines the value of the empirical Philosophy is nothing else than reflection on this normal consciousness²⁵

In the Essay 'Immanuel Kant' in the same book, Windelband says that the merit of Kant's philosophy lies in this, that instead of the agreement of the thing with the consciousness, which Greek philosophy held to be the essence of knowledge, it seeks the *norms* of consciousness 'Kant's philosophy cannot therefore be called a Weltanschauung, for it can, and it will give no world-picture' Instead of a picture, it gives us "reflection on the normal laws of the spirit embracing the entire range of human life-activity" These normal laws cover not only the theoretical sphere but also the spheres of ethics and aesthetics If truth means, with Kant, the norm of the spirit, there are ethical and aesthetic norms, as there are theoretic-

22 "Das Objekt der Philosophie bilden die Beurteilungen" (*Präjudien*, Vol I, p 33)

23 *Präjudien*, Essay "Was ist die Philosophie," Vol I, p 35

24 *Ibid*, Vol I p 44

25 *Op cit* p 45

26 *Ibid*, Essay *Immanuel Kant*," Vol I, p 140.

cal ones.²⁷ The problem of philosophy, therefore, says Windelband, according to Kant, is reflection on the absolute norms. These absolute norms consist of norms of thinking as well as norms of willing and feeling. These norms constitute the rules of all possible experience.

As Picard points out,²⁸ we find quite a different conception of norms in the Essay *Normen und Naturgesetze* in the same book. Here Windelband distinguishes between norms and laws of nature. Thus he says —

"The norms are, therefore, to be distinguished in any case from the laws of nature, but they do not stand in relation to them as something foreign and distant. A norm is a determinate form of psychical life, and one that is created by the natural laws of mental life. Thus a law of thought (in the language of logic) is a determinate way of combination of conceptual elements which through the natural course of thought is brought into being and which is capable of being incorrect.

All norms are thus *special* forms of realization of natural laws. The system of norms represents a *selection* out of the immense multitude of combination-forms through which, according to individual relations, the natural laws of psychical life can manifest themselves."²⁹

Norms are thus only a selection from natural laws. There is, therefore, a great departure from the position taken up by Windelband in the essay *Immanuel Kant*, where he looks upon the norms as the conditions of all possible experience. The purely epistemological standpoint is thus replaced by one where selection plays a part.

Picard thus remarks on this change in Windelband's standpoint: "In giving up the full Kantian point of view, Windelband's theory loses some of the plausibility that it gained when the norms were presented in the guise of epistemological necessity, but the theory remains an attractive one. We are now compelled to assume that norms have a metaphysical existence, and once this is done, there is always the possibility of a pre-established harmony between the psychic

27 "Wenn aber man unter Wahrheit mit Kant die Norm des Geistes versteht, so gibt es ethische und aesthetische Wahrheit so gut wie theoretische." (*Prolegomena*, Essay "Immanuel Kant," Vol I p 140)

28 Picard *Values, Immediate and Contributory*, p 129

29. *Prolegomena*, Essay "Normen und Naturgesetze", Vol II, p 75

and the cosmic processes."³⁰ As I shall presently show, a similar invasion of the metaphysical standpoint saves the general logical theory of Windelband from complete and unrelieved epistemologism. But I prefer to call it an invasion of the spiritual standpoint, for it is this, rather than any other metaphysical view, which characterizes the change noticed above.

In his Essay "Principles of Logic" in the *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Windelband makes a contrast on lines exactly similar to those exhibited in the "Praludien," between Science and History. The methods adopted respectively by these sciences are the nomothetic and the ideographic method. The first method proceeds by the discovery of the universal laws under which the particular facts have to be subsumed. The second recognizes the unique character of the individual. But it is important to observe that none of these methods is employed in its pure form either by Science or by History. In both Science and History, the nomothetic and the ideographic methods always interpenetrate.

The standpoint of Science is trans-anthropological, while that of History is anthropological. It is significant, however, that the anthropological standpoint is required to complete the sciences resting apparently upon a trans-anthropological basis. Thus, for example, in the biological sciences, "it is only the historical moment, the history of evolution, which promises to shed light on the facts of morphological co-existence."³¹ So great, indeed, is the necessity of the trans-anthropological standpoint for Science that the question may seriously be asked how far "psychical life can be grasped by Psychology which, with its mechanical causality of association follows the methods of the natural Sciences."³²

The development of the historical as well as the natural sciences raises the question of the nature of objective universal validity. This question takes us to the deepest problem of epistemology: what is the relation of objective thought to reality or of consciousness to being? In discussing the question, epistemology has to make a thorough-going revision of the

³⁰ Picard *Values, Immediate and Contributory*, p. 133.

³¹ *Principles of Logic*, "Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences," Vol. I, p. 49 (English Translation).

³² *Principles of Logic*, "Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences," Vol. I, p. 50.

naïve ideas of reality. The manner in which it does has already been indicated by Windelband in his essay on Immanuel Kant in the "Praludien." The net result is similar to Rickert's conclusions. The core of objectivity is found not in the sensuous reality but in what is called the 'valid', a "kind of existent which is yet not to involve any being." It comes very close to Rickert's value-in-itself. The valids, it is further explained, "are not themselves existents, either as things, as states, or as activities, they can only become actual as the content of the psychical functions of knowing. But in itself the realm of the valid is nothing else than the *form and order under which that which exists is determined*. These forms are valid in themselves, they are valid for that which exists and they are valid for the process of knowing, but their validity for being and for knowing is only grounded in the purely essential validity which belongs to them in themselves."³²

We see thus that the normative standpoint of values of Windelband leads him precisely to a position to which Rickert was led, namely, extreme axiological epistemologism. From this standpoint, however, Windelband has been able to extricate himself with the help of his spiritual principle, exactly as Rickert could do with the help of his notion of Subject. Windelband thus indicates this spiritual standpoint. "That order of the existent which validity means is no stranger to being itself, although it appertains neither to that which is contained in it nor to that which is derived from it, but to something in it which is movable and which is akin to it. Hence an explanation of this relation would refer us to a still higher point of union, above validity and being, and is therefore altogether impossible. But we here catch sight of the reason why *metalegical speculation* can take no other path than that of a *spiritualistic Metaphysics*."³³ This clearly shows that the last word of Windelband is not epistemologism but spiritualistic metaphysics.

We must, however, point out that this spiritualism is frankly inconsistent with the epistemologism which preceded it, or this epistemologism itself is inconsistent with the original identification of a value with the object of 'Beurteilung'. If value is connected with an approval or disapproval, then it is fundamentally different from the pure epistemological objectivity.

³² Op cit p 59

³³ Op cit, pp. 59-60

ty which is indicated by the 'valid'. And if value means the valid, then it cannot be the spiritual principle which a spiritualistic metaphysics gives us. Perhaps this spiritual principle is higher than value, as Rickert's World-Whole is higher than value. But it is not easy to see how Windelband's ultimate principle can be anything but a value, for he has from the beginning defined philosophy as the science of value.

The same logicism and the same distinction between reality and value which haunt the systems of Windelband and Rickert, we find also strongly marked in the philosophy of Husserl. In his work *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Husserl has given us the outlines of a theory of values based upon pure phenomenology. This pure phenomenology is the new axiology of the school of Husserl.³⁵ He calls it a science of Essence (Wesen) and distinguishes it from a science of facts (Tatsachen), like physics or physiology or psychology. The contrast which Husserl makes between Essence and Fact is as great as that which Rickert makes between Value and Reality.

So strongly has Husserl separated Essence from Fact that he even calls Essence unreal, exactly as Rickert calls value unreal. Essence, in fact, is Husserl's name for a value. "The phenomena of the transcendental phenomenology," says Husserl, "will be characterized as unreal. It will be shown that all transcendently purified 'experiences' are unrealities, placed outside all order in the real world."³⁶

Essence is also called by Husserl *Eidos*. He also speaks of an Essence-intuition (Wesenserschauung) which reveals a pure Essence, just as an Experience intuition reveals a pure Fact. This conception of an Essence-intuition is a very novel one. On the face of it, it seems rather strange that Essence, which is called *Eidos*, should have anything to do with an intuition. But Husserl's object is to set up a parallel kingdom to that of Facts, and hence it is necessary to provide

³⁵ Husserl thus characterises his phenomenology: "Die reine Phänomenologie zu der wir hier den Weg suchen, deren einzigartige Stellung zu allen anderen Wissenschaften wir charakterisieren, und die wir als Grundwissenschaft der Philosophie nachweisen wollen, ist eine wesentlich neue, vermöglicher prinzipiellen Eigentümlichkeit dem natürlichen Denken fernliegende und daher erst in unsern Tagen nach Entwicklung dringende Wissenschaft" (*Ideen etc.*, p. 1).

³⁶ *Ideen etc.*, pp. 3-4.

it with all the paraphernalia with which the kingdom of Facts is provided

The world of Essence can, in fact, be called a second order of reality, if the world of Facts is called the first order of reality. This mathematical analogy is carried so far by Husserl that he calls the logic of Essence a 'mathesis universalis'. This reminds one of Keyserling's conception of a world-mathematics in his "Gefuge der Welt".

What, however, is the value of this logic? It is evident that Essence is of the nature of a mathematical entity. Husserl, in fact, wants to introduce the idea of dimensions in reality. His logic, therefore, has for philosophy the value which n-dimensional Geometry has for Mathematics.

Husserl thus represents extreme axiological mathematicism, from which, as we have seen, Windelband and Rickert were saved by their spiritualism. Indeed, without the saving grace of some sort of spiritual principle, mathematicism is the inevitable fate of all philosophy which rests upon an absolute distinction between value and reality.

In Royce's philosophy we have a system which, thanks to its strongly marked Hegelianism, avoids the difficulties inherent in the value-system we have so far examined, by making value and reality correspond to different grades in the conception of Being. Thus beginning with the realistic conception of Being, Royce gives us four different conceptions of Being, which correspond to the different categories in the Hegelian Logic. Value or appreciation corresponds to the fourth or highest conception of Being, whereas the scientific conception of reality corresponds to the third, and the naive realistic conception corresponds to the first conception of Being.

The fourth or highest conception of Being, where Being is looked upon as a value, has three main features: (1) it is a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea, (2) it is a complete fulfilment of the will or purpose partially embodied in this idea, and (3) it is an individual life for which no other can be substituted.³⁷

This conception of Being at once brings into prominence the pragmatist and voluntaristic features of Royce's philosophy. It is a cardinal principle of Royce's philosophy that the

37 Royce *World and the Individual*, Vol. I, pp. 340-41.

theoretical can never be divorced from the practical—"when I know", says Royce, "I am acting. My theoretical life is also practical."³⁸ He further says, "Ideas are like tools. They are there for an end. They are true, as the tools are good, precisely by reason of their adjustment to this end."³⁹ This reference to an end or purpose, indeed, constitutes the internal meaning of an idea, and this internal meaning gives the truth-value

But Royce's Hegelianism saves him from the subjectivity of pragmatism. The end which he takes to be the internal meaning of an idea and in terms of which the truth-value of the idea is to be defined, is not any subjective end but an end of the Absolute Self. Any subjective end is only a partial fulfilment of the internal meaning of an idea. Truth, however, is "the complete embodiment in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."

The four conceptions of Being represent four stages in the evolution of the idea of reality. The lowest is the naïve realistic conception, according to which, reality is merely the external. The next is the conception of mysticism, according to which it is purely internal without any objective content. The third is the conception of critical rationalism, the Kantian conception, as we may broadly call it, which reduces reality to a system of eternal types or order-series. All these standpoints are enhanced and perfected, and not merely rejected, by the fourth conception, according to which reality is the "complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."

Just below this fourth or highest conception of Being is the conception of critical rationalism which Royce has dealt with very fully in his paper on *The Principles of Logic* in the "Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences," Vol. I. This conception, as Royce has shown in that paper, inevitably leads to a sort of Platonism. It also represents the standpoint of the logic of order and also of mathematical logic.

This standpoint of critical rationalism is, in the system of Windelband and Rickert, the standpoint of values, and it is for this reason that in both these systems, value occupies not the ultimate but the penultimate position.

³⁸ Ibid, Vol. II, pp. 27

³⁹ Ibid, Vol. I, p. 308

Royce, therefore, departs very considerably from Windelband and Rickert in the position which he assigns to Value in his system. Value occupies the highest position in his system. "The true world," he says,⁴⁰ "the world of values or of appreciation, as rightly viewed by an absolute insight, would be a world of Selves, forming in the unity of their systems One Self."

But although Value is the highest principle of Royce's philosophy, it is hardly distinguishable from the Hegelian Absolute. As Aliotta says, "To Josiah Royce must be ascribed the credit of having placed the philosophy of values upon a more solid speculative basis, by grafting it on to the rigorous stem of English neo-Hegelianism."⁴¹ This is, however, a left-handed compliment, for it means that Royce's philosophy of values has no independent standpoint but rests upon Hegelian metaphysics.

We thus see that the metaphysical and axiological approach to the problem of values has either ended in epistemologism or in Hegelianism. The need, therefore, is felt for a new orientation in the philosophy of values. Such a new orientation is supplied by the psychological mode of approach indicated by Meinong and others. My second paper on the problem of values, therefore, will deal with the psychological approach to the problem of values, as also with the relative merits of the two modes of approach and the general position which the philosophy of values occupies in the history of philosophy.

(to be continued)

40 *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 106.

41 Aliotta *Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 240.

NYAYA CONCEPTION OF TRUTH AND ERROR

PROF M. HIRIYANNA, M. A.

Psychology in India never succeeded in getting itself separated from philosophy. Accordingly each system has its own view of *jñāna* or knowledge which is coloured by its metaphysics. The Nyāya believes in a permanent self and makes consciousness, which it describes as the basis of all life's activity,¹ one of its special attributes (*viśeṣa-guṇa*). The self has other attributes also of the same kind, but we are not at present concerned with them. *Jñāna* is here divided, as in the other systems, into two kinds, viz. mediate and immediate.² The latter, termed *pratyakṣa*, may roughly be taken as equivalent to perception, and the former, termed *parokṣa*, is such knowledge as is derived through inference or verbal testimony. The definition of *pratyakṣa* as knowledge which does not presuppose other knowledge³ shows its primary character. When we for instance infer that there is 'fire' on the 'hill' we should previously have observed 'smoke' there, not to mention the need for recollecting the inductive relation between 'smoke' and 'fire'. But when we see a 'jar,' no such preliminary *jñāna* is necessary. It will suffice to consider the question of truth and error in reference to *pratyakṣa*, for the validity or invalidity of other forms of knowledge which are all derivative is eventually traceable to it or is dependent upon processes whose direct bearing is psychological rather than logical.⁴ There are two points, however, about *pratyakṣa* as conceived here which it is necessary to know before we can treat of its validity. They are —

(1) All perceptual knowledge, according to the system, is expressible in the form of a judgment—a subject together with something predicated of it. Even what appears as an isolated percept really stands for a judgment. 'A horse' for example is

1 *Tārā-mangraha* p. 21 (Bombay San. krit. Series).

2 We are overlooking here the more fundamental distinction of *jñāna* into *anubhava* and *smṛti*. See *Ibid.*, pp. 21-2.

3 *Tranākaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam* (*Siddhanta-mūlavarṇi* Numb. 5a5. Edn. 1916, p. 237).

4 Cf. *Nyaya-cūṭika-tatparyā-śika*, pp. 131-2 (Chowkhamba Series).

equivalent to 'an object possessing the characteristic of horse-ness' In other words *pratyakṣa*, as familiarly known to us, is complex in its character It is therefore described as *savikalpaka* or 'determinate' Now according to the atomistic view adopted in the system, all complex things are explained as the result of a putting together of the simples constituting them. The complex of *savikalpaka* also is brought under this rule and it is assumed that it is built out of simple or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, which presents the isolated object altogether uncharacterized.⁵ Thus if at any time we cognize that a cow is white, we must, it is stated, necessarily have perceived previously a cow by itself, the whiteness by itself and the relation between them also by itself Perception is thus conceived as a process of 'compounding units distinctly given' and not one of 'discrimination within a mass'.⁶ This preliminary cognition however, it is admitted, is not a matter of which we become directly aware,⁷ it is inarticulate (*avyapadeśya*) and is only the result of a logical deduction based upon a fundamental postulate of the system In other words, it is only the *savikalpaka* that is an actual fact of observation, the *nirvikalpaka* is a mere hypothesis to account for it We become aware of the *savikalpaka*, not as it arises, but later in a second knowledge termed *anuvyavasthāya* ('after-knowledge') We first know the object, and then, if we choose, we may become conscious of this fact, i. e. of the self as characterized by the *jñāna* in question It is inner perception or introspection (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) That is, knowledge is primarily directed to the object, and it is later reflection that the self as well as the fact of its having got the knowledge in question is known No such introspection is at all possible in the case of the *nirvikalpaka*

(2) In addition to the ordinary or normal kind of *pratyakṣa*, termed *laukika*, the system recognizes another, *alaukika*—which has been rendered as 'transcendental'⁸ but which it

5 *Siddhānta-mūl tīkā*, p. 255

6 In current expositions of the doctrine, the preliminary knowledge is stated, need only refer to the *vācaka* (*vikṣāṇa-jñāna* *vācaka-jñāna-janyam*), *Dīpikā* (Bombay Sanskrit Series) p. 30 Compare *Siddhānta-mūl tīkā* p. 253 But a knowledge of the other constituents also seems once to have been thought necessary Compare *Āgāra-māhātī*, pp. 93 and 96

7 *Siddhānta-mūl tīkā*, pp. 253-5

8 This is according to the *Dinakarīya* See p. 246 (Nirn. Sag. Fdn.)

9 See Keith *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 81

would perhaps be better to call 'implicit' *pratyakṣa*. It is of three kinds, but it will be sufficient for our purpose to refer to only one of them. When we see a rose at a distance we apprehend its redness, form etc directly. We may also become conscious then of its fragrance by virtue of, say, the impression left on our mind by a past experience of that quality in the rose, but, the flower being by supposition too far from us, we cannot ascribe it to normal perception. This is regarded as a case of *abūhika-pratyakṣa*. The psychological truth involved here is the familiar one that all percepts are partly presentative and partly representative. But the representation, it must be noted, falls short of memory or more correctly gets ahead of it since it appears as the predicate of what is the object of normal perception. When we become aware of fragrance in the example given, we relate it to the rose which is in contact with a sense-organ. Though dependent upon past experience, the idea is thus sense-bound¹⁰ and that is the justification for bringing it under *pratyakṣa*.¹¹

One of the distinguishing features of the doctrine is its belief that all knowledge points to an object outside it which is necessarily real and independent of it. External objects exist in their own right. They can be known by themselves and knowing makes no difference whatsoever to them. The scope of this realistic postulate however is restricted to the *nirvikalpa* which merely tells us that things are—whether substances or attributes or relations. Its data can never be false for we are then in direct contact with reality and get an immediate knowledge of it.¹² An erroneous *nirvikalpa* is thus a contradiction in terms. Error may however creep in when we relate two or more objects given in it, for though all the things we are thinking of may be severally there, the content of our knowledge as a complex may be false. In

10. It may be noted that *dravyas* also may be directly perceived according to this doctrine (*Kārakāvalī* st. 54 ff.)

11. We see from this in what wide sense *pratyakṣa* is to be understood here. It includes on the one hand sensation or more presentation and, on the other, what is described by modern psychologists as 'complication' which takes place during the evolution of a percept.

12. The *Sapta-padārthī* (Viśvanagaram Sans. Series) includes it in *pramā* (p. 25) while later writers like Viśvanātha place it quite outside the range of Logic calling it neither true nor erroneous (*Kārakāvalī* st. 135). The first of these views shows kinship so far with Buddhistic realism which also regards *nirvikalpa* as valid.

other words it is the judgment with its synthetic character or the *sattatpaka* that is alone the subject of Logic. If the complex content of our knowledge has a complex corresponding to it in the objective world, we have truth, otherwise, error.¹⁵ Thus, when one sees the conch to be yellow (*pīta-sankha*) owing to one's jaundiced eye, the conch, the yellow colour and the relation of *samānya* are all facts of the objective world and are given at the *nirvikalpak* level. But while the yellowness is not related to the conch there by *samānya*, it appears so in knowledge. It is accordingly erroneous knowledge. In our example of a red rose when it is cognized as such, the two schemes—the mental and the actual—agree and we have therefore truth. While the three elements involved in judgment do not constitute in error a single complex whole in the objective world, they are thus perceived by us. In truth, on the other hand, they are not only thus perceived but are actually so. This explanation of error will have to be altered in a matter of detail when we take other examples. In the case of the yellow conch or the white crystal appearing red when placed in the vicinity of a red flower, the several elements constituting them are presented to the mind in the ordinary or *laukika* sense, but there are cases of error in which it is not so. Thus in the stock example of 'shell-silver' (*shukti-rupā*), the silver cannot be said to be so presented. Here also the system maintains that not only the subject but also the predicative element is 'presented', but the presentation is of the *abhidhā* kind—that variety of it to which we have already alluded, where the impression of a former experience serves as the means of representing it to our mind. The silver is not here but else where. It is *apena- ttha* ('in the shop') as it is put. Thus even here error is due to a wrong synthesis of presented objects only.

The aim of these explanations, it is clear, is to show that, like truth, error also has an objective basis. It is neither a thinking of nothing (*asat-khyāti*), nor not thinking (*akhyāti*), but wrong thinking (*anyathā-khyāti*). This view by the way is in harmony with the Nyāya conception of *abhāva* which does not stand for nothing but only for negation i.e. the negation of something (*pratyogin*) of something else (*anyogin*)-

15 *Pancatī tat tat arādhakam manam pramā, tadabha u ate tat pratāratam manam bhramah*. Cf. *Parva-saṅgraha*, p. 23 and *Kārikāvatī*, st. 13.

an absence in presence, if we may so express it. Neither a true negative nor a false affirmative proposition accordingly points to absolute nothing or is a mere gap in knowledge. But what, it may be asked, is the distinctive object of an erroneous judgment? It cannot be the thing that stands as the subject in the judgment, considered as a mere 'that,' for that, according to the Nyāya hypothesis, is apprehended in the *anvikalpa*. Nor can it be that thing as characterized by the 'what' in question, for that would make the judgment true and not false. The object, as required by the classification of error as a form of the *samkalpa*, is not simple but complex. It has a 'determinate' feature, only the feature is not the one we are thinking of at the time but something else. This is clearly indicated by the expression *atubhāvavati* occurring in the description of error¹⁴ which signifies a complex something as also by the well-known Nyāya maxim¹⁵ *Sarvaṃ jñānam dharmavyabhirūṭam, prakāśe tu aparigrahaḥ*, which restricts error to the predicative element.

Such is the Nyāya view of truth and error. We may now briefly examine how far it is satisfactory. We need not enter into a discussion of the postulates on which it is based. Granting their validity we may inquire whether the explanation given is consistent with them. For this, it will be useful to find out how the correspondence with reality which is said to constitute truth is to be known. There can obviously be no direct testing of correspondence, for we cannot get outside of our knowledge. Hence the Nyāya proposes an objective or indirect test, through putting the knowledge in question to practice. This is according to its belief in *parataḥ-prāmānya*. If we doubt whether a thing we cognize as fire is really fire or not, we have to see whether it burns, if it is water whether it will quench our thirst. The proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. This is what is known as *samūḥi-pravṛtti* or 'fruitful activity'.¹⁶ The verification is thus pragmatic. The definition of truth, it is necessary to remember, is not so. Truth is not what 'works', but what conforms to reality. Knowledge, according to

14. See extract quoted above in Note 13.

15. Cited e.g. in the Com. on the *Sapta-padārtha* p. 25. This is the reason why this view of error is called *ananta-lakṣaṇa*, *anyathā* meaning *pralāsa*.

16. There may be other means of testing also, e.g. through corroboration by different channels of knowledge or by different persons, but nowhere is the means of testing knowledge other than knowledge.

the system, is for its own sake. Its value is cognitive.¹⁶ In this discrepancy between the nature of truth as understood in the Nyaya and the manner of its verification proposed by it, we discover the essential weakness of the doctrine. Thus truth is stated to be correspondence with reality but the test does not, indeed cannot, ascertain that correspondence. What serves as the test is another experience—that of thirst being quenched, to take only one of the examples given above. Now this second experience cannot validate the first without itself being similarly validated, and setting about verifying it would only lead to infinite regress. Even supposing that this second experience needs no verification, it cannot vouch for the presence of a corresponding reality outside knowledge. A person may dream of water and also of quenching his thirst by drinking it. There is fruitful activity there, but no objective counterpart to what is experienced. What the test actually finds out is only whether two experiences *cohere*. That is virtually to give up the realistic position, for the supposed correspondence with reality is left wholly unverified. Thus we see that though the Nyaya starts as realism, it finds it hard to maintain its position in the solution of what is one of the crucial problems of philosophy—that of truth and error. The fact is that a realistic doctrine cannot adhere to the *paratah-prāmāṇya* view. Here we discover the reason why the Mīmāṃsakas who are equally upholders of realism advocate the opposite view of *svatah-prāmāṇya* which, by presuming all knowledge to be valid, normally dispenses with the need for testing it. Whether that is a satisfactory mode of establishing an outside reality independent of the perceiving mind is, however, a different matter.

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17. Our perceptions do doubt suggest and lead to action but that is a further aim, which, according to the Nyaya psychology, is dependent upon desire and interest over and above knowledge. *Artha-pratītiśāna-matā ca jñāna-va-tārkan jñānīyādesh-jāre-cchā-nibandhanatāt Nyaṇa-mañjarī* 1. 161.

AN IDEA OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION.*

PROF. D D VADEKAR, M A

Whether any one Universal Religion will ever establish itself in this widely heterogeneous world is a theme that must have vexed many reflective minds. Religious missionaries and enthusiasts, on the other hand, must have always thought to themselves that there could not be any reasonable doubts about the ultimate establishment of their respective religions,—religions represented by them,—throughout the world. But leaving aside for the present the possibility of Universal Religion, we can at least assume for ourselves that even if Universal Religion may not be possible quite yet, still *religion* itself seems to be a universal fact of human life. A philosophical analysis of the essential conception of Religion as well as the modern factual researches in the fields of anthropology and sociology tend to prove beyond all doubt that religion is an irreducible phenomenon involved in all human life and history. Philosophical theorists of religion now define religion as essentially a reaction of man against the Universe in which he finds himself. And this definition itself positively commits us to the acceptance of at least an ideal concomitance of man and religion; where man is, religion also is. In fact religion is involved in the human nature itself. It is a relation and a response. And though the modes and forms of this reaction or response may be found to vary in actual fact according to the nature of the specific stimuli, the fact of the reaction itself can hardly be gainsaid. Even Sir John Lubbock's famous atheistic tribes can, if suitably handled, be proved to betray a more or less explicit capacity for religious response, in howsoever nascent or incipi-

* The writer of this paper is at present engaged in studying the Bhagavad-Gītā with a view to ascertain its value as a text-book for Universal Religion, so far as an idea of it is possible for us under the present conditions of our knowledge. For that purpose he has formulated a tentative conception of Universal Religion. The above is an attempt to state the conception as briefly, if a bit dogmatically, as possible. A detailed and a critical consideration of it is not possible within the limits of this paper.

ent a form it may be. And these statements can be fully supported and substantiated in the light of the extensive researches that have recently appeared in the field of anthropology with special reference to the phenomenology of religion.

But it is not our immediate purpose to enter into that discussion here. That would require us to explore all the anthropological material unearthed by specialists and sift it and interpret it so as to bring out its religious implications,—a task that lies outside our present scope and perhaps beyond our personal capacity. Our specific aim here is a much more restricted and a definite one, and we shall indicate it below.

On observation among the scientists of a general presumption in favour of accepting the fact of the universality of religion, one naturally feels tempted to formulate a conception of Universal Religion, if such were possible under the present conditions of our knowledge. We shall attempt this formulation very briefly in this paper.

Before we take up our task proper, a few words about the method of formulating or determining the main characteristics of Universal Religion may not be out of place here. One thing seems clear and it is this, that our enunciation of these characteristics will not be a case of mere empirical enumeration of readily found facts, as no one universal religion exists where one can find these simply waiting for our recognition. Here also as elsewhere, the Reality is not a fact, but a *construct*. And the study of Psychology in modern times has shown us that religion is a function of human life. We must therefore largely depend upon a theory of human nature to enable us to formulate the said characteristics. Whatever lies embedded in our essential human nature as its native and permanent endowment as distinguished from its temporary and vanishing sophistications must have a significance for us in our formulation of the conception of Universal Religion. In other words, we suggest that a psychological approach is the only method possible and accessible to us in the formulation of the chief features of Universal Religion.

For considerations of space, we refrain from enlarging here upon a theory of human nature which we propose to adopt as the basis of our speculations. Our discussion therefore in what follows must necessarily appear as somewhat of a summary and dogmatic nature. For our purposes suffice it to say here that

our theory will be a theory of the *whole* of human nature, even as and because religion is a reaction of the *whole* personality of man. In fact it will be our deliberate postulate that *religion to be universal must satisfy the whole of human nature with all that is implied and involved therein*.

(a) Universal Religion then must be a monotheistic religion to begin with. Religion is a relation between a human personality and another extra-personal entity called God. And as human personality with all its aspects and distinctions of faculties and instincts is after all one and irreducible, even so God must in the last resort be one. With the progress of world-civilizations, the unity of all human life and experience must come—as it has been coming—to be increasingly recognized. If men as such are one at heart, so must be the Supreme Person whom all of them worship. Monotheism unites men, polytheism as such creates barriers between them. Monotheism at its best stands for a brotherhood common to all; polytheism and even undeveloped monotheisms countenance distinctions between the Jews and the Gentiles, the Christians and the Heathens, the Greeks and the Barbarians, the Aryans and the Dasyus, the Mussalmans and the Kafirs, and so on. In monotheism lies the hope of Humanity, persistence of polytheism in some form or other acts as a backward drag in the way of its realization.

Pantheism, it must be further noted, is the logical culmination of any thorough-going monotheistic doctrine. The one living God must be immanent in this world and not merely a transcendent being alone and abstracted. The world is not merely a creation out of nothing or a case of divine procreation, but is direct, though perhaps a partial, manifestation of his nature.

But this manifestation is by no means homogeneous or complete in the world. All things do not display the divine nature and being in them equally or wholly, but there is a graded scale of values in which there is the divine revelation from the nascent or incipient forms of divine being and presence to the highest and transcendent Essence of Godhead in an Incarnation. In fact, Incarnationism is involved in all true Pantheism.

Universal Religion must further satisfy the three broad recognized tendencies or the inner cravings of the human

spirit — (1) To Know, (2) To Feel, and (3) To Act To take these *seriatim*

(b) Some sort of apprehension of the circumstances is the primordial fact of all conscious life We *know*, before we feel and act. This fundamental truth of Psychology when applied to religious life means that a theory of the Real or the Universe must lie at the basis of a religion that would be universal. In other words a sound metaphysics must constitute the solid foundations of a world-religion Mere moralizing in the air would be dogmatism and would not do in the long run The rebellious reason is an irreducible and distinctive factor in man's make-up and perhaps it is this that is responsible for almost all the revolutions and wrecks in the history of the world Universal Religion therefore must be no mere faith or make-believe, it must be a rational conviction, Its foundations must lie deep enough and they must be solid enough to be beyond all the rude shocks coming from the fresh discoveries and inventions of science and philosophy Religion must not be a ghost-like apparition living in the gaps of science and suffering amputations with every fresh step in its field and dying a perpetual death with its onward and continuous progress It must be rather vital and virile enough to be capable of absorbing and assimilating every new conquest of science It must fatten, rather than furnish, in the hands of the scientist and the philosopher In other words, the Universal Religion must make friends with and must not hate or be indifferent to them

It is also possible to add a few words about the kind of metaphysical philosophy that would underlie the Universal Religion It must in some sense be monistic, though it need not be singularistic Dualism and other pluralisms are out of question The object of genuine religious worship must be *supreme* and without any limitations from without The modern doctrine of a 'Finite God' helping and being helped by human beings is a mockery of genuine religious feeling and is scarcely a fair representation of it God as such must be *one* and *independent*, *causa sui* And having once accepted this, the further consequences in regard to the status of the individual follows, viz that the individuals are the sparks of the Divine Energy, and therefore draw upon it for their existence and power The free currents of Divine Life course through and replenish and sus-

tain at bottom these apparent centres of independent being and existence.

(c) But mere intellectual knowledge of God does not make up the whole of religion. After apprehension comes affection, after knowledge comes love. Universal Religion must be a religion of Love and Beauty, and must thus offer satisfaction to the emotional and aesthetic aspects of man's personality. There are moments when man feels lonely and none in this mundane world is then found capable of satisfying the inmost cravings of the human heart for intimacy and union, except the Ultimate Experiences of deep personal love point to and culminate in a love of the Ultimate, of the Highest God alone then can come to the rescue of man, God to whom man could offer himself in entirety with all his merits and faults. Such an ultimate relation should be capable of eliciting the highest expressions of love and devotion and worship towards the Ultimate or God. But even a mere life of love and devotion does not make up the emotional or affective side of the Universal Religion. This must also make room for man's ideals of beauty and sublimity suggested by his life of nature and art, which also is a manifestation of the affective element in his make-up. As Carlyle has said somewhere, there is music in every soul. And a religion that neglects art or goes against the primary æsthetic intuitions of man is a religion that is not likely to be capable of holding civilized humanity for long. Universal Religion therefore must keep itself abreast of the æsthetic ideas of humanity and it is only by resorting to art that it can hope to convey its message home to human minds inherently gifted with ideas and ideals of Beauty and Sublimity. For instance, we must recognize the genuinely religious feeling tone or quality in the higher reaches of the beauty of art and the sublimity of nature which finds spontaneous expression in the writings of religious poets or nature-mystics. Universal Religion will never be a dead or dry dogma, on the contrary, it will and must recognize and tap the emotional and æsthetic resources of man and divert or subliminate them towards the 'Para' or the Highest.

(d) But there remains a third and an important aspect of human nature which must also find scope in our theory of Universal Religion. This is the volitional aspect. Impulse in some sense lies at the root of this universe. This dynamism is naturally shared by

the whole of creation. But in man the unconscious life-force of nature or the *élan vital* is transformed into conscious teleology. Man wants to act and to achieve, and a theory of Religion Universal must accept this as one of the fundamental facts of human life and must provide for it. For one thing, under Universal Religion there must not be a call to the total eradication of the instincts and impulses planted in man by nature. It must allow them some amount of unimpeded scope or sphere for their free play. Life is activity, stillness is stagnation and even death. Religion that depreciates activity and preaches pure inaction and asceticism cannot take root, and if it does, it will either languish before long or else have disastrous moral and material consequences both for its immediate adherents and for the civilization of humanity at large. A Religion of inaction and abstinence is an abstractionist 'idol,' which our modern psychological knowledge of human nature has done much to dispel.

But Universal Religion cannot rest with a mere negative vindication of impulse and sensibility. It must further provide a positive *end* and *method* for their exercise. Universal Religion must define the *end* of human life and prescribe a *path* for its realization. In other words, it must offer a theory of *Moral Ideal* and *Moral Life*. We might even go a little further and briefly define the general nature of the kind of moral ideal and moral life that is involved in our conception of Universal Religion. Some sort of *Eudæmonism* (in Aristotelian sense) will be the moral creed. Happiness of the *complete* personality of man must be the moral ideal in Universal Religion. One-sided ethics whether of the Hedonistic or Puristic type must be given up and a larger and a *conserving* synthesis must be adopted.

And the same conserving attitude must characterize our conception of moral life. The Ideal (Moral) Path of Life must not seek to sacrifice or suppress worldly life. The realization of the ideal must be open *in* and *through* and even *because of* it. Thus optimism must be an integral element in the moral theory of our Universal Religion, and this can only be secured by the interpenetration of the worldly and the spiritual (as distinguished from their bifurcation which spells pessimism).

(e) The last, but not the least, is the necessity of recognizing in our theory of Universal Religion, the *unique* significance and potentialities of human personality with all that is involved therein. Religion is essentially a relation, and though the nature and meaning of the other term of it (God) is not always very obvious to man, man himself doubtless, constituting as he does the first term of the relation from our side, must be recognized as an integral and basic entity on which the whole superstructure of religious life rests. Human Personality is the one unique thing of central interest in the study of religious life. The wonders and ramifications of the religious experiences of humanity would lose all their significance unless they were referred to the underlying personalities, viz., the experients. And whether the personality is ultimately conserved or surrendered in the highest reaches of religious life and experience, it is the *personality* doubtless that is the point of departure, whatever the culmination.

With this admission of the unique significance of human personality, our theory of Universal Religion must also accept some minor admissions in regard to this personality, the more important of which may be formulated here. *Every* Human Personality as human must be the seat of our Universal Religion. Universal Religion admits *all* within its fold,—irrespective of race and sex, and even views. Nothing can preclude anybody with all his peculiarities and idiosyncrasies from its membership. Under it, there will be no man-made distinctions between man and man like the distinctions referred to before. Universal Religion stands for a world-unity based on the foundations of the essential unity of all human beings. The attitude in it will be at bottom all of us are one, citizens of the same one Universe and, therefore, the followers of the same world-religion of the One-without-a-second God.

But if truth is not to be sacrificed, the counterstroke must also be given. Human diversity is as much a fact as human unity. And if this is so, our Universal Religion must tolerate peculiarities inherent in the individuals. We are not articles manufactured to a type, we are personalities and as such are bound to be each one of us unique. No actual uniformity of worship therefore must be expected, though worship as such will reach the same ultimate God (of monotheism) behind His diverse symbols. Christ cannot

be the only saviour son of the Father ; nor Mahomed the only prophet of Allah , nor yet again can Moses be the only law-giver of Jehovah , nor Krsna the only avatāra of God Visnu . Not only has every body the right to choose either or none of these for himself, but every body has also the right of aspiring to be any of them himself. Human personality has infinite potentialities and the Universal Religion must leave the fullest scope and freedom for their realization

With freedom must also be admitted the necessity of positing a sort of 'conservation of values' and immortality (pre-existence and rebirth) There must be a formal provision for the 'storing' of the good and evil on one's account . There is nothing absolutely new , there is a sort of continuous 'karmic' process in which nothing is lost . Nor are, consequently, the apparent beginnings and ends final . This is the ordinary course of the Universe and can be intertered with only by the deliberate acts of Divine Will

With the retention of freedom and conservation goes also the possibility of man's going wrong . If man is capable of rising to giddy heights, he is as well liable to err and to fall to the infernal depths . But his fall cannot be something irrevocable or final . Under Universal Religion there must be an opportunity and facility for him to try and rise again . We might even go further and say that under Universal Religion man may not only ascend, but that he will also be lifted up through love . In other words, there must be there a doctrine of redemption and forgiveness or grace

We have formulated above the main characteristics of Universal Religion so far as this is possible in the light of our knowledge of human nature and personality . And we trust that our outline can well be used as a test or criterion to examine any religious text with a view to ascertain its value from the point of view of Universal Religion

THE CHRONOLOGICAL POSITION OF VIŚISTA-ADVAITA

Y. SUBBA RAO

It was Dr Thibaut who first discovered a hoary tradition for the Rāmānuja philosophy, and advanced some weighty reasons for supposing that the Śrī Bhāṣya as the embodiment of very ancient philosophical views even antecedent to Sankara, not only provides us with a powerful means of criticizing the latter's explanations but is also very likely to prove a valuable help enabling us to go beyond the scholastic interpretations as to the meaning of the Sūtras themselves. The chief arguments in favour of this position are briefly (1) that Rāmānuja frequently quotes from Bodhāyana the Vrttikāra and Dramida the Bhāṣyakāra both of whom, we learn from Śankara's commentators, are referred to in the Advaita Bhāṣya and (2) that the Rāmānujas are closely connected with the Bhāgavatas or Pañcarātras whose doctrines, it is generally admitted, are discussed in the last four sūtras of the second 'pāda' of the second 'adhyāya' of the Brahma-Sūtras. As both these statements are of considerable interest to the students of the history of Viśista-Advaita, I propose to examine them in the light of other evidences now available.

BODHĀYANA AND DRAMIDA

So long ago as 1915, I urged certain reasons against the identification of Sankara's Vrttikāra or Dravidācārya with their namesakes referred to by Rāmānuja in his books. In an article contributed to the October number of the "Sanskrit Research," Bangalore, that year, I showed how in the several places where Sankara differs from the opinion of 'another' as to the interpretation of the Sūtras and where that 'other' is declared by Śankara's commentators to be the Vrttikāra, Rāmānuja is by no means solicitous either to defend the views rejected by Sankara or to appeal to Bodhāyana as an authority for his own interpretation, as we should expect if Bodhāyana were

the Vrttikāra of Sankara. But opinion seems still to swing towards this assumption. Mahā Mahopādhyāya Kuppu Svāmī Sāstrigal of Madras has recently given his weighty support to it by making extracts from Sankara, Rāmānuja and other writers. It is therefore necessary to pursue the enquiry a little further.

The new argument for the identification may be stated as follows —In the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, Sankara refers to a Vrttikāra, according to commentators, in several places. He unmistakably refers at the beginning of his Bhāṣya on 3-3-53, to Upavarsa as having written a commentary on the Brahma-mīmāṃsā Sūtras and Karma-mīmāṃsā Sūtras. This Upavarsa is identified both by Ānandagiri and Rāmānanda with the Vrttikāra. Hence, it is argued that Upavarsa must be the Bodhāyana in question, for he is in favour of treating the Karma-mīmāṃsā and Brahma-mīmāṃsā as integral parts of one system. In my opinion this argument is based on several assumptions. In the first place neither Sankara nor his commentators recognize Upavarsa as the Bodhāyana Vrttikāra nor have they anywhere mentioned the difference between Sankara and Upavarsa about the unity of the two Mīmāṃsās. In the second place, are we sure that there is but one Vrttikāra whom Sankara deals with in all his Sūtra Bhāṣya? The subjoined references would show that this is by no means the case. In the very first sūtra, where Sankara dissolves the compound ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा into ब्रह्मणि जिज्ञासा the commentators are as unanimous in thinking that a previous Vrttikāra had dissolved it into ब्रह्मण जिज्ञासा, as they are further on when they say that the कर्मणि षष्ठी view of Sankara was in opposition to the शेषषष्ठी which had been accepted by another Vrtti (वृत्त्यन्तरं, p. 39 Nirṇaya Sagar Edition). Now neither of these Vrttikāras, can possibly be Bodhāyana, for Rāmānuja agrees with Sankara in rejecting both the views. Again the Vrttikāra who maintains (in 1-1-4) that Brahman is subordinated to Upāsanāvīdhī in the Upaniṣads, can only be an Advaitin,¹ for he quotes the Śruti 'ब्रह्म ब्रह्मैवमवर्ति'. Again the Prapañca-vilaya-vādin opposed by Sankara (Nirṇaya Sagar Edition—p. 648) were evidently Advaitins, in the Adhikaraṇa leading to the discussion of their views, reference is made to a Vrttikāra whom we may safely suppose not to have been Bodhāyana or his kindred

¹ This has been expressly recognized by Bhāṣakara. Compare his Bhāṣya भवतु तावदेदान्तगतानां वाक्यानामेवमद्वैतात्मप्रतिपत्तिविधिरन्येन समन्वयः ।

And Rāmānuja himself is not unaware of Advaitins holding views discordant with Śaṅkara's. In the *Samanvaya Sūtra* (1-1-4) where he undertakes to refute both the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādins* and *Prapañca-vilaya-vādins*, it is interesting to note that his commentator calls the former the old *Māyā-vādins* (जन्मायावादिनः). The foregoing considerations should suffice to show that there had been a number of *Vṛttikāras* before Śaṅkara who were all Advaitins and could well be styled by him as *अस्मरीया* (Ibid, p 238). Should there still be any doubt left on the point, it could be dispelled by a reference to the oldest commentary on Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* now available in the *Pañca-pādikā* reference is made (pp 42,43,44 and 64—*Vizianagaram Series*.) to *Vṛttikāras* of three different types and even short extracts from them are to be found in that work. Again, it is well known that *Suresvara* the immediate disciple of Śaṅkara controverts, in his *Sambandha Vārtika* and elsewhere, several Advaitic views opposed to Śaṅkara's *Siddhānta*. There is therefore no alternative but to regard, for the present, *Bodhāyana* as an independent *Viśiṣṭa-Advaita* writer, whose identity however, remains enigmatical.

As for *Dravidācārya* I see no reason to change my view that he should have been altogether different from Śaṅkara's *Dravidācārya*. In the *Siddhitrava* of *Yāmunācārya*, the oldest representative of *Viśiṣṭa-Advaita* whose works are still extant, there is reference to a *Bhāṣyakṛt* who is believed by the Rāmānujas to be *Dravidācārya*, but we have not the slightest hint from Śaṅkara or his commentators that their *Dravida* has commented on the *Sūtras*. Again, the confidence with which Śaṅkara quotes *Dravida* as an ancient teacher, (आचार्य p 145 *Chandogyā*, *Ānandāśrama Edn*) as one who knows the purport of the *Āgama* (2-2 *Māndukya Kārikā*), and as one conversant with the true tradition (मप्रज्ञावित-297 *Bīha-dāranyaka*,—*Ānandāśrama Edn*) is quite inexplicable if this *Dravida* be so decisively a *Saguna-brahma-vādin* as Rāmānuja makes his *Dravida* to be. The last two references of Śaṅkara cited above, make *Dravidācārya* hold doctrines diametrically

2. In the light of these facts we can attach little importance to the later statement in the *Tattvāloka* by *Vedānta Deśika* suggesting a possibility of *Upaniṣad* being another name of *Bodhāyana* (कुनिषत्सु बोधायनस्य हि उपपन्न इति स्थाश्रयः).

3. भगवता वादरायणेनेदमख्यान्येव स्यादपि प्रणेतानि विद्वत्तानि च परिमितगम्भीरभाषिणा भाष्यकृता । (*Siddhāntīya*)

opposed to Rāmānuja's System In this connection Ānandagiri's remarks deserve careful consideration For with regard to the व्याख्यसर्वाधितराजपुत्राख्यायिका he says तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमैक्यपर तच्छेष सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यमित्युक्तेष्वै द्विविधाचार्यस्मृतिमाह (p 298) Rāmānuja has not cared to explain away these quotations from Dravida, which are obviously damaging admissions from a Viśiṣṭa-Advaitin The circumstances that lead Sankara to quote from Dravida are also instructive, for, in the passage from which the Brhadāranyaka quotation is taken, the subject for discussion is whether the individual soul may not be an actual part of Brahman The objector contends that on the analogy of sparks and fire taught by the Śrūtis, Jīva may very well be taken to be a part of Brahman Sankara replies that the analogy is wrong if it is meant to convey the idea of parts, since Brahman is indivisible Hence it should be interpreted so as to fit in with experience and accepted tradition It might be considered strange that Sankara should not raise here the Viśiṣṭa-Advaitin's objection that a Jīva might with good reason be considered to be a part of Brahman as the two stand in the relation of शरीरशरीरिभाव, but that he was quite unaware of the existence of such a Vedāntic theory is made clear by the immediately following statement He says—सर्वपापनिवर्तुः हि विज्ञानात्मन परमात्मनेऽव्यपत्यया विधीयत इत्यादिप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वपापनिवर्तुर्द्वैतनाम्—“There are no two opinions among the Upaniṣad-vādins as to the identity of the Individual Soul and the Supreme Soul taught in all the Upaniṣads” (p. 297) It is here that the famous quotation of Dravidācārya is introduced with the words अत्र च सम्प्रदायविद आख्यायिका सम्प्रचक्षन् “And here the knowers of tradition relate a story” (Ibid) Would it be against all expectations if this Dravida were an Advaitācārya whose identity has been lost to us?

Prof Kuppā Svāmi Śāstrigal offers two evidences in favour of the identity of the two Dravidas The first is that in a certain verse of the Samkṣepa Sāriraka (III-221) we have an important part of Rāmānuja's quotation from Dramida Bhāṣya Sarvajñātma-Muni the author of this book being Suresvara's disciple and contemporary according to the oral tradition of Advaitins, it follows that Dramida preceded Suresvara in point of time I refrain from stating the many reasons which make me distrust the received opinion about Sarvajñātma being Suresvara's disciple, but I should like to point out here that it is unsafe to jump to this conclusion merely on the strength of the eighth and penultimate verses of the Samkṣepa-sāriraka, especially as the guru's name quoted in both the verses happens to be

Deveśvara But supposing Sarvajñātma is really Suresvara's contemporary it is to be doubted very much, whether he knew any Vedāntic writer so much inclined towards the Saguna Brahma Theory, as to endorse the assurance with which Yāmūnācārya and his successors considered him to be the repository of their tradition. On the other hand a reference to Vākyakāra identified as Brahmanandin, gives a strong support to the view that neither of these hesitated to emphasize their unmistakable Advaita leaning. In his commentary on the 217th verse of the third chapter of Sarvajñātma's work, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, has an extract from Brahmanandin which substantiates this statement —

छान्दोग्यवाक्यकारेण ब्रह्मनन्दिनापि व्यवक्ष्यमान सतश्चोत्पत्ती दीव्यमुक्त्वा साव्यवहारिकमाद्या-
मयन्वपक्षेण समाधानमुक्तम् । नामत उत्पत्तिः, अनिष्पाद्यत्वात्, नापि सतः प्रवृत्त्यनर्थक्यात्,
रूपाविशेषात् । अभिव्यक्तव्यमिति चेत् न, तस्या अपि सत्त्वात्, प्रवृत्तिनित्यत्वाच्च सदा-
भिव्याक्तिप्रसङ्गः ॥ न, सव्यवहारमात्रत्वात् ” इति — (Samkshepa-Sārīraka—Kāśī
Sanskrit Series)

Are we not now rather to suppose that later Viśiṣṭādvaitins having no access to the writings of their Dramiḍa Bhāṣyakāra and Tanka Vākyakāra, unwittingly came to identify them with their Advaitin namesakes ?

The second reason advanced by the learned Śāstrigal relates to the identification of the Tirumalisai-Alvar of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas with Dramiḍa. Now this theory of Dramiḍa-Tirumalisai equation has, I think, to be judged on its own merits independently of the Dravidācārya problem, which we cannot hope to solve with the meagre information at our disposal.

Until further light is thrown on the subject, therefore, we have to conclude that the names of Bodhāyana and Dramiḍa take us little further towards the identification of either and they afford no clue whatever as to the existence or the form of any Viśiṣṭa-Advaita system during the time of Sankara.

THE BHĀGAVATAS

We shall now take up the second part of the theme with which we started, namely the relation between the ancient Bhāgavatas and the later Rāmānujas. Dr Thibaut believed in the general agreement of the system of the earlier Bhāgavatas with that of the Rāmānujas so strongly that he did not feel it incumbent on him to examine the grounds of that

belief Most probably it was sufficient for him that a distinctive tenet of the Bhāgavatas was taken by Śaṅkara to have been refuted by Bādarāyaṇa while the same was considered by Rāmānuja to have been upheld Not impossibly he was very much influenced by the traditional information which Pandit Rama Misra Śāstri possessed regarding the history of the Bhāgavatas and Rāmānujas (see note on p XXII of his introduction to Śaṅkara's Sutrabhāṣya) But I am sure that much of this opinion would have to be revised, had he undertaken a detailed examination of the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata, to which as its chief source Vaiṣṇavism is rightly traced

In the 339 th Chapter of this section, we are told straight off about the evolution of Vācudeva into Śaṅkarsana, Pradyumna and Anuruddha—a tenet which Śaṅkara would probably have interpreted in his own way to suit the Advaita System But the Vyūha Theory as given here has nothing in common with the “Vibhava and Sūkṣma” aspects referred to by Rāmānuja (p 116 of the Sri Bhāṣya, Ānanda Press) Nor do we notice there Rāmānuja's Theory that Śaṅkarsana, Pradyumna and Anuruddha being the preceding deities of Jīva, mind (manas) and ego (ahamkāra) are themselves known in Pañcarātra as Jīva, Manas and Ahamkāra respectively (Ibid) On the other hand we have in this very Nārāyaṇīya section a number of verses which Śaṅkara frequently quotes as favouring the doctrine of the One Self (Compare for instance slokas 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of chap 350) In the same chapter we have the following slokas —

बहवः पुरुषा एव त्वया यः समग्रताः । एवेत्यतस्तिष्ठन्त द्रष्टव्यं नयमिदमपि ॥ २२ ॥
आचारं तु प्रवक्ष्यामि । कस्य पुरुषस्य तः । बहूनां पुरुषाणां स यथार्था यानिरुच्यन्तः ॥ २६ ॥
तथा तः पुरुषः विश्वं पश्य समग्रतमम् । निरुणं निर्गुणं भुत्वा प्रविशन्ति सनातनम् ॥ २७ ॥

Here the liberated souls are expressly stated to enter the Godhead characterized as attributeless This is in strange opposition to the doctrine of Rāmānuja, that the released only realize their own nature, which is a state of eternal dependency on the Paramātmā whose body they are (परमात्मात्मरूपं तन्त्रयिरतया तद्वत्कालगतस्य Sri Bhāṣya p 473)

Scholars have so invariably associated the Rāmānujas with the Bhāgavatas that it certainly seems incredible that the Pañcarātras or Bhāgavatas had any point of contact with Advaitins But the strangeness of this circumstance is

greatly mitigated by the following facts. In the first place Sankara in his refutation has touched no other doctrine of the sect than the origination of the individual souls. If the Bhāgavatas did hold with Rāmānuja that the Lord Vāsudeva is altogether different from the individual souls whether bound or liberated (बद्धात्मकाच्च अन्यन्तविकल्पाण परमात्मा—Vedānta Dīpa p 114—Ānanda Press) is it not rather surprising that Sankara should have suffered this teaching of vital importance to remain unmolested, while taking up for elaborate refutation a dubious tenet which the other party could easily prove to have been falsely imputed to it? The opening part of Sankara's commentary on this Adhikarana gives an unbiassed reader the unavoidable impression that, except in a few details which he mentions, Sankara was ready to admit that the Pañcarātra dogmatics were at one with the Vaidic—(एवजातीयकज्ञ समानत्वान्न-विनवदगोचर Sāṅkara Bhāṣya p 494). As a matter of fact we learn from another source that the Pañcarātras unlike the Rāmānujas, did maintain the complete non-difference in Mukti between the individual and the supreme soul. Bhāskarācārya⁴ in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras quotes a verse to this effect—पाञ्चरात्रिका अयवमाह । श्रष्टुर्भेद एव स्याज्जीवस्य च परम्य च । मुक्तस्य च न भेदोऽस्ति भदहेतावमावत । (Bhāskara Bhāṣya p 81).

The foregoing considerations render it necessary that the whole of the Pañcarātra literature has to be subjected to a critical examination to discover the grounds on which Rāmānuja identifies his system with that of the Bhāgavatas. Till then the supposed connection between the old Bhāgavatas and the Rāmānujas cannot be considered to have been substantiated.

The Śrī Bhāṣya is rightly looked upon to be the most powerful exposition of Viśiṣṭa-Advaita. The Śrīkantha Bhāṣya with its own intrinsic merits and the strong support it receives from the celebrated Sivāika-manī-dīpikā of Appayya Dikṣita, has been now shown to be mostly a mere duplication of Rāmānuja. The pre-eminent position of the Rāmānuja Vaiṣnavas and the influence of Rāmānuja on their minds at the present day, invest his book with greater importance than merely a useful record on which to base our criticism of the

4 This writer opposes his system to many other Vedāntic systems, though singularly enough, he does not betray any consciousness of views akin to Rāmānuja's.

philosophic views anterior to him. The numerous authorities from whom he quotes frequently throughout his writings must be of special interest to all lovers of the history of Indian Philosophy. Fortunately the spirit of research has awakened in the South, and when the Śrī Vaisnava and Śaiva Tāmil works on philosophy are made the subject of comparative study in addition to Sanskrit works, there is every hope that Bodhāyana, Dramida, Tanka and others on whose support Rāmānuja writes, will be more than mere names in the brilliant history of Viśiṣṭa-Advaita

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN ETHICAL JUDGMENT*

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I

Presentation of Subject and Object

The terms subject and object are employed in ethical literature to point out two distinct methods of moral valuation one emphasizing moral good as internal, while the other looks upon it as external. Consequently, there appear in ethical literature two points of view. To the view of good as a product, an activity, an achievement to be measured in the world outside, there is contrasted with another view of good as something that can be valued independently of any such *necessary* objective results. Subjective good is internal, and is said to consist in motives and mental attitudes alone, such as in faith, purity of purpose, single mindedness, conscience, good will, intuition etc. On the other hand, objective good is supposed to connote acts or their consequences measured independently of the agent himself, i. e. from their effects judged apart from the motives of the agent. "I would first break up," says Sidgwick, "the simple notion of approbation by means of the distinction Subjective and Objective, the intention of the indiscriminating almsgiver is subjectively right but objectively wrong"¹

The dualism of subjective and objective values becomes especially prominent in ethics on account of the problem of moral responsibility, a part of an agent's conduct depends upon circumstantial possibilities and a part upon himself. It is argued that we can not hold him responsible for consequences that he has not willed and it is enough if he can maintain his motives pure. This means that moral value depends on inward goodness rather than on external consequences. Kant maintains "In this sense morality is said to be universal

* This Thesis was approved by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Columbia University, New York, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

¹ Sidgwick, *Ethics of Green, Herbert Spencer, and Martineau*, p. 333, also *Methods of Ethics*, 206 ff.

and formal, while the rest of the calculations regarding the actual procedure and the consequences in the world outside are said to belong to the category of particular, material and accidental "1

The problem presents itself in a still more radical form when, instead of judging other people's conduct, an individual begins to judge his own actions or to choose from among a number of courses. The agent cannot hope to solve the problem adequately merely by putting together quantitatively a part of the two *sorts* of good. Such a procedure simply begs the question since the logic of moral understanding necessitates a proper statement of the conditions of a conscientious choice.

In fact, a more complete understanding of this dualism of subjective and objective good leads one to the conclusion that they are based on the same assumption. In both instances moral goodness is regarded as a state rather than as a method of procedure. When the *summum bonum* is looked upon as a fixed end (whether in the form of subjective goodness or objective results in the world outside, as in the utilitarian standard of universal pleasure or happiness), little logical ground is left for reflection to operate upon the total values involved, and the actual *direction* of choice is left to the individual's inclination rather than to considerations of logic. From the subjective point of view, social good becomes largely a matter of chance or an accidental possibility while from the objective point of view it may become *the end*. In other words, the entire moral reflection in either case reduces itself to a mere selection of means. This is obvious in utilitarian ethics. But it is equally true with respect to intuitionism. Conduct in both becomes a mere instrument without power to contribute anything to the concept of good.

A concurrent reading of Mill and Kant reveals in an intense form the two opposite methods of measuring moral conduct. One is subjective and the other objective, though it is a fact that Kant uses the term objective in the sense of good will being universal and not merely individual³. Kant holds that ethical judgments deal with motives alone, the consequences being inferior or altogether immaterial. Mill on the other hand maintains that motives make no difference in the

1 Kant, *Theory of Ethics* (Abbot), 30 ff.

2 Dewey and Tuft, *Ethics*, pp. 46-63.

3 Kant, *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

evaluation of moral conduct if they make none in the consequences.¹

The dualism of subject-object is not limited to Kant and Mill alone but is accepted by a number of ethical writers. Though the connotations of subject and object may vary somewhat with each writer, the outstanding feature of subjective ethical theories is that the truly moral good is supposed to be inward, whether as a state of mind, an attitude, a feeling, or a particular attribute of human mind apart from the actual implications of the conduct in the world outside, whereas the latter are taken as the criteria of the objective theories.

"Moral action then has two factors," sums up Prof. Bowne, "a certain content and outcome which may be objectively estimated without any reference to the person whatever, and, next, a moral character which can only be subjectively estimated."² "The morality of a code depends on its consequences while the morality of the person depends upon his motives."³ According to Paulsen, "*Every* act gives rise to two judgments, a *subjective*, *formal* judgment of the disposition of the person and an *objective*, *material* judgment of the act itself. In the former case, we inquire into the motive, in the latter, into the effects following from the nature of the case."⁴ He further maintains that "it is of the utmost importance that we clearly understand this difference, and also that we see that these two judgments are independent of each other."⁵

In passing judgment on a piece of conduct what is it that is *morally* right, or in other words, where is *the* moral element to be found when we propose to value a voluntary conduct? Martineau maintains that conduct to be morally right must be subjectively right and to be subjectively right it must originate from the higher of the "springs" of action planted in the human mind. The higher the springs, the greater the moral value. "Surely," says he, "the word right has an obvious ambiguity, and denotes now the ethically good, and now the *intellectually* true. In the phrase "subjective right," it has the former meaning, in the phrase "objective right," the latter. To treat it as covering the same quality in both is to make it a fruitful source

1 Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 17

2. Bowne, *Principles of Ethics*, p. 32

3 Ibid., p. 34

4 Paulsen, *System of Ethics* pp. 227-28

5 Ibid., p. 228

of illusions. To guard against these, *the whole moral essence* of voluntary conduct must be planted in its inner spring, while its outward history must be judged by the canons of *rationality*."¹

Martineau is not merely clarifying two possible meanings of the same word. He is enunciating a difference in valuation based on two sets of principles, which to him and to many others are not only distinguishable but are also frequently found apart and even in contradiction. Value lies in "good affections" and not in "the production of good actions," so that to confuse one for the other becomes "monstrously false." According to him it is an opposition between the "inward creative energy" and an "outward success." "Instead of measuring the worth of goodness by the scale of its external benefits, our rule requires that we attach no *moral value* to these benefits, except as signs and exponents of the goodness whence they spring, and graduate our approval by the purity of the source, not by the magnitude of the result. Here, therefore, we touch upon an essential distinction between the Christian and the Utilitarian ethics and confidently claim for the former the verdict of our moral consciousness."²

Royce makes it especially clear that to him "loyalty" alone is the truly moral good. By loyalty he means devotion to a cause. It is universal because everyone can be loyal to some cause, even thieves are loyal among themselves. Loyalty promotes loyalty. When loyalty to one group conflicts with loyalty to the other, our maxim must be the promotion of the greatest possible loyalty, i.e. loyalty to loyalty is the supreme good.³

In almost the same manner as Kant, Royce makes attachment to duty the supreme moral good so far as the individual is concerned. As a consequence he is forced to maintain a formal definition of good. His moral good becomes independent of goods in the objective world, and also of many of the individual qualities, the possession of which makes a person's judgment fuller and finer. Thus he maintains that "the keeper of a lonely lighthouse, and the leader of a busy social order, the housemaid and the king, have almost equal opportunities to

1 Martineau, *Types of Ethics*, Vol. II, pp. 55-56

2 Ibid., p. 26

3 Royce, *Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 118-121 also Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, chapter on "My Station and its Duties."

devote the self to its own cause and to win the good of such a devotion" ¹ In fact the balance may be in favour of the housemaid as compared to the king, she having less difficulties to perceive her simple devotional duties

Now this is exactly what Plato and Aristotle deny According to them it is wrong to conceive of virtue in this limited sense Plato maintains that the highest kind of virtue is philosophy and that the philosopher must be a king In other words the highest possible virtue must comprehend in itself many other attributes than simple devotion to a cause or mere respect for the moral law ² "The good of man," according to Aristotle, "is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue," "in a complete life" ³ He even goes further and doubts whether the young can be said to be virtuous

The subjective element in ethical judgment is systematically presented by Kant in the form of good will. According to him good will alone is good and any consideration of consequences is irrelevant to ethical valuation He holds that there is a "moral form" which consists in recognizing our obligation to an autonomous will Good will acts simply and purely in its own terms, because any other consideration would make it "heterogeneous" As a consequence, the positions of Kant and Royce are identical so far as the external world of action is concerned Virtue is the same for every one, since it is independent of the external variations of circumstance or personal limitation, mental disposition being the only essentially moral factor "This imperative is categorical It concerns not with the matter of the action or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself the result, and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may This imperative may be called that of morality" ⁴ So what a person actually does in consequence of his moral activity belongs to different perceptions and gives rise to different values Kant asks us to disregard it all "as belonging to the world of sense" in order to have the motive "quite pure" ⁵

1 Royce, *op cit*, p 152

2 Plato, *Republic* V, p 473

3 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Wellson), p 16

4 Kant, *op cit*, p 33

5 Kant, *op cit*, p 107

The Kantian mode of ethical valuation is more simply exemplified in the Stoical conception of what is *morally* good. Epictetus asks 'where lies the good?—In a man's will. Where lies evil?—In the will. Where is the neutral sphere?—In the region outside the will's control.'¹ The Stoics divide what is in one's own will from what is not in one's own will and confine the sphere of duty to the former while rejecting the latter as simply impertinent. Following the Stoic "wheel" the sage is driven from the state to his stoa or school, from his school to his family, and from his family to his inside self, because that seems to be the only place where will may be said to prevail independently of the outside world. The rest simply does not concern him.

Green in discussing conscientiousness or the moral judgments of a conscientious person raises two questions. The first is "What ought to be done?" At this point he contrasts a saint with a social reformer, and holds that the core of the saintly attitude "may be described either as self-abasement or self-exaltation—the act in which the heart is lifted up to God, in which the whole inner man goes forth after an ideal of personal holiness—this act, while it is in principle one with the whole course of man's moral endeavour, may be deemed in a certain sense its most final form. Whether such a heart in this person or that, itself issues in outward 'transient' action of a noticeably beneficent kind, will depend mainly on the social surroundings and on the intellectual and other qualifications of the particular person." "The spiritual principle ... may be the same in another person otherwise circumstanced and gifted, by whom no such apparent effect is produced."²

The second question is "What should I be?" "He may ask such a question reasonably because it does not depend on the amount of his information, or on his skill in analysis, but on his honesty with himself, whether the answer shall be virtually a true one. But will he for raising such questions and raising them with such an ideal of virtue before him as has been above indicated, be any the wiser as to what he ought to do, or any the more disposed to do it?" The answer is, "He will not for doing so, directly at any rate, be the better judge of what he should do, so far as the judgment depends on

¹ Epictetus, *Discourses* (Matheison), Vol. I, p. 194, also for the ideal Cynic, Vol. II, Chapter 22.

² Green, *Prolegomena*, pp. 362 and 365.

correct information or inference as to matters of facts, or on a correct analysis of circumstances" ¹

Keeping these two questions apart, "What ought to be done?" and "What should I be?" (Green comes to the conclusion "The question whether he has done what he ought in any particular case may be answered in the affirmative without its following that he has been what he ought to be in doing it"") He finally comes to the conclusion that a person may be objectively right though subjectively wrong, at the same time he maintains that to be subjectively right one has to be objectively right as well. The underlying difficulty with Green's analysis is that he considers the moral attributes independently of other personal "gifts," as for example intellect, imagination, ability to analyze, etc., and he fails to see the contribution of the latter in the evolution of the former. In other words, he fails to supply a total meaning of intelligence which will be 'moral' as well as 'intellectual' and be competent to explain moral discrimination in a particular case. Therefore the effects of one's conduct appear to belong to another order of calculations, to such an extent that "no recognition of an ideal virtue, however pure and high, no such incentive to the reform of oneself and one's neighbour as a comparison of the ideal with current practice can afford, will enlighten us as to the effects of different kinds of action upon the welfare of society, whether that welfare be estimated with reference to a maximum possible pleasure, or to an end which the realization of a good will itself constitutes" ² It is supposed that consequences are independently known by some other process of calculation and that moral goodness consists in interpreting such given consequences into "a personal duty."

Plato and Aristotle at times are inclined to uphold a pure speculative life as the highest, and as akin to the gods' activity. "It would seem too," says Aristotle, 'that the speculative activity is the only activity which is loved for its own sake as it has no result except speculation, whereas from all moral actions we gain something more or less besides the action itself' ³ In such a life very few external conditions are required. It is self-sufficient as an end in itself, and is divine in

1 Green, *Prolegomena*, p. 364

2 Ibid., p. 366

3 Ibid., p. 368

4 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Welldon), p. 336

contrast to the moral life which is human. Besides, moral virtues are united with emotions which are an inferior part of our nature. "We may go through the whole category of virtues, and it will appear that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of gods" ¹

Similar arguments are offered in the traditional Christian theological ethics when it emphasizes "faith" in opposition to "acts" as the saving element. "The emphasis which Luther laid upon the doctrine of justification by faith alone has identified it for ever with the Reformation, so greatly was he enamoured of it, that he introduced in the ardour of his passion the word "alone" into his translation of Romans iii 28, a passage which does not contain the word in the most corrupt of manuscripts" ². According to Luther, God does not ask how many and how great are our works, 'but how great is our faith?' Thou owest God naught but confession and belief. In all other matters thou art free to do as thou wilt, without any danger of conscience" ³. So according to St Augustine though virtue holds the "highest place among human good things," yet "what is its occupation save to wage perpetual war with vices" ⁴.

Something analogous to "faith" in theological ethics is supplied by the moral sense school in a more naturalistic manner. They assume that moral apprehension is entirely "within" and proceeds from internal affections. Certain modes of conduct affect us in certain ways and according to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson a balance or harmony of affections is moral good. The moral sense apprehends the balance in the same intuitive manner that an artist apprehends the symmetry of a work of art ⁵.

The discussion so far has aimed to bring out some of the variations in the "subjective" element in ethics. If we consider ethical theories such as those of Martineau, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, or Butler, the "subject" in these subjective types of ethics is different from that to be found in Kant's formal account. In Kant feelings and emotions have little or no

1 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Welldon), p. 340.

2 Karl Pearson, *Ethics of Free Thought*, p. 223.

3 Luther, quotation from *ibid.*, p. 234.

4 St Augustine, *City of God* (Classical Moralists by Ward), p. 181.

5 Shaftesbury, *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue* (Selby-Bigge), pp. 63-65, also *Francis Hutcheson* by W. R. Scott, 199 ff.

moral value while in the "ideo-psychological ethics" of Martineau the "springs" or subjective elements are highly emotional attitudes. Ethics of the theological type give high value to certain specialized feelings, and exclude everything else as "wordly" or "material," certain mental qualities alone make up the moral good, while the rest is regarded as either alien or indifferent to moral values.

Although the connotations of the subjective may vary widely from system to system, there is one elemental view common to subjective types of ethics. They all hold that moral good or virtue consists essentially in an "inward" state, while moral conduct with all its rational economy is in the main regarded as extraneous to morality. This is the crucial point. It is here, for example, that Epicurus and Mill differ in the practical application of their ethical principles, although both name pleasure, a subjective standard, as the end term. Epicurus reduces pleasurable activities in the external world to a minimum and confines pleasure to a state of mind to be reached by itself. Mill on the other hand sacrifices subjective pleasure by making the criterion universal and by supplying an elaborate objective technique for getting it. He even admits without reason that it is better to be Socrates unhappy than a pig satisfied.

Bentham and Mill start with pleasure in a highly individualized form and then try to overcome the individualism by resorting to a sort of pre-established harmony. Earlier thinkers such as Butler, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and other intuitionists try to show the connection between the good of the individual and good of the society by a psychological analysis of egoistic and benevolent feelings designed to show that both are "natural" and hence capable of mutually harmonious expression in the moral life, the utilitarians fill up the same gap between the individual and the society mathematically. If the pleasure of one is good to one, they argue, then the pleasure of all must be good to all. Thus pleasure is objectified by the mere addition of so many subjective units. Mill and Sidgwick go further than Bentham in admitting that a virtuous life need not necessarily be a happy one, and thus the utilitarian calculus of objective good is made complete.¹

¹ Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Ferryman), Chapter on "What is Utilitarianism," also Albee, *English Utilitarianism*, 251 ff.

"By Utilitarianism is here meant," says Sidgwick, "the ethical theory, that the conduct which under any circumstances is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole, that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct"¹ So conduct is good or bad not according to the motives but according to the results measured independently of motives if necessary. According to Bentham, "There is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one," if acts are "good or bad, it is only on account of their effects, good on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, bad on account of their tendency to produce pain or avert pleasure."² This position is diametrically opposite to that of Kant, who holds that "the necessity of acting from *pure* respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good *in itself*, and the worth of such a will is above everything"³

There are several other standards besides the utilitarian according to which conduct is to be measured independently of subjective values.⁴ Custom for example is concerned not with the motives of conduct but with conduct itself "It tolerates," says Westermarck, "all kinds of volitions and opinions if not openly expressed. It does not condemn the heretical mind but the heretical act. It demands that under certain circumstances certain actions should either be performed or omitted, and, provided that this demand is fulfilled, it takes no notice of the motive of the agent or omitter"⁵ Customs have changed but the concentration of customary ethics on the outer manifestations of conduct has remained the same.

Professional ethics in large measure is a form of customary ethics. Certain things are permissible in professional ethics, which on general ethical grounds may be of doubtful value. A lawyer's professional code of ethics may be as different from that of the teacher as was the layman's from that

1 Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 412

2 Bentham, *Principles of Morality*, Chapter 10, Art. 12

3 Kant op. cit., p. 20

4 Wundt, *Ethics*, Vol. 1, 151 ff

5 Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. 1, p. 160

of the clergy in the middle ages.¹ A lawyer can defend a criminal without laying himself open to the charge of encouraging crime, he is not expected to divulge the secrets of his client even though to do so would advance the ends of justice.² A banker would be considered 'unethical' in his profession if he were to warn the depositors of another bank that is in an unstable condition. His veracity is assumed to be different from that expected of a common man.³ A good deal of modern business is based on considerations different from those of "simple truth." Legal ethics is an objective type of ethics. The formal authority of the state stands behind legal enactments, whereas the authority of custom is only implicit. Like custom, law deals only with the general case, and like custom too it "only deals with overt acts or omissions and cares nothing for the mental side of conduct unless the law be transgressed."⁴ Hume cites a number of cases where law dispenses its justice without considering the subjective elements that may be involved.⁵ Leaving aside laws enforced purely for private ends, that is, if we consider law as a social instrument for the guarantee of order and security, it will be evident that motives, intentions, etc., have only an indirect place in legal ethics. "With rare exceptions," says Frederic Pollock, "an act not otherwise unlawful in itself will not become an offence or legal wrong because it is done from a sinister motive, nor will it be any excuse for an act contrary to the general law, or in violation of any one's rights, to show that the motive from which it proceeded was good."⁶

Now the object or the matter in moral judgment is not the matter of this, that, or the other particular proposition, but it is the materiality or material side of ethical judgments as such. The material aspect of the ethical judgment is indicated in ethical theories by such terms as consequence, utility, overt, activity, prudence, calculations, means, etc. Ethical theories are subjective or objective according to the

1 Hugh Black, *Culture and Restraint*, Chap. on 'Medieval Saint-hood'.

2 William Howard Taft, *Ethics in Service*, p. 32.

3 Page Lectures (Yale 1908), *Morals and Modern Business*, pp. 1-22.

4 Westermarck, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 167, also Chap. on "Customs and Laws as Expressions of Moral Ideas."

5 Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, pp. 146-154.

6 Pollock, quotation from Mezza, *Ethics Descriptive and Explanatory*, pp. 309-10.

value they place on the "what" side of moral judgment. The specific connotations of "matter" in ethical judgment vary as much from theory to theory as the specific connotations of "subject" or "form," in theories of the opposite type. For instance, the good in the objective sense may be stated in terms of utilitarian good i.e. conduct leading to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It may be the good of State (Hobbes), the well-being of the social tissue (Leslie Stephen), or a harmonious co-ordination of highly differentiated evolutionary processes (Spencer). Objective good is often identified with the good of customary ethics, rituals, state-religion, professional ethics, or with such individual pursuits as fame, wealth, etc., the emphasis being all along on conduct and its consequences to be measured in the objective world.

Plato presents the practical issues involved in the dualism we are discussing by bringing out the conflict between the just and the unjust or only apparently just. In life at large one sees constantly an opposition between the successful man and the really good man. The latter often seems to be confronted with the dilemma of either losing the world to keep his goodness or of tampering with his principles in order to gain the world. What is the relation of the good man to a life of activity, of results, and of objective goods? If morality is the highest concern, to what extent has the moral man to attend to so-called objective considerations? One finds great departments of life such as politics, business, the professions, etc., following purely utilitarian lines based on expediency often at the expense of so-called subjective values. Can the moral man have anything to do with these activities? Men who are impressed by the standard of success in such activities are likely to look upon a clear uncompromising ethical attitude more as a hindrance than as an essential factor to the promotion of that success. On the other hand, if the moral man fails in the world of results and activity, morality may appear to be limited by external considerations so that there may be required either a readjustment of our moral conceptions or a total foregoing of them. In daily life we find thus uncertainty reflected either in a tendency to compromise truth in order to satisfy the so-called exigencies of life, or in an insistence upon principles to the extent of fanaticism. We have either moral make-shifts or spiritual crankiness.¹

¹ Dewey, *The Study of Ethics*. A Syllabus, pp. 35-40.

Failing to analyze the problem, common sense morality resorts to a kind of moral opportunism. It classifies certain attitudes as good or bad *in themselves* and confines discrimination only to *time* and *place*. Thus truth, honesty, charity, etc. are virtues in the form of categories, and moral goodness consists in applying them on certain occasions and not on others. It is supposed that everyone knows what truth is though it may require considerable experience to know how and when to act on it. If you act one way, it need not mean that your point of view regarding that virtue is different. The popular opinion takes it for granted that you did not see the *occasion* to be virtuous. Thus popular books on ethical conduct exhort their readers to know when to be brave, and when to yield, to know when to help others, and when not to help, to keep in mind certain occasions when such virtues are to be acted upon or held in restraint, in short, to know the *when* rather than the *what* of virtue. This is the advice parents give to their children, teachers to their pupils, and older people to the younger generation. Thus we start with a morality fixed in its forms and handed down from one to the other. Common sentiment is satisfied with its observance and the average public opinion is not likely to go beyond it.

Naturally the outcome of such an attitude is an authoritarian ethics. An elderly person is supposed to know more about virtue than a younger one. It is not thought that he knows more about the ideas of virtue, since young and old alike are supposed to share the simple basic ideas of virtue. The superiority of one over the other, therefore, consists not so much in acquaintance with these ideas as in knowing the occasions for acting in accordance with them.

It will be seen, therefore, that the dualism of subject and object is not purely of academic importance, it has practical bearings involving the very logic of moral understanding. If moral judgment is a practical judgment, it becomes imperative that the agent clearly perceive the relation between conduct, prudence, practical intelligence, etc., on the one hand, and the will to do good, motive, etc., on the other. If a fanatic is subjectively right but objectively wrong (Sidgwick), can anything be done to make reason *really* reasonable and not so contrastingly good and bad at the same time? Again, if subjective and objective good are really independent, that is, if there is no coherent logic for the moral life, how can there be progress

in the good man's conduct; that conduct consists not merely in a single judgment, (e g, such as the judgment that the good will is good), but in a series of judgments extending over the whole of his voluntary life. It becomes still more imperative that we have some kind of logic indicating the relations between the two realms since there is no absolute guarantee at any particular time that a specific item of conduct is finally good subjectively or objectively. Lastly, since a large part of our life consists of interactions with other human beings who are also moral agents, it becomes necessary that we have at least some intelligible method of explaining to each other what we mean by saying that someone is subjectively or objectively right or wrong.

[*To be continued*]

REVIEWS.

"MULĀVIDYĀ-NIRĀSA OR SRĪ-ŚĀNKARA-HRDAYA"
by Y SUBRAHMANYA SARMA - Published by the Adhyatma
Prakash Office, Bangalore City Price Popular Edition - Rs.
2-8-0 (5 s.), Superior Edition - Rs 4/- (8 s)

Śankara not only frequently pays homage to those who have taught and handed down the traditional exposition regarding the *Adhyātma Vidyā* (the Indian Science of the Self as Pure Being), but distinctly says in his *Gitā-Bhāṣya* that "those who do not know the traditional teachings, even though they might be conversant with all other branches of knowledge, must be discarded as if they were ignorant men". With regard to the author of the work under review, we find that he not only proclaims, but frequently repeats the proclamation of the fact, that he "gained his knowledge of the Vedānta through his repeated remembrance of, and intimate acquaintance with, the feet of Bhagavan Śankara". This avowed disregard of the tradition (*sampradāya*) of Śankara's school of Vedānta not only amounts to a rejection of all the available aid to a true understanding of Śankara's doctrine, but is the main reason why, as we shall proceed to show, our author's work, whatever its literary merits, fails to accomplish what its very name shows to be his essential aim viz, to represent what is the "heart of Śankara" in its truth and perfection.

Further, we are told in the English Introduction to the work that it "gains in value from the author's acquaintance with European speculation" and, especially, "the Kantian discovery of Time, Space and Causality as the *a priori* forms of the intellect". Our new Western education has helped to firmly implant in many a modernized Indian mind the conviction that European scientific thought can alone be accepted as worth our attention and acceptance, and that Indian knowledge and thought can be treated with consideration only so far as it can be brought into line with them. But no true Śankarite can accept Kant's *a priori* forms and presuppositions of the intellect as the conditions which alone can enable anything to get accepted as an object of knowledge. Further, though Kant never succeeded in gaining a clear comprehension of the nature of what he called "*understanding*" as distinct

from the faculty of mind or sense-perception, he held that, when developed, it can give us a knowledge of "*Things-in-themselves*", objects which transcend the forms and laws of our experience as consisting in our mental life and sense-perception. All this will go to prove how impossible is the hope to be able to bridge the gulf between Sankara's Vedic doctrine of Brahman and the world and Kant's philosophy as based on a purely rational synthesis of the fundamental presuppositions on which the activity of consciousness is based and as, therefore, leading to a form of idealism of which one result has been to prepare the way for a psychology such as is prominently associated with one of the forms of the Buddhistic creed now gaining ground in Europe and elsewhere in the West

In this first article, we propose to deal with our author's central theme—what he calls *svaprakṛyā*. We hope to deal with certain subsidiary views of his in a later issue. Mr Sarma calls his work, "the overthrow of causal ignorance" (*mulā-vidyā*). His main aim is to show that in *Susupti* (deep sleep without dream) there is not the slightest touch or trace of what is known as *bhāva-rūpa-agnāna* (positive ignorance), that a knowledge of the Absolute Reality can be gained by an examination of the states (*avasthās*) of waking, dream, and dreamless sleep—that the self free from all colouring contact with the dross of material objects exists in '*susupti*' as the essence of pure knowledge (*cintā*) and perfect bliss (*bhūmānanda*), though only '*vicāra*' (inquiry, ratiocination) can bring the liberating enlightenment which is the highest aim of life—the knowledge that all perceived material objects, as having no unfailling persistence are, for that reason only and no other, to be deemed false (*mithyā*), and that they entirely cease to exist and are unperceived in the state of dreamless sleep by the living self (*Jīva*)

We shall first dispose of an important preliminary topic as our author frequently refers to it and seems to regard it as furnishing the key to the comprehension and the establishment of the main theme of his work as above stated. He expresses his view as follows—"Adhyāsa—which is of the nature of the identification of the Real (*Satya*) and the Unreal (*Anṛta*) is *alone* Avidyā." Again—"The Adhyāsa (identification) of the Self and the Not-Self is *alone* Avidyā." According to our author the two terms, '*adhyāsa*' and '*avidyā*', denote the same phenomenon and idea, and should not be distinguished in any wise,—and he makes this a chief reason for holding that

there is no such thing as a causal 'avidyā' forming the seed of phenomenal existence and of 'adhyāsa' too as the beginning and foundation of all kinds of activity and experience therein. In justification of this view, he quotes the following sentence from Sankara's Introduction to his Sūtra-Bhāṣya, a sentence following his definition of 'adhyāsa' of which we have more than one — "*The Adhyāsa, thus defined, learned men (Pandits) consider to be Avidyā*" Sankara here clearly refers to the opinion of certain learned persons, and is not to be understood as giving his own view. The position is analogous to the context at the beginning of Chap. XVIII of the Bhagavadgītā, where the divine teacher, in reply to a question from his disciple regarding the difference between 'tyāga' and 'sanyāsa', first gives the views of others whom he calls *Kavis*, *Vicaksanas* and *Manīs*, and then goes on to say, 'learn from me the certain truth regarding this matter'. In the second place, Sankara has, in this same context, already stated as follows — "The causal phenomenal ignorance (mithyā-ajñāna) is the cause of the *mithunīkaraṇa* (identification) i.e. (adhyāsa) of the Real with the Unreal". Here Sankara expressly states his view that 'ajñāna' (avidyā) is the material cause of 'adhyāsa', the identification (mithunīkaraṇa) of the real self with the unreal Not-self. The two, however, are not to be regarded as existing in mutual separation, but in a relation of close association or co-existence, a relation analogous, though somewhat distantly so, to that which exists between the earth in the form of 'mrd' and the pot which is made out of kneaded clay, or to that existing between a mental impression (samskāra-vāsanā) and the sense-cognition of external objects which it helps to produce. In both these latter cases, there exists the relation of a finer form to a grosser one between the two co-existing (or successive) phenomena under consideration. Similarly, 'avidyā' is the finer and causal form of 'adhyāsa' which is the grosser form taken by the effect and is, in its own turn, the producing cause of the still grosser stage of the manifested experiences and effects forming the phenomenal world. Hence, it is rightly designated *Mūlāndyā*, the root-ignorance, which is at the basis of all existence and life as we know them. Indeed, in his Bhāṣya on the Sūtra I, 4, 3, Sankara speaks in express terms of the unmanifested state of the world before creation, and calls it 'avidyā'. His words are — "The bīja-sakti (the causal potentiality of the world) is of the nature of avidyā". Here Sankara emphatically and expressly affirms the existence of 'mūlā-

vidyā' We have here, therefore, a thorough dismantling and even effacement, of the entire fabric which our author has abortively aimed at constructing in his work. Further, Sankara says in this context, "a previous *avyakta* (unmanifested) state of the world must be admitted, since it has (rational) purpose." That is, nothing can come into existence in the world without a cause. Being of the nature of the cause, it must be positive in nature (*bhāva-rūpa*)—a fact whose significance will appear at a later stage when we take up for full consideration our author's discussion of the nature of 'avidyā'. Furthermore, Sankara says in this same context—"This unmanifested (*avyakta*) i.e., the 'bija-sakti' which is of the nature of 'avidyā' is in some places denoted by the term 'ākāśa', in some places it is spoken of as 'māyā'." Sankara, it must be noted, does not say that it is ever known by the name 'adhyāsa'. This negative argument, too, has its own force when added to the positive arguments already put forward above in order to prove that the two terms, *avidyā* and *adhyāsa*, are not synonymous. Fourthly, Sankara has elsewhere taught us that "all instances of *adhyāsa* have their producing cause in the similarity (*sārupya*) existing between the objects (identified)." If the recognition of such similarity is the necessary condition and rational presupposition why 'adhyāsa' takes place at all,—and, further, if 'adhyāsa' (as Sankara says in his introductory *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* itself) is the cause of all "activity in the phenomenal world (*loka-vyavahāra*)", this will certainly lead us into the fallacious argument known as *anyonyāśraya* (the reciprocal relation of cause and effect). Hence, we finally reach two conclusions of a decisive nature. First, 'adhyāsa' has its own cause, and this already existing cause is the *bija-sakti* which is known as *avyakta*, *avidyā*, *māyā*, etc., and which, when it manifests itself as Īśvara's creative activity, makes possible the jiva's process of *adhyāsa* and the life of *samsāra* in the world of material phenomena which results from 'adhyāsa'. Secondly, in order to avoid the fallacious argument above mentioned, we have to adopt the rational explanation based on the unquestionable fact involved in what is known as *bījānukaranyāya* and the perfectly rational conception of *anāditya* based on it,—a conception finally accepted in the Vedānta, but totally and frequently denied by our author as having no basis in fact or reason.

We now take up the central theme of the author's work as already outlined above,—that a knowledge of the Absolute Re-

ality, one and without a second, and of the Perfect Bliss and knowledge which is its essence, can be gained by an enquiry into the three states (*avasthās*) of waking, dream, and deep sleep,—and that, especially in the last one (*susupti*) we attain to a unity with the Pure Being free from all contact with the dross of material objects. We give the following translated extracts from his work in order to enable the reader to follow us in our critical comments. (1) 'In all the three states, the failure (i.e., the absence) of the Witnessing Self in its essential nature is not perceived' (2) "We do not agree to the existence of 'avidyā' in deep sleep, but agree to its existence in the waking state" (3) "In deep sleep, there exists nothing other than the Ātman, and this has been shown already. That this Ātman is without limiting conditions must be agreed to for the reason that the *mithyā* (falsehood, in the sense of inconsistency) of all apparently existing material objects enters (as a conviction) into the thought (*buddhi*) of the investigator" (4) "We do not say, that, having been liberated (*mukta*) in *susupti*, one becomes bound when awakened. What then? Though always of the nature of one liberated — even as a person, because he has not enquired into the real nature of the Ātman, falsely assumes that bondage exists in the self, so also though there is no phenomenal world in deep sleep, we think wrongly that in deep sleep there is ignorance of the phenomenal world, that in the waking state, there is the reality of the phenomenal world, though as a real fact, there is always no *prapañca* therein" (5) "In deep sleep there is knowledge of the ego (*aham-jñāna*). Further, that the absence of all activity (*vyavahāra*) is of the essence of deep sleep is well-known to all from the shepherd to the learned man, and hence it is not possible, by any kind of reasoning, to establish that the Ātman is of the nature of the Ego (*Aham*)" (6) "In deep sleep there is no material object (*viśaya*) known. What then? There is the non-existence of any such material (*sāmagrī*) as would prove an impediment to sleep. If there exists any impediment to sleep then there must also exist a phenomenal knowledge (of objects) intervening in the midst of sleep" "As regards memory, there is no indispensable necessity to assume that there must be previous experience in all cases, and as in deep sleep there is no possibility of having any experience of positive phenomena, this mere seeming (or shadow) of memory is only a '*vikalpa*' i.e., it is only a mental fabrication, and there is non-existence of any positive object outside to corres-

pond to it " (8) "As the Ātman is also of the essential nature of bliss and as in deep sleep there is no cause of distraction, the Śruti says that in sleep we attain to the nature of Bliss" We have given all these extracts in order to represent our author's central thesis in his own words. We now pass to a critical examination of them in the light of the explanations contained in Sankara's Bhāṣyas. Our object now is to show that Sankara's view of deep sleep (*susupti*) is quite opposed to our author's representation. Sankara does postulate (1) that in deep sleep 'avidyā' exists in a positive form (*bhāva-rūpa*) and (2) that there is no pure bliss, but only a kind of phenomenal and conditioned bliss in the same state (i.e. deep sleep).

In his 'bhāṣya' on the Māndukya-Upaniṣad, Śāṅkara gives the following explanation of deep sleep "Without giving up the actual form of the sum-total of material objects known to the mind in the distinct states of waking and dream one has become filled with ignorance (*avvekāpanna*) even as the light of day with all its extensive content of objects is devoured by the darkness of night (*nausa-tamas*)" This passage clearly shows that in deep sleep, ignorance exists in all as a positive phenomenon and only helps to cover up the forms of material objects known to the mind into an indistinguishable whole. Secondly, Śāṅkara, in commenting on sloka 2 of the 'āgama-prakarana,' tells us what has become of the mind itself when explaining the statement, "*ākāśe-a-hrdi*" He says.—"Only when perception and memory exist, the mind is active, when they cease, it has its residence in the heart alone in the form of the vital principle (*prāṇātmanūrasāhānam*) without the knowledge of any particular object" Further, "as mind has no activity (*vyāpāra*) all the 'vāsanās' have become solidified (*ghana-prajña*) and integrated into an indistinguishable unity". Sankara here also quotes a Śruti.—"prāṇa devours all these", viz, the *vīśeṣas* and the *vāsanās*. Thus we see clearly that Śāṅkara holds that, though the mind has no activity (*vyāpāra*) in 'susupti-avasthā' it does exist with all its contents solidified and integrated into an indistinguishable whole. It becomes one with the vital principle in the heart for the time being, and in fact is protected by it with all its contents in a passive state.

We shall next refer to the important explanations regarding 'susupti' contained in the Prasna-Upaniṣad and the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad. In the former he says—"At what time the shining one of the nature of mind (*manorūpa-devah*)

becomes overcome (*abhibhūtaḥ*) by the solar heat (*sourena tejasū*) known by the appellation of 'pitta' pervading all the tabular organs (*nāḍis*) of the body, and thus all the doorways of the impressions (*vā.anās*) lying therein become closed, then the rays of the mind become suppressed - i.e., when the mind having pervaded the whole body like the fire dormant in a piece of wood subsists therein the form of *vijnāna* (the principle of cognition, ordinarily known as *buddhi*) not related to any particular object - then it (*manas*) gets into the state of deep sleep. In this state, it - the shining one named mind - does not see dreams, as the doorways of sight are closed by the solar heat. Furthermore, in this body this bliss exists viz the bliss in which the mind, without impediment of any kind and freed from its function of knowing particular objects, attains to the state of peacefulness pervading the whole body." This state of blissful peace is called elsewhere in the Upanisads by the name of *samprasāda*. Sankara here distinctly tells us that (1) the *manas* and *vijnāna* become one in deep sleep, (2) that, though the mind has not its capacity to know particular objects as in the waking state, it attains to, and enjoys, a state of blissful peace. This state of bliss, however, ought not to be confounded with the pure bliss (*ānanda*) of the one Existence only. But of this we shall have to speak later on in dealing with our author's interpretation of certain Upanisadic passages.

Śankara then goes on to point out:—"At this time the objects outside and the sense-instruments which have as their causes 'avidyā', 'kāma', and 'karma' become stilled. When they are stilled, the non-dual blissful self manifested in different forms by phenomenal limiting adjuncts becomes (also) stilled. In order to present this state clearly as one in which there enter the minute parts (*mūtras*) of earth etc. which are the products of ignorance (*avidyā-kṛta*), the Śruti gives an example as follows "As, dear friend, birds retire to their residence in trees, so all (the *tanmūtras*) to be enumerated (in the Śruti text following) enter into the higher self (*pare ātmanī*)."

From this passage we can easily draw the following conclusions (1) Avidyā is positive in nature (*bhāva-rūpa*), for Śankara holds that the *tanmūtras* are "avidyā-kṛta". Nothing can be produced from a mere negation. Hence *avidyā*, as the producing cause of the *tanmūtras*, must be positive, and it is therefore also rightly called 'mūlāvidyā', (2) As the 'tanmātras' become connected with the self as its limiting adjuncts in the state of dreamless sleep, the "pare-ātmanī" of this text must be distinguished from the

"param-eva-aksaram" and the "śubhram-aksaram" of the text immediately following. The former is *not* pure (*śubhram*) for the reason that it is associated with the 'tanmātras' in 'susupti'.

In this connection, it is important to refer to a Bhāṣya passage also relating to dreamless sleep in Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Chap VIII, Khanda 3, section 2 — "Even as men who, do not know the 'nidhī-sāstra' (the science of treasure-trove) cannot become aware that gold lies hidden below the surface of the earth even though they may be daily walking over it and are quite capable of knowing of its existence, even so all these men who have 'avidyā', though in their 'susupti' state they daily go into Brahma-loka—the 'hrdayākāśa' (the ether of the heart) already referred to,—they do not attain to the realization 'I have now attained to the state of Brahman'—they are pushed out of their own (true) self by the said *anṛta*—they are forcibly driven outside by the defilements due to 'avidyā,' etc. The conclusion to be arrived at is that it is the misfortune of all living beings that (in 'susupti') Brahman is not attained by them, though within their reach". Sankara has interpreted the word 'anṛta' used in the Sṛuti-text above quoted to mean "*andīyādidosah*," 'avidyā' and other defilements. We must note that Śāṅkara here states in express terms that, in the state of deep sleep, all living beings become subject to ignorance and other defilements and that hence they are not only thereby prevented from attaining to Brahman, but even pushed out (*bahvapakṛstah*) into the world of material objects.

In the section following (Chāndogya VIII, 3—3) Śāṅkara also says — "The man of knowledge who is enlightened by the teaching, 'tat-tvam-asi'—having known that he is the One Existence (Sat) only and nothing else, becomes Sat only. Thus, in 'susupti,' though both the knowing and the ignorant do attain to Sat, still he who realizes it thus is said to attain to "*svargam-lokam*". The word "*svargam-lokam*" in this section is equated to "Brahma-loka" in the previous section. Here is an important clue to us,—for it shows that the "bliss" enjoyed in the state of 'susupti' (*samprasāda*) is *not* the highest bliss of the one Existence only, as our author supposes.

In order to make this matter clear, we shall again refer to the Bhāṣya on Prasna-Upaniṣad, Section IV. Here Śāṅkara explains as follows — "The object of the inquirer is to know the speciality of the states of 'susupti' and 'pralaya' in which the entire collection of senses and their objects is swallowed up."

In section 4, we have the Upanisad statement — "the mind is the sacrificer (yajamāna), the 'udāna' (one of the five breaths) is the result of the sacrifice (yajna), it conveys the sacrificer daily to Brahman." Śāṅkara says in his 'bhāṣya' on this passage — "In this state (of deep sleep) when the fires of breath are active and the outer sense instruments and their objects are withdrawn into the mind, the sacrificer is awake, wishing to attain to Brahman, like 'svarga' as the result of 'agnihotra'. The mind like a sacrificer moves chiefly (i.e., in the waking state) among the sense instruments and their objects. The mind is represented as a sacrificer, because the mind moves on its journey towards Brahman even as the sacrificer is going towards 'svarga'. The result of the sacrifice is attained with the help of *udāna*. How? Every day in the time of deep sleep, the *udāna* having made the sacrificer called *manas* slide down from the dream phenomena conveys him to Brahman even as to svarga." Here the comparison of 'Brahman' to 'svarga' in the state of 'susupti' corresponds to the similar comparison (above referred to) of Brahman to 'svarga' in the Chāndogya Upanisad and in Śāṅkara's 'bhāṣya' thereon. The comparison is clearly intended to show that the Brahman attained in both cases in the state of 'susupti' is *not* the one Absolute Existence, but that which is limited by the activity of *avdyā* and *prāṇa*. Only the sense instruments and their objects (*kāryakārana*) are actually withdrawn and become inactive in deep sleep. Śāṅkara, also, immediately goes on to point out as follows — "To the man who knows thus (*evam-vidusah*) during all the time intervening from the time when the ear, etc., become completely stilled to the time of rising from deep sleep, there is only the gaining of all the results of 'yāga' (*sarita-yāgaphala-eva*) and there is nothing tending to what is painful (*ananta*) as in the case of one who has ignorance, and this is 'only to be understood as a "eulogy" of the state of one who has (true) knowledge. For with regard to the man of (true) knowledge, neither his sense of hearing, etc., becomes inactive in the dream-state, nor does his mind get into the state of deep sleep, voluntarily in his every day life. The getting successively into the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep is common to all living beings. Hence it is reasonable that here we have only a "eulogy" of the state of the man of knowledge." Thus Śāṅkara distinctly tells us that so far we have in the 'susupti' state no *real* getting into the Ātman as it truly is. A little later on Śāṅkara also distinctly says about all the three states in general — "Until

liberation is reached, all '*vyavahāra*' (life-activity) is related to '*avidyā*' and springs from mind and other limited adjuncts (*upādhis*)". We have put these important words in italics in order to press on the reader's attention the fact that in all three states there is *vyavahāra* (activity of one kind or another) having a common origin in '*avidyā*'. Also, it must be clearly apprehended that, whenever, in the Upanisads like the Chāndogya etc., in describing a living man's '*susupti*' condition, such expressions occur as "he has attained his self" (*svam-āpito-bhavati*)—an expression to which our author draws special and frequent attention in the work now under review—every one of them is only to be understood as a "eulogy" of the state of man of true attainment or knowledge of the Ātman, but that, as a matter of fact, there is no such attainment even in deep sleep in a sense different from what happens in the states of waking and dream. For, in Sankara's own words above quoted, "until liberation (from '*samsāra*') is attained, '*avidyā*' is common to all activity (*vyavahāra*)". It is this '*avidyā*' that Śankara in several places calls *bīja*, the seed from which a material body sprouts. Hence, it is *mūlāvidyā*. Hence, also, it is positive in its nature (*bhāva rūpa*). Hence, also, owing to the fact that the organs of sense and their objects in the external world are not exercising any influence on us, "there is (according to Śankara) this kind of bliss—*etad sukham bhavati*—viz., that which is due to the peacefulness pervading the whole body"—that which is known as *samprasāda* in the Upanisads—not the pure '*Ānanda*' or '*Brahman*' itself.

In the Chāndogya context (Chap VI-8) also, where the '*Jīvātman*' is said to have passed into '*Sat*' (Existence) beyond even '*Susupti*' through the gaining of true knowledge, Śankara refers to it as follows—"If this living self, too, being withdrawn into *Sat*—even as the mind is withdrawn into *Sat*—even as the mind is withdrawn into its cause by a *nimitta* operating in the time of its sleep—is withdrawn owing to true knowledge (*abhisandhi*), it attains to '*Sat*' only, and never again comes out of it in order to get into another body, as it does after *Susupti*." This passage is particularly valuable and worth the reader's attention, as proving how utterly untenable is the main theme of our author's work. For, Śankara says therein, clearly and in so many words that, between attaining the '*Sat*' only and the state of deep sleep, the special difference is not only that, in the former case, there is true knowledge (*abhisandhi*) while, in the latter case, there is "*avidyā* and its defilements", but that, when-

ever it is stated in the Upanisads that, in the 'Susupti' state a man has attained to 'Sat', 'Svam', 'Para-Ātman' and so on, it is only to be understood as a "eulogy" of the man who has attained to true knowledge. There is *really* no such attainment. Sankara himself says later in the same context — "All these living beings (*prajāḥ*), though daily attaining to 'Sat' in 'susupti', even as in the state of *marana* (death) and *pralaya* (universal dissolution)—do not know that they are going to attain or have attained to 'Sat'." For such knowledge can only be gained through the processes of 'Śīavana', 'Manana' and 'Dhyāna' mentioned in the Upanisads and taught by a competent teacher to the aspirant after release from the bondage of 'samsāric' existence. On the other hand, in the ordinary state of deep sleep, 'avidyā' exists in what Sankara calls its form of 'bija-sakti', the mind enters into 'prāṇa' with the heat of the sun associated with it and becomes diffused along with them, but is not non-existent, though it loses its special forms of activity (in the waking state) owing to such diffusion. Sankara, in explaining the term 'ānanda-bhuk' as applied to the 'prajña' or the self in the condition of deep sleep states as follows — "As regards 'manas', as it has not the trouble of moving (*spandanyāsa*) so as to take the form (*ākāra*) of material objects (*viśayas*) and of the living self (*viśayi*) associated therewith, it is *ānandamayī, ānanda-prāya, not Ānanda-eva* (pure bliss)." This clear statement together with the detailed explanations already given regarding the peaceful state of bliss (*samprapāda*) in the state of deep sleep ought to convince all that our author's central contention that in the state of 'susupti' there is the attainment of 'Sat' *only*, or 'Cinmātra' or pure 'Ātman', is absolutely unsupported and opposed as the poles to what he conceives to be "the heart of Sankara." It has also been shown, on the support of various Bhāṣya passages from several Upanisads, that there is not an atom of support for the author's contention that there is no phenomenal experience of 'avidyā' (ignorance) or of blissfulness in 'susupti'.

Before closing this part of the subject, we wish to refer to two short Bhāṣya passages in further elucidation of the state of 'susupti'. (1) In his Bhāṣya on Gaudapāda's Kārikā, Sankara says — "If there is non-existence of the seed (of ignorance) which is capable of being burned by 'jñāna', the uselessness of 'jñāna' will come in as a necessary consequence. The seed-state (*bījasthā*) is experienced in the body, for in him who has risen from sleep there is observed the

cognition (*pratyaya*), "I knew nothing" (2) In his *Bhāṣya* on the *Jyotiṣ-trāhmana* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, Śaṅkara says:—"there is seen also the rising after deep sleep with (the consciousness) that I slept blissfully and had no knowledge of any object". In this passage Śaṅkara distinctly asserts the positive existence (or experience) in 'susupti' of 'avidyā', of egoity and of blissfulness. Further Śaṅkara says in his *bhāṣya* (on *Āgama-prakaraṇa*, śloka 1) —"All these are three successive states, and through memory taking the form, 'soham' (he is I), there is an answering previous cognition." In the face of this direct statement of Śaṅkara, how can our author come forward to say "As regards memory, there is no indispensable necessity to assume that there must be previous experience in all cases and as in deep sleep there is no possibility of having any experience of positive phenomena, this mere seeming (or shadow) of memory is only a *vikalpa*"—a mere verbal concoction without a basis in actual fact. But our author goes further —"Even if we agree to the experience of memory (i.e. after waking from 'susupti') there is no *anubhava* (experience) of an existence, viz, bliss, therein, but only a *parāmarśa* (an inference)" To this we reply, using Śaṅkara's own words, that in every case of memory there is "an answering previous cognition". What the nature of such cognition is in the case of sleep has already been stated in the words contained in the two '*bhāṣya*' passages just previously quoted. In both cases, Śaṅkara distinctly and positively assures us of the existence of a cognition (*pratyaya*) existing in sleep and continued (as a memory or otherwise) into the waking state. Finally, our author makes the following suggestion — "As regards what is not cognized as a particular object, it is known, not as 'I have become awake' but only as 'I was immersed in profound sleep'—i.e. this last is only an inference (*anumāna*) from the non-existence of any material provision capable of proving an impediment to 'susupti'." Our reply is, that this is a far truer instance of a *vikalpa* than the "seeming of memory" in deep sleep which he called such. But, in the state of deep sleep we have already shown and on the authority of Śaṅkara himself that there exist many positive elements, and cognitions of them, which are continued till *jāgrat* is reached.

We shall now pass on to a consideration of our author's views on the waking and dream states. Our author points out (1) wherein they resemble each other, (2) where they differ.

We quote the following passages from his work in order to give a definite idea of his views on both points "Speaking truly, as regards the states of waking and dream, there does not exist in the least degree any distinguishing characteristic to justify us in drawing a contrast between them except the name (*vyapadeśa*)" "No one can venture to deny their similarity in every respect" "As regards the names and conditions of both, together with the objects perceived as included in them, they are equally incapable of having their nature fully and truly ascertained and they are also mutually exclusive of each other Hence, even as dream objects are decisively false in nature, so also are those which are perceived in the waking state" and so on

We now pass to a consideration of Sankara's views in order to show whether our author's views regarding the "similarity in every respect" between the states of waking and dream are in consonance with them, or the reverse Śankara compares the two states in his *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* III, 2-3 He says—"The manifestation in dream is false in its entirety. It has not the least trace of *paramārtha-vastu*, an existing material object What is the meaning of 'entirety' here? The answer is—the possession of the attributes of time, place and causation and the absence of stultification These attributes of a real material object—viz time, place, causation, and the absence of stultification—cannot be regarded as appertaining to dreams"—thus clearly revealing to us the implication that they appertain only to the objects of the waking state which Śankara calls here by the name, *paramārtha-vastu*, really existing material object The objects of the dream state are "stultified" in the waking state, and therefore, there is no chance of a recurring experience Hence both the 'sūtra' itself and Śankara in his *Bhāṣya* also, call them by the name of "*māyamātra*"

Before we leave this topic, we have to draw attention to the fact that, in this connection and elsewhere, our author declares with especial emphasis, that *vyabhūṭa* (failure or inconstancy) alone is the test for declaring a thing to be *mithyā*, phenomenal, unreal Śankara and his school are not opposed to this view But we have just seen that Sankara holds that the objects of the waking state, which he calls *paramārtha-vastu*, have the attributes of "existing in time, place and causation and also the absence of stultification", and that these attributes cannot be regarded as appertaining to dreams, and so he

calls them *māyāmūḍā* and *mithyā*. Whether the objects in dream are characterized by inconstancy (*vijabhucāra*), as they are in our experience only, or whether they are made to appear for a time and then withdrawn and exist elsewhere, is a point on which no certain pronouncement can be made. Śāṅkara at least speaks with no uncertain voice. He gives his teaching fully and clearly as follows in this same connection:—"While a man imagines himself in his dream going in his body to another place, the bystanders see that the very same body is lying on the couch. Further a dreaming person does not see in his dream, other places such as they really are. . . In the second place, we see that dreams are in conflict with the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night dreams that it is day in Bhāratavarṣa, another lives through many whole periods of years during a dream which lasts for a short 'muhūrta' only. In the third place, there do not exist in the state of dream sufficient *nimittas* (efficient causes) for thought or action, for, as the organs are drawn inward, the dreaming person has no eyes etc. for perceiving chariots and other things and whence should he, in the interval needed for the twinkling of an eye, have the power to procure the material for making chariots and the like. In the fourth place, the chariots, horses etc., which the dream creates, are stultified (i.e. shown not to exist) in the waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself stultifies what it creates, as its end often contradicts the beginning; what at first was considered a chariot turns in a moment into a man, and what was conceived to be a man has all at once become a tree." Also, in this same context of his Sūtra-Bhāṣya, Śāṅkara says:—"The world, consisting of ether, etc. remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul knows the Brahman as the self, the world of dreams, on the other hand, is daily stultified (*bādhyate*) by the waking state." The objects of the material world in the waking state are designated by Śāṅkara *paramārtha-vastu* and stated by him to have *vyavasthita-rūpa*, because they last for ever for all ordinary people and are only stultified for those rare souls—perhaps only one in a hundred millions—who realize the identity of the Brahman with their own living self.

Our author here casually introduces a discussion regarding *pratyabhijñā*—the recognition of identity in an object or person or the continued existence (*anuvṛtti*) of the cause in an effect. He states as follows:—"When we examine whether 'praty-

bhijñā—the knowledge that this object now before us is the same as what we saw before (*tudevedam*)—can be accepted as reliably correct, (we ask) why cannot the object now present be also a false perception, as mistake (*vipralambha*) can possibly happen with regard to external objects. We have already shown that though ‘*pratyabhijñā*’ is competent to influence the exercise of human activity, it is not certain that it will rest on an experience which is not stultifiable”. Our reply is that there are ‘*pratyabhijñā*’ like our daily identification of the sun, moon etc., or the perception of the continued existence (*anuvṛtti*) of earth in the form of *mr̥d* in all its transformations as a pot, wall, etc., about which no mistakes can possibly happen in the nature of things, and hence we must reject our author’s idea that the liability to mistake affects every case of ‘*pratyabhijñā*’. ‘*Pratyabhijñā*’, therefore, must be accepted as falling into two divisions, one with regard to which no mistakes are possible, and another, where false perceptions are possible and do ordinarily arise.

Our author, too, seems at this stage of his discussion on this topic to be rather at his wit’s end when he warns us that, if we differed on this point, we might become guilty of the charge of discarding the customary obligation by which “all schools of (Indian) philosophical thought accept as unquestionable what the old Tārkikas have held to be true regarding *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*”. To our mind, no such obligation has been recognized even as regards the nature and number of the categories, much less as regards any of the essential doctrines of the Tārkikas. We shall give an example which, as will be seen, has a bearing also on our present topic of ‘*pratyabhijñā*’. Sankara, as all Vedāntins ought to be aware, holds the doctrine known as *sat-kārya-vāda*, the view that every effect (*kārya*) in the world of phenomena exists previously in the positive form of its cause (*kāraṇa*). Sankara here opposes the Tārkika doctrine known as *asat-kārya-vāda* or *ārambha-vāda*, i.e., that an effect does not previously exist in any form, and there is only a previous negation (*prāgabhāva*). Sankara’s doctrine of *sat-kārya-vāda* is based on the very phenomenon we have been dwelling upon, viz., ‘*pratyabhijñā*’. Sankara says (in his *Bhāṣya* on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) that the continued existence of the cause (*kāraṇānuvṛtti*) is perceived in the effect. “The causal earth (*mr̥d*), in producing one of its effects like a pot after ceasing to exist in the form of *pṇḍa* (kneaded clay) is seen to have continued existence (*anuvṛtti*) in its original

form of earth. Hence we cannot assume, by (mere) inference, the similarity (*sādrśya*) between cause and effect." Here Śāṅkara rejects another Tārkika doctrine, that of similarity between cause and effect, and takes his stand on the recognition of the continued existence of the former in the latter.

In a later context too, where our author is dealing with our knowledge of the world in the 'jāgrat' (waking) state, he makes a reference to 'pratyabhijñā', and expresses the following view - "It is not competent for us, basing ourselves on the strength of Pratyabhijñā, to establish the continuing identity of the world in the waking state." His reason for holding the view is stated as follows - "What is known by simultaneous experience as two (separate) knowledges—viz memory and direct-perception—is not fit to produce one and the same knowledge. Much more distant is the prospect of establishing the (continuing) sameness (*ekatva*) of the world on the strength of the certainty of such a demonstration. Thus there is no chance of truly establishing the existence of Pratyabhijñā, i.e., the perception of the world as a continuing existence." To this argument, we reply that 'pratyabhijñā'—the knowledge defined as *adevedam*, the identity of the object now seen with that which we saw formerly,—is not at all asserted as referring to the whole world of objects known to an individual or even to each and every separate object therein without exception, but confined only to objects assuredly known to have continued the same within the interval of time between our past and present perceptions of them. To hold that there are no such objects at all is to go counter to the universal experience of humanity. It means also that our author is in favour of the *ksanikavāda* of the Buddhists,—the view that every thing exists for one instant only and no longer.

K. SUNDARARAMA IYER

A POSTSCRIPT

In the above review, we have in one place referred to a Gītā-analogy in order to show that the author of the work has erred in holding that,—simply because Śāṅkara says that "the 'adhyāsa', thus defined, learned men (Pandits) consider to be 'avidyā' "—he must, therefore, be also considered as maintaining the same view, viz that 'avidyā' and 'adhyāsa' are identical. We wish to add the remark that Śāṅkara does not at all hold Pandits to be infallible, but frequently points out

their ignorance and errors. In the 'bhāṣya' on Sūtra I, 1-4, Śankara says — "Even Pandits who know the difference between the self and the not-self are ignorant of the true import of words and concepts even as keepers of sheep and goats ordinarily are". Again, in his 'bhāṣya' on Gaudapāda-Kārikā, Sankara says — "Though a Pandit, one must be considered only an ignorant man (*bāḷasa*) if he has no knowledge of the truth regarding real existence". In the Brhadāranyaka-bhāṣya, also, Sankara speaks of the Brahman as "a matter in regard to which the highest ignorance prevails even among Pandits". Statements like these can be found in any number in Sankara's works

K. SUNDARARAMA IYER.

NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY—Proceedings and Abstracts of Papers of the Congress held at the Yale University, New Haven (Connecticut), from September 1 to 7, 1929—Published by The Psychological Review Company, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America—pp 534

The official Report of the Proceedings and Abstracts of Papers of the Ninth International Congress of Psychology that conducted its deliberations under the auspices of the Yale University in the first week of September, 1929, which has just reached India is a valuable document which sums up and presents in a nut-shell as it were, the substance of the investigations and researches of international workers, and in a distinctively technical periodical like the Journal of Philosophy and Religion the volume deserves some detailed critical notice. Dr James McKeen Cattell, whom J. R. Angell in the course of his address of welcome described as "the most ingenious, as well as the most discreet and well-poised of the pioneers in the creation of a Psychology based on objective methods" has undertaken a brilliant and illuminating survey, in his Presidential Address, of "Psychology in America" giving a faithful account of the rise and progress of the science, from the days of its dim, distant origin down to the period of its contemporary radiance and brilliance. With the help of a mass of statistical data, Dr Cattell narrates the achievements of American psychologists and observes that the main condition favourable to the remarkable academic advance of Psychology from 1883 to 1900 was the growth of our universities (p 17)

Though American Psychology owes a significant debt to the work of two illustrious Europeans, Wundt and Galton, it has developed on the lines required by the exigencies of national life and advancement. The readers can get some idea of the democratization of Psychology in America from the utterance of the President of the Congress—"Our people had curiosity, acquisitiveness and energy, with ever-increasing wealth. We were able to take over what we wanted from abroad. We were not bound by traditions and precedents. The Psychologist has some reason to thank God when he is born a happy and irresponsible American child" (p. 18). The pre-eminently practical mentality of the Americans has engendered impatience with the introspective psychology and to-day America stands as perhaps the most enthusiastic exponent of the Behaviouristic Psychology, the theories and principles of which have been applied to the practical concerns and values of life with a view to making it richer, fuller and heightened in hedonistic hue. The second section is packed with information about organizations in America devoted to researches in Psychology and the papers contributed by several American workers on the various branches of Psychology. National tendencies rightly regulate and determine the lines of advance of sciences, and taking stock of the achievements of American workers in pure and applied Psychology, the president "points with patriotic pride to James, Hall, Royce, Dewey and Santayana as five writers on Psychology approaching it from the philosophical and literary side, but, with full appreciation of scientific method, such as it would be difficult to parallel in any other country" (p. 21). The Presidential Address concludes in a highly idealistic and optimistic strain with the expression of hopes of a family or fraternity of nations working and utilizing scientific resources for the common good of humanity.

Pages 53-503 are devoted to abstracts of papers, of addresses, while those from 507-531 to a list of members of the Congress arranged in alphabetical order. It is obviously not possible to make any detailed reference to the topics discussed at the informal symposia and the limited formal sessions, and the addresses delivered by the presidents of the sections into which the Congress had been divided for the purpose of study of special fields of Psychology, but, the initiated and the uninitiated readers can have a fairly accurate idea of the researches and conclusions submitted to the Congress from the following list of some of the subjects on which papers had been contributed

by international workers in Psychology Animal Behaviour and Animal Psychology, Abnormal Psychology, Application of Psychology to teaching etc, Effects of Drugs, Child Development, Juvenile Delinquency, Educational, Legal, Social and Criminal Psychology, Meaning, Motivation, and many other topics of absorbing interest Experimental Psychology with especial reference to the investigation of Conditioned Reflexes, Psycho-galvanic Phenomena, Eye-movements, Fatigue etc has occupied a prominent place in contributions to the Congress There are only four papers contributed by Indians (1) Prof M V Gopalaswamy of the Maharaja's College, Mysore, writes a paper on "Psycho-galvanic Reflex as an indicator of consciousness of guilt" (2) Prof Haridas Bhattacharya of the Dacca University has a paper on "The Psychology of post-mortem Existence" (3) Prof K. C Mukherji also of the Dacca University discusses the psychology of instinct in his paper on "Is Gregariousness an Instinct?" (4) Prof R Naga Raja Sarma has contributed a paper on "New Light On Dream Psychology From the Upanishadic Sources"

Though it is obviously not possible to do anything like justice, in the course of this notice, to the research-work accomplished by international workers in Psychology, it is necessary to record certain reflections which are sure to pass across the minds of and which are sure to be shared by those interested in the advancement of India's scientific and general culture Dr Cattell writes, in his presidential address, in golden characters as it were, a glowing account of the part played by the Behaviouristic Psychology or the "meta-behaviourism" (p 18), and observes that those who first waged a war with nature, animals, and savages, then cleared the wilderness, and those who are now engaged in the construction of a vast and complicated industrial civilization would be more interested in their own performance and in the conduct of others than indulgence in the refinements and vagaries of introspection The ancient Hindus too should have waged wars against wild animals and savages, and whether for the good or evil of the people, developed an introspective Psychology which as Dr, Cattell must know has had powerful champions in civilized and scientifically-minded Europe Ancient Indian Introspective Psychology which reached its high-water mark in Yoga, practice of certain rigorous spiritual disciplines with a view to self-purification and self-realization, would appear to have fallen on evil days.

In democratic America it is perhaps practical politics for every American boy to hope to become a Coolidge getting two dollars a word for his auto-biography or a Carnegie making all University Professors his pensioners, but politically subordinate nations like India where communalism and nepotism reign supreme, such a rapid advancement is simply unthinkable. Dr Cattell remarks that meta-behaviourism evolved under the stress of national life, scientific resources being applied to the exploitation of natural resources. The wilderness has been subdued to make room for super-sky-scrapers, but, does president Cattell believe that the meta-behaviourism made in America which can find manifestations in the jubilant lynching of the Negroes and similar phenomena, would take one a step nearer heaven than the introspective psychology which constantly reminds persons, high and low that there should be daily, almost hourly searching of heart to see if one's fellowmen are treated as ends in themselves or merely as means to one's own advancement and aggrandizement?

Do not animals seek their own pleasure? Do they not struggle and strive to get hedonistic satisfaction and gratification of their desires? Researches in Animal Psychology prove they do. If the behaviour of human societies and organizations is as well directed just for the satisfaction and gratification of the master-desires that sway animals and humans alike, how can the latter behaviour be evaluated more precious spiritually than the former? That is the whole trouble. Nothing succeeds like success. If the politically and scientifically advanced nations and communities intoxicated after drinking profusely at the fountain of success, see only an object for ridicule and rude handling in introspective psychology, it is time one cried halt. It is because, individual, social, national and international behaviour is being moulded in ways and by methods the dominant and dynamic principle of which is *egoism*, that Disarmament Conferences end in dismal failures, Peace Conferences prove to be paltry playthings, League of Nations languishes into lifelessness, and universal brotherhood becomes an utterly useless Utopia. If the success of Behaviouristic Psychology has to be measured only in terms of economic, industrial, and political exploitation of the weaker by the stronger, there must be something radically deficient about the criteria chosen.

Behaviouristic psychology or any other scientific pursuit carried on to the highest point of perfection in quantitative

measurement, when guilty of excesses is bound to break down under the weight of its own achievement and meticulous precision, unless it is checked, challenged and corrected in the light of moral and spiritual considerations that demand the treatment of one's fellowmen as ends in themselves and never merely as means for the advancement of an unmitigated life of selfishness and egoism. It would be idle to contend that even in the most up to date democratic countries of the world, the sacredness and sanctity of individual liberty is recognized and respected. Why? The capitalists that hold in their hands, as it were, world-monopolies of objects and articles and those that control the conditions of existence in Industrial Democracies manage to exploit and fatten while the labourers are obliged to earn their living by the sweat of the brow. In any clash of interests between the Individual and the State, the latter has all its own way while the former, wanted at the time of voting, is despised and discarded when once the state-officials and ministers happen to be in their places. Under the electric and dynamic inspiration supplied by the New Morality, Divorces increase by leaps and bounds. Countless other instances can be cited of the way in which individual, social, national and international Behaviour in countries, the people of which fondly believe that they are the God's chosen Messiahs to deliver unto erring struggling humanity the message of calm and comfort, is solely determined, fashioned and regulated by considerations of self-advertisement, self-aggrandizement and self-adulation. If future scientific advancement in Psychology and other sciences is to proceed on similar lines and continue to be determined and regulated by similar considerations of unmitigated selfishness and egoism, it is high time someone seriously thought of short shrift being made of Behaviouristic Psychology.

As the Śrī Bhāgavata Purāna brilliantly puts it, the conduct of the so-called civilized modern individual and civilized societies is based on the Psychology of Sensation and Sensationalism. The senses are to be satisfied and sense-cravings are to be gratified. The sense-organs and desires pull the individuals and societies, and nations in diverse directions just as co-wives pull the master of a household in multifarious ways. The securing of the sense-satisfactions, and heightening of the hedonistic hue of life do not by any means constitute the be-all and end-all of life though at present they unmistakably appear to be the dominant motives of knowledge and conduct in the West.

Indian Psychology emphasizes the value and significance of Introspection for purposes of self-purification, self-criticism, and self-realization. The brilliant survey undertaken by Dr Cattell of the achievements of Behaviouristic Psychology must convey a valuable lesson to nations, and communities that are politically backward. No amount of idle theorizing would ever make a nation efficient. The individual or the nation concerned should behave in such a way as to compel admiration even from the unwilling and the inimical. Development of efficient political Behaviour is the only help. On the other hand, the Indian workers in the social, educational and political fields should not blindly imitate the behaviour of the successful western nations, for the best of all possible reasons that efficient behaviour in one set of circumstances and in one set of environmental factors would not suit other circumstances and other environments. Efficient behaviour in one case, would very likely and even certainly prove to be ill-adjusted and clumsy behaviour in another. Those at a distance attracted by the grandeur and glamour of Western Civilization—the great Industrial Civilization as Dr Cattell characterizes it—which has been the outcome of and which has as well nurtured Behaviouristic Psychology may suggest the adoption of those methods as far as possible which have enabled other nations and communities scientifically, economically, industrially, and politically to advance themselves, but, I very much doubt whether a transplantation wholesale of the methods in Indian soil would bear desirable fruit. For obvious reasons relating to space and selective choice, I have confined my observations to the Presidential Address, and I must now conclude this notice. Fifty years ago, as Dr. Cattell points out (p 13) there was no science of Psychology in America, and to-day America leads as it were, the Psychology-World in the scientific study and systematization of “our meta-behaviourism” as the President affectionately styles it (p 18). Another weighty pronouncement of the president is “By increasing economic production we can do more for the welfare of the people *than by teaching them to be virtuous* (italics mine). In America, we have constructed a great civilization, not by trying to be civilized, but, by applying invention and organization to the exploitation of natural resources” (p 14).

Ancient Indian Introspective Psychology on the other hand as we find it embodied in the Sanskrit texts—some of which have been and are still being investigated by me in a

series of articles to the patriotic daily of Madras, *The Hindu*—endeavours to make people wise and virtuous above all. It is said spectators often times see more of the real game than the players themselves. If the great and undoubtedly magnificent civilization constructed by the champions and devoted exponents of meta-behaviourism can set before itself no higher ideal in view than economic exploitation, it surely needs a thorough overhauling in the light of Introspective Psychology which counsels prayerful searchings of heart, constantly to satisfy oneself if conduct is such as to respect the individuality, freedom and rights of neighbours.

Behaviourism is not unknown to Indian Psychology. Just at the present moment, India needs dynamic Behaviourism which alone can enable her to win economic and political freedom. As, however, we have been studying and watching the consequences desirable and undesirable of the progress of Behaviourism elsewhere, Indian Behaviourism will have to endeavour to rid itself of the latter. Even so, cautious and thoughtful psychologists in the West should press for a correct evaluation of the rather extravagant claims of the Psychology of meta-behaviourism in the light of introspection.

Our ideal is then clear. For the immediate economic and political salvation of India, dynamic behaviourism is the only psychological gospel. Nevertheless, there is bound to be a substratum of introspective analysis of conduct and searchings of heart. The necessarily subjective deliverances of introspection should be constantly challenged and corrected by dynamic behaviourism. Dynamic Behaviourism in its turn should be critically reconstructed in the light of introspectionism.

Not economic and political exploitation but self-realization or coming face to face with the Supreme Power that rules and guides the Universe is the ideal—the Parama-purusārtha—according to all the schools of Indian Philosophy that count. Psychology cannot afford to stand aloof from the general metaphysical standpoint. A careful combination or sane synthesis of the good elements that are to be found in Dynamic Behaviourism and Introspectionism would alone satisfy the requirements of scientific and general progress. Dr Cattell's masterly survey of the record of progress achieved by American Psychologists during the last fifty years conveys to my mind—I believe to others as well—the valuable lesson that future workers in psychology should endeavour to approxi-

mate to the ideal of *Synthetic Behaviourism*—if I may be permitted to use the term to signify a combination of the good elements in Behaviourism and Introspectionism—in their investigation of Pure and Applied Psychology. In conclusion, I heartily endorse the remark in the resumé, "The Congress and its proceedings might come to represent a typical cross-section of Psychology as it existed in 1929" (p 5). Those engaged in teaching Psychology in Indian Universities and colleges should make it a point to pursue some specialized lines of investigation and communicate their results to the International Congress so that India's place in the sun may be ungrudgingly recognized and guaranteed.

R NAGA RAJA SARMA.

SKEPTICAL ESSAYS by BERTRAND RUSSELL—Allen and Unwin, 1928. Price 7/6

Agnostic, sceptical, rationalistic, realistic, naturalistic, positivist, freethinker, irreligious, atheistic, iconoclastic, anti-puritanical, socialistic, internationalist, pacifist,—the myriad-faced Russell never painted himself more faithfully and more vividly than in this book of his—to borrow a phrase from Baron Verulam—"dispersed meditations". *Prima facie* the book looks like a selection of his occasional and shorter writings, but a closer perusal reveals a certain unity of plan and purpose which, in spite of the apparently disconnected character of the essays, is nevertheless a very real feature of the book as a whole. Occasional essays and addresses have been welded into a continuous series of reflections on a variety of topics from the author's own point of view and the series has been rounded off at both ends by a specially written introduction on 'the value of skepticism' at the beginning and a speculative epilogue about 'some prospects—cheerful and otherwise' at the end.

Broadly speaking these essays—seventeen in number—divide themselves into two groups,—scientifico-philosophical and socio-political.

In Philosophy, Russell is an undepressed believer in the powers of reason. 'The power of reason is thought small in these days, but I remain an unrepentant rationalist' (p 120). And his skepticism is simply a plea for a non-dogmatic attitude in all departments of life and knowledge,—a steady refusal to accept anything that fails to commend itself on the grounds

of reason. Russell's rationalism must not be confused with Cartesianism and he wants that even his skepticism must be understood in the Humian sense, not in the Pyrrhonic 'I am prepared to admit the ordinary beliefs of common sense, in practice if not in theory' (p 12) And he would not like to maintain his skepticism as an absolute doctrine 'We must be skeptical even about our skepticism' (p 142) All that these utterances come to is not really an attitude of skepticism. The upshot rather is a scientific rationalism which when left to itself indulges in an apotheosis of reason, not at all objectionable, taken in itself and so far as it goes, but is in reality identical with the empirical-scientific spirit of calm and impersonal enquiry and judicious and discriminate judgment in every walk of life. Till such a judgment is possible under any given conditions, Russell would recommend a suspense of judgment 'It is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true' (p 11)

This is certainly a very healthy attitude to take towards our problems and few would have any quarrel with Russell on this score. But his readers will refuse to go all the way long with him in his sweeping condemnation of almost everything in actual conditions of life. The other group of his essays in the book under review represents this side of his reflections. They constitute the author's attempt to apply his rational skepticism to morals and politics. Our moral and political life is according to Russell infected by irrationality to the core and Russell wants to point out the advantages of the rational-skeptical attitude in these walks of human life. 'Education, the press, politics, religion, in a word all the great forces in the world are at present on the side of irrationality' (p 53). Accordingly Russell strongly criticizes many conventional aspects of our life and recommends a complete transvaluation of their values on the basis of reason. Russell raises against morality the often-repeated and as-often-refuted argument based on the absence of uniformity in our conceptions about it. For example, from the variety of conventions in regard to marriage, Russell concludes: 'It seems sin is geographical. From this conclusion, it is only a short step to the further conclusion that the notion of sin is illusory' (p 16). He even goes so far as 'to suggest that the standards of virtue now prevalent are incompatible with the production of good poetry' (p 113). Note for instance Russell's illustrations of the perverse changes in our moral judgments on or about poets. 'The life of Wordsworth illustrates the change,

In his youth, he sympathized with the French Revolution, went to France, wrote good poetry, and had a natural daughter. At this period he was a "bad" man. Then he became "good", abandoned his daughter, adopted correct principles and wrote bad poetry. Coleridge went through a similar change. When he was wicked he wrote *Kubla Khan*, and when he was good he wrote *theology*' (p 113)

Russell thus accuses our - according to Russell, conventional - moralists of perversities and incongruities and also extends this accusation to legislators, educationists and social reformers. And he pleads for a freedom, - a rational freedom - in all walks of life. We are afraid Russell throughout his critique fails to show even the least traces of a spirit of immanent criticism which is the core of all genuine philosophy. He is too much in a revolutionary hurry and is not in a mood to listen to the reason of conventions and the wisdom of institutions. And his conception of freedom scarcely seems to fit in with his avowed, 'British love of compromise and moderation' (p 11). The truth is that Russell's whole thinking is a curious admixture of individualism and socialism. As an individualist he wants all license to himself and yet as a socialist wants to claim all facilities and co-operation from the socialistic community. Thus he wants every educational facility from the community, but would denounce all authority in education, the State, the Church, the school-master, and even the parent. None of these can be trusted. And therefore 'we must aim at having as little authority as possible' (pp 190-91). But little does Russell seem to realize that such a professedly 'free' education far from socializing a community actually spells its disintegration. Unmitigated freedom whether of action or opinion is only possible in a 'solo community' if such were ever existent.

It is not possible in this all too short a notice of the book to do full justice to all the important views of the author therein, especially when one feels inclined to differ from him in many matters. But all of Russell's writings have a uniform appeal to the readers in virtue of their peculiar flavour and piquancy. His paradoxical expressions always arrest the readers' attention and often hide behind themselves substantial and acceptable truths and shrewd observations on our modern life. These Essays have a particularly well-sustained freshness about them almost on every page and their most eminent quality is that they are uniformly thought-provoking.

D. D. VADEKAR.

INTRODUCTION TO VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY by PRAMATHANĀTHA MUKHOPĀDHYĀYA, Calcutta, 1928, Publishers - The Book Company, Calcutta

Prof. Mukerji is to be congratulated on striking a new line of presenting the tenets of Śāṅkara's Vedānta in his new book "An Introduction to Vedānta Philosophy" in which he discusses the main problems of the Vedānta of the Monist School in a small compass of about 250 pages. The learned professor has attempted with success exposition of his subject in such a manner that a reader not acquainted with Sanskrit terms can easily follow the subject-matter.

The author opens his inquiry from the anthropological, psychological and metaphysical points of view, which points, he says, resolve into two notions, the subjective and the objective, the thought and the thing, in fact, Experience and Fact. The learned lecturer kept these two notions constantly in mind, and accordingly analyzed and examined the tenets from this standpoint. The doctrine of Māyā, he maintains, does not affect our ordinary every day acts, nor does it undermine the foundations of ethics, aesthetics or religion. The Brahman is real, in fact, is centre of our consciousness, and is beyond the realm of analytic and discursive thought. This Brahman, as basis of our consciousness, radiates into many "names and forms", a fact that can be illustrated by examples drawn from experimental sciences like Physics and Mathematics.

We cannot, however, close this brief notice of the book without remarking that the author would have easily avoided the reader's bewilderment if he had given in parenthesis Sanskrit terms for the English terms that he used in his book. We hope another edition will soon be in demand when the author should improve it as suggested above for the benefit of his Indian readers at least.

P L. V.

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SAIVA SIDDHANTA SYSTEM by K. SUBRAMANIA PILLAI, M. A., M. L. —Publication No. 123 of the South India Saiva Siddhanta Works Publishing Society, Ltd, Tinnevely and Madras, pp 38.

This is an outline of the metaphysics of the Śaiva Siddhānta, System by Mr. K. S. Pillai, Advocate and Tagore Professor of Law, Calcutta. The author is devoting his life-

time to a study of the System in all its aspects and the present effort to interpret the System in terms of Western thought is all the more welcome especially in view of the fact that the System has been hitherto confined to the Tamil country. The pamphlet contains a short introduction by Mr M. Bala Subrahmanyam, B. A., B. L.

The author begins his outline with the opinions of two Westerners on the System. According to one it is "the choicest product of the Dravidian intellect", while the other regards it as "the high-water mark of Indian thought and Indian life". It appears to us rather novel that so "well-known and talented" an author in his zeal for advocacy of the Saiva Siddhānta System should begin his critical exposition with this Western opinion which though appreciative is likely to cloud the reader's mind to the merits or demerits of the System examined. Secondly, we think with due deference to the efforts of Western scholars to interpret our past that time has now arrived for Indians to conduct a dispassionate study of their ancient culture independently. Indian opinion has now become sufficiently alert to understand and appreciate whatever is presented to it without Western advocacy on each occasion.

After this 'Western Opinion' the author gives us (pp 2-9) a Historical and Doctrinal Sketch of the Saiva Siddhānta, and pursuing the orthodox method passes in review the views of the various schools of thought viz the Lokāyatam, Buddhism, Jainism, Vedic Schools, Vaiṣṇavism and the Ekātmavādam of Sankarācārya (pp 10-24). He concludes his survey with the remarks that the "Ekātmavāda and allied theories leave us in confusion as respects the nature of the Universe, that of the Soul and of God himself in relation to these". Further according to Mr Pillai what is opposed to the Siddhānta in the above systems is the "confusion of the intelligent with unintelligent and the identification of the intelligent many with the Supreme Being" (p 24). The five "Saiva Siddhānta Tatvas" are next elucidated in all their divisions and subdivisions (pp 25-28) and the Pamphlet is concluded with a more detailed elucidation of the nature of the Soul (pp. 28-38).

It would appear from the foregoing résumé of the subject-matter of the pamphlet that the author has given more attention to the Historical and Doctrinal sketch than to the "Metaphysics of the Saiva Siddhānta System" which is the main subject and we hope that the learned author would try to remove this impression from a revised edition of the pamphlet.

The South India Saiva Siddhanta Works Publishing Society must be congratulated on getting such learned men as Mr. Pillai to write in a popular style on the philosophical subjects connected with the Śaiva Siddhānta and, to judge from the present publication, as the Pamphlet under review bears the serial number 123, it appears that they have already to their credit a number of useful publications for the benefit of a wider public interested in such subjects

P. K. G.

THE LATE LORD BALFOUR.

The death of Lord Balfour, the octogenarian philosopher-statesman, has deprived the philosophical world of a brilliant thinker. It is a remarkable fact in the life of Balfour that the year which saw him appointed to the post of the private Secretary of the foreign minister (Lord Salisbury) was also the year in which he became known in the world of letters. The intellectual subtlety of his 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt' (1879) raised the hope in the minds of his friends that he would soon establish his reputation as a great speculative thinker. But destiny had marked him out for the sphere of politics in which he came to be revered as the Nestor of British Statesmanship.

In these circumstances it was impossible that he should make a substantial contribution to the development of English Philosophy. Nevertheless he maintained throughout his life a genuine interest in philosophical problems. Both in his 'Theism and Thought'-a study in familiar beliefs-(1923) and in his able introduction to the remarkable symposium-'Science, Religion and Reality' (1925), he endeavours with great dialectical skill and literary effectiveness to vindicate human interests that rest on faith and feeling as against the unreasonable claims put forth on behalf of the scientific method of investigation.

In spite of its tremendous advance, science should recognize its limitations. So far as scientific research is concerned, it is perfectly legitimate to press mechanical theories of the material world to their utmost limits. But in the practice of life and in speculative philosophy, we should be free to move in wider horizons. We are spiritual beings and must take account of spiritual values. "The story of man is something more than a mere continuation of the story of matter." It is, therefore, unreasonable to limit ourselves by mechanistic presuppositions (however useful in our investigation of nature) in our attempt to determine which of our beliefs are rationally acceptable. In this way both by his writings and practice of life, Lord Balfour shattered the belief, extant in the 'Eighties and Nineties' that a man of science can have neither philosophy nor religion.

K H KELKAR.

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1931

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Printed at the Aryabhushan Press, House No. 936/2, Peth Bhamburda,
Poona City, by Mr. Anant Vinayak Patvardhan and published by
Mr. Parashuram Krishna Gode, M. A. Secretary, at the Branch Office
of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, Poona 4

Annual Subscription : Rs. 4/- (Inland); 7 s. 6d. or \$ 2.50 dollars (Foreign)

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Vol. II.

MARCH 1931

No. 1.

REVIEW 33
OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Being the Journal
OF
The Academy of Philosophy and Religion

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Printed at the Aryabhushan Press, House No 936/2, Peth Bhamburda,
Poona City, by Anant Vinayak Patvardhan, and Published by
Parashuram Krishna Gode, M A Secretary, at the Branch
Office of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion
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TOTEMISM AND THE MARĀTHĀ 'DEVAK'.

J ABBOTT, ICS

There is probably no 'ism' that has played more havoc with the interpretation of Indian customs than 'totemism,' and both English and Indian writers have constructed comprehensive theories of totemism on little else than apparent resemblances.

Of the survival of a genuine institution of totemism a few examples in the Bombay Presidency are still to be found. The Kātkari of the Konkan illustrates a totemistic organization which for practical purposes is now a thing of the past. He calls his totem 'brother' and has vague ideas that he may be reborn as his 'totem', he also pays a certain respect to the totem but this figures in none of his ritual. It plays no part in his celebration of *Sarvapitrī Amavāsya*, when through the medium of symbols, usually *tāk* or engraved pieces of copper, he invokes the spirits of his dead, and its absence from his marriage ceremonies is still more marked.

It is not always easy to say how much the sophisticated Son Kātkari has borrowed from his Hindu neighbours. In the Thana district he has a 'devak' synonymous with his family gods, which one may not rashly assume he has borrowed, but granting that this institution is borrowed it is clear that he does not imagine he has borrowed the 'totems' of others. In the Kolaba district the 'devaks' of the Kātkari appear more or less identical with those of the Marāthās, but here again tradition makes one and the same original families, such as the Powar and the More, which have different 'devaks' and in marked contrast to his totem his 'devak' is a very important feature of a marriage ceremony.

The Kātkari accordingly suggests the impossibility of attributing to the 'devak' a totemistic origin. In primis he has both a totem and a 'devak', the former is not brought into any ceremony of today, the latter is a well-marked feature in the important ceremony of marriage, and again whilst every family or 'kul' is supposed to have its own totem, a single family on partition takes different 'devaks'.

Existing definitions of the 'devak' are many. In *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. II, 1910, pp. 376-77, Sir James

Frazer quoting from the Census of India of 1901, writes of the 'devaks' as sacred symbols which appear to have been originally totems. Mr. R. E. Enthoven in several publications has given a fuller account which again however accepts this connection between the 'devak' and totemism. In the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. II, p. 338, 1909, he calls the 'devak' a marriage guardian, in '*Tribes and Castes of Bombay*', 1922, he speaks of it as a 'god of the exogamous section, whilst in his edition of *Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, (W. Crooke, 1926) he describes it with fuller detail as "the totemistic spirit contained in some tree, animal or material object which in addition to being the subject of special worship, regulates the marriage laws of many primitive sections of the population. In origin it appears to have been an ancestral spirit." Finally in *Tribes and Castes of Bombay*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 282-3, he identifies the 'devaks' of the Pardesi Kumbhars with their family deities or 'dhiradis,' and elsewhere (idem vol. I, p. 61) the 'devak' of the Baris with their 'house goddess'. Then again there is the definition made by Sir James Campbell of the 'devak' as a 'marriage guardian' or 'wedding guardian'. It is at the outset obvious that these various definitions cannot have the same connotation, the family gods, the 'kula devata' of the Hindu are not ancestral spirits. No Marāṭhā would accept the identity of his 'devak' with an ancestral spirit, none of the offerings that are usually made to the 'pitrs' are made to the 'devak', and lastly a ceremony of invoking an ancestral spirit at a marriage, the *Mūlapurusa* as it is called, has not yet quite fallen out of practice among castes that have 'devaks' and this ceremony has no connection with the installation of the 'devak' and may even be performed along with the latter at a marriage.

One deduction that has given colour to the theory of totemism is that drawn from the identity of names that undoubtedly exists between some families of Marāṭhās and their 'devaks'. It is easy for instance to find families of *Mores* who have as their 'devak' the *Mon* or peacock, to find *Sālunkes* with the 'sālunkī' bird as a 'devak' or *Selārs* with the 'Seli' or black she-goat. It is however equally easy to find *Mores* with the 'maryādvēl' or 'pānkanis' as their 'devak' and *Sālunkes* with the *Sahāmr̥g*, the *Nāg*, the *Sami*, *Sūryakīraṇ*, *Bhāradvāj*, *Bhārang*, *Umbar*, and *Conch*, whilst I was fortunate in finding in *Wai*, a village of the *Satara* district, a family of *Selārs* who within living memory had the banyan

tree as their 'devak' but changed this subsequently to the Sell, on their becoming meat-eaters. When one remembers that punning and false etymologies lead to restrictions on the cutting or planting of trees, decide the form of charms and expand the meaning of a 'devak' as when those who have as 'devak' a 'dhār' or edge of a blade, avoid garments with a coloured or pronounced edge or border, one can easily concede that a pun may have led to the choice of a 'devak'. Among the Kātkaris a play on the words *sindī*, 'wild palm-tree' and *sindulī* 'a kept woman' leads to the injunction that those who have lost their totems should take the wild palm-tree as their totem. So far from concluding then that the family name was taken from that of the 'devak' there is reliable evidence to suggest that the 'devak' is often chosen from a play on the name of the family, on the principle perhaps that there is 'sakti' or 'power' innate in a name.

A second deduction that has frequently been made is one drawn from the respect paid to the source from which the 'devak' is taken. In *Trees and Castes of Bombay* (vol. III, p. 131), Mr. Enthoven writes 'these devaks are totemistic as the objects representing them are not touched, cut or otherwise used'. There are several inaccurate surmises in this assumption. In the first place the 'devaks' include objects which on grounds other than their being 'devaks' are revered by Hindus in general, and in the second place it is easy to multiply instances of trees from which 'devaks' are cut that receive themselves no reverence at all save on the occasion when the 'devak' is cut. Further than this, even should one concede that the parent source of 'devak' always received reverence, one would not be justified in assuming that the 'devak' is a totem. It is not unusual to find reverence paid to a thing which at times is used in a special ceremony, the Marāthā has a disinclination to cut the *mū* tree as he uses this in the worship of Gaṇpati, and the Brahmin of course is equally reluctant to use for ordinary purposes the five trees he burns in a 'homa'.

There are other considerations too that discredit the theory of totemism as applied to the 'devak'. Many families have more than one 'devak', sometimes two, sometimes even three, which they use alternatively one of these usually being some

object easily obtained, families that claim no inter-relationship at all have the same 'devak', contrawise families that cannot intermarry because of consanguinity have different 'devaks' and families making division take different 'devaks'. Then again there are villages in which a number of races entirely different, even different sects, share a common 'devak', and it is quite common for a family migrating from one village to another to assume the 'devak' it finds common in its new abode. No principle in line of totemism rules the adoption or the abandonment of a 'devak'.

To return to the many current definitions of a 'devak'. If one rules out the possibility of a 'devak' being an ancestral spirit is it possible to accept it as a 'marriage guardian' or as a 'family god'? Now there are several vernacular names for a 'devak'. In the Konkan among the Agris and again in Khandesh among the Konkans the 'devak' is called *Vārah* which I presume means 'defender' or 'that which wards off', in other districts it is frequently called *Māy Devata* and a more esoteric definition is the 'abode of God' (ईश्वरान आश्रित). The key in fact to the problem of the 'devak' is nothing more than the Hindu practice of invoking 'sakti' or 'power' into symbols, the practice of *Avāhana* (आवाहन). The 'devak' of the Marāṭha and other castes is a symbol into which the 'sakti' of the village or the family god is invoked, these being often identical. By this invocation the presence of the deity is ensured during the marriage ceremony within the marriage 'mandap' or booth, and when as occasionally happens a marriage is performed in a temple in pursuance of a vow, the 'devak' is not installed because the deity is already present in the temple.

The details of the ritual of installing the 'devak' follow exactly the ordinary canons which guide the practice of *Avāhana*. Should the 'devak' be a branch of a tree it is severed from the tree with certain formalities which in general constitute the only reverence which is accorded to the parent tree. Whatever be the 'devak' it is first taken to a spot considered sacred, this is usually the temple of the village god. Some Marāṭhas take it to the threshing floor, some Kolis to the cattle stand, whilst by depressed castes it may be taken to the site of the *Holi* fire. Another alternative practice is to take it direct to the shrine of the family gods where it may be placed in a winnowing fan with a bodice before the gods. Whether however it is taken to the one or to another of these places the

subsequent ritual is essentially the same. The 'devak' is insulated from the ground by an 'āsan' or seat of rice and 'aksat' unbroken rice, the usual medium for invoking 'sakti'. It is from this moment that the object really becomes a 'devak', the repository of holy 'sakti' and henceforth ritual consists in providing the symbol with protection from influences that would destroy its inherent 'sakti' and finally in its final dismissal '*devak-utthāpan*'.

First and foremost the 'devak' must be protected from the sun, when it is carried to the marriage 'mandap' four persons hold over it a (*āndhū* or canopy which in the centre is held up with an axe by a male member of the family who walks under the canopy with his wife, their clothes tied together. In the marriage mandap it is then once again isolated from contact with the ground by being tied to one of the posts of the marriage booth. Along with it are tied a cake of flour '*puranpoḷi*' an axe and five leaves '*pañcāḥv*' the object of which is to protect the 'devak'. Marāṭhās also tie a lamp which is a betel-nut wrapped in cloth and lighted in ground-nut oil and it is a bad omen should this lamp fall. Occasionally a comb, a wooden bowl and other objects are also tied to the post. It is very essential to emphasize that none of these objects constitute the 'devak' or even part of it. In the *Indian Antiquary*, May 1895, vol. xxiv, p. 126, however, Sir James Campbell writes that one of the 'devaks' of the Deccan Mahārs is a piece of bread tied to a post, whilst in *Tribes and Castes of Bombay* Mr Enthoven not infrequently confuses all the articles so tied.

The last item in the ritual of the 'devak' is its formal dismissal and the request made to the deity to return again when asked. This is the ordinary practice of *visarjan* the dismissal of invoked 'sakti'. In the Konkan one common method of dismissing the inherent 'sakti' of the 'devak' is to shake it, just as the 'sakti' of the manes is dismissed in the Śrāddha ceremony from the 'pindas' when the 'yajamān' moves them. After this *visarjan*, the customary practice is then to throw the 'devak' into a well or running water, which again is after the general procedure following the dismissal of 'sakti'. *Danqars* and *Chāmbārs* in some cases take the 'devak' of a branch of a tree back to the parent tree under a protecting canopy and leave it there, whilst in the Konkan it is often abandoned near the *Tulsidev*.

From the beginning therefore to the end of the 'devak' ritual it is treated as something embodying the 'sakti' of a deity. It is protected from contact with the ground, from uncleanness of all kinds, from being stepped over, it is shielded from the sun and when tied to the post it is protected from evil 'sakti'. Yet another provision or rather prohibition which illustrates the 'power' of the 'devak' is the prohibition of all forms of 'himsā' during the time the 'devak' is in its position on the 'mandap' post. Grinding, washing, sweeping, shaving or the cutting of nails, the eating of meat are all prohibited whilst continence is insisted upon. As too in the case of the worship of a god, if the worshipper wears silk or wool he need not wash his clothes, but if his clothes are of cotton it is imperative to wash them. The importance of the 'devak' is further evidenced by the fact that it must be worshipped by a married pair with 'sakti'.

In an Appendix I have given the 'devaks'. I have myself collected among six thousand examined. The majority of these consists of trees and creepers. There are also symbols representing beings and animals of Hindu mythology that could hardly be 'aboriginal', and among the metals used there is the significant absence of iron into which 'sakti' cannot be invoked. The individuality of the 'devaks' themselves accordingly seems to support other evidence that the 'devak' is nothing more than a symbol into which the 'sakti' of a deity is temporarily invoked.

Criticism of my explanation of the 'devak' however may still urge the possibility of a totem having been perpetuated in use as a symbol, and point to the influence of the 'devak' in restricting intermarriage. Now the possession of a common 'devak' is by no means a universal bar to intermarriage, and there seems little more ground for arguing that present practice discloses the one-time prevalence of prohibitions based on the 'devak', than for thinking that the practice of today may have followed the wholesale alteration of Marāthā names that occurred under Muhammanadan rule. The association of family unity with a particular symbol is not unknown even among Desastha R̥gvedi Brahmins. I found six instances of such Brahmin families using in the worship of their family gods special grasses and herbs and in one case a family that used 'paritācighadī' as a canopy within the marriage 'mandap' and this is a Marāthā 'devak'. There are too, and this has been forgotten, a few instances among Marāthās of families which

use their 'devak' everyday in the worship of their family gods but do not use them in any special way at a marriage.

To return to Mr. Enthoven's account of the 'devak'. He frequently asserts that the commonest form of 'devak' is the 'pañcāpālvi' or 'five leaves'. As the number of trees used in the 'pañcāpālvi' (vide Appendix B) is distinctly limited and no permutation or combination thereof can reach a very large figure in proportion to the number of 'devaks' known, and as the 'pañcāpālvi' does not operate as a bar on consanguineous marriages, it would follow that the 'devak' seldom restricts marriage, a deduction inconsistent with Mr. Enthoven's assumption that it does so generally. Misled indeed apparently by the recurrence in ritual of the word (pañcāpālvi) Mr. Enthoven has built up a very untenable theory as to the five leaves as a 'devak'. He says for instance that one of the leaves 'as the original devak of the section is held specially sacred'. In actual fact there are few 'pañcāpālvis' that do not include leaves of the three trees Mango, Umbar and Jāmbhul, the 'pañcāpālvi' again is sometimes five leaves of one tree, and the only preference I have been able to find after examining several thousand 'devaks' is a preference for the *saundad* tree because it is credited with the power of warding off witches, but this is not in the 'pañcāpālvi' used as a 'devak' but in the five leaves used on the threshing floor, which last has nothing at all to do with the 'devak'. A 'devak' may be the 'pañcāpālvi' but every 'pañcāpālvi' is not a 'devak'.

One might multiply ad nauseam illustrations of the 'pañcāpālvi' in Hindu ritual. The Brahmin uses it in the installation of 'kalasas' and in the '*punyāhavācana*', the Marāthā ties it to his 'devak', Konchikoravas in times of marriage tie a branch of five leaves to their 'hālgamba', Bhils offer the leaves of five trees to their gods during an epidemic; Kātkaris place five leaves on five roads after a birth on the fifth day and at a marriage sprinkle water on the feet of their guests with the same number of leaves. Marāthās place the 'pañcāpālvi' beneath the pole of the threshing floor, and on entering a new house tie five leaves to the roof, along with many other castes when they take away their image of *devī* from the goldsmith they carry five leaves with it. One might even go beyond Hindu rites and adduce the customs of the Sindhi Muhammadan which entail the use of '*punjpālvi*'.

As to the use of the 'pañcāpālvi' as a 'devak' there would seem to be very precise restrictions. Though for instance

when so used the name of the family goddess is taken when the leaves are tied to the post I have found no single instance of the 'pañcāpālvi' being taken to the 'kula devatās' as other 'devaks' are taken. In many cases too though the 'pañcāpālvi' is used as a substitute for a lost 'devak' it is not called 'devak', and sometimes the number of leaves is three and not five, or the 'pañcāpālvi' is a misnomer as the five articles used are not all leaves. Above all it is but a short step from tying the 'pañcāpālvi' to every 'devak' to using the 'pañcāpālvi' independently when the original 'devak' has been lost or forgotten.

In a similar way there seems to have been a confusion as to the use of craft tools as 'devaks'. Here again a multitude of craftsmen tie their tools to the 'mandap' post but do not call them 'devak' and according to their own explanation do so in order to secure that they are not used on the marriage day, and again as a substitute for the ordinary axe that is generally tied with the 'devak'. It is obvious too that in any case if the whole of a class of goldsmiths were to use their pincers or blow-pipe as a 'devak' that 'devak' could not possibly operate as a bar to consanguineous marriages between families, but would prevent marriage altogether save with other castes. Whatever the explanation, accordingly, of the use of tools as the 'devak', several of the ordinary conclusions applied to the usual 'devak' cannot be applied to a tool used as a 'devak'. There is yet another possible explanation of this use of craft tools as 'devak'. The Brahmin custom of installing at a marriage Bhagvatī Śāstragarbha signifying the inherent 'sakti' in a weapon suggests a parallel which may have influenced the practice of non-Brahmin craftsmen. It may also be to the influence of Brahmin custom that the use of the 'pañcāpālvi' is due for I examined a large number of such 'devaks' and in every case I found that at some time or other those who used the 'pañcāpālvi' as a 'devak' had employed Brahmin priests.

In speaking of the 'pañcāpālvi' or of craft tools used as a 'devak' it must therefore be recognized that the term when applied to them is used with a much looser connotation than is implied in the ordinary use of the term, and above all in their case the grounds which have been adduced as evidence that the 'devak' is a 'totem' are quite irrelevant.

The internal evidence of the 'devak' and its ritual warrants in my opinion the assumption that it is but a medium

for the invocation of divine 'power'. There is fortunately a number of customs very similar to that of installing a 'devak' which force the same conclusion. The 'devak' is an institution prevalent in the Deccan and Konkan and I should suspect having its origin in the Konkan. In the Karnatak one finds the 'hālgamba' or 'milk-post', in Gujerat the 'manekstambha' or 'ruby pillar'; among Tamil Christians the 'Arasani Kallu' among Rajputs the 'Vedikkhāmb' and among Ahir Gaulis immigrants from the Mysore State the 'mandā'. Between all these customs there is a remarkably close affinity which must be accepted in discussing the meaning of the 'devak'. The 'hālgamba' is a post in the marriage booth to which symbols are tied. The affinity between this custom and that of the 'devak' is so close that the Marāthā of the Deccan with his 'devak' can accept the 'hālgamba' when resident in the Karnatak, and the Lingayat of the Karnatak when resident in the Deccan can take the 'devak' instead of his 'hālgamba'. The symbols tied to the 'hālgamba' are usually two or three branches of different trees though the practice of using a single branch of a single tree is not unknown. A few hours before the marriage ceremony begins a man who is neither a widower nor unmarried is sent to the parent tree which he worships before he cuts the 'hālgamba'. He then takes the severed branch to a temple, or throws it into a tank or well, in the temple the twig is worshipped on an 'āsana' of two pots of water brought by two married women and 'aksat' is thrown on it. From the temple or well it is then taken in procession to the marriage booth under a canopy (*Talī Chatra*), if brought from a well it is placed first on an 'āsana' of the same wood and 'aksat' is thrown on it before it is tied to the post where it becomes the *Kalpavṛkṣa*. The person bearing the twig is treated with respect; a lamp or 'ārtī' is waved round him and a woman pours water on his feet. Along with the twig are tied to the post rice coloured red, five pieces of turmeric and five pies wrapped in new cloth and a coconut.

In some cases in lieu of being tied to a post the 'hālgamba' is tied to the yoke of a cart erected in a pit in which the 'pañcāmṛt' has been placed and over this five pies, five rupees, lime and red earth are applied to the yoke. When the 'hālgamba' consists of several twigs, these are made up into five separate bundles. Of these bundles one which is the 'hālgamba' proper is made from two trees and the remaining bundles are composed of twigs of a third tree. The first bundle

is then installed to the right of the 'mandap' whilst the four bundles are thrown on the roof of the booth and after the completion of the marriage ceremony all five sheaves are thrown on the roof of the house. Supplementary practices are to make two dolls out of the 'hālgamba' wood and give these to the bride to hold when she takes the 'mangalsnān' or 'auspicious bath', or to make from the 'hālgamba' two miniature 'āsanas' and place these in a bag of rice which five married women must carry throughout the marriage ceremony. One doll and one 'āsana' represent male issue and the other female issue.

Now to revert to the affinity between the 'devak' and the 'hālgamba'.

1 The 'hālgamba' like the 'devak' is the tabernacle of invoked 'sakti'. In the temple or in the marriage booth five married women throw 'aksat' on the symbol and invoke the presence of the marriage deity. At one Lingayat marriage that I attended the 'sakti' of *Agni* was invoked into the 'hālgamba', in other cases the family god was invoked and when the five bundles of twigs are thrown on the roof of the house these are held to embody the 'sakti' of the family god. Sometimes again a distinction is made between two posts of the 'mandap' and the 'sakti' of *Varuna* is invoked into the *Hasargamba* with the object of averting a spirit *Yakṣa* who molests the bridal pair.

2 Like the 'devak' the 'hālgamba' is protected. It is primarily protected from contact with the ground, it is again shielded from the sun and carried under a canopy held up by four persons. One quaint form of protection that I found in one village was the provision of the uncle of the bride who carried the 'hālgamba' with an umbrella to which were attached old shoes and torn rags, with a garland of brinjals, onions and old brooms, with old clothes and torn blankets and an earthen pot marked with soot. As in the case again of the 'devak' widows or unclean persons cannot touch the 'hālgamba'. Corresponding too to the *Purampṭī*, which protects the 'devak' is the *Hurand Holqī* which protects the 'hālgamba'.

3 The dismissal of the 'hālgamba' requires the same precautions as the 'visarjan' of the 'devak'. The 'hālgamba' must not be thrown on the ground where it might be stepped over, it is thrown after use on the roof of the house, at the root of a tree or into water.

4 The same restrictions as to committing 'humsā' prevail during installation of the 'hālgamba' as during that of the 'devak'. All grinding is prohibited, sweeping if done from

necessity cannot be done with a broom but only with a cloth, the baking of bread is tabooed. Amongst flesh-eaters no flesh can be eaten or any animal killed, haircutting and shaving are forbidden as is also the threshing of grain. In the case therefore of the 'hālgamba' we have the same practice of *āvāhan* and of *visarjan* as in that of the 'devak'. We have different families possessing separate symbols though family exclusiveness is not as marked as among Marāthā families with their 'devaks', these symbols however are not connected with any restrictions on intermarriage and the most ardent enthusiast would not think of attributing to them a totemistic origin.

To pass to the customs of other castes. Tamil Christians in their turn pay deference to a pillar of the marriage booth. To this they fasten mango leaves and at the top a crucifix. Around this post of bamboo the bridal pair turn followed by married women throwing grain at the foot of the pillar and sprinkling milk on the grain. The catechist reads the marriage prayers near the pillar, the family of the bridal pair standing close by. On the third day of the marriage all seize the pillar together and shake it after which the pillar is thrown away. It requires little imagination to trace in this practice particularly in the shaking of the pillar, the memory of a custom of invoking 'sakti' into the pillar and of eventually dismissing it.

Among Rajputs a platform or *vedi* is built in the west of the 'mandap' and behind it a branch is fixed in the ground of mango or 'gular' and to this 'halad' and 'aksat' are tied. The branch is called *vedikhamb*. This branch after severance from the parent tree is first taken to a temple and thence brought in procession to the 'mandap' under a canopy (*chut*), in the 'mandap', the priest invokes into it the 'sakti' of the family god.

Jains of the Karnatak have their 'Manekstambha' a familiar institution in Gujerat. A 'khajda' tree (*Prosopis spicigera*) is cut, this through the agency of Kolis and Sutars as there is danger supposed in doing this cutting when the tree is cut it is addressed with these words 'do not be angry with us as we want your wood for a good purpose'. The branch is then taken to the marriage booth and before its erection cotton thread coloured red, 'mendphul', 'kanganu' and an axe are tied to it. The post is then placed in a pit on the right side of the bridegroom's 'mandap' and to the left of that of the bride. 'Aksat' is first thrown into the pit. No respect is

shown to the 'khiḍa' tree save on the occasion of its use at a marriage. The post remains erect for some days during which no widow or unclean person can touch it as it is supposed to be the residence of the family god. On the seventh day a ceremony of dismissal is performed and until this is over no grinding of grain is permitted. After this dismissal of the inherent 'sakti' the pole is thrown into a river or well by a member of the family of one of the bridal pair.

Among *Ahīr Gauḷīs* at a marriage the maternal uncle of the bride worships a mango tree and severs a branch some five feet long which is taken direct to the marriage 'mandap' and erected in front of it. Then a small earthen pot besmeared with cowdung and rice is taken, a half anna piece and leaves from the mango branch (*Mandā* or *Mānda*) are placed in it and the pot is put in front of the branch. During the marriage ceremony the bridal pair go round the pole each day five times, and on the third day when 'kankans' or wristlets are tied to the wrists of the bridal pair similar 'kankans' are also tied to the post and these with the post are thrown into running water. Though it is not an invariable practice some *Ahīr Gauḷīs* bring the mango branch to the 'mandap' in procession under a canopy coloured with turmeric.

In all these kindred practices, therefore, there are many features in common. In the care taken to protect the branch from the contact of the unclean or from that of the ground and to shield it from the sun, in its formal dismissal and the final throwing of the branch into water there is proof that the branch is believed to embody the 'sakti' of a god, and in some cases there is direct evidence of the invocation of such 'sakti'.

In the case of the *mandā*, the *manekṣāmbhā* and the *Vedī-khāmbā* a whole caste uses one and the same symbol, in the case of the *hālqāmbā* there is some variation in the symbols according to families but the number of symbols is very limited. Between these symbols and restrictions on inter-marriage there is no connection. If then we pass from these customs to the institution of the 'devak' it seems unnecessary to assume at once that because the symbols used are more numerous they must necessarily represent family unity in the sense of entailing restrictions on consanguineous marriage. To go from the *mandā*, the *manekṣāmbhā* and *vedīkhāmbā* through the *hālqāmbā* to the *Marāthā Devak* is merely to

proceed in orderly stages from the use of a single symbol employed by a whole caste to a differentiation of symbols among families which reaches its most perfect form in the 'devak'. To assume a priori that the 'devak' is a totem is to neglect altogether these other customs which are so alike in ritual detail and meaning and to which no totemistic origin can be attributed. The whole theory of totemism in fine as applied to the 'devak' institution is a loose construction based on hasty deduction from a few premises, moulded by assumed analogy and framed with no consideration for the fundamental axioms of Indian thought.

APPENDIX A

'DEVAKS'

(1) Miscellaneous.

Vāgh—The skin, claws, or flesh of
a tiger

Bhārādīyā—Bhāṅgavarāma, Kukul-
kumbhā, Bhairav, Sonkāyila—the
crow-pheasant

Rāghams—The goose

Tanūyā—The hair of the wild ox

Mor, *Lūndor*—Peacock and peahen

Sēti—The hair or head of a black
she-goat with issue

Garud—A mythical animal half man
half bird represented by a species
of eagle

Sahāmra—The eggs of an ostrich

Parī—A fabulous bird represented
by a water-bird

Dahyat—A bird

Kank—A cuckoo or heron

Parthiv—The wing of a pied wagtail

Bali—the cattle egret *Bubulcus*
coromandus

Hastadant—The tusk of an elephant

Gāy—A cow, also *Gāyāṅgomūta*

Bajr Potira—A bird

Ghār—A kite

Kombdū—A hen.

Dukar—A pig.

Kāṣayācī Pāth—Tortoise-shell

Kolisarā—A lynx

Sāyalācī Kāndi—A porcupine quill

Bail—An ox

Cātal—A bird, *Cuculus melanoleucus*

Sankpāl—A lizard

Vāg—A snake, *Vāgācī Phadī*—The
hood of a cobra

Sone—Gold

Pāmbh—A copper

Sandh—A snail

Tātār—Burnt powdered brick

Ghūgarī—A small bull

Dur—Lambs to the number of fifty
or 260

Dhūr—A blade with a lemon at the
end of it, a blade with a garland
of onions or umbra at the end, a
blade with a piece of white *Cāphā*
wood, a blade with the feather of
a kite. The lemon at the end of
the blade is also called *Dhāreca*
Phul or the sparks that fly when
steel is edged

Paratācīphali—A fold of cloth wash-
ed by a washerman and brought
from his house.

Jakeri—A lamp of flow placed in an earthen pot and taken to a stream covered with cloth

Pomale—Coral

Kāndyānāi Māl—A garland of onions with gold

Rudrākāmī Māl—Berries of *Eleocarpus ganitrus* with gold

Sūrakānt—Saxum—Sunstone, Crystal

Leṇḍ—Dung

Sugar

Har—Garland of onions on the feet of the umbay tree

Nārāl—Coconut

Bhomaḍ—A large anther

Varūṭac Sany—The upper part of a white ant-hill

Vābhūti—Ashes

Kāḷi Māt—Black earth

Cotton wool

(2) Trees and Creepers etc

Māreel—*Andropogon scandens*

Nirgūḍ—*Vitex negundo*

Ru—*Rachikā Calotropis gigantea* with white flower

Mandār—*Calotropis gigantea* with grey purple flowers

Agastī—*Sesbania grandiflora*

Kalāmb—*Kadamb Stepegvne parvifolia*

Añjan—*Hardwickia binaria*

Karun—*Pongamia glabra*

Nāgāṇṇṇā—*Mussaenda*

Pivalā *Chāphā*, *Kāñan*—*Michelia champaka*

Pūmpāl, *Asciath*, *Ravi*, *Bari*—*Eicus religiosa*

Umbar—*Ficus glomerata*

Vāl—*Ficus bengalensis*

Jāmbhūl—*Calyptanthus jambolani*

Saundal, *Sama*—*Prosopis spicigera*

Bel—*Aegle marmelos*

Kalāh—*Bambusa arundinacea*

Velā—*Dendrocalamus strictus*

Palas—*Butea frondosa*

Bhārang—*Clodendron serratum*

Roth—*Malva rotundifolia*.

Aghāḍā—*Achyranthes aspera*

Vel—*Calamus rotang* or *verus*

Moh—*Bassia latifolia*

Gugul—*Balanmodendron mukul*

Ketak, *Kevadā*—*Pandanus odoratus*—*simus*

Kamal—*Lotus*

Lokhande—*Ventilago madagascapana*

Kukhar, *Dibābhal*—*Acacia latifolia*

Seras—*Mimosa surisha*

Rā—*Sinapis racemosa*

Uhapāl—*Juniperus Lycia*

Kambāl—*Hymonodictyon excelsum*

Sisal—*Dalbergia Sisua*

Āplā—*Bauhinia racemosa*

Servī—*Bombax heptaphyllum*

Nimbūti—*Citrus limonium*

Am—*Terminalia tomentosa*

Sorā—*Loxotrophis Roxburghii*

Lwar—*Aluennus ottomalis*

Dhotarā—*Natura*

Sundī—*Phoenix sylvestris*

Kaval—*Stecelia menis*

Mandri—*Mulca begonifolia*

Somel—*Sarcostemma brevistigma*

Tāñel—*Lasium grandiflorum*

Salpi *Salphali* *Salm*—*Boswellia serrata*

Thāl sūñel—*Vitis vinifera*

Maratvel, *Bel*—*Aegle marmelos*

Darbha—*Eragrostis cynosuroides*

Morāl, *Morbal* *Morcel*—*Clematis*—*omina*

Vasani—*Cocculus villosus*

Gulul—*Tinospora cordifolia*

Guruphal—*Annona cocculus*

Pāñkanis *Pāñdelanis*—*Typha angustata*

Margadul *Manjadul* *Margat*, *Margat*—*Ipomoea biloba*

Pāñul—*Piper betle*

Cāñdel—*Mussaenda Roxburghii*

Pajāñ—*Vateria Indica*

Muracul—*Pilea nigrum*

Asanul—*Pterocarpus marsupium*

Davāñ—*Alchemilla Sieberiana*

Basundāñul—*Rubus biflorus*

Tāñandee *Phūl*—*Hibiscus rosa-sinensis*

Sonvel—Cuscuta reflexa
Mogari—Jasminum Sambac
Phanaue Jhād—Cavallia integrifolia
Mircā—Cappium frutescens
Ġaghānti—Capparis Zeylanica
Serni—Adelia nerifolia
Kākad—Gaiuga pinnata
Maharukh—Ailanthus excelsa
Vasundarivel—Cocculus villosus
Kanheri—Oleander odoratum
Kanukūnche Jhād—Pittanugra
 monophylla
Bhadarāci Phūl—Aitocarpus Lak-
 kochi
Margali—Gemma indica
Bāndgūl—Epidendrum tessellodes
Garudvel—Annonita cocculus
Ramban, Ramban—Typha elephantina
Pōngārā—Erythrina indica
Madhvel—Combretum ovalifolium
Khukhulā—Crotalaria retusa
Kūvel—Cinnamomum trigonum
Sūryakānti—Londium sudanticosum
Sūryakamal—Helianthus tuberosus
Ġangavel—Cucurbita maxima
Karal—Baobab melibabica
Mendī—Lawsonia albi
Kumbhū, Valumbhū—Caleva uborea
Vrvel—Fimbricia cuspidata
Vāghācū Chāmpū—Michelia excelsa
Vāsukicūvel—Chenopodium ambu-
 sioides
Maredi—Eriogonon iserioides
Aqasvel, Ālācūvel—Cassia triflor-
 mia

Deupāyāricakānti—Ficus Rumphii
Sundravel—Argyria speciosa
Mareicāvel—Allophylus Cobbe
Ricratavel—Jasminum angustifolium
Haral, Durvū—Cynodon dactylon
Ġauri—Calamus acanthospathus
Aran—Clerodendron philomoides
Kāte Kalah—Bambusa arundinacea
Mol—Pyrus Pashia
Arkhad—Rhus Punjabensis
Ghavadā—Dolichos lablab
Asali—Vitis glabrata
Bilūyat Jhād—Feronia elephantum
Pal—Mimusops hexandra
Surad—Laportea granulata
Koch—Cucumis aromaticus
Ġarudāsān—Annonita cocculus
Lendphūl—Salacia macrosepalma
Kaval—Helictes Isori
Ġahū—Wheat

(3) Other 'devaks' but not identifiable

*Āqvel, Mōrgalvel, Bhūrgalvel, Vasa-
 mūcūvel, Maral, Mragvel, Vasa-
 dicūvel, Vasanūcūvel, Marhalvel,
 Maritūcūvel, Dāghel, Asuparsh,
 Juvayeli, Katval, Cephul, Mūka-
 picūvel, Rohita, Pāhni, Dāq-
 dyūcūvel, Marilvel, Vasamūcūvel,
 Udabha, Pavamūcūvel, Senjavil,
 Kamalūl, Vichitra, Vadvagi,
 Shudhravil, Mārgalvel, Salhar-
 vūcūvel, Mundravel, Dāngūcūvel,
 Madhura, Kanholi*

APPENDIX B

THE 'PAÑCĀLVI'

Khar—Acacia catechu
Hivar—Leucophloea
Phanas—Aitocarpus integrifolia
Garvad—Cassia angulata
Cin—The tamarind
Bor—Zizyphus jujuba
Ramphal—Anona reticulata
Korvand—Carissa carandas
Sūḍphal—Anona squamosa

Pimparni—Thespesia populnea
Yoval—Siliginea teispesma
Toran—Zizyphus ingosa
Dālmh—Punica granatum
Ārl—Phyllanthus emblica
Payara—Ficus Rumphii
Perū—The guava tree
Chāmpa—Melia champaca
Nimb—Melia azadirachta

Tambura—*Diospyros melonoxylon*

Nāgvel—*Piper betle*

Supāri—*Acacia catechu*

Palas—*Buta frondosa*

Saundad—*Prosopis spiergia*

Vad—*Ficus bengalensis*

Ruc—*Calotropis gigantea*

Salas—*Boswellia serrata*

Amba—Mango tree

Moh—*Bassia latifolia*

Arkhaul—*Lilium punjabensis*

Jambhul—*Calyptanthus jumboluna*

The mango, umbar and the jāmbhul trees are almost without exception an invariable ingredient of the 'pine pālvi.' To these two other leaves are added and castes choose different trees.

Mahār—*Rāmphul* Kairavān, Bōi, Sitāphul, Saundad, Pimpāl, Pimpāl, Yāwad, Cinc, Jack

Rava, Banyan, Cāpā, Rū, Toian; Kalamh, Perū, Betel leaves and nuts and jowar are also added to make up the number of five things.

Leṭi—Banyan, Saundad, Bōi, Pimpāl, Kairavān

Nhāvī—*Sami*, Cāphā, Kairavān, Bōi, *Dhangar*—*Hirwai*, Bōi, Taiwad, Palas, Khur, Pimpāl

Cāmbār—*Sami*, Cāphā, Bōi, Pimpāl, *Āyū*, Pimpāl, Rū, Lūmb

Johār—Kairavān, Jack, Rava, Bōi

Vān—Bamboo, Dālmh

Māng—Pimpāl, Bōi, Hirwai, Taiwad, Saundad, Kairavān, Jack, Rava

Parī—Saundad, Pimpāl

Koti—Saundad, Kairavān

Kūmbhār—Bōi, *Āyū*

Rāmosi—Bōi, Rū, Pimpāl, Payān

Mā'—Bōi, Saundad, Pimpāl

APPENDIX C

THE 'HĀLGAMBA'

Ekki—*Calotropis gigantea*

Alad—*Ficus bengalensis*

Pimpri—*Ficus infectoria*

Basari—, ,

Asiath—*Tinus indica*

Calli—*Artocarpus integrifolia*

Gular, *Atti*—*Ficus glomerata*

Sand, *Kalli*—*Euphorbia flammula*

Nirat—*Eugenia jamboluna*

Mulla—*Mutala*, *Halwal*, *Halvan*—*Erythrina indica*

Lpu—*Capparis septaria*

Mar Aulla—*Jatropha Curcas*

Dageri—*Cocculus villosus*

Apā—*Typha angustifolia*

Banni—*Acacia ferruginea*

Ingāl—*Blatanites Roxburghii*

A RECENT WORK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

N. C. MUKERJI, M. A. *

Professor Pringle-Pattison has been busy in his retirement systematizing and reviewing as a whole the teaching which has made him the foremost living philosopher of theism in the English-speaking world today. In the book under review¹ he supplements the philosophical system he has given us in *The Idea of God and Immortality*, by laying bare the Christian basis of his theism and undertaking a philosophical valuation of the Christian faith. It is a double-barrelled task he puts his hand to here, *viz.* (1) furnishing a philosophical justification for the fundamental ideas of Christianity and (2) relating these to Christian dogmatics. The first part of the work Professor Pringle-Pattison has already done in his previously published works. It is the second, therefore, that he concentrates on here. While the book under notice is principally a study of the Christian development in religion, it has also some chapters on 'religious origins'.

A reminder of the position both in Philosophy and Biblical criticism today, would furnish the requisite setting for the study of our Professor's work. As to the first, it is a delusion to think that philosophers are a happy family. The reign of universal peace amongst them is yet to be. One of the fiercest fights waged in the history of philosophy is as to the place of religion and morality. There are philosophers, for example, who consider the reign of religion in philosophy to be but a suspicious trek. True, today heads are not broken as of old in these squabbles. The A. D. position, again, is bound to be different from the B. C. in this matter, considering the gains of the Christian contribution. But the struggle has not been ended yet, and it breaks out time and again though at a different level. Is ethics a mere phenomenology and religion a picture-language which we outgrow with our baby stage? Or are we to accept their evidence as much as of abstract reason in the construing of reality? — that is the question. As to Biblical criticism or New Testament criticism, which concerns the matter in hand specifically, we are not yet on *terra firma*. A general agreement is visible more in the acceptance of the

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¹ Pringle-Pattison *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, pp vi + 256, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1930, 12s 6d net.

critical method than of its particular conclusions. A big step forward was made when, as Professor Pringle-Pattison had himself urged in an address of his (as President of the New College Theological Society, Edinburgh, 1920), the New Testament was no more treated as a closed ground, but was subjected with the Old Testament to the same type of examination. The result of it is to be seen for example, in the two Bible commentaries recently published, one English, under the editorship of Bishop Gore, another American, the *Abingdon Bible Commentary*. The number of what might be called the critically minded orthodox is on the increase. Fact and interpretation are now felt to be more inextricably blent. This is so not merely with St John's Gospel, but *mutatis mutandis* with the whole range of the New Testament writings. Further, interpretation has been found to be more regulative in the arrangement of the raw material than was hitherto suspected. As to miracles, the general position seems to be that while they happened, we could not be quite sure of individual ones. There is even a suggestion of the intrusion of legendary elements in our narratives. It is more openly acknowledged now that the apostles did misunderstand the Master, especially as to his return the Second Coming. There has been a realization, also, of the gradual development in the Church's understanding of the implications of its faith in Jesus.

To many believers all this will appear as so many concessions of weakness, betraying a defeatist mentality. It will be said that they rob the Christian religion of 'inspiration' and 'infallibility'. The reply is that such a position places these burdens on the wrong shoulders. Professor Pringle-Pattison has told us where to stake one's all in the game. It is on the character of Jesus. The true Christian evidences are not his miracles, but his moral greatness. The passage where Professor Pringle-Pattison sums the matter up deserves quoting in full. "The lesson of Christianity is that we have to think of God in terms of Christ—*sub specie Christi*, if we may adopt a great phrase—in terms, that is to say, of his recorded teaching and of the spirit of his dedicated life and death. And in order to give us authentic tidings of the character of God, Jesus did not require actually to be God. As the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews puts it: 'God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son.' Jesus completes the message of the prophets. The religion

of Jesus is — is, we may say, obviously — the religion of the greater prophets, only more intimately realized, and consistently lived out in the story of his human life and death. In both cases the message authenticates itself, not because it comes to us through some miraculous channel, but by its own content as Spinoza says, 'by the wisdom of its doctrine'. It 'binds' us by its appeal to all that is best in us 'We needs must love the highest when we see it' And because its origin was not 'miraculous', in the specific traditional sense of that word, it was none the less the work of God in a human soul. In that sense we may still say with St Paul, 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself' Indeed, no statement of the fact could be more appropriate"

It will be said, we are reading a meaning in Professor Pringle-Pattison's words which they do not bear, in view of his express ruling out of the miraculous origin of Christianity 'in the specific traditional sense of the word' and the many qualifications inserted in the passage quoted. We are not so sure, however, of doing violence to our Professor's position. In the passage under notice, with all its qualifications is attributed finality to the authority of the Jesus of history, however wide a chasm might be dug between him and the Christ of faith There is also implied the sinlessness of Jesus the religion of the greater prophets is "only more intimately realized and *consistently lived out* in the story of his human life and death", (*idaho* ours) It is a very long road that one elects to travel when he makes his rule to think of God in terms of Christ, *sub specie Christi*—to borrow our Professor's happy adaptation—and at the end of the road he will have to face the old, old dilemma *aut deus aut non bonus*¹, 'Either God or not good' Professor Pringle-Pattison will certainly recede from the orthodox dogma of the divinity of Jesus For him it is a result of many influences¹ But he has already gone too far on the dogmatic road, we fear, to retract the great confession of his rule of faith — viewing things *sub specie Christi*.

1 "Apart from the impression made upon the original disciples by the personality of Jesus, three influences may be seen at work In the first place, the apocalyptic setting in which the figure of their master was conceived after his death by his first disciples, secondly, the associations of the Saviour-god of the Hellenistic mystery religions, which inevitably gathered round the figure in the minds of gentile converts, and thirdly, the influence of Greek philosophy, in terms of which the doctrine of the Church regarding his Person was ultimately cast"—p. 180

Professor Pringle-Pattison explains the Resurrection as a vision, more of the kind that Paul had on the Damascus road. It conveyed, however, a true idea and was not a hallucination. Professor Pringle-Pattison's heterodoxy is rooted more to orthodoxy, one feels. The story of the empty tomb, he continues, was a later invention. What this position means is that the resurrection faith, which was a primitive belief according to our Professor, was a *gnosis*, and had later to be adapted to popular belief by the invention of the physical miracle, and that in this adaptation it was a conscious falling off from the mind of Christ. It further implies that the New Testament miracles are a picture-language for those who are babes in Christ, and what we should do as philosophers is to suck the meaning of their values dry and throw the dry skin of the physical framework to the scrap-heap. In this matter of miracles, 'visions' and 'voices' are our Professor's absolute minimum. One of the questions which this position raises is the juxtaposition in the records of a true objective picture of moral perfection, on the one hand, and a play of wild inventiveness in the line of the miraculous, on the other. How could the two strands be kept segregated from each other in the creative activity of the New Testament writers? It is against alike the laws of the human mind and of human character. It is more intelligible to cut out individual miracles as not consonant with the character of the picture, but to make a clean sweep of the miraculous as such from our canvas, on the ground of untrustworthiness, is to raise the much bigger problem: why this untrustworthiness did not infect the picture also, and destroy the perfect balance of its character? We cannot accept half the record and reject the other half. The two are organically related and the records cannot be treated as a mechanical mixture.

Our Professor's anxiety not to let drop any Christian value is responsible for what emerges eventually as two separate strands in his thinking, making a difference between religious value and metaphysical reality. St John's Gospel is spoken of very appreciatively as "a manual of Christian devotion." The Evangelist's interpretations are daringly true.¹ In the Farewell Discourse and High-priestly Prayer is registered the highwater mark of religious insight and aspiration.

1 "But the 'It is finished,' which the Fourth Evangelist so daringly substitutes for the last cry of anguish, does in fact interpret more truly the significance of his death."

But in these very discourses we have inwoven the two doctrines of the Incarnation and the two natures in Christ. What this comes to then is that what is necessary for religion is meaningless for philosophy. The task of their unification, by way of comprehension and not elimination, still awaits. On the doctrine of the two natures of Christ, Professor Pringle-Pattison has a shrewd remark. He points out how all those who believe in the divinity of Jesus, even when they expressly reject it in their theory of His person, have to admit a duality at some point or other. This will bear thinking on. If we take Jesus as our rule of faith, as Professor Pringle-Pattison does, if he is to be fully satisfying to the Christian religious consciousness, try as we may we shall not be able to squeeze him within the bounds of a purely human development *as we know it*. This is what the Church meant when it enunciated the doctrine of the two natures or two wills. Not Greek philosophy, but the religious consciousness dictated the demand for the doctrine. And can we escape it today? We can do so only by falling into a contradiction ourselves. Professor Pringle-Pattison's view of Jesus perhaps illustrates our point. If Jesus is our final religious authority, can we deny him the knowledge of his end from the beginning? Professor Pringle-Pattison does it in the interests of a simplification of that nature. But at what a cost! 'The final authority here learns by way of trial and error the necessity of death to finish his work. If progress is through extremes for such a nature, then it cannot be our final moral authority. There would be too much of unbalancedness in his judgments, which in turn would need correction by a higher authority. Thus if there is to be such a man, in a very real sense he should be beyond our psychology and laws of development. We cannot straighten out all the tangles in the consciousness of Jesus, but all reconstructions proceed on such a supposition.' Such a method is but to deny in the conclusion what is implied in our premises.

The regulative philosophical ideas with which Professor Pringle-Pattison has started on his task in this work are perhaps three in number. They are first (1) the maintenance of breaks with continuity in the evolutionary process (2) the task of reason to separate the husk from the kernel in religious experience, (3) the interpretation through the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The first conception he applies in discussing the originality or uniqueness of Jesus in relation to the Old Testament preparation. The place of the

second in his thinking we have already dwelt on, and the third is present in the background in his thought of evil and redemption. Professor Pringle-Pattison has not adequately discussed the atonement in his present study. Yet the centrality of it for the Christian experience he would be the last person to deny. It would be churlish to ask for more where one has so much. But if our Professor chooses to fill up the lacuna in a future edition, it would be idle to expect that what he writes will pass the test of orthodoxy. Prof. Pringle-Pattison is not bound by such standards. But there would certainly be the flashes of insight, deep piety and long brooding over the theme which transfigure all that he writes and provide enrichment for our souls.

It is a fascinating and a provoking book that Professor Pringle-Pattison has given us in this volume. It will drive us all anew to answer the question "What is a Christian?" This question is pressed on us wherever a great undogmatic Christian, as in the present case, bares his heart and like the wise scribe in the story brings out things new and old from his treasures. This question was answered by Dr. Marcus Dods for an earlier generation in a remarkable sermon of his with this very title. A present-day teacher has said the same task and we cannot do better than quote him at the close. "It is good sometimes" writes Dr. Matthews in his *The Gospel and the Modern Mind* "for those who have a richer creed to remind themselves of the simplicity of the Gospel which is the core of their religious life. But it is still more necessary for the numberless men of goodwill who are doubting whether they can call themselves Christians to be persuaded of its simplicity. The very wealth of the Christian tradition may sometimes be an obstacle to its acceptance. But the essential Gospel is not in these things. Let us not let slip the simplicity which is in Christ Jesus. God is real. His nature is love. He has manifested Himself in human life. He draws near to His children to save, to strengthen and enlighten. If everything else in the teaching of the Church should remain dark to us, we should doubtless miss much inspiration and value, but if we believe this in such a manner that it enters our lives as a principle of action we have the good news of God."

One word more. Would Prof. Pringle-Pattison very kindly consider the printing of the address referred to as an appendix in a future edition of this book?

MODERN CONCEPTS OF MATTER

SATYAPRAKASH, M Sc *

The idea of matter, including motion, space and time has always been a subject of confusion, both to the experimentalists as well as to the speculative philosophers. The Indian atomists of the school of Vaisesikas as well as the Greek thinkers from the days of Empedocles and Anaxagoras down to the periods of Philolaus, Democritus, Plato and Aristotle have tried to explain Nature in such terms which by themselves require an explanation. The five entities, earth, water, fire, air and sky have very little significance apart from their association with the five sensations of smell, taste, form, touch and hearing, for they are compository in their intrinsic nature. To an idealist, the realistic aspect of nature and the distinction between the objects and ideas, and various other intricacies which supplement themselves with the relative notion of time and space are not at all convincing.

It is difficult to conceive of an object without its attribute and the perception of an attribute without mind is another impossibility, and on this basis, the doctrine of 'esse is percipi' has been evolved. According to Locke, a body is a solid extended, figured substance, endowed with the faculty of motion together with such qualities as colour, weight, taste, smell and sound. But all these qualities are not inherent, some of them being the effects of the body produced in the perceiving subject. These are the secondary qualities. The primary qualities are only the extension, figure, solidity, motion and rest. But to an idealist like Berkeley, these so called primary qualities are just as secondary as the others. His doctrine reduces the subject of human knowledge to the knowledge of ideas and spirit. But is there anything representative of the ideas in the object itself to give duality to the perceptions of mind? This question may not be of any importance, may even be irrelevant, to an idealist like Berkeley. But to a realist or an experimental scientist, it has always been a pleasure to look for all such sensory qualities in the intrinsic structure of the matter itself.

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The colour to a modern scientist is not what we perceive through our eyes. It is a record of the selective absorption of certain radiations by substances in a spectrograph. The phonographic records of sound do not take into account the nature of individual ears. At present, we have no autorecorders of the sensations of smell, taste, and touch, but we believe that with the advancement of our knowledge, science will come forth to help us in this direction also. So far as colour is concerned, we have definite proofs to show that it is related to the structure of molecules, and its sensation is due to the electronic and atomic vibrations under specific conditions. Our knowledge in this direction has provided a chemist with a vast store of synthetic dyes. Similarly, we have reasons to believe that taste and smell are related in a definite way to the chemical constitution, though the relationships have not yet been worked out thoroughly, due to the lack of quantitative recorders. All this shows, that there is something whatever it may be in the objects themselves, representative of sensations, and a realist is led to think that the so-called secondary qualities of Locke are just as primary as any other—a proposition which is just the reverse of what Berkeley holds.

In this phenomenal world we live amongst changes, and fixing our attention on the material aspect, we find that the changes are twofold—additive or constitutive. A change may occur in an object by adding something to it or by subtracting something from it, either in the form of matter or energy. Another sort of change with which chemists are so familiar is the change in the constitutive arrangement of the units forming a molecule. By simply altering the arrangements of these units—the so-called atoms of a chemist—radically opposite and quite distinct properties are attained by a molecule. The order in which ultimate or penultimate units are arranged, it must be emphasized, is of very much importance, for it is the only way by which diversity can arise out of unity. In order to follow the modern atomic concept, it must be clearly understood, that the union of one unit with the other is not through linkages, binding chains or hooks or through the contact attachment of sides, as was regarded by the old atomists. The union is more dynamic than static, and is the name of a state produced by the mutual attraction and repulsion of units by virtue of their position, and state.

The modern atomic theory begins with Dalton, who on experimental basis showed that (1) every element is made up of

homogeneous atoms whose mass is constant for a particular element, but differing for different elements; and (ii) chemical compounds are formed by the union of the atoms of different elements in numerical proportions. The final unit of a compound is a molecule, and the molecule is further broken up into such units, which no longer possess the properties of the compound, and these units are known as atoms. Thus from the gross compound, we come down to molecules which still possess the quality of the original compound, then to the atoms of the element. These atoms are up till now the final units which play part in the chemical reactions. The atoms, though final units for a chemist, are also divisible and finally we come to an element of elements known as combination of electrons and protons. And this is the stage where our modern physics has taken a stop, though the idea of sub-electrons has also been put forward by some of the investigators, but their results are not decisive. It is interesting to find that the dimensions of the molecules, atoms and electrons, all determined on the experimental basis, are much smaller than the speculative atoms of old atomists, and yet it is not the final stage of our knowledge.

It is easy to think and also to believe that on our continued analysis, we will be able to reduce all objects of our knowledge to unity but it is not so easy when actually done. The great thinker Leibniz gave out his theory of *monads* to explain metaphysical as well as material phenomena. *Monad* according to him is a *simple* substance, which enters into compounds. It has no shape, otherwise it would have parts. One *monad* is distinguishable from the other only by its internal qualities and actions, — the perceptions and appetitions. He further says "Since the world is a plenum all things are connected together, and every body acts upon every other, more or less according to their distance, and is affected by the other through reaction. Hence it follows that each *Monad* is a living mirror, endowed with inner activity, representative of the universe according to its point of view." Since there is nothing real but *monads*, the relation between soul and body is also to be explained in terms of monads. According to Leibniz, monads differ in clearness of their perceptions, and those which have clearer perceptions are more active. One monad which can produce a change in the other monad is said to be more active. In my body, that monad, which is myself has clearer perceptions than any of the others, and may be

said to be dominant in the body, since in relation to other monads, it is active while they are passive.

Ordinarily, Leibniz supposes a monad to consist of *materia prima* and *materia secunda*. God could deprive a monad of *prima*, the assemblage of monads which constitutes its body, but he could not deprive it of its *prima*, for a monad minus *prima* would have been the God Himself. From this Monadology of Leibniz, it is clear, that monads are infinite in number, differing from one another in passivity or activity, but resembling in something which is no more than beingness, which is a constitute of the *materia prima*. The *prima* may be supposed to be a nucleus around which the *materia secunda* is held by virtue of association or attraction, a relation which has found an analogy in the modern theory of electrons and protons.

The monadic doctrine has been extensively worked out by Wildon Carr. To him, a monad is not a unit but a unity. It cannot be supposed as one of many. He agrees with Leibniz in the conception that monads have no windows through which any thing can enter or pass out, it being only a conception of the subject of experience in its integrity. Subject and object are not separate existences held together by an external bond. They are a unity in duality and a duality in unity. In each monad there is the one and only centre into which the universe is mirrored and one universe mirrored into its own centre. Further, to Wildon Carr, the monads appear to represent a mental or spiritual order and are not to be confused with physical atoms which represent nature as an external order independent of mind. The monad is self-contained and all-inclusive, yet experience obliges us to recognize that there is a plurality of monads, because there are other minds and infinite possibilities of subjective centres each of which mirrors the universe. Monads are creative in nature, but to create monads is inconceivable. God, not being a living mirror of the universe, cannot be a creator of monads, else He would have been a monad himself. In substance, according to this author, monadism means that reality is activity and not a stuff of which activity may be an attribute, quality or endowment. It denies substance as inert substratum, but affirms substance as active subject of experience.

The difference between the concepts of Leibniz and Wildon Carr parallels to the distinction between the *Vaisesikas* and

the Sāṅkhya. The monad of the former represents units or *anu* while of the latter, it is unity or *sāmyānasthā* of *Avyakta Prakṛti*. An activity without material substratum (*dravya*), only residing in what we call centre of forces is an idea which appears to be gaining ground with the higher researches of modern physics also, where the activity has been replaced by almost an equivalent term, energy, though it has not yet been possible to exclude the notion of matter altogether. Knowledge means the study of changes, and wherever there is a change, we have to conceive of activity of energy, hence the idea of substratum apart from its activity is not a subject of knowledge, and as such, Science, (and perhaps Philosophy also) cannot commit itself in any way as regards the existence or absence of the inert principle.

The wave-length of visible light is of the order of 5×10^{-5} cm, while the diameter of an atom is of the order of 1×10^{-8} cm, and hence, it is apparent that howsoever powerful a microscope be, it can never even theoretically give us a magnification to the order of the visibility of an atom. So we can never see an atom. The history of the discovery of electrons takes us back to the experiments of Plucker (1859) and Hittorf and Crookes (1869) who discovered what we call Cathode-rays by means of electric discharge in a tube containing air at low pressures. On examination, it appeared, that these rays could be deflected by a magnetic field in a direction in which a stream of negatively charged particles would be deflected, and they also afford a sort of pressure on any object placed in their path. The further experiments of Perrin and Sir J. J. Thomson decisively proved that these particles are negatively charged, and built up of negative electricity. Their mass is about $1/1850$ of that of an atom of hydrogen. Whatever gas may be taken in the discharge tube, the particles given out contain the same amount of the negative charge and possess the same mass, and from this it was concluded that all the substances are reduced in a discharged tube to one and the same substance, which is electrical in nature. The particles of this substance are now known as electrons, a name which signifies that they are made up of electricity. This discovery at once revolutionized the conception of matter.

The chemists were familiar with a huge number of elements, about 90 in number, and the striking resemblance and graded property of elements always led them to think that there is something common in these elements, the quantity of

which when varied will give rise to the transmutation of one element to the other. The atoms of all the elements differ from one another in atomic weights. Since the discovery of radio-active elements, like radium and uranium, a new phenomenon appeared to the chemists. It was found that these elements spontaneously give out something and they are being constantly converted to the elements of lower atomic weights. Thus from radium, the atom of which weighs 226 times that of hydrogen, by disintegrations, we get lead, the atom of which weighs only 208 times that of the hydrogen. The fact which was still more astonishing was that the gas collected during the disintegration was found to be charged helium, an element which weighs about 4 times more than that of hydrogen. These results showed that radium element is equivalent to lead plus helium, both of which are also elements themselves. The weight of electron is almost negligible, and the weight of an atom is due, therefore, to something else.

It was early suggested that the mass of an atom was due to its electrons, and if it is, then hydrogen atom, the lightest of all the atoms, would necessitate about 1850 electrons per atom, but experiments show that hydrogen atom contains only one electron. This fact gave rise to the positive nucleus theory of the atom. Electrons are negatively charged, while the atom itself is neutral and as such in the atom, there is every reason to believe, there is something which is charged with positive electricity. To account for the mass of the atom, it is inevitable to assume that the positive nucleus is about $1/1850$ of the size of the electron in the case of hydrogen and still smaller in the case of other atoms. In fact at present we know very little about this intensely condensed positively charged mass, simply of what we are sure is of its existence. Rutherford's brilliant experiments further proved this fact beyond any doubt.

It was believed by J. J. Thomson that the atom consists of rapidly revolving negative electrons within a sphere of positive electricity, the total positive charge being equal to the negative charge. However the idea of positive sphere was abandoned in view of Rutherford's experiments which showed that a positively charged alpha particle (charged helium atom), when allowed to penetrate inside an atom goes to a short distance only and is then repelled with a force backwards. This goes to show that there is a positive nucleus at the centre of an atom which has repelled a similarly charged positive particle. Rutherford's school calculated out the number of free

positive charges in the nucleus of atoms of various substances, and it was found to be approximately half of the atomic weight.

Moseley, another young physicist, tackled the same problem from X-ray point of view. His X-ray-spectrographs showed that every element gives a characteristic spectrum, and the position of lines in a spectrum depends upon the number of electrons in the atom of a certain element. He showed that all the elements can be arranged in a series according to the number of electrons in their atoms. This number has been named as atomic number. The atomic number comes out to be about one-half of the atomic weight, as was found by Rutherford also as regards the number of free positive charges.

The atomic weights of elements as determined by chemical methods are in the following series —

<i>Atomic weight</i>			<i>Atomic weight.</i>		
1	Hydrogen	1	10	Neon	20
2	Helium	4	11	Sodium	23
3	Lithium	7	12	Magnesium	24
4	Beryllium	9	13	Aluminium	27
5	Boron	11	14	Silicon	28
6	Carbon	12	15	Phosphorous	31
7	Nitrogen	14	16	Sulphur	32
8	Oxygen	16	17	Chlorine	35
9	Fluorine	19	18	Argon	40

and so on

From Moseley's work, it was shown that the number of electrons in the atom of a particular element is the same as its serial number in the above series. Thus oxygen atom, which is the eighth member in the above series contains eight electrons, while phosphorous which is the 15th member contains 15 electrons per atom. This gave another significance to the chemical idea of elements and atoms. Thus one chemical element differs from the other in the number of electrons and the corresponding charge on the positive nucleus of its atom. One element is transferable into the other if the number of electrons and protons (the constituent of the positive nucleus) are varied.

Very little is actually known about the nucleus of an atom. As has been stated before, this positive principle of atom may be regarded as the *materia prima* of the substance. It is difficult to say whether the mass of the nucleus is material in nature or simply electrical, as is very probable in the case of electrons. The results of Kaufmann have shown that the mass

of an electron varies considerably with the velocity, a fact which substantiates the hypothesis of J J Thomson that an electron is a disembodied atom of electricity free from association with matter, and its mass is wholly electrical.

Taking it to be beyond doubt that electrons and protons form the necessary constituents of an atom, we have now to discuss how these are arranged inside an atom. The old idea of J J Thomson that electrons are arranged in fixed orbits inside the sphere of positive electricity is not convincing. We have to believe that the whole of the positive electricity is confined in the central or nuclear portion of the atom. Of all the models proposed by different authors, the Saturnian model, representing the solar system inside an atom is the most fanciful and is in agreement with the various observations in the domain of physics and chemistry.

An atom is the representative of the solar system. The proton or the positive nucleus is like our sun around which the electronic planets revolve. They have got their own characteristic orbits, elliptical in form, and are guided for the most part by the Newtonian dynamics. From the calculations based on the statics and the dynamics of ordinary mechanics, it has been shown that the most stable system of the electrons revolving in the same orbit would be represented by the following Rydberg's series

$$2(1^2 + 2^2 + 2 + 3^2 + 3^2 + 4^2 + \dots)$$

Unlike the solar system, it has been shown that on one and the same orbit, more than one electron can be made to revolve and the activity of the system will depend upon the number of the electrons, especially on the external orbit. In the simplest atom of hydrogen whose atomic number is one, there is only one electron revolving in one orbit. In the atom of the next element helium, two electrons revolve on the same orbit. Mathematics shows, that in such systems the number two is very stable, and the greater the stability of a system, the less will be its activity, because activity is simply a manifestation of instability and is exhibited when an unstable system tends to attain a stable form. The whole chemistry of helium shows that it is one of the most inert gases, having no tendency to combine with any other element to form a compound.

From the Rydberg's series, the next stable arrangement would be $2(1^2 + 2^2)$, that is an atom comprising 10 electrons, two in the first orbit and eight in the second. The element which

possesses the atomic number 10 is neon. Here again the chemistry of this element helps us to show that like helium, it is also another very inert element, which refuses to combine with any other. The next stable arrangement, $2(1^2 + 2^2 + 2^2)$ shows that another inert element would comprise 2 electrons in the first orbit, 8 in the second, and another 8 into the third, thus 18 in all, and we know that argon, an element of the atomic number 18, is similar to helium or neon. Other inert gases are krypton and xenon, with atomic numbers 36 and 54. Xenon contains a stable system containing 2, 8, 8, 18, and 18 electrons in the orbits number 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

As regards the other elements, like lithium, beryllium, etc. the arrangements of the electrons can be shown in the following way —

Element	Atomic number	Electrons in orbits				No. of electrons necessary to produce stability in the external orbit	Valency
		I	II	III	IV		
Hydrogen	1	1				1	1
Helium	2	2				0	0
Lithium	3	2	1			-1	1
Beryllium	4	2	2			0	0
Boron	5	2	3			-1	3
Carbon	6	2	4			-4	1, 4
Nitrogen	7	2	5			-3	3
Oxygen	8	2	6			-2	2
Fluorine	9	2	7			-1	1
Neon	10	2	8			0	0
Sodium	11	2	8	1		1	1
Magnesium	12	2	8	2		2	2
Aluminium	13	2	8	3		-3	3
Silicon	14	2	8	4		-4	1, 4
Phosphorus	15	2	8	5		-5	3
Sulphur	16	2	8	6		-2	2
Chlorine	17	2	8	7		-1	-1
Argon	18	2	8	8		0	0
Potassium	19	2	8		1	-1	1
Calcium	20	2	8		2	-2	2
Scandium	21	2	8		3	-3	3

and so on

By valency we mean the combining tendency of one element with the other. In lithium, there is only one electron in the external orbit. In order to attain a stable system, it has a tendency to give out one electron. But fluorine, which has got 7 electrons in the external orbit, will more readily try to snatch up one electron from another system so as to make a stable system by having 8 electrons in the outer orbit. Chemically we know that

lithium has a very powerful affinity to combine with fluorine; thus, one free electron of lithium has shared with 7 electrons of fluorine in lithium fluoride to give stability to both the systems. But oxygen contains only 6 electrons in the external orbit, and in order to complete this orbit, 2 electrons will be necessary to make the system of 8. But, lithium has only one free electron to share in the external orbit. So two lithium atoms are necessary to share one oxygen atom, a fact which is so well established by chemists in the formation of lithium oxide. But beryllium contains two electrons in the external second orbit, and to give stability to the external orbit of oxygen, an addition of two electrons is necessary. So it is clear, that one atom of beryllium would be the best to share with one atom of oxygen to form the compound, beryllium oxide. But in the formation of a molecule of beryllium fluoride, one beryllium atom combines with two fluorine atoms. Thus it will be seen that the electronic structure of atom is in agreement with the chemical combinations.

The greatest pioneer in the domain of modern atomism is Bohr who has postulated the following hypotheses regarding the electronic arrangement in an atom - (1) An electron rotates around the nucleus of an atom, not only in one fixed orbit, but successively in several different orbits, springing from one orbit to the other from time to time. (2) No radiation occurs while the electron is confined to one orbit, but when it jumps into a fresh orbit, then the radiation takes place during the transition. Thus unlike the solar system, though the orbits are fixed, yet an electron has a choice to jump from one orbit to the other, but, there are also some limitations for this.

The necessity for such postulation was inevitable, for, if it is regarded that the cause of the emission of energy is the motion of the electron round the nucleus, then an electron would be gradually losing the energy, and would, on this account, come nearer and nearer to the nucleus and finally the whole of the system would collapse. But actually, the loss of energy is never continuous. Bohr says that so long as the electron is moving in one and the same orbit, there will be no absorption or emission of energy. Each orbit has a fixed energy level, and this depends mostly upon the distance of the orbit from the nucleus. Whenever an electron jumps from an orbit which has a higher energy level to another orbit of low energy level, there will be an emission of the energy

equal to the difference of the two energy levels, and this emission of energy is manifested as light, magnetic or electric waves. An electron can go to a higher orbit from a lower one only by absorbing some extra energy. Thus, whenever, there is absorption of energy in the form of heat or light waves, the atom is excited, that is, the electron of lower orbit jumps to a higher orbit. These facts have been very beautifully established in the vast amount of spectroscopic research of modern physicists. Every element is supposed to give its own characteristic spectrum, where lines are obtained in definite positions. Each energy level is very clearly pictured through these lines and it is a great satisfaction to the physicists, that their speculations based upon mathematical reasoning are fully substantiated from these observations. It will be out of the scope of this paper, and it will be doing injustice also to the subject, to give even a cursory survey of the experimental facts in this direction.

The circular orbits of Bohr were further modified into elliptical orbits of Sommerfeld. In fact, the whole of our solar system is made up of elliptical orbits, and it is no surprise that inside the atom, there is exactly an analogous system existing. The atomic ellipses have two foci and at one of them is situated the nucleus. The electron so often changes the orbit when excited that it can be assumed to impart any shape to the orbit, even parabolic and hyperbolic and various other curves, the complexity of which increases with the complex structure inside the heavier atoms. In some cases, at least, all of them have been carefully worked out to the exact precision on the basis of spectroscopic observations.

We now very clearly know that the sound waves are due to the oscillation of gross particles of molecules of the body, under limited frequency and wavelength, while at a stage, by increasing the frequency, we come to the heat waves. By the electronic and atomic excitations, other sorts of energy are propagated.

Modern physics, based on the chemical information, and evidences from radio-active changes, X-ray investigations, spectroscopic results, achievements in the region of magnetic and electric properties, all with one voice are in agreement with the present electronic concept of atomic structure. This is really a great triumph for the scientific investigation. Difficulties and anomalies are no doubt in our way, but we are nearer the truth. Our ignorance about the nucleus is another

stumbling block, but we expect that electrons and this proton will be explained in the terms of one and the same *materia prima*. Monads are centre of forces, who knows with or without substratum, and an electron is energy manifested, but who can say whether it is with or without matter, for we cannot conceive of matter without energy. However, with the present state of our knowledge, the philosophic monads may be *unity*, but the electrons of a physicist are yet *units*.

NEW LIGHT ON THE GAUDAPĀDA KĀRIKĀS *

B N KRISHNAMURTI SARMA

माडूक्योपनिषद्ना सुविदिताः श्रीगोडपादस्य य
श्लोकास्तानह विश्रमादुपनिषत्वेनेव मेने तथा ।
नद्वयाख्या च समानतात्माविगुलामानन्दार्थस्त्वधी-
नित्यद्वैतिजनोक्तदायदलन बद्रोत्सुकोऽस्यादगन् ॥

The opinion is strongly held in the fashionable circles of Vedānta Philosophy that the Kārikās of Gaudapāda on the *Māndūkya-upanīśad* have been mistakenly confounded with and taken as a part of the original Upanīśad by Śrī Madhvācārya and his followers. This attitude of Madhva has been severely criticized¹ as one of scholarly stupidity and he and his philosophical system have been sought to be discredited on this and on other accounts.

I propose to demonstrate in the course of this article that the 'upanīśadic theory' of the Kārikās (as I shall hereafter designate it) is perfectly tenable. It can readily be pointed out that the tradition which Madhva inherits and in accordance with which he reads the first twenty-nine Kārikās of Gaudapāda as part of the *Māndūkya upanīśad* is a very old one. And apart from what Madhva and his followers have to say, the mass of external evidence relating to the text and interpretation of the Kārikās unmistakably proves that Madhva's position is entirely justifiable.

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1 Modern scholars have not so far openly come out with a criticism of Madhva. But orthodox advocates of the past century like Triyambaka Sāstrī have written elaborate criticisms not however available in print. Many responsible votaries of Advaita still hold the belief that Madhva has committed a serious blunder and preach it as a fashionable fad.

Before proceeding to set forth and examine these grounds, it is necessary to briefly notice the arrangement of the text according to the Advaita and Dvaita schools of Vedānta

The Gaudapāda Kārikās, two hundred and fifteen in number, are arranged in four sections or chapters, designated *Āgama Prakarana*, *Vaitathya-Prakarana*, *Advaita-Prakarana* and *Alātāśānti-Prakarana* in order. The Advaitic tradition ascribes all of them to the authorship of Gaudapāda, the grand-preceptor of Śaṅkara. The first twenty-nine kārikās about which has arisen the present controversy, come under the first chapter. They are interwoven with the original upanīśadic passages at regular intervals and are introduced everytime with the words *ātrute ślokā bhavanti*

The arrangement of the Upanīśad according to Madhva consists of four short Khandas. The Kārikās are interwoven with the original upanīśadic passages and are introduced with the same remark as in the other school. The Upanīśad thus ends with the twenty-ninth Kārikā. It is interesting to note that with the first twenty-nine Kārikās, which Madhva reads as part of the Upanīśad, also ends the first chapter of Gaudapāda

It will be seen from the foregoing that Madhva has incorporated only twenty-nine of the whole lot of Gaudapāda-Kārikās numbering two hundred and fifteen into the original. We may also remember that the twenty-ninth Kārikā marks the close of a chapter and of a topic. The designation of the first chapter as *Āgama Prakarana* would seem to suggest¹ the (quasi)? scriptural character of that chapter which indirectly strengthens Madhva's position. If therefore, as had been suggested, Madhva had been misled and had mistaken there is nothing to have prevented him from mistaking some more or all the rest of the Kārikās. Inadvertence is unimaginable on the part of Madhva who is all alert. And the fact that he himself attributes the Kārikās to some other source equally distinct and different from both the Upanīśad and Gaudapāda proves that he was far from inadvertent. It follows on the other hand that he deliberately identified the twenty-nine Kārikās as part of the Upanīśad. When we say that Madhva

1 Prof K Sundararama Iyer of Kumbakonam who is one of the ablest expositors of Advaitic tradition in these parts, in the course of one of his talks with me opined that there need be no quarrel over this since even the Advaitins tacitly attach scriptural validity to the disputed Kārikās by dubbing the chapter *Āgama Prakarana*

incorporated some of the Kārikās of Gaudapāda it is understood that he was aware of the whole body of the Kārikās numbering two hundred and fifteen. His own commentary on the *Māndūkya Upanisad* shows that he was aware of the Advaitic interpretation of some of the Kārikās. And the fact that he has taken no notice of the rest of the Kārikās shows that he ought to have had very good reasons to doubt the genuineness of the tradition which attributed those twenty-nine Kārikās to Gaudapāda. Madhva could as well have given the slip to the Advaitin by coolly turning his back upon all the Kārikās and boycotting them. Why should he have worried himself about the Kārikās of a certain Gaudapāda who was above all else a pucca Advaitin? Madhva, it should be remembered, was a rising philosopher. He was a newcomer in the field. Would he have jeopardized his popularity by committing a conscious blunder and introducing what would otherwise have been a new-fangled fad? Would his rivals and critics have simply tolerated his aberrations? Could he, I ask, have simply attempted the feat? Or again, Madhva ought to have known very well that that surely was not the way either to beard the lion in his own den.

The fact that with the portion which Madhva regards as part of the Upanisad also ends the first Prakaraṇa of Gaudapāda is significant. The evidence against Madhva would have been stronger, and still more conclusive if he had ventured into the 'Kārikā portion' a little further and appropriated some more. But it would be enough to appeal to the continuity of thought which is seen throughout the Upanisadic passages and the suspected Kārikās against the view that the latter have been mistakably or forcibly appropriated. The phrase *Māyāmūlān idam dr̥ṣṭam* against Madhva's interpretation of which a hue and cry is often raised, is thus an obvious and unmistakable echo of a foregoing *icchāmūlān prabhāḥ sṛṣṭiḥ*. It will thus be seen that Madhva's rendering of *māyāmūlān* into *icchāmūlān* has not only dialectical and verbal but also semantic and contextual consistency — a fact to which Śrī Vyāsarāja Svāmin himself draws pointed attention in his *Nyāyāmṛta*. Śrinivāsatiṛtha, in his commentary on the *Māndūkya Upanisad* points out the interrelation between the Upanisadic passages and the Kārikās and the continuity of thought is sufficiently discernible to rebut the charge of their having been forcibly or otherwise sifted to suit a preconceived notion.

The same amount of consistency cannot be shown on the Advaitic side. The advaitic interpretation of the *kārikā* प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत involves great confusion and a lot of inconsistencies. Some kind of अनुकूलतर्क is evidently sought to be made out by the dictum प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न सशय. Now, the proper statement of it would be in the form of what is called a विपर्ययपर्यवसान. Such a syllogism would run प्रपंचो न विद्यते । यदि विद्यत निवर्तेत । न निवर्तेत । तस्मात्प्रपंचो ॥ i.e. to say — *The universe does not exist. If it existed, it would disappear. It does not so disappear. Therefore, it does not exist.* Now, this is more than the Advaitin can conveniently grant. It would be hazardous for him to deny that the universe does disappear — no matter when. The entire edifice of Advaitism rests on the assumption that the phantasmagoria of creation disappears at the dawn of monistic consciousness. So then, the dictum : प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत would only land him in difficulties. Gaudapāda an adept in logic that he was, would not have framed such an awkward dictum which is so suicidal in effect. The best thing for the Advaitin would therefore be to absolve Gaudapāda of the authorship of such *kārikās* and adopt the other alternative of regarding them as part of the Upanisad whose interpretation however, may quite logically be left an open question.

However that may be, the *kārikā* प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत (and many others besides to be noticed presently), *QUA* *kārikā* is extremely fatal to Advaitic dogmas. One may also draw attention to a palpable contradiction between Sankara's own dicta सचेन्नब्रह्मयेत and विद्यमानश्च निवर्तेत. The other hemistich विकल्पा विनिवर्तेत कल्पितो यदि कल्पित is equally fatal to Advaitic dogmas. It unmistakably establishes the reality of the universe by means of a *reductio ad absurdum*. The reasoning runs:

The universe if it were a phantasy would be negated
some day

It is not so negated

∴ It is not a phantasy

That is to say, it is a reality¹

The *Ātropantiya*¹ has a lucid exposition of the whole argument विकल्प प्रपंच यदि कल्पित स्यात्तदा निवर्तेत इति यद्यप्यवधारितान्त्व-याच्च तर्क एवात्र श्रुतावुपनिबद्धः । न तु यदार्थकथनं । तर्कस्य विपर्ययपर्यवसानमावश्यकं ।

विकल्प. प्रपंचः कल्पितश्च निवर्तेत ।

न च निवर्तेत ।

तस्मान्न कल्पितः । किन्तु परमार्थिक एवेति वाक्यशेषोऽवगम्यते ॥

1. A printed commentary on Madhva's *Tattvodyota*

Gauḍapāda could not have framed such a *vyūpti* for himself ' As Vādirāja Svāmīn ' aptly remarks

इयं श्रुतिः पञ्चभेदान्त्यता सत्येन स्फुटः ।
यदि प्रपञ्चाविद्येन निर्वर्तेत तदाकिल ॥
इममयं महानयकं क. पांडितो वेदेत् ।
ब्रह्मवान्मलयत्तस्मात्तद्व्याप्यमानकक्षः ॥
एव च ब्रह्मणो ह्यर्थो किं न व्याप्तिरियं तव ।
विषयया मद्रातासीत्तकस्यास्य विषयं ॥

Another case of doctrinal inconsistency crops up if we assume Gauḍapāda to be the author of the Kārikās Just see What is his view of the nature of the world? That it is a merest illusion (मायामात्र). It is interesting to note that in the first chapter several theories of the nature and motive of creation are stated and refuted ² —

वभूति प्रभव त्वन्य मन्यन्ते मृष्टिचिन्तका ।
स्वप्नमायामरूपानि मृष्टिन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥
इन्द्रामात्र प्रभाः मृष्टिर्गतिं मृष्टे विनिश्चिताः ।
कालात्मसूनि भूताना मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥
भाग्यं मृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे ।
उदस्येष्वभवावोऽयमावकासस्य एव मृष्टा ॥

And among the theories thus criticized is found the Advaitic view that creation is an illusion and a myth स्वप्नमायामरूपानि मृष्टिन्यैर्विकल्पिता Sankara says that here reference is made to two views of creation 'स्वप्नरूप मायामरूपाचेति' Of these, the latter is obviously the Advaitic view (of मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं) There is no denying ' the fact that the real Advaitin regards the world as the merest illusion (मायामरूप) Sankara himself strikes a timely note of warning ⁴ at the end of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra लोकवस्तुलीलाकैवल्यं (II, 33), that the truth of the unreality of the Universe should not be lost sight of. From this it is clear that the Advaitin is pledged to the theory of the unreality of the Universe But the conclusion of the author

1. *Yuktisamālā* of Vādirāja, Kumbakonam Edu p 135

2. *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* I. 7-9

3. Vācaspati Miśra comes out with a clear confession परमार्थस्तु न विभ्रमो नाम कश्चिन्न च भ्रमागेनाम Satkara himself declares नम्यान्न कश्चित्प्रपञ्चः प्रयत्नो निवृत्तताऽस्तीत्यभिप्रायः

4. न चेय परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्चुति । अविद्याकल्पिततामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात् । ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यं ॥ (II, 38)

of the *Māndūkya Kārikās* is different 'देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयं' which implies that the universe as caused by the Will of God is a reality. The Kārikā 'देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयमात्मकामस्य का सृष्टिः' simply denies that God is motivated by any external desire, personal aim or objective in his creation of the world but not that the world itself is a reality¹. If it were not so, the whole series of *pūrnāpakās* and the show of an ultimate conclusion would be grotesquely out of place and would amount to a parody of reasoning. And in the Kārikās the theory of the unreality of the world has been definitely set aside, so it cannot again be raised to the rank of a *Siddhānta* view. The slightest endeavour to do so would constitute an insult to the genius of the author of the Kārikās — whoever he be.

The author of the *Vyākhyāna-Tarāṅginī*² also adopts a similar mode of argumentation in establishing the upanishadic theory of the Kārikās. He points out that इच्छामात्रप्रभा सृष्टिः and 'देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयं' should be taken as representing the considered opinion of the author of the Kārikās. His reasons are that (1) the term विनिश्चिता used in connection with इच्छामात्र etc., necessitates its acceptance as the ultimate conclusion³ and (2) that the absence of terms like अन्य in this one case alone, confirms the fact that it is intended to be taken as the ultimate conclusion of the author of the Kārikās. Under the circumstances therefore, मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं etc. must necessarily mean what

1 (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra*, p. 301) — अन्यथा परिणामाविवादादपि प्रशङ्कम् ।

2 I am deeply indebted to His Holiness Śrī Suvratindra Jirthe svāmi of the Sumatindra Mutt for his first drawing my attention to the fact that Rāmācārya is the earliest writer in Dvānta theology to have felt it necessary in his times to defend the upanishadic theory in his own way. It might presumably have been a burning question of the day. It is a pity, however that Rāmācārya did not deal exhaustively with the question or take into account the opinions of his predecessors in the other Schools of Vedānta such as are at our disposal now.

3 विनिश्चितं प्रसवत्वान्ये विनिश्चिता इत्यादिना सृष्टीश्वरादीनन्त स्वमतमित्युक्तं । भूत्या मायामात्रमित्यत्र मतान्तरव्योतकस्य अन्यादृशव्यवस्थामावेन तस्यापि स्वमतवर्षिज्ञानात् स्वमतं च सृष्टीश्वरादीनन्तावगमात् मायामात्रमित्यत्रापि मायाशब्देन ईश्वरेच्छेष न त्वेन्द्रजालिक-मर्यादायैवार्थः ॥ *Tarāṅginī*, edited by T. R. Krishnacharya, p. 211.

4 The term विनिश्चिता in the advaitic interpretation turns out to be pointless. Why should Gaṇḍapāda use such a term of eulogy in connection with a *pūrvapakṣa*? Jayatīrtha also draws pointed attention to this cue.

इच्छामात्रं प्रभो सृष्टि means 'That is to say, Madhva's rendering¹ of मायामात्र into इच्छामात्र is absolutely correct and to the point. The conclusion set forth in इच्छामात्र etc. is that the world is caused by the will of God and is as such a reality. The theory of the unreality of the world having been already discarded, मायामात्रमिदं द्वैत must necessarily mean the same thing i.e. the world is caused by the will of God. माया भगवदिच्छा ।² तयामितं ज्ञातं च मायामात्रं । अथवा मायामात्रं भगवदिच्छाधीनमिति वा ॥

Thus an examination of the real meaning of the Kārikās in the light of the context also establishes beyond doubt that the doctrine of the unreality of the world is not warranted by the trend of the Kārikās, and hence Gaudapāda's authorship of those Kārikās naturally collapses.

The position of the twenty-nine Kārikās *qua* Kārikās is highly suspicious. Why are they thrust in between the Upanisadic passages? Gaudapāda was after all a commentator and the normal procedure for a commentator—however eminent—is to keep the original and the commentary unmixed. He should not have allowed them to run riot, encroach upon the original, nay thrust themselves in between the body of the original Upanisadic passages and thus jeopardize their sanctity as a piece of revelation.

This strange admixture of text and Kārikās extends only up to the first chapter. We do not know if Gaudapāda himself was responsible for this. Apologists may come forward with the explanation that Gaudapāda or for the matter of that Sankara himself might have inserted these Kārikās in between the Upanisadic passages as embodying a most faithful interpretation and as such inseparable from the original. But suffice it to say that the faithfulness of an explanation or interpretation has to be accepted by all and it is for later generations to say if a particular interpretation is faithful. Discounting the self-complacency of the procedure, it is difficult to see in that case why the same method was not followed in regard to the rest of the work of Gaudapāda. The other three chapters stand by themselves. There seems to be no reason, however, to withhold the honour in their case alone. Or

1 Cf. महाभाष्येऽवस्थितिं नियतिर्मेहिनीति च ।
प्रकृतिर्वामनेत्येव त्वेच्छानन्तं कथ्यते ॥

2 Cf. मायेतीच्छासमुद्दिष्टा मायामात्रं तदुद्भव ।
उत्तमत्वात्परमार्थोऽसौ भगवान्विष्णुकथ्यते ॥

if it were true that everything pertinent to the original had been set forth in the first twenty-nine Kārikās, there would have been no need at all for Gaudapāda to have written three more chapters on the same subject! The only reasonable conclusion we can come to on a consideration of these and similar difficulties is that the first twenty-nine Kārikās were not Gaudapāda's own

He might have had access to an original Upaniṣad with an explanatory tract thereon, on which again he based his more elaborate treatise. Thus the twenty-nine Kārikās may have simply served as the nuclei of his later and more detailed treatise. The designation of the first chapter as *Ājama Prakaraṇa* also suggests the quasi-scriptural character of these Kārikās in contradistinction from the purely secular character and human authorship of the rest of the work

II

Madhva's ascription of the Kārikās to the upanīṣad seems to have met with tacit acquiescence at the hands of prominent Advaitic writers as well

(1) Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* elaborately discusses the meaning of a number of so-called monistic texts (*advaita śruti*). In the course of his exposition he fully quotes the two Kārikās 'प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत' and 'विकल्पो विनिवर्तते ..', not as Kārikās indeed but as *śruti* texts *par excellence* and establishes after an elaborate process of reasoning that these *śruti* texts do neither contemplate nor advocate Advaita Vāda

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the great champion of Advaitism, vehemently criticizes the *Nyāyāmṛta* in his *magnum opus*, the *Advaitasiddhi* and leaves no opportunity unavailed of to discredit his adversary. In the present case, Madhusūdana could easily have assailed his opponent not only for misinterpretation of the Kārikās but what is more for his mistaken identification and misappropriation of the two Gaudapāda Kārikās into the genuine Upaniṣadic text. But it passeth strange that the great veteran of Advaitism has simply held his peace and has slipped over this text of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. It is significant to note the author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, who is at times only too ready to flare up against his opponent in unparliamentary invective, consciously overlook a most vulnerable point in his adversary's position. It is therefore impossible not to interpret this 'masterly silence' into a tacit acquiescence in the Upaniṣadic theory.

(2) Śāṅkara himself gives no indication of the authorship of Gaudapāda in the course of his commentary on the disputed Kārikās. Not to speak of a recent theory of Vidyasekhara Bhattacharya¹ that Śāṅkara himself is not the author of the commentary attributed to him, it is highly surprising that he does not even once mention the name of Gaudapāda anywhere in his commentary – not even where the context requires it! There is every chance and necessity for him to do so as under the headlines अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति, he simply adds अत्र एतस्मिन्मथोक्तेऽप्येव श्लोकमवन्ति, but does not at all say who the author of these slokas is or why on earth the Upaniṣad should take any notice of them. Now, either the Upaniṣad may be taken to cite some parallel passages as is usual in Upaniṣadic literature, or Gaudapāda himself may be taken to have quoted them from an earlier source for purposes of elucidation. In any case, they cannot be his own. The words अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति preclude that assumption. If one would rather not have them as the Upaniṣad's own words we have to take it that the quotations following are from an earlier or contemporaneous source. This would only substantiate Madhva's attitude toward the Kārikās. If on the other hand, they are to be treated as emanating from Gaudapāda himself, even then the conclusion is irresistible that he is quoting from an earlier source. In any case, the parallel passages cannot be treated as Gaudapāda's own. Indeed to be his they ought to have been prefaced in a more complete form. It is ludicrous to believe that Gaudapāda began his treatise in the most abrupt manner possible without any benedictory verse and plunged into the subject with a mere – 'so it is'. And one can legitimately wonder why at all he should have stated that much (i.e. अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति) when the readers can very well see for themselves what is going to happen.¹

(3) And if Śāṅkara had felt them to be the *ślokas* of Gaudapāda he would have said so in so many words. The versatile Editors of the Ānandāsrama series make out that the words अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति proceed from Gaudapāda (and not the Upaniṣad as we may be led to think). But this would result in suggesting an abrupt and unnatural beginning for the

1 It remains to be seen how Dr. Bhattacharya who has himself been carrying on independent research in regard to Gaudapāda would view or welcome the disclosures made in the present article.

Kārikās which already suffer¹ for want of a benedictory verse

(4) Ānandagiri evidently feels nervous that his master should have left Gaudapāda's name out of account at the very beginning of the Bhāṣya and he therefore hastens to supply the omission. He writes "श्रीगौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान् माण्डूक्योपनिषदर्थोपेक्षरूपपरानपि श्लोकानाचार्यप्रणीतान्व्याचिख्यातुः" A close scrutiny of this passage would reveal that he himself had his own doubts and difficulties about ascribing the disputed Kārikās to Gaudapāda. Ānandagiri clearly leans to the view that Gaudapāda used some portion of the Kārikās as nucleus to his more elaborate treatise. This original portion he attributes to some Providential source. The phrase नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान् is clearly and unmistakably antithetical to the other आचार्य-प्रणीतान्. It only means that Gau'apāda had access to some explanatory verses which he used as his starting point. These he attributes to the grace of Nārāyaṇa. Madhva attributes them to Brahmā while another authority of whom mention will be made anon does likewise. Anyhow, all are agreed that these Kārikās do not belong to Gaudapāda.

The consideration of the charges against Madhva leads us happily enough, to unexpected quarters. During the course of my researches into this *verula questio* I have lighted upon some startling evidences tending to prove Gaudapāda a plagiarist². Often times genuine research lands us in unexpected quarters and reveals a staggering vista of information. The tables are turned sooner than we are aware. I have already suggested in the foregoing pages that the utmost that can be said of Gaudapāda is that he can be credited with the authorship of all the three chapters excepting the first which (I further maintain) he ought to have used as nucleus to his more elaborate treatise.

(5) Far from Madhva's having sifted or torn off a portion of Gaudapāda's work knowingly or otherwise from its proper context and author, and passed it off as *śruti* text, it is Gaudapāda who turns out to be the real offender. Madhva himself gives us the cue in his commentary on the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*

1. It appears to me that Gaudapāda's beginning his treatise without the usual benediction is highly unaccountable and tends to argue forcibly against his authorship of the first twenty-nine Kārikās.

2. I am aware of the seriousness of such an allegation but the proofs in support of it are glaring.

It is thus. Madhva quotes a number of passages from the *Brahma Tarka* which paraphrase the particular Kārikās beginning with प्रपञ्चोयदि विद्येत etc —

तन्वा स्वस्वामिसम्बन्ध प्रपञ्चाम्य शर्गणि ।
वस्तुतोमौ न चेवास्मि परमात्मवशे यत ॥
तन्वादिकस्मन्धात्येष ह्यभिमानात्यदृश्यते ।
अत स विद्यत इति स्वर्गाकारे भवेद्यदि ॥
तर्थाप भगवज्ज्ञानात्म निर्वर्तदमशय ।
विकल्पो दृष्टवन्धादिः कर्नाचिन्काशेन न ॥
कल्पिता विनिवर्तन गुल्वाक्यादमशय ।
एष एव मता वादो ज्ञाने द्रुत न विद्यते ॥
निवर्तते तथाज्ञानं तत्र यानदमेत्यसौ ॥

And again commenting on the words अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति he cites relevant passages from the *Gāruda* in which the propriety of the *śruti* quoting from elsewhere in support of its own views is discussed and exemplified

प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणचेद्वल्लवार्हयत मन ।
ब्रह्मदृष्टानतो मन्त्राप्रमाण माल्लश्वर ।
अत्र श्लाकाभवन्तीति चकारेव पृथक् पृथक् ॥

Thus the fact that Madhva has cited parallel passages from the *Purāṇas* shows that the Kārikās whose import these parallel passages convey must necessarily belong to some *śruti* consistent with the dictum इतिहासप्रमाणभ्यां वदं सप्रपञ्चयेत. It is out of the question to suppose that the *Gāruda* or for the matter of that any other *Purāṇa* thought it worth its while to paraphrase the Kārikās of a certain Gaudapāda. As the *Tarkamuni* remarks—

ननुमाडक्यापानपाद्विदग्धरूपगोडपादीयवानिहम्मा प्रपञ्चा यदीत्यादि श्लाका । न
श्रुतिभ्या । अत एव गोडपादीयवार्तिकभाष्यानन्तर्गतावुक्त । गोडपादाचाय माडक्यो-
पनिषद पाठत्वा नदृष्ट्याभ्यान्तत्वाकावतरण अत्रैते श्लाका भवन्तीत्यनन कृतमिति । त-
स्माच्च्यते श्रुत्यर्थ इति । मेव । आचार्य माडक्यभाष्य तन्वा स्वस्वामिसम्बन्ध इत्यादिना
भ्यास्यातत्वात् तयोः श्रुतत्वमवर्मायत ॥¹

All these parallel passages could not be pronounced to be fabrications of Madhva. Critics and scholars would be carrying their prejudice too far if they begin to doubt the *bona fides* of Madhva at every step. Let them consider for a while what on earth he could have gained by indulging in a systematic and wholesale fabrication thus raising a hornet's nest about him.

Taking a more sober view of the situation we cannot be far wrong in supposing that these parallel passages cited by Madhva testify to the existence of an ancient tradition which identified the disputed Kārikās as part of the original upanishad. It is only in this spirit that Madhva himself offers these quotations. His contemporaries and successors among whom there were veritable veterans of the day would not have easily swallowed his pills. Ignorance of the exact state of the philosophical and polemical atmosphere during the times of Madhva and long afterwards (for which lack of sufficient historical material is a partial excuse) coupled with a rank Monistic bias is alone responsible for refusing to see thro' this a clear case.

(6) I shall now come to the startling evidence which exposes Gaudapāda in the unsuspected light of a plagiarist. Its value is naturally enhanced as it comes from one who is sufficiently impartial and who certainly had no love lost for Madhva and his much-maligned dualism. It is none other than Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the author of the *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*. Bhikṣu cites two verses in the course of his aforesaid commentary which are both of them found in the extant and undisputed portion of Gaudapāda's treatise. One of the verses—

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोवमार्दिमव्युते ।

न च सर्वे प्रयज्यन् एव जीवा मुक्तादिभिः ॥

is quoted by Bhikṣu from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. Commenting on the Sāṅkhya Sūtra 1, 152, Bhikṣu writes, 'तथा वस्तुष्वपि बुद्धिधर्माणां सुखदुःखादानां दारयमाणा च ब्राह्मण्यवत्रियस्वादनां आरोपितानामपि व्यवस्थास्ति शास्त्रेषु । प्रश्ना विष्णुपुराणे—यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे' etc. This verse is cleverly given out by Gaudapāda with a slight alteration as his own.

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोवमार्दिमव्युते ।

न सर्वे मप्रयज्यन् तद्वज्जीवाः मुक्तादिभिः ॥

(अद्वैतप्रकरण III, 5)

The *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* is a much more ancient affair than Gaudapāda and I believe it will be granted by Oriental scholars that it is not likely that the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* has borrowed the verse in question from Gaudapāda. The painful conclusion stares one in the face that Gaudapāda has plagiarised a bit here — not without an effort to conceal the same.

1. *Sāṅkhya-pravacanabhāṣya*, Choukh. Edn., p. 100.

(7) Another instance of a similar procedure is to be seen in :—

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न च द्वौ न च साधकः ।

न मुमक्षुर्नैव मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ (वैतथ्यप्रकरण II, 31)

which is quoted¹ by Vijñāna Bhikṣu as a *Śruti* text!! Bhikṣu writes —

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिरित्यादि श्रुतेस्तु आत्मार्तिरक्तस्य कूटस्थनित्यतारूपानि परमार्थतत्ताविग्रहाः । किंचात्मना निर्गन्धस्पर्शरसवादिव्यः । अन्यथा एतादृशज्ञानस्य मोक्ष-फलकत्वप्रतिपादनविगर्हात् । न हि मोक्षो मिथ्येति प्रतिपाद्य मोक्षस्य फलत्वमप्रमत्तं प्रति पादयतीति । याश्चात्मैक्यश्रुतयः तास्य प्रथमाध्याय एव व्याख्याता । ब्रह्ममीमांसाभाष्ये च एतादृशान् श्रुतयः अस्माभिर्व्याख्याता इति दिक् ॥

The Bhikṣu would not have taken so much trouble and racked his wits to harmonize his ideas with the text in question, if it were merely a Kārikā from Gaudapāda. Bhikṣu is quite clear that the text is a *śruti* which requires to be satisfactorily answered and explained. He also says how he has already reconciled similar *śruti* texts advocating Advaitism. The case admits of no doubt or division of opinion. Bhikṣu is a versatile scholar and cannot easily be dislodged. He cannot be mistaken in treating न निरोधो etc. as a *śruti* whose advaitic interpretation he challenges. It is utterly impossible that he is inadvertent² especially when he is quoting this *śruti* for *adverse* comment.

The conclusion therefore is that Gaudapāda has simply passed off this *śruti* as his own Kārikā. Seeing that at least two of the Kārikās of Gaudapāda admit of being traced to earlier sources, a serious and genuine suspicion may rightly be entertained with regard to the disputed Kārikās as well. Madhva's ascription of them to the original upanishad is thus a legitimate conjecture. Enough has been said to prove the inherent validity of his contention and more will follow. Thus Gaudapāda ought to have purposely drawn³ his materials

1 Ibid p 22. Bhikṣu once again quotes the same *Śruti* in his commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtras*—which thus leaves Gaudapāda utterly exposed. Indeed Bhikṣu does not forget to quote it in his *Yoga-Vārtika* too!

2 Bhikṣu again quotes the same text in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* (p.101) along with वाचास्पृशश्चैतन्नि and repudiates its advaitic interpretation.

3 Some such suggestion is presumably thrown out by Śaṅkara himself whenever he remarks with significance अत्रोक्त वेदान्तसंप्रदायविद्विषाचार्यै etc. in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya*.

bodily, from various authentic sources while composing his *Kārikās*. The two verses quoted by Viṣṇāna Bhikṣu only illustrate this methodological device of Gaudapāda. He himself might not have scrupled to use the twenty-nine *Kārikās* preserved by current tradition as nucleus to his treatise and might have proceeded, in his zeal, to incorporate them into the body of his work to such an extent that modern Advaitic tradition has entirely missed the real character of these verses and imagined them to be the original productions of Gaudapāda.¹ If the equation of our Gaudapāda with the author of the commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikās* is tenable, further evidences of an aptitude for plagiarism can be adduced in the *Gaudapāda-vṛtti*, being an unacknowledged abridgement of the *Māthura Vṛtti*.

(8) Sankara himself throws out unmistakable hints that he attaches some sort of scriptural validity to these twenty-nine *Kārikās*. In the opening lines of his commentary on the second chapter of Gaudapāda's work, he writes — ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते इत्युक्तं । आगममात्रं तद्वत् । तत्र उपपत्त्यापि वक्तव्यं शक्यतेऽवधारयितुमिति द्वितीयं प्रकरणं मारभते । It means that the proofs so far adduced in respect of the doctrine of the unreality of the world being mainly scriptural, the author proceeds to establish the same on logical grounds also. This leaves us in no doubt that the quotation ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते is here regarded as a *śruti* text. Since this occurs in the *Kārikā* verse, it is conclusive evidence to show that this *Kārikā* and others besides are regarded by Sankara as plain *śruti* texts which are sought to be reinforced by logical argumentation. There is however a slight difficulty in adopting this view because in the commentary we find the words एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः intervening between 'ज्ञाते द्वैतं' and आगममात्रं तद्वत् thus creating the impression that the scriptural text so referred to is not ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते but एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म thus strengthening the Advaitic view that the *Kārikās* are not to be included in the Upaniṣad. But the spurious character of this intervening line is

1 It would be interesting in this connection to draw the attention of readers to the disclosures made by Prof R D Ranade, and Dr Belvalkar in their joint publication of the History of Indian Philosophy, Vol II regarding the authorship and authenticity of the fourth chapter of the Gaudapāda *Kārikās* (p 96-7 *ibid*). I have not so far taken up this question or utilised the suggestions of Prof Ranade because this question is not germane to my thesis. But I hope to deal with this question exhaustively on a future occasion.

self-evident. In the first place, the commentator proceeds to recount briefly what had been set forth in the previous chapter. He naturally quotes from the previous chapter 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं' has no earthly connection with the present context. It has not been taught in the original and no reference to it can reasonably be expected. The Kārikās themselves profess to interpret the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* and not any other. Under the circumstances therefore it will be out of place to refer to some scriptural text which has nothing to do with subject-matter, and which does not also occur in the upanīṣad about which the Kārikās and the Commentator himself happen to be speaking.¹ No sane commentator would have the temerity to hang his thesis upon a non-contextual and far-fetched allusion. Śaṅkara himself cannot be guilty of such a piece of illogicality. The sentence therefore seems to be an evident interpolation.

(9) Nor is the above the only instance where Śaṅkara refers to the Kārikās 'ज्ञाने द्वैतं' and others as upanīṣadic texts. In the opening lines of his commentary on the third chapter, he again remarks 'सोऽकारं निर्णय उक्तः । प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवो द्वैतं आत्मेति प्रति-
ज्ञामात्रेण । ज्ञाने द्वैतं न विद्यते इति ॥ अद्वैतं हि मायामात्रेण प्रतिपत्तव्यमाहोस्वित्तकैणापी-
त्यत आह शक्यते न कदापि ज्ञातुं ॥' Here again he pointedly quotes a Kārikā verse in company with an upanīṣadic passage and argues the doctrine of the unreality of the Universe so arrived at on the basis of scriptural evidence alone, is sought to be reinforced through a process of logical reasoning. This leaves as in no doubt that the text 'ज्ञाने द्वैतं'—uttered in the same breath with a recognized *Śruti* text must also be a *Śruti* text. And again commenting upon the passage 'नान्तं प्रज्ञा' he once more says 'अन्तं प्रज्ञादिनिर्गन्तममकालमेव प्रमानृत्वादिभेदेनियुज्यते तथा वक्ष्यामि ज्ञाने द्वैतं न विद्यते इति ॥'

(10) In his commentary on the *Viśvānātha Sūtra* लोकवन्तु लीलकैवल्य (II 1 33) Śaṅkara argues very strongly against the attribution of any motives to the creation of God. We have

1 It is a mystery why Śaṅkara should have gone all the way to the *Chāndogya* to cite a *śruti* regarding the unreality of the Universe when he could more easily and naturally have cited one from the *Māndūkya* itself besides the Kārikā.¹ It is also doubtful whether 'ज्ञाने द्वैतं न विद्यते' and 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' have anything in common. Śaṅkara's own interpretation of the latter is not specially favourable to the Monistic view.

2 Granted thus and construed with 'आगममात्रं नतु' the Kārikā 'ज्ञाने द्वैतं विद्यते' becomes a *Śruti* text.

already seen how the same topic was discussed in the Gaudapāda Kārikās as well and what the conclusion put forward by the author of the Kārikās was Sankara takes up the cue furnished in one of the Kārikās देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टा reviews various views about creation and its motive and rejects them one by one on the strength of *Śruti* texts which disapprove of them नहीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायत श्रुतितोत्रां सभवति । न च स्वभावं पर्यनुयाक्तुं शक्यते । यद्यप्यस्माकीमं जगद्विवरचना गुह्यतरमरभेवाभाति तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलावत् केवलं य । अपरिमितशक्तित्वात् । यदि नाम लीले लीलास्वपि किञ्चित्सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमप्येक्ष्येत तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते । आप्तकामश्रुते । नाप्यप्रगल्भस्मत्प्रगल्भत्वात् । मृष्टिश्रुते । सर्वज्ञश्रुते च ॥ Sankara here presumably means by 'आप्तकामश्रुति' the Kārikā देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टा Since this occurs among the disputed Kārikās we have to take it that Sankara regarded it as a *Śruti* text. Thus we have in this an additional confirmatory evidence for the reasonableness of the Upanisadic theory.

(11) We shall notice another evidence which clinches the issue once for all. It appears beyond a shadow of doubt from Sankara's commentary on the *Nṛsiṃhatāpanī Upanisad* that he is positively and avowedly in favour of treating the disputed Kārikās as part of the Upanisad. The *Vṛṇṇāḍī* in our place (IV, 1), entirely agrees with slight alterations and omissions with the text of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanisad*. Commenting upon this difference in reading Sankara remarks — किं च उभयत्रापि बहुतरपाऽमार्ग्यैषिक्किञ्चिपाठनदापि दृश्यते and further on अत ऊच माह्वये उक्त एवार्थे श्लाघान्पठित्वा तुरीयं पादं । एतस्मिन्तापनीयेन तान्वत्तय तुरीयं पादं ॥ which means that herein the reading in the *Māṇḍūkya Upanisad* includes some sloka before the Turiyapāda while the reading in the *Tāṇḍanīya* would omit these slokas. These Slokas are no other than the disputed Kārikās beginning with बहिः प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वः । etc. Thus Sankara seems to be entirely in favour of the Upanisadic theory.

1 I have not been able to trace any other *Śruti* wherein the words आप्तकाम occur as a प्रतीक as is intended by Sankara and associated with the act of creation.

2 Works of Sankara (Vani Vilas Press Srirangam) Vol X p 106 containing *Nṛsiṃhatāpanī Upanisad* and comm.

3 Ibid, p 110.

4 Sankara's reference to a disputed Kārikā (I—16), in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* with the words अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तमप्रदायविद्विगताचार्यैः admits of other explanations.

(12) There is also another and a most effective evidence in favour of the upanisadic theory from the works of Śāṅkara. His Holiness Śrī Satyadhyānatīrtha Svāmī of the Uttarādī Mutt, to whom I submitted my thesis for approval besides helping me in a general manner with very valuable hints and suggestions and evincing a personal interest in my work was kind enough to draw my attention to the *Vivekaśūdhāmāṇī* of Śāṅkara, wherein the hemistich मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः is quoted as a *Śruti* text¹. I am indebted beyond expression to His Holiness for the particular verse which runs —

मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।

इति ब्रूते श्रुतिः साक्षात्सुप्रमाणभूयते ॥²

and this clinches the matter once and for all. And His Holiness rightly holds that a vigorous research is bound to reveal many more evidences from extant Advaitic works.

III

The balance of evidence thus inclines to the side of the upanisadic theory. Except for the solitary criticisms of Triyambaka Sāstri³ a very recent writer, the upanisadic theory has continued to pass muster and has not been in the least questioned or repudiated by hosts of Advaitic veterans who came after Madhva and who created for themselves many opportunities and lost none to criticize him. The author of the *Achanta Siddhi* as indicated before, has observed a masterly silence over this *veritas quaestio*.

(13) In the *Tanmugī* for the first time the upanisadic theory is sought to be maintained and reiterated. But in the

1 Works of Śāṅkara (Varan Vilas Edition), Vol. xiv, p. 82, Sl. 406

2 These are known to have been answered by the late Hulanī Śrīvaḥpatyācārya

3 It is interesting to note in this connection that Appayya Dīkṣita who bore a special grudge against Madhva for his quotations from untraceable works etc.

तथाप्यानवतीर्थस्य मतमप्राप्तमिव न ।

यस्य वदितुमयोग्यं भूयस्याकुञ्चनागता ॥

has not raised the present problem anywhere. And seeing also that Vijayindra Tīrtha, his contemporary and critic has not also adverted to a discussion of these problems, Appayya's silence towards the same is established.

famous *Brahmānandīya* which is a reply to the criticisms of the *Taraṅgīnī*, not the slightest attempt is made to clear up the problem of the *Kārikās*. On the other hand, the author of the *Gaṇḍa Brahmānandīya* tacitly admits the upanishadic theory and simply criticizes the dualistic (*dvaita*) interpretation of the texts मायामात्र etc. This is clear from the statement of¹ the *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Brahmānandīya*. Just see “मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतम-
देत परमार्थत इति गोडपादीयान्कथ्यते भेदमसानार्थकं द्वैतपद । मायामात्रपदमाश्वरेच्छा-
नीनतया सत्यामित्यर्थकं । तथा च सर्वोऽपि भेद सत्य इति श्रुत्यादेरद्वैतार्थकत्वव्यव-
हारेणोक्तम् ॥” In the foregoing citation the author of *Brahmānandīya* accepts मायामात्र etc. as a *Śruti* and criticizes the interpreta-
tion thereof put forward by the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and defended by the *Taraṅgīnī*. It does not require a genius to see that had the *Brahmānandīya* disagreed with the upanishadic theory and meant to criticize it, the statement of the *pūrvapakṣa* would have been made in a different strain.

A colossal misunderstanding prevails in regard to Madhva's attitude toward the *Kārikās*. It has been repeatedly urged in some quarters that he reads them as part of the upanishad. Even the late Rāi Bahadur Śris Chandra Bāsu—the excellent translator of Madhva's commentaries on the Upanishads who had understood Madhva's system much better than most modern writers on Indian philosophy—has made the mistake of fancying that “the above *Kārikās* are really *Kārikās* of Gaṇḍapāda but are read by Madhva as part of the Upanishad.”

It is therefore necessary to clearly set forth Madhva's attitude toward the *Kārikās*. In the first place, amazing as it might seem, Madhva never regards the *kārikās* as an integral part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*. He is clearly of opinion that the twenty-nine *Kārikās* or *śī* *has* as they are called, and the rest of the Upanishad did not emanate from the same source. Setting aside the orthodox and traditional view of the *upanishadya* doctrine (अर्थावयवत्व) of the *Śruti* for a while, we may understand in more modern terms that he was prepared to grant that the author of the upanishad and the author of the *kārikās* were two different personages. It will be overstepping the limits of research to

1 *Advaitasiddhi* with *Brahmānandīya*, Bombay 1917, p. 827.

2 And further no attempt is made by Brahmanandi after closing the *pūrvapakṣa*, to criticize the upanishadic theory and establish the authorship of Gaṇḍapāda as one would naturally expect.

3 Sacred Books of Hindus Series, Vol. 1, Allahabad, 1911.

presume to say whether these *ślokas* were written (or 'seen') before or after the *Māndūkya-upanīśad* or when they came to be associated with it. Madhva proceeds to show in his commentary that the *Ślokas* are quoted to explain and reinforce the original. He also states that Varuna is the Rsi of the upanīśad to whom they were revealed by Brahṁā. Divested of its mytho-poetic garb, the import is plain in more modern terminology.

I have already indicated how it would be impossible for Sankara to account for the presence of the *kārikās* *qua* *kārikās* in between the upanīśadic texts and how as a consequence of the admixture of the text and the *kārikās* the sanctity of the former *per se* would seem to suffer. With Madhva no such difficulty arises. सलिलेश्वर स्वोक्तोऽयं दृष्टव्यः ब्रह्मशान्मन्त्रान्प्रमाणत्वेन वक्तुं प्रतिजानीते । (Srinivāsa Tīrth.) The peculiar position of the *Kārikās* would also necessitate such an inference.

(14) It is no strange phenomenon for the upanīśads to quote in support of their views. Instances of such parallel quotations (समाख्या) can be pointed out in profusion. The method of introduction is also the same everywhere. तदेतद्व्याख्युक्तं तदप्यश्लोकमवति (or as we have it in the *Māndūkya* अत्रैतं श्लोकमवति). To cite but a few of them:

तदेतद्व्याख्युक्तं (Prasna 1-7) तदेप्यश्लोकः (1-10, 11-11, 12-10, 13-5)
तदेतां श्लोकान् भवतु (5-5) तदेतद्व्याख्युक्तं (Mundaka 11-9) तदुक्तमप्युप
(Aitareya 11-44) तदप्यश्लोकमवति (Bṛhad 12-3, 13-11, 14-48)
तदेतद्व्याख्युक्तं (12-23)

(15) I have come across an old 'Telugu Edition' of the *Māndūkya Upanīśad* with an independent commentary published by Mr. A. Buchia Pantula, as a supplement to the (now defunct) 'Hindu Reformer,' Madras. This edition contains the text and the *kārikās* separately numbered. But the last quarter of the twenty-ninth *kārikā* is repeated twice. सद्यः नैतरो राजन सद्यः नैतरो राजन इति । which is very significant. Such a repetition also occurs in the Bombay editions with Madhva's commentary as well as in another to which reference will be made anon. It is a well-known fact that the last few words are usually repeated in the Upanīśads and allied works as a sort of emphasis and reiteration. Commenting on this repetition Srinivāsa Tīrth remarks उपनिषदर्थस्यावधारणार्थमन्तः पदश्लोकः and he quotes a

1. Raja Ram Mohan Roy Press, 1863.

2. This edition is rather than the Anandasrama Edn. (1900) and the repetition in reading seems to have been based on well-authenticated MSS.

well-known tag अत्रायान्त दिरुक्ति स्याद्वेदवा वैदिकेष्वपि । Thus, on the strength of the repetition we may infer that the twenty-ninth *kārikā* marks the close of the Upanisad

(16) I shall now notice some of the formidable evidences available from among the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sources Rāmānuja has not of course left any continuous and complete commentary on any of the Upanisads. But he makes plain his attitude toward the disputed *kārikās* in the course of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra 1.1.1 wherein he criticizes the advaitic interpretation of all the authoritative texts in which the term *माया* occurs. He shows that the term *माया* does not mean unreality or illusion as Śaṅkara holds. नहि सर्वत्र मायाशब्द मिथ्याविषयः । असुर-गक्षमशास्त्रादिषु सत्येष्वपि मायाशब्दप्रयोगात् यदाह ।¹ and he proceeds to examine a number of *Sūtra* texts wherein the term *माया* occurs, and offers his own interpretation of them. In the course of his examination, he introduces a *kārikā* ज्ञेयस्यैव हि मायया निर्गोच्य श्रूयते । तस्मिन्शान्त्यो मायया सनिर्मुक्त इति । अनादि मायया सन्ना यदाजीव प्रबुद्धयत इति च ॥² Rāmānuja would not have quoted this *kārikā* if he regarded it as one of Gauḍapāda. He would have treated it with the utmost indifference if not also with scorn. But the fact that he quotes it with approval and places it on a par with a text from the *Sūtrasāra* clearly indicates the scriptural validity he attaches to it.

(17) And naturally enough, some of his disciples followed Rāmānuja. Long before Madhva was born, Kuraṇārāyaṇa Muni, a contemporary and disciple of Rāmānuja, wrote a commentary on the *Māndūkya Upanisad* in which he treated the first twenty-nine *Kārikās* as part of the Upanisad and at-

1 *Śrī Bhasya*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, vol. III, p. 102.

2 *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, I, 16.

3 There is some difference of opinion among the followers of Rāmānuja at the present day, whether this Kuraṇārāyaṇa is the same avatar-disciple of Rāmānuja. I had occasion to discuss the question with Mahāmahopādhyaya Kṛpāśāstram Deśikācārya in the recent presence of H. H. Śrī Suvratendra Svami Tirtha of Sumatendra Mutt. M. M. Deśikācārya places this Kuraṇārāyaṇa later than Vedānta Deśika. But I have reasons to believe along with the learned Editor of Kuraṇārāyaṇa's commentary in *Grantha*, that he was a disciple of Rāmānuja. I cannot discuss the question here for want of space. Apart from the question of his identity, the probative value of his attitude to the *Kārikās* remains unshaken. The question of identity may be left an open one without any prejudice to my point.

tributed them to the same source as Madhva's¹ उपनिषत्प्रमाणवैपि
स्वाकाथिदाकार्यं स्वाकाथं मन्त्रादुदाहरति । मन्त्रद्वारा ब्रह्मणा भगवद्गुणानामितेषामेकव-
स्तुतिमिति । He also holds that these Kārikās were 'seen' by
Brahmā. He also notices the repetition in the reading मय्यनितै-
तरेजन and adds द्विस्तुतस्तुतयप्रमयावधारणाया उरनिषत्समाख्यार्था च ॥ There
is no doubt that he was fully aware of the more elaborate
treatise of Gaudapāda. The work of Gaudapāda was well-known
in those days. Yāmunācārya has a quotation from it. Nobody
can therefore say with any show of reason that the com-
parative oblivion of the work resulted in a confusion after-
wards of the genuine Kārikās with the Upaniṣad Kūranārā-
yana could not have been removed from Sankara by more
than three centuries, and if just three hundred years after San-
kara there was a persistent tradition which assigned the dis-
puted Kārikās to a source earlier than Gaudapāda, there is
every reason to suppose that Madhva had equal access to it in
his own days. Nor is this surprising considering the versa-
tility of Madhva and the wonderful range and variety of his
equipment as is evidenced in his numerous works.

(18) Kūranārāyana is not the only writer to be mentioned
in support of Madhva. There is another, belonging to the seli-
same school of Rāmānuja. It is Doddacārya alias Mahācārya
who calls himself of the Vadhulagotra, and a pupil of Sriniva-
sacārya. He seems to have been a contemporary of Appayya-
Dikṣita. He is the author of some polemical works against the
Advaita Vada such as the *Advaitavidyābhāṣya*, *Pārūṣāryaṁbhāṣya*,
Sādvidyābhāṣya, *Brahmavidyābhāṣya* etc. In the first-named he
criticizes the monistic interpretation of many *Śruti* texts. A
Telugu manuscript of the book is deposited in the Government
Oriental Mss. Library, Madras. It bears the Descriptive Cata-
logue No. 4851. I managed to examine the work in parts
with the help of a Telugu Pandit in the Library and to my
surprise I found the author inclined to treat the Kārikās
beginning with अत्रैतन्नाकाशमवन्ति in the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*
as part of the original. Mahācārya is found actually to chal-
lenge Sankara's interpretation of the text प्रपञ्चपक्षमं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं

1. It was my esteemed Professor Mahamahopādhyāya S. Kupp-
svami Sasiriar of the Presidency College Madras who drew my
attention originally to Kūranārāyana, which enabled me to look up
his commentaries. And with the help of information gathered from
elsewhere I was able to make an exhaustive study of the question of
his identity and come to definite and independent conclusions.

मन्यन्ते । In the course of his criticism Mahācārya writes —
 माद्वययोपनिषदि उपक्रमे प्रपञ्चपक्षस्य मन्यन्ते इत्युक्त्वा तद्विवरणकाक्षायामुक्त । अत्रैते
 श्लोकाभवन्ति । निज्ज्ञे सर्वदुःखानां विभु स्मृत इति ॥
 काऽर्थमन्तर्हस्यं वाक्यम्यतिचिंत । तद्व्याख्याने न आवाभ्या यतितव्य ।
 अन्यैश्च व्याख्यानात् Thus one more proof is added
 if any more were wanted, in support of Madhva's position

Thus it will be seen that there is voluminous evidence in favour of the Upanisadic theory. And it has been fully and unreservedly acquiesced in by all the prominent champions of the three Schools of Vedānta not to speak of alien writers like Vijnāna Bhikṣu. The Upanisadic theory of the Gaudapāda Kārikās can no longer be dismissed by the noblesse of Oriental scholars and savants as a mad freak of Madhva and his followers. It is high time for the slumbering sexagenarians of Sanskrit Research to wake up and modify some of their pet theories and opinions in the light of recent research.

And the present article would not have been written in vain if it would convince impartial scholars and critics that Madhva is fully justified in treating the Māndūkya Kārikās as part of the Upanisad. And I would consider myself amply requited for all my labours if it would dispel ignorant and calumnious criticisms against Madhva and his followers in this respect. Much remains to be done in the field of the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva. A satisfactory solution of the problem of Gaudapāda Kārikās would in turn facilitate a sympathetic approach to and understanding of the system of Madhva, and it is hoped the present article has not failed in this its aim.

AL'FARABI *

ALI MAHDI, M. A.

(c) THEORY OF CREATION

We have seen how Farabi emphasizes the absolute Unity and the supreme agency of God and how he endeavours to derive the Many from the One without breaking the Divine Unity, or damaging His absolute agency. In the *Ideal City* he emphasizes that God as the self-sufficient essence and as the creator of the universe is one and the same—the two phrases being indistinguishable in any way. Creation and origination are not natural, involuntary effects of God, nor do they presuppose any volition on His part like human volition, which is guided by some purpose, to say so would be to endanger God's absolute agency and self-sufficiency.¹ The sole cause of creation is the divine knowledge and His agreeable disposition.² The creative process is described as 'the overflow of the effect of divine existence on 'things which only then become existent' Farabi terms it *Ialaz*. *Ialaz* means the continuous, unchecked, unobstructed, overflow of existence from the Divine without any purposive volition.³

Farabi's theory of creation is based on two ideas—the omniscience, and the omnipotence of God. God knows all and therefore created *All*. The Divine Personality cognized Himself, and His knowledge became the cause of existence. This act of divine cognizance is a twofold one. In the first act of cognizance 'the One cognized *itself*, and consequently cognized His sublime *Agency*'.⁴ This cognizance of His Agency led to the cognizance of objects, and He cognized the *All*. His cognizance of himself thus became the cause of His cognizance of others.⁵ The first cognizance is not separate

* Continued from p. 69 of Vol. I, No. 1

1. *Ideal City*, Ch. 7, *Fontes Questionum*, Ch. 6.

2. *Fontes Questionum*, Ch. 6.

3. Mohd. Badruddin-ul-Jalabi's commentary on the *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 30.

4. *Fontes Q.*, Ch. 6.

5. *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 16.

6. *Ibid.*, Ch. 57 cf. also Ch. 16.

from His essence, while the second cognizance—the cognizance of the All—is not His essence, but in it there is unlimited plurality according to the unlimited plurality of things known. Therefore the plurality is not in His essence, but posterior to it.¹ The first cognizance, thus, which is the essence, does not admit of plurality, and the second cognizance admits of plurality, but the plurality comes *after* the essence.²

From the second cognizance, the knowledge of the All, resulted a unity—a perfect immaterial conscious entity, the first intelligence. This has a double aspect (1) as connected with the One it is necessary being and a *unity*, (2) but in itself it is a possible being and a *plurality*. It therefore produced two entities (1) the second Intelligence (a pure immaterial existence like itself), in so far as it is a necessary being, and cognizes the One, and (2) the first heaven (a composite entity, with a body and a soul), in so far as it is a possible being, and cognizes itself. Similarly the second Intelligence produced the third Intelligence and the second heaven, and so on. This series, which could not be infinite, terminated in the immaterial objective active *Intellect* and the last heaven.³ This last Intelligence produced two things (1) earthly souls, and (2) the material elements—the latter in conjunction with the heavens. Farabi distinguishes two grades of creation. From the second cognizance—the horizon of the divine Lordship—to the origination of all the intelligences is *Alam-i-Amr*. Beyond this from the first heaven down to the barest and the minutest particle of matter is *Alam-i-Khalq*.⁴ *Alam-i-Amr* is the world of objective, immaterial, rational, entities, and *Alam-i-Khalq* is the world of sensible material existences.⁵

The nearer a being is to the One the inferior it is, because it has more of plurality and possibility. There is a regular gradation and system in the order of beings, each enjoying so

1 Ibid, Ch 58

2 Ibid, Ch 13

3 In one place Farabi says: "We do not know the exact number of these intelligences and heavens" (*Fontes Quæstionum* Ch 9). In another place, he limits the number of intelligences to eleven and that of the heavens to ten, the last heaven being the heaven of the moon (*Ideal City* Ch 7).

4 *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch 16

5 Halabi's Commentary on *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch 29, also of *Gems*, Ch. 47.

much of existence as, and being placed in the rank which, is just and proper for it' The system and arrangement of grades in nature is the result of the goodness of God, who, being pure goodness, is the sole author of the system of good in the universe This could not be otherwise, for God is pure goodness and justice is His very essence This is how Farabi reconciles the idea of differences with the goodness of God In fact the question does not arise for Farabi, for he maintains that goodness and justice require that there should be differences

It is important to understand the position of material substance in Farabi's system Farabi is a spiritualist, or more correctly, an intellectualist The spirit is the only true existence for him, and he cannot believe in any kind of dualism. The possible must necessarily have an element of plurality, and this idea of plurality is developed by Farabi into the idea of a material substance "The corporeal . . . , as it originates in the imagination of the spirit, might be designated 'a confused presentation' "2 Like Leibnitz Farabi has turned the material into the spiritual substance, and he has anticipated Leibnitz so much as to say that each body has an inertia by virtue of which it can move itself i.e. it has the source of motion within itself The corporeal substance is, in fact, spiritual in essence, only that, being farthest removed in the gradation of being from the creator, it has been covered with innumerable veils of plurality

The details of Farabi's natural philosophy need not long detain us He invariably follows Aristotle in his definition of space, time, motion, and spherical revolution Like him he rejects the Atomic Theory, and says that the four elements are capable of dissolution into one The only point where he diverges from Aristotle is that he does not believe in the eternity of the world, but says that it has a beginning and was created We accordingly turn to his doctrine of the human soul

(d) PSYCHOLOGY

What is the position of man in this gradation of being? Man occupies, according to Farabi, an intermediate position between the two classes

Conception of the Soul

There is a regular process of evolution from the basest material

1 *Ideal City*, Ch 7

2 Boer, *History of Philosophy in Islam*, p 124

3 *Fontes Questionum*, Ch 16

particles—through the four elements, elementary bodies, minerals, plants and lower animals—to the human organism.¹ Man is the perfection of material composition as an organism; but also partakes of a higher reality—the soul. Man, thus, is a composite being and is, says Farabi, made up of two substances—the one having form, quality, quantity, motion, and rest, being divisible, and occupying space, and the other being sharply distinguished from the first in all these qualities and sharing nothing of it.² The soul belongs to *Alam-i-Amr* and the body to *Alam-i-Khalq*, and man is a combination of both.³ At another place⁴ Farabi defines the soul as ‘unique, immaterial, indestructible, unextended, conscious substance.’⁵ Such a sharp distinction does Farabi make between body and soul, or the material and the spiritual, which receives a greater emphasis from the corresponding distinction between sense and thought. The sensational as sensational, says Farabi, cannot be rational; and the rational as rational cannot be sensational. Sensation requires bodily organs; but the rational—the human soul—works with an immaterial, and unspatial substance, which cannot be sensed or imagined.⁶ Sensation works on what is in *Alam-i-Khalq* whereas reason works on what is in *Alam-i-Amr*.⁷ Thus the faculty of sensing together with the lower mental faculties, and the objects of such sensations and actions, are thrown on the side of the body,⁸ the material, and to the soul are assigned certain higher actions which are purely intellectual and do not require the help of bodily organs.

1 *Ideal City* Ch 16 & 10

2 *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch 30

3 *Ibid*, Ch 30

4 *Fontes Questionum*, Ch 21

5 Poer states Farabi's definition of the soul as “that which gives completeness (Intellectus) to the existence of the body” (*Hist of Philo in Islam*, p 118) and O'Leary follows him in this. We have quoted above the actual words of Farabi. The misunderstanding in this case is again due to a strange mistake. Farabi, in his *Letters in Reply to Questions* (Reply No 32) says—“Aristotle's definition of the soul is that it is the first completion of the physical body etc.” Apparently, thus the misunderstanding is due to the mistake in attributing an opinion to Farabi which he explicitly calls Aristotle's and not his own.

6 *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch 47

7 *Ibid*, Ch 47

8 Farabi defines body as “physical structure, and a vital principle which is located in the heart, the whole being the receptent of the human soul” (*Fontes Questionum*, Ch 22)

Such a clear-cut distinction like that made by Descartes, we should expect, must lead Farabi to raise the problem: How can body and soul unite?—or must land him into some sort of Dualism. But he has already solved the problem in the sphere of metaphysics, saying that matter in reality is a form of spirit.¹ The question, therefore, does not arise for him at this place

The human soul has divisions, powers, faculties or activities; and Farabi goes on to point out in detail that these divisions are not of a co-ordinate rank, but constitute an ascending series—the higher ones becoming *forms* for the lower ones.² It is important to understand the notion of this subordination of psychic activities. Farabi believes in evolution—though not, like Spencer or Darwin, in blind evolution without an end term; and just because man is the most developed being in organic evolution, Farabi believes, he shares all the faculties or activities of plant and animal life.³ The evolutionary course is traversed by all men in their mental development from childhood to maturity, and Farabi seems to imply this doctrine as a fact. Consequently he gives a psychological sketch of the evolutionary development of mind, and puts forward an analysis of different levels of mental evolution or grades of psychic development.

The whole psychic life falls into two divisions knowing and doing, or theoretical and practical⁴, the practical appearing first. The child is born with the faculty of nourishment, the nutritive faculty shared by it together with plants. This is followed by a rudimentary faculty of cognition—the apprehension of external objects through the five senses. This leads to the development of the appetitive faculty, which man shares with the lower animals.⁵ After this comes the imaginative faculty,

1 See above p 43
 2 *The Ideal City*, Ch 20. The whole chapter is an interesting reading, and the reader is recommended to go through it.
 3 *Genes of Wisdom*, Ch 34
 4 *Genes of Wisdom*, Ch 34, and *Fontes Quæstionum*, Ch 21
 5 *Genes of Wisdom*, Ch 35 and *Ideal City*, Ch 17. Farabi is convinced like the best modern psychologists that every sort of cognition has some affective tone (vide *Genes*, Ch 20 etc), and, therefore, he thinks that sensational cognition should lead to the development of the appetitive faculty

which apprehends what cannot be known through the external senses, e.g. the power in the goat to imagine the enmity and the hostility of the wolf which cannot be externally felt.¹ This is the end of the sensational level, and beyond this the lower animals do not share anything with man. To this we might also add memory, with its two grades—the one a faculty of recollection, which is the store-house of what is apprehended through the five external senses, and the other memory proper, which is the store-house of what is sensed through imagination.² Up to this level, says Farabi, the images are not free from material attributes and forms of the corporeal.³ In modern terminology this statement would mean that the impressions at this level are merely percepts, and free trains of ideas are impossible.

At this stage the specifically human soul steps in—a soul which is not shared by the lower animals, and which does not work through either the external or the internal sense-organs, and which abstracts the essences, meanings, and rational forms, of things from the form of the corporeal, frames general notions of objects, and make them a form for itself.⁴ In other words, we have reached the ideational level, where imageless presentations become possible. There is an intermediary faculty, says Farabi, which raises us from the sensational to the ideational level, viz the representative faculty.⁵

The human soul, says Farabi, works with a power named the *Theoretic Intellect*, which is to the soul as polish is to the mirror.⁶ In his treatise *On Intellect*, Farabi describes the four-fold grades of this theoretic intellect. In this he develops the doctrine of Al-Kindi.⁷ The first grade is the potential intellect—just like that of Al-Kindi, existing as a capacity in the soul of the child, which when it comes into activity, becomes the second grade viz active intellect.

1 *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 33

2 *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 34

3 *Ibid*, Ch. 34

4 *On Intellect*, Ch. 5

5 *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 35

6 *Ibid*, Ch. 42

7. Nearly all the doctrines contained in *On Intellect* are again described by Farabi in the *Ideal City*, Ch. 21

The Acquired Intellect comes third, and to understand it, we should anticipate a bit of Farabi's theory of knowledge. The cognition of the theoretic intellect, says Farabi¹, resembles the impression on wax, with the difference that the seal only affects the surface of the wax whereas the rational contents affect the whole of the surface of the rational faculty, so that *the intellect can not be distinguished from its contents*. The objects conceived by the active intellect, thus, are not embedded in forms of the material, but become something internal to the soul. The sum-total of these concepts of reason, which are of a spiritual character, (or the full contents of rational knowledge), together with the active intellect (i.e. the ideational faculty), become objects for the third grade of intellect. The intellect in this stage, says Farabi, has developed into *Acquired Intellect*, which works on what is within the soul. It does not know anything external to itself, but it knows itself, and thus knows that which cannot be separated from itself (i.e. its own contents)². This is the Intellectual Level at which ideas combine into judgments and more complex mental activities begin.

Farabi believes that the passage from the potential to the active intellect is affected by the *Agent Intellect* which is immaterial, immortal, and indestructible. The potential intellect cannot in itself become actual, if it be not helped by the Agent Intellect. The Agent Intellect is not a development of lower mental activities, but is something which is sharply distinguished from them, belongs to a different class of beings,³ and therefore is something *acquired*. This intellect is a kind of, and closely resembles, the acquired intellect⁴. It is the perfection of human rational activities so that it becomes the *form* for all the lower faculties, while nothing can be a form for it⁵. It knows the first substance, the most perfect essences, the first forms, the first principles of Geometry, Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Logic⁶. It

1. *On Intellect*, Ch. 5.

2. *On Intellect*, Ch. 5.

3. *Fontes Quæstionum*, Ch. 21. (*On Intellect*, Ch. 6 and *Ideal City*, Ch. 10).

4. i.e. it belongs to *Alam-i-Amr*, the spiritual world.

5. The above is an almost literal translation of a very condensed passage in Farabi. (*On Intellect*, Ch. 6.)

6. *On Intellect*, Ch. 5.

7. *The Ideal City*, Ch. 21.

"passes judgment on good and bad, gives to the will its motives, and constructs arts and sciences" ¹ It completes the characteristically human practical soul This Agent Intellect of Farabi is what the modern psychologists call the Ego, the Self, or the Personality

What is our justification for interpreting Farabi in this way? The vindication of this interpretation becomes all-important, because all previous workers in this field have given a totally different interpretation Let us try to understand the position Modern Psychology ² tells us that experience is made possible through the synthetic construction of the data furnished by the senses, and in this the apperception, in which the Ego plays an important part, is a significant factor Kant would say that experience is impossible without the synthetic unity of apperception In other words they mean to say that, without the help of the Ego, no experience and no intellection is possible Farabi speaks of the same thing—the synthesis of experience, intellection, and arrangement of ideas in judgments, and an act of cognition where the cognitive faculty works on materials which are within itself But he assigns all this to the *Agent Intellect* instead of the Ego Can we then identify the Agent Intellect with the Ego? There seems to be nothing against it, on the other hand Farabi himself virtually does so, because he calls the Agent Intellect *Man in Reality* in other words, the ego or the personality).

That the acquired intellect implies something 'got from the outside' ⁴ need not trouble us The great champions of evolution, I mean Herbert Spencer and Darwin, have failed to show how sensation develops into intellection The best modern psychologists agree that there is a new growth at the intellectual

1 Boer, *History of Philosophy in Islam*, p 118

2 To be more exact '*Rationalistic Psychology*'

3 *Pontes Questionum*, Ch 21

4 This word 'outside' has been the cause of trouble for scholars like Dr. Boer and Dr O'Leary 'Outside' however is used by Farabi in the sense of *immaterial* Sometimes he clearly says 'outside matter', but sometimes for the sake of brevity, he uses the word 'outside' only, thinking that the context would supply 'matter' I have retained the word simply to expose the misunderstanding, otherwise the word itself is misleading There seems to be no reason for using the word 'outside' when 'immaterial' is the right rendering.

level which cannot be deduced from the lower levels. Farabi was bold enough to say frankly and openly—rather over-emphatically—that intellection is a new growth and comes from something *other than* the human organism: in other words, it is acquired from *the outside*, not developed from the inside. Farabi has, before this, made a distinction between the soul and the body and placed sensation on the side of the body. It is but natural for him to say at this stage that the spiritual is not the material, nor can it be derived from the material. Just because it cannot be derived from the material, Farabi calls it 'acquired.' We should remember that it is acquired only from the Agent Intellect, which, as we have seen, creates both the elements and the human soul. The notion of being *acquired* does not, therefore, mean 'outside humanity', but it only means outside the physical, material body, and no body would object to saying that the soul is *immaterial*, and comes from *outside* the material.¹ Boer calls the Agent Intellect superhuman,² but from what we have said above, it seems all-important to remember that it is *not* superhuman but human—or in Farabi's words 'man in reality'. This finishes our broad analysis of the psychic life.³


Munk, in his Article on Farabi in the *Dut de Sciences Philos.*, says that Ibn-i-Tophail tried to accuse Farabi of denying the immortality of the soul. Farabi, however, is open to no such accusation. He says more than once⁴ that the soul

*Immortality of the Soul
and Transmigration*

1 Cf. page 64, note 4

2 Dr Boer, *History of Philosophy in Islam*, p. 119

3 Farabi's analysis of the mental life may be tabulated as follows —



4. *Fontes Quæstionum*, Ch. 21 etc

is immortal and indestructible. He believes in the life after death, and is convinced that souls shall be judged for their actions, and shall receive rewards and punishments in after life. He does not, however, believe that souls existed before the body, and he totally rejects all theories of transmigration or metempsychosis.¹

(e) THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

We have already given some hints as to Farabi's Theory of Knowledge. We have mentioned his analogy of the wax impression where he means to point out that the concepts of reason are identical with the reason itself. We have seen that he sharply distinguishes the sensational from the rational. There are passages in Farabi where he gives physiological and psychological explanation of the sight, touch, and auditory sensations. I am careless of these. Intellectual cognition, he says, means that we feel something objective, in the percept of which reason *works*, and then conceives it. This work according to him, is a kind of purification and remodelling, only after which it can become a concept of reason. I am indifferent to these hints, although these are pregnant and interesting statements for the Kantian student. It has been pointed out more than once that Farabi is an intellectualist, and what should interest us here is Farabi's idealistic doctrine of cognition as expressed in his treatises *On Intellect* and *The Ideal City*. The problem is: How and why does reason know its objects? The active intellect is related to the potential intellect as the sun is related to the eye. The sun gives light to the eye and radiation to the colours, so that the eye becomes active sight, and colours become perceptible—both owing to the sun. Similarly, says Farabi, the Agent Intellect makes the concepts of reason rational, and the faculty of reason active. The doctrine, we can plainly see is merely the epistemological side of Farabi's metaphysics. In metaphysics, the Agent Intellect is the unifying entity for matter and spirit, and in epistemology it becomes the co-ordinating and the reconciling agent of thing and thought. And just as in metaphysics the Agent Intellect creates the material in conjunction with the heavens—a material composite being—, so in epistemology reason knows the sensibilia through the bodily organs—a material something.

¹ *Fontes Questionum*, Ch. 22

(f) MYSTICISM¹.

The sense knows the material and the reason knows the spiritual, but what is beyond both matter and spirit is veiled from both sense and reason². Rational knowledge, therefore, cannot disclose to us the essence of God, it can only tell us His attributes³. Should we, then, become hopeless of any approach to God? Farabi tries to find a way of approach in the feeling of *Love* pervading in all beings, which, therefore, are interrelated in feelings of love and friendship and thus make a united whole⁴. With reference to God all things unite⁵. "The lower strives wistfully to reach the higher, and the higher lifts the lower up to its own level. The spirit which stands above us, and which has lent to all earthly things their forms, seeks to bring these scattered forms together that they may become one in love⁶". Man shares this universal love, and "an approach to God is the aim and the blessedness of the spirit of man⁷".

The way to realize this aim is to strive after unity, for God is near (immanent)⁸. The material clings to us and strives to pull us down. The more we leave matter, the nearer shall we come to God⁹. We must therefore, leave the material world for Him, and thus know Him. We cannot have any idea of things mystical in this state. Our visions are perverted, and we are like a man suffering from bulimia, who hates food. When the man suffering from bulimia is cured, he feels excessive hunger, similarly, when our veil is removed, our vision gets sharper¹⁰. This veil is the force of matter which drags us down. Thou hast got veils other than thy clothes, says Farabi¹¹, and thou

1. Mysticism has been dealt with elsewhere in this book. Farabi is not a mystic but a *faṣṭuṣ*. There are, however, hints of mysticism scattered in his treatises, and I have tried to group them together under this heading.

2. *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 7.

3. *Ibid*, Ch. 48.

4. *The Ideal City*, Ch. 4.

5. *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 11.

6. Dr Boei, *History of Philosophy in Islam*, p. 120.

7. *Ibid*, p. 120.

8. *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 14.

9. *The Ideal City*, Ch. 5.

10. *Gems of Wisdom*, Ch. 23 and 24.

11. *Ibid*, Ch. 25.

shouldst try to cast off the veil, and to become pure Only then thou canst commune Thou shouldst not ask with whom thou communest (it is indescribable).

"Although within thy body, thou shalt feel as if thou art outside (i.e. thou shalt, in the state of ecstasy, forget thyself and lose thy personality), and art in a divine spiritual harbour Then thou shalt see what eyes have not seen, and hear what ears have not heard, and what has never passed in the hearts of men" "If this state continue, thou art fortunate Thou must make an agreement at this stage to remain in this state always"

Such an agreement is necessary, because, according to Farabi the state of Gnosis is at first transitory Those who have this divine vision, he says¹, either (1) stick to it, or (2) have to give it up under compulsion The latter must not give up their endeavours, but try to have it again. Their strivings shall not be wasted, for God rewards those who take pains for Him.

The mystic activities, says Farabi², are effected by a distinct faculty of the soul *Naf'-i-Mutma'anna*
The Mystic Soul It is a development of the practical reason, ("the practical reason which has been radiated from the light of the heart, to the extent that it has fully lost its vicious desires and become all virtuous"³) All the faculties of the soul, have a perfection, and the perfection of this faculty is Gnosis of the Divine In this state of Gnosis the soul attains to the *Eternal Bliss*

Mysticism thus becomes for Farabi the end of life, as well as of Philosophy According to Farabi, we come to resemble God in the acquisition of Philosophy, and now we have seen that communion with the Divine is possible only for the mystic. Gnosis and Gnosis alone, is thus the cream of perfection for knowledge as well as for life In it we know the real, and in it we attain the eternal bliss

(g) PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

To come now to Farabi's practical philosophy Farabi, as we have seen,⁴ believes that some affective tone accompanies

1 *Gems*, Ch 27

2 *Ibid*, Ch 21

3 *Muhit-Al-Muhit* Vol II p 2109.

4 See above p 61, note 5

all cognition. The faculty of desire (which develops from the feelings of pleasure and pain) superintends over volition. To will, says Farabi, is¹ to strive for that which we have cognized, or to keep away from it. Volition is of three kinds, according as it is moved by perception, representation, or theoretic intellect. In the first two cases the lower animals share it with man. In the third case we call it choice and it is characteristic of man only. Choice is perfected with the appearance of the characteristically human practical reason, which strives for an end remoter than the immediate life. It is completed, as we have already said, by the theoretic intellect. Just because choice is based on knowledge, it cannot be enjoyed without the possession of the theoretic intellect. Pure thought only is the sphere of freedom.

This end is the good which Farabi defines as "the perfection of the human soul in existence to the extent of becoming independent of matter and keeping in this state permanently—this good being an end in itself".² Those actions and habits which debar man from attaining to this good are *vices* and those which lead to its attainment are *virtues*.³ Virtues, thus, are not an end in themselves, but only a means to the good. Although the practical reason desires the good, it cannot immediately attain it, for the good is attained by spiritual efforts in the domain of pure thought. The practical reason, says Farabi, is *subordinate* to the theoretic intellect, which itself is not subordinate to any thing, but immediately attains the good.⁴

The attainment of this end is impossible for a man individually. No man is self-sufficient, and the choicest blessings can only be attained in society. Society, thus, arose to supplement individual insufficiencies.⁵ We shall not discuss Farabi's *Politics*, which reminds one of Plato's *Republic*.⁶ There is a point, however, where Farabi goes farther than Plato, and rightly corrects him. Philosophers should be kings, says Plato; philosophers should be kings, says

1 *The Ideal City*, Ch. 22

2 *The Ideal City*, Ch. 22

3 *Letters in Reply To Questions*, Ch. 3

4 *The Ideal City*, Ch. 22

5 *Ibid.*, Ch. 25

6 *The Ideal City* (from chapter 25 to the end of the book) deals with *Politics*

Farabi, but this he persists, is only a second best. In a perfect state the rulers should be *divine agents*,¹ i.e. those who have a divine right, and rule with a knowledge gained from the Divine. The casual reader will say that Farabi is a greater *idealist* and has flown higher than Plato. But a deeper insight will reveal more than this. Farabi has flown higher, because Plato's principles in consistency needed such a flight. Every serious reader of Plato's Republic must have felt that Plato's doctrine can become consistent and practicable only if the Ideal state be turned into a *Theodicy*.² But why, it will be asked, first put forward an ideal scheme like Plato, and then reduce it to consistency like Farabi? The answer goes beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, as a student both of Plato and Farabi, I am tempted to speak a word on this question. Ideals have their own use, but for our human shortcomings, they would be real, and when put forward they should at least be consistent. Moreover the one lesson that History teaches us is that if individuals are given absolute charge of the destinies of a society, they must be divine i.e., they should not be subject to human shortcomings and blunders, otherwise the interests of society shall every moment be at stake. In the absence of such infallible beings the modern civilized world has preferred to be ruled by a group of politicians. And Farabi expresses no strange notion when he says that if one man rules, he should be a divine agent, otherwise a group of philosophers—each a specialist in one particular branch—should be the rulers. This apparently, as he says, would only be a second best, for each of these philosophers being human, and therefore imperfect, even a joint action of the group may be a blunder.

1 *The Ideal City*, Ch. 26

2 Dr H. N. Randle, my Professor, was the first to point this out to me. Since then, the more I studied the Republic, the more have I been convinced of the depth and validity of this criticism.

REVIEWS.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY — by
G. F. STOUT, M. A., LL. D., LITT. D. — Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 37
Martin's Street, London, 1930.

The essays contained in this volume constitute a valuable addition to the literature of the controversy with which they deal. They discuss problems of deep interest and are written in a language which is at once clear and packed with thought. They have attracted the close attention of philosophical thinkers and though some of the articles contained therein do not represent his present position, yet "they all contain views, which in my opinion, ought to be considered before they are rejected" (Introduction, 1)

"The order of the papers in this volume is in the main that in which they were written" with such changes as were necessary "to bring together papers with closely related subjects" (Introduction, *ibid*). First in order is published the Herbartian article "because the Herbartian Psychology is at least of great historical interest, and there is no other tolerably full account of it in English" (Introduction, 1). The chapter on Ward as a psychologist is an interesting and valuable reading. Ward the psychologist is more often misunderstood than understood. He explains the 'central scheme' of Ward's psychological principles which "is a stumbling-block on the threshold which more or less bars understanding and appreciation of Ward's work as a whole" (p. 92, *ibid*). The article is valuable because, Dr Stout is "convinced that there is much that is of permanent value in Ward's detailed work which has not yet been assimilated and utilized by others" (p. 92), and further because he approaches Ward's work not "as an external critic, but rather as a disciple seeking and in a large measure finding in it a basis from which to develop his own" (p. 127).

The remaining essays deal with the problems of knowledge and error. He has outgrown some of the views contained in his account of the knowledge of the external world, which has been described by some thinkers notably Mr. Joseph as tending to be subjective. Dr Stout, however, thinks that he does not lapse into subjectivism. When he wrote the article 'Sensation

and thought' he was under the influence of such thinkers as Leibniz, Lotze and W K Clifford who... agree that matter as it is in itself is not really material but mental. (But) "they are not subjective idealists" (Introduction, vi)

The articles on 'Immediacy, Mediacy and Coherence' and 'Real being and being for thought' form a highly acute and penetrating analysis of knowledge and Dr Stout has defined and defended his position on this point with refreshing clearness. He is against the doctrine of 'representative contents' of Descartes and his followers. For "according to this view there intervenes between reality and the knower a peculiar kind of entity called a content. Hence the content is often simply called a thought or a part of knowledge, the implication here is that we do not think or know reality directly but only our 'thought' or knowledge of reality" (p 302). Dr Stout is of opinion that the upholders of this view have apparent reasons. "It is error, therefore, and the play of fancy and universal concepts which give to the theory of representative contents whatever plausibility it may possess. If this can be otherwise explained, this theory becomes a gratuitous absurdity" (p 303), and Dr Stout brings to bear his searching analysis upon the problem to show that they can be so explained.

Dr Stout maintains that sense-data constitute an essential element in all knowledge and declares that it is wrong to say that absolute truth is realized in so far as the sense-datum is completely rationalized. Immediacy and coherence are both necessary in the development of knowledge. He criticizes Joachim who holds the opposite view that "though thought cannot by its mediation exhaust the *data* — though finite individuals cannot overcome the opacity of its material — it attains the truth only in so far as its mediation progresses, and not in so far as its progress is barred" (p 323). The pre-supposition of this contention according to Dr. Stout is that mediacy and immediacy are incompatible with each other. But "the immediate cognition must have a positive character of its own and cannot be merely the negation of mediate cognition. Otherwise there would be no cognition except mediate cognition and immediate cognition would be simply synonymous with blank ignorance" (p. 323). The immediately presented is that "which is not merely known as required to interpret something else, but as something to be interpreted... This nucleus of immediacy constitutes an original point of

departure in the development of knowledge and it communicates to the rest of the perceptual judgment its own originality so as to constitute it a relatively independent datum" (p. 324). "This passage from mediacy to immediacy, which we call unification or appeal to matter of fact, is just as essential in the development of knowledge as the passage from immediacy to mediacy which we call interpretation or explanation" (p. 325), so that "it must follow that ideally perfect knowledge must be regarded as the limit of progress in both directions. It must be conceived not only as completely mediated but also as completely immediated" (p. 326)

Having analyzed the nature of truth and having shown that we do get a direct revelation of reality, he considers the nature of error which he defines as "a blank failure to think" (p. 342). Error therefore arises when the mind fails "in distinguishing various modes of being" (p. 342). In other words "Error is defeat. We mean to do one thing and we actually do another. So far as the error is merely theoretical what we mean to do is to think of a certain thing as it is, and what we actually do is to think of it as it is not" (p. 268)

The volume contains discussions on important philosophical problems and it is difficult to do it justice in a cursory review. It is an interesting and stimulating work which will greatly benefit the students of philosophy.

J. N. BOSE

A THE ŚIVĀDVAITA OF ŚRĪKANTHA, by S. S. SURYANARAYANA SHASTRY, M. A., B. Sc., Bar-at-Law, Reader in Indian Philosophy, Madras University—Published by the University of Madras—Law Journal Press—pp. 310. Appendices, pp. 48. Glossary and Index, pp. 35. Price Rs. 5, or Ten shillings.

B SIVĀDVAITA—NIRNAYA by APPAYYA DĪKṢITA. With an Introduction, Translation and Notes. Edited by S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri, University of Madras. Sri Vanī Vilas Press, Srirangam—Introduction, pp. 64. Sanskrit Text, pp. 96. English Translation and Notes, pp. 161. Price Rs. 2-8-0 (four shillings)

C THE SĀṆKHYA—KĀRIKĀ, by ĪŚVARAKRṢṆA. With Introduction, Translation, Transliteration, and Notes—By S. S. SURYANARAYANA SHASTRY, Madras University.—Madras Law Journal Press—pp. 130. Price Rs. 2 (Four Shillings)

D. VEDĀNTA OR THE SCIENCE OF REALITY,
by K. A. KRISHNASWAMY IYER, B A (Mysore Educational
Service, Retired) Foreword by Dr. S RADHAKRISHNAN of the
Calcutta University - Published by Ganesh and Co Madras.
Printed at the Huxley Press, Madras - pp 346 Price Rs. 10

A

The substance of seven lectures delivered by Mr. S S Suryanarayana Shastry, under the auspices of the Madras University has been expanded and elaborated into a systematic account of the metaphysico-religious system of Srikantha, who in the progressive evolution of Indian Philosophical systems has figured as a redoubtable champion of Śiva as the most-Supreme Deity to whom spiritual aspirants should owe devotional allegiance if they are to secure freedom from the countless ills of the here and the hereafter (1) The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of "some general considerations" like the date, place, the identity of the spiritual preceptor of Srikantha, doctrinal comparisons and contrasts with the systems of "Saiva-siddhānta", "Advaita" and "Viśiṣṭādvaita" (2) In the second chapter, the "preliminaries" and "presuppositions" of Brahma-Vidyā are considered. (3) Srikantha's criticisms of "rival theories" form the subject-matter of the third chapter (4) The nature of "Brahman and the World He creates" is explained in the fourth chapter (5) The mundane and the ultra-mundane destinies of the finite self, the Jīva—are critically examined in the fifth chapter (6) The sixth chapter is concerned with Śrikantha's description of the state of release and a discussion regarding its nature and the means through the instrumentality of which release may be obtained (7) In the seventh—the concluding chapter, the author has endeavoured to determine and assess the value of the system of Śrikantha's "Śivādvaita" in the light of religious and metaphysical requirements.

Though I readily congratulate the author—by no means a pioneer—as he has had it is presumed the benefit of Tamil and English translations and Prof Radhakrishnan's account of Śrikantha in the second volume of his work on "Indian Philosophy" on his fine critical exposition of the doctrines of Śrikantha, I feel bound to draw the attention of your readers to certain statements and opinions expressed by him in the course of the volume, which should not have found any place in a work issued by the research department of the Madras

University, and a work too the "first draft" of which had been perused by Prof S. Radhakrishnan (preface). Perhaps a very interesting and withal intriguing question is—who are the predecessors (*pūrvācāryas*) against whom Śrīkanṭha loudly complains that they had muddled, blurred, or dislocated the visual apparatus of pandits (the Sūtras of Vyāsa) and *pro tanto* prevented them from getting a glimpse of the Infinite? In a footnote on page 10, Mr Shastri observes—"Who these prior commentators were we do not know. The *advaita* and *bhedābheda vāda* are criticized in the course of the *Bhāṣya*; the reference is possibly to Śankara and Bhāskara" and repeats the ingenious and irrelevant suggestion made by Appayya Dikṣita that the "ancestors of the commentators in the line of philosophic tradition could also have been meant." A little careful reflection would have convinced any impartial investigator that Śrīkanṭha is not referring to predecessors of predecessors or ancestors of ancestors as there could obviously be set no limit in any mental retrospect, but accuses only the three famous *Bhāṣyakāras*, that had preceded him in writing commentaries on the Vyāsa Sūtras, namely, Sankara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva. Appayya Dikṣita's interpretation that the uncomplimentary reference in question touches the ancestors and predecessors of the *Ācāryas* is a clever camouflage, the psychological motive of which is to exempt Sankara or save him from Śrīkanṭha's criticism. Why not say that the three *Ācāryas* are attacked by Śrīkanṭha? If anyone is anxious to urge the exclusion of the *Ācāryas*, the exclusion of their predecessors is far-fetched and uncritical. Just see Śrīkanṭha is commencing a new commentary on the Vyāsa Sūtras. The new venture can be justified only on the ground of the unsatisfactoriness, real or imagined, of the works of the previous *Ācāryas* not their ancestors and ancestors' ancestors. Śrīkanṭha had a quarrel with all the three *Ācāryas* that had preceded him. He did not relish Śankara's Absolute Monism (Appayya Dikṣita's efforts to establish the contrary notwithstanding). Though he experienced irresistible leanings to Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, he did not like the advocacy of the supremacy of Viṣṇu in the latter. That Śrīkanṭha could never have liked poor Madhva's uncompromising and unmitigated Dualism will require no demonstration or proof. By the term "*pūrvācāryaiḥ*" in the fifth stanza of the Śrīkanṭha *Bhāṣya* reference has been made only to the three famous *Ācāryas*.

whose works Śrīkantha intended to eclipse by his own. This view, if accepted, will settle the question of chronology as well. I believe that Śrīkantha came after Madhva, and a fortiori after Rāmānuja. In support of this view, let me cite the following evidence which appears to me to be conclusive. According to tradition Madhva is said to have intended the refutation of *twenty-one* commentaries on the Vyāsa Sūtras by his predecessors, by his own Bhāṣya. If Śrīkantha had flourished before Madhva, his Bhāṣya will certainly have been included in the list of those in criticism of which the latter wrote his Bhāṣya. As a matter of fact, there is no mention of Śrīkantha in the list which runs thus "Bhāratī-vijayascaiva - samvidānandaevaca Brahmaghosah - satānandah-uddhataścaiva-pañcamah (b) Vijayo-rudrabhattaśca-vāmanākhyastathāstamah Sa-yādavaprakāśasca-navamastatrakīrtitah (c) Rāmānujah -tathā -Bhartṛprapañco -dravidastathā Brahmadatto - Bhāskarasca pīśāco - vṛttikārah (d) Tathā - vijayabhataśca - viśnukrāntastathaivaca Vadīndrasca - tathā - pascāt - tato - mādhavādāsakah, (e) Tataśca - Sankarācārva-yekavimsatī-vāḍibhiḥ Prānītāni - niraścakre - bhāṣyaṇi - sa - mahāmatih". The absence from this list of Śrīkantha's name is conclusive evidence that Śrīkantha flourished after Madhva. If this view be accepted, a great deal of the discussion about the period of Śrīkantha, in the first chapter, and Mr Shastri's apparent indecision would turn out to be pointless. He observes that "the conclusion therefore seems inevitable that Śrīkantha came later than Rāmānuja" (p. 64) and yet, he seems to incline to the hypothesis of contemporaneity of the two Ācāryas (pp 69 and 75).

(2) In a criticism of the Sāṅkhya Mr Shastri accuses Śrīkantha of "clumsy procedure" (p 124, footnote), when the latter proceeds to interpret the term "pañca - pañca - janāh" as meaning the five sense organs, and not the twenty-five tatvas of the Sāṅkhyas. The entire note and the accusation of procedural clumsiness would be easily seen to be absurd. When the Sāṅkhya claims that his doctrine of the twenty-five tatvas has the authority of a sacred text, Śrīkantha and others as well reply that the claim is baseless as the term "pañca - pañca - janāh" means something different from the tatvas. Where is clumsiness in it? On the other hand, the author's translation of the passage that these (twenty-five tatvas) are established in (*italics mine*) the Ākāśa (p 123) is clumsy. The fact is that the twenty-five tatvas and the Ākāśa

are established in *something else*. (3) On what is undoubtedly the most important issue - whether Śrīkantha is or is not a Monist, the author has made mutually incompatible and irreconcilable statements. The author observes that the advaitin abandons the concept of causation, but Śrīkantha is "not prepared for it" (p 198). On page 285 I read "that vivarta-vāda is a logical implication of Śrīkantha's teaching and that he is therefore, *really* (italics mine) an advaitin. Again it is said Śrīkantha's non-participation in active polemical warfare against the advaita is very inadequate support for the position that he himself was an advaitin (304). Finally, as a feature of merit of the philosophy of Śrīkantha, it is pointed out that "the way seems to be left open to reach to the logical fulfilment of the thought in a system of pure non-dualism" (p 309). (5) The heading of the paragraph on page 156, "Brahman as sarva - śabda - vāci" is erroneous. It should read - "Brahman as sarva - śabda - vācya."

B

Appayya Dikṣita in his "Śivādvaita-Nirnaya" has endeavoured to demonstrate that the fundamental doctrine of Śrīkantha is Monism, the Reality foundational of all existence being Śiva. It is obvious that Appayya Dikṣita would not have undertaken this polemical interpretation of the meaning of Śrīkantha, if in his time, there had not been set forth a claim that Śrīkantha was not a Monist. "Evamāpātatah-pratīyamānepi-sūksma-drṣṭyā Bhāṣya-chāyā" (italics mine) parāmarse — suddhādvaitameva-tesām paramasiddhāntah" (p 24). Appayya Dikṣita explains that there was a need for a new Bhāṣya by Śrīkantha. Sankara had the Nirguna-Brahman at heart, yet emphasized the value of the Saguna. Śrīkantha established that the Saguna-Brahman is Śiva (pp 65 and 74).

(1) That Appayya Dikṣita's case is not quite so strong is evident from his use of term "chāyā". The general import of the Śrīkantha Bhāṣya and not the actual terminology used is in favour of a Monistic interpretation of the work. (2) The Editor observes that it "seems exceedingly improbable that Śrīkantha intended pure non-dualism as the culmination of his system" but that such a culmination could be worked up from materials taken from Śrīkantha's exposition, as was actually done by Appayya Dikṣita, (English introduction, p 41, section V). The criticism of Śrīkantha's position by the Editor

and Appayya Diskita's working 'up of the philosophy of Śivādvaita to the acme of Monism, suffer from the fact that judgment has been pronounced on the assumption that Monism is the only fashionable or civilized philosophy or world-view

(3) There occurs a very ugly mistake in the first line of paragraph numbered 5, on page 95 of the Sanskrit text "Yattu-paresām-bhāsyē-visistādvaita-nirūpanam-yaccānnye-sām-bhāsyē-śuddha-advaita-nirūpanam-lattu-tadavastu-tatvamityabhiprāyena" The reference is to Rāmānuja and Madhva obviously. The reading should be "annyesām-bhāsyē-Śuddha-dvaita-nirūpanam". There cannot be any other reading as Madhva stands sponsor to pure dualism (śuddha-dvaita).

(4) The author's excursions into the realm of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā afford an amusing spectacle in the shape of a note on page 149. The two concluding sentences of the note and the use of the expression "functus officio" are irrefutable evidence that the author has not understood the discussion at all. "Jaiminiya-Nyāya-Mālā-Vistāra" puts the matter plainly thus "Strilinga-vācinah-tap-pratyayādapi-pūrvapāthitasya-prathametasya — prātipadikasya — prabalatvāt ato — vikṛtis — vapi — anyasya — api — reah — prathamasthāne pāthitayah — tri-rabhyāśah — kartavyah — sthanāntare — pāthitayah — pravovaj-ityasya — api — reo — nābhyāśah". Nyāyamālā - vi-tara, Calcutta Edition p. 453. The two rks, Pravovaja and Ajuhota standing first and last respectively to be chanted in the Darśapūrnamāsa (prakṛti) do not retain monopoly of first and last rank. The contention of the pūrva-paśin is that in view of the injunction "trih-prathamamanvāha-trinuttamam" the first and the last to wit, Pravovaja and Ajuhota are *always* to be chanted. The answer to this contention is that even before the feminine gender termination is grasped, the basic elements "prathama" and "uttama" are apprehended. Hence the two specific rks enjoy no monopoly of order in chanting. But *any other rk* standing first and last in the vikṛti rites should be chanted thrice. On the basis of the feminine termination, chanting thrice cannot be restricted to the two specific rks mentioned. These two if and when they occur, elsewhere i.e. neither in the first nor the last place, should *not* be chanted thrice. That is the truth of the matter. I wonder what this has to do with "functus officio" !!

C

The translation, transliteration, introduction and the notes prepared by the author, in order to meet the demands of the

student population preparing for the degree courses of the different Indian Universities, are bound to be undoubtedly useful and helpful to beginners in the study of Sāṅkhya thought, but, in the interests of impartial and disinterested scholarship and progress of research, it becomes necessary to emphasize the following inaccuracies:—(1) The author of the introduction holds that "if there was a re-action against idealistic Monism, it is difficult to believe that Sāṅkhya went very far with it" (p. xii) and repeats this estimate in a subsequent place (p. xv). On the other hand, tradition and textual testimony are clearly indicative of the fact that the Sāṅkhya speculation constitutes a direct protest against the Monistic Idealism. That such an estimate was prevalent even in the days of Śaṅkara is quite evident from the following remarks of the Ācārya that the Sāṅkhyas are to be regarded as "dvaitis" (dualists). The Ācārya writes—"Dvaitino-hi-te-sāṅkhya—yogasca—nātmaikatva-darsinaḥ"—Śaṅkara's commentary—Vedānta Sūtras—Bombay Edition (p. 354). (2) The author has made inconsistent statements about the plurality of selves in the Sāṅkhya system. On page, xxiv, the plurality is restricted to "empirical selves" while on page xviii, it is stated that according "to the classical Sāṅkhya of which the Kārikā is an exposition, we have but Prakṛti on the one hand and a multitude of puruṣas on the other". (3) The rendering of the term 'pramāṇa' into "mental function that leads to correct knowledge" and of 'āptavacana' into "valid testimony" are *prima facie* erroneous. (4) On page 16, the Advaita inference is said to be a "mixed hypothetical syllogism" while on the next page occurs the statement that it is "a mixed Disjunctive Syllogism". It is hoped that in the subsequent edition of the work these inaccuracies will be eliminated. Freed from them, the edition of the Sāṅkhya Kārikās will be better appreciated by the students of the universities for whom it is intended by the Editor.

D

In the course of twenty-five chapters, Mr. Krishnaswamy Iyer has developed an arresting and important thesis that the fundamental essence of Śrī Śaṅkara's Monism is the practical realization of the identity of the finite selves with the Infinite and not mere speculation or speculative system-building. The Śaṅkara Vedānta does not rest on any scriptural authority or any apocryphal text, but, its truths can be understood

and realized by earnest aspirants from the data derived from a close and careful study and analysis of the three states of (a) waking, (b) dreams, and (c) dreamless sleep. The author's central thesis is that in the state of dreamless sleep, the finite selves intuit Pure Consciousness — abbreviated into P. C. throughout the book. Pure Consciousness is God. In the state of intuitive identity with the P. C. all distinctions, duality, discord, and disharmony characteristic of the empirical state (*vyāvahārika*) vanish. The state is beyond the tainting influences of time, space, and other categories of waking life (pp 98-102 and 111). The author has undertaken a reasoned criticism of European and American schools of thought, the philosophical and practical inadequacy of which in the light of the Vedānta is vividly brought out.

Though one may not feel inclined to agree with the author in his conclusions, it cannot be denied that he has presented his thesis in such a closely reasoned manner as to compel attention. There is no doubt a new line of approach indicated by the author who wants concentration of attention on the data collected from the three States. Granting the sustainability of the entire line of argument, and focussing criticism on the comprehensive aspect of his thesis, I feel obliged to draw the attention of your readers to the following — (1) Scriptural authority cannot be so completely thrown overboard. Reason and ratiocination are capable of unrestricted and riotous procedure, and Sri Sankara is quite emphatic that valid knowledge about supersensible Reality — the Brahman — can be got only from the *Sruti* — the sacred text — “*Tad-Brahma sarvajnam sarvasakti jagadutpatti — sthiti — laya — kāraṇam vedāntasāstrādevāvagamyate*” (Opening sentence of the *Samanvayādhikaraṇa* p 61 *Sāṅkara Bhāṣya*, Bombay Edition). (2) Further, the text of the *Māndūkya-upanīśad* is committed to the admission of the existence of a fourth state — the *Turiya* — which would correspond to the P. C. and others would mention a fifth state, the *Turiyātita* as well in which one would intuit the P. C. Such views have not been examined by the author who claims finality for the third state of *suṣupti* — dreamless sleep. Though I consider that the fundamental thesis of the author needs reconsideration and restatement in the light of the *Māndūkya* and other *Upanīśadic* texts, I congratulate the author on his keen and penetrating criticisms of the Western systems of thought, and on his attempt at a vindication of the truths of the Vedānta, from the stand-

point of reason and intuition. The author's vindication of the Sankara Vedānta is from a fresh angle of vision, and I believe the present volume is bound easily to excel some recent critical expositions of the Monism of Śrī Sankara, and I unhesitatingly commend it to the authorities of Indian Universities for being forthwith prescribed as a textbook suitable for the Degree Examinations. So many volumes good, bad and indifferent have been written about the Monistic Idealism of Sankara by Indian and European authors which merely repeat and rehash ill-digested half-truths, and Mr Krishnaswamy Iyer has come to the rescue of students and scholars, researchers and reviewers, by indicating a comparatively new line of approach to the doctrines of the Ācārya.

R NAGA RAJA SARMA

BHAGIAVADGĪTĀ—AN EXPOSITION, by DR. VASANT G. RELÉ, F.C.P.S., L.M. & S.—Published by Messrs D B Tara-purwala Sons & Co., Bombay

In this book Dr Relé has tried to interpret the Gītā from the point of view of New Psychology. He maintains that the Gītā was preached to cure the functional disease of Arjuna's mind by restoring the harmony of the conscious and subconscious parts of his mind. The subjective and objective aspects of the conscious are distinguished from one another, the former is identified with the subconscious, and declared to be only a spark of the Superconscious, which is in fact the Purusa or Brahman. The Conscious and Subconscious are again described in the Vedāntic terminology as being the same as the 'Kṣara' and Akṣara, and the inherent qualities of the conscious and subconscious are supposed to be identical with the demonic and divine qualities described in the Gītā (xvi, 1-3, 10). All actions proceed from the impression which the subconscious receives from the objective world in the present and past lives, and wisdom (jñāna) consists in the knowledge of the working of the conscious and the subconscious. The one aim of human life should be to control the objective consciousness and turn the energy of the repressed emotions from the subconscious into the Super-conscious. The difference in the various individuals is explained as being due to the disturbance of the balance of the three qualities in the Cosmic matter, caused by the passage of the individual from one life to another. One can regain the balance by reaching the mental field through the body by means of *Asvattha* or the Nervous

System, which is in fact the physical manifestation of the Absolute Union with the Super-conscious or Brahman is attained by making this Asvattha unimpressionable. Great Psycho-analysts like Kṛṣṇa alone can awaken the divine consciousness in others. The author then proceeds to describe in detail the methods adopted by Lord Kṛṣṇa in educating the mind of Arjuna by means of Karma, Yoga, Jñāna and Bhakti. Kṛṣṇa made Arjuna to realize the importance of controlling and subordinating the objective consciousness to the subjective, and directing the energy of the suppressed emotions to the internal purification, that is, to the purging the subconscious of its impressions of worldly desires in such a way that it may realize its unity and identity with the blissful Super-conscious or Brahman, which ought to be the one goal of all human endeavours.

The attempt of the author to explain the fundamental principles of the Vedānta philosophy in terms of New Psychology deserves some praise. But his mind seems to be vitiated by what is known as the Fallacy of Happy Exercise and in spite of his earnest desire to offer an 'objective' interpretation of the Gītā, he reads his own subjective ideas in it. We do not question his profound knowledge of the Science of New Psychology, nay, we wish he should write an independent work on the subject. What is highly objectionable is his exposition of the Gītā in terms of New Psychology, as this is absolutely unwarranted by the text of the Gītā. There is nothing in the Gītā that would in the least justify such an interpretation. His supposition that the Asvattha is the Nervous System (p. 35 ff.), his explanation of the verse *ब्रह्मर्षिं ब्रह्मज्ञानं* etc. in terms of New Psychology (p. 75), his identification of the four kinds of spiritual aspirants, Arta, Jñāsa, Arthārthi and Jñāni with the Mantra, Laya, Hathā and Raja Yogis (p. 94), his self-advertising and irrelevant references to the line of Kundalini (pp. 85, 108), his so-called new interpretation of the Uttarāyana and Dakṣiṇāyana, white and dark (Sukla and Kṛṣṇa) paths as referring to the conscious and subconscious paths in the body, to the cerebro-spinal and autonomic nervous systems (pp. 106, 107), his explanation of Soma (the moon) as the cerebro-spinal fluid secreted by the moonshaped ventricles of the brain (p. 115), and of 'Ausadhi' as autonomic nervous system (p. 119), — are, to put it in the mildest terms, nothing but quixotic and meaningless jargon. In fact, the whole book is a sublime illustration of Ignoratio Elenchii,

entirely ungrounded and irrelevant. The author seems to be obsessed by the 'New Psychology Complex,' and in spite of his condemnation of the orthodox commentators, for their reading their own ideas in the *Gītā*, he falls a prey to the same blunder, and finds in the *Gītā* what could not have been even dreamt by the author of the *Gītā* himself. An impartial, unbiassed and objective interpretation of the *Gītā* is yet a desideratum, which can be fulfilled by one, who would not try to find in the *Gītā* what is not there — a full fledged system of philosophy.

K. V G

CHRISTIAN DHYĀNA, by VERRIER ELVIN, Christa Seva Sangha (S P C K, Bombay)

'Christian Dhyāna' is a short study of 'the cloud of unknowing', a fourteenth century classic Christian mystical work of the Neo-Platonic Sāṃpradīya or tradition, the question of whose authorship is still wrapped in a shroud of mystery. The 'cloud' is, indeed, a beautiful mystical work of a high order, discussing the 'work' or what the author of the present study, (after the Indian fashion) rightly calls 'Dhyāna'. In presenting this study to the readers, the author's chief aim is not to make a critical and objective presentation of the 'Cloud', but to correlate the Christian ways of contemplation with the Indian, so that 'his non-Christian friends will recognise in the account of the broad principles of spiritual life as expounded by an ancient classic, something in no sense strange to them, as something perhaps which will fulfil the deepest longing of their hearts'. In fact, the book can be looked upon as one of the attempts by the Sangha to bring closer the East and the West, and for this to present to the Easterners Christ and Christianity through the study of Indian works and Indian ideals.

In the first three chapters, the reader is introduced to the main subject of the book, the 'method' of the 'Cloud' and the 'practice' of the 'Cloud' with a preliminary brief account of the antecedents of the 'Cloud'. The method of the cloud has two aspects represented by two clouds, the cloud of Forgetting and the cloud of Unknowing. A seeker is first rightly asked to leave behind him the consciousness of the world. That represents the first stage. But this quietistic, negative state is not the goal. The quiet is won just to enable the seeker to concen-

trate freely and unceasingly upon the Divine and this is the positive aspect. The importance of the 'cloud' lies just in stressing the importance of both for the seeker. In the chapter on 'Practice', we are introduced to what the yogis call the physical and moral preparations. In the last two chapters, the method of the cloud is rightly contrasted with the yogic and quietistic methods which are mainly negative.

The book is written after a careful study of the Christian and Indian works bearing upon the problem. Throughout the whole book the author profusely quotes from these both types of works. At the end a small bibliography is attached. And for the convenience of Christian readers, a glossary of Sanskrit terms with their meanings is also attached.

The present study will certainly create an interest in 'the cloud' in the minds of the non-Christian seekers. And if such seekers take up the volume, they will, we are sure, find that wherever a true and sincere seeker is working, he characteristically follows very nearly a similar path. But a word of warning is necessary for these non-Christian readers who will not be satisfied with this book and who will form the idea of the original from the present study. In his enthusiasm to help the non-Christian, the author has unfortunately made too much use of yogic terminology and yogic methodology. The cloud for instance knows nothing like Niskāma Bhakti, Pratyatā, Spiritual Discrimination etc - terms without number used in this book. Nor does 'the cloud' describe its subject-matter in the method followed by the present writer. In fact, we wish that even from the standpoint of the non-Christian reader it would have been better if a more objective presentation of 'the cloud' had been made. For, we believe, that the 'Cloud' as it is, without the Indian garb, is sufficiently attractive to draw towards it any sincere seeker interested in such problems.

S. V. DANDEKAR.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, which was held at Oxford in the first week of September 1930 under the presidency of Professor J. A. Smith, proved a great success. It was attended by many eminent philosophers from different countries. It was rather unfortunate, however, that the following philosophers were not able, for some reason or other, to attend the Congress: Mr. Santayana, M. Bergson, Mr. Russell, Prof. Dewey, Joachim, Armstrong, Aliotta (Italy), Dr. Hicks, Prof. de Ruggiero, Prof. de Wulf, and also Prof. Radhakrishnan and Ranade (India). In all eighty-two papers were contributed, and they dealt with various branches and aspects of philosophy like logic and epistemology, ethical and political philosophy, psychology and aesthetics, history of philosophy, philosophy of science, etc.

In his welcome address, the President, Prof. J. A. Smith, said that such congresses were helpful in contributing to the community of minds by emphasizing common points. Prof. Perry, however, thought that they rather tended to sharpen intellectual differences and that it was yet possible to have 'a happy fellowship amidst such differences'.

Senatore Benedetto Croce's paper, entitled "Antistoricismo", the anti-historical spirit, aroused great interest by its learning and eloquence. The outburst of this anti-historical spirit, which he calls Futurism, takes, according to him, two forms: the first is the worship of vitality, force and activity for their own sakes, and of the new simply for its novelty, the worship of a future without a past. Futurist artists would like to start absolutely afresh, heedless of all old forms, futurist politicians would have nothing to do with customs and traditions evolved by the trial and error of centuries. The second form of futurism is an exaltation of the absolute, of system and uniformity, which in art would return to a rigorous classicism and in social matters would suppress individual enterprise by inflexible rules. In speaking about these forms Croce had in his mind the American craze for novelty and wild experimentation in Russia, and Fascism in Italy. The two forms are not really independent, the one readily passes into the other. Anarchy is next-door to despotism. Neither

the cult of vitality nor that of abstract rationalism, too sharply separated from each other, can express the rich fullness of human life. Croce held that they could not provide forms in which a life that was genial and creative could grow up. The historical and the liberal spirits are inseparable, so much so that history cannot be better defined than as the story of liberty. "He who opens his heart to the historical spirit feels himself no longer alone, but united to the life of the universe, brother and son and comrade of these great minds, who, their labour over, still live in the works they have achieved."

In such a short report it is not possible to allude to all papers, it is very difficult to single out papers for special mention. But we might be allowed for the present to refer very briefly to the important discussions on Mechanism and Vitalism, Fine Arts and New developments in Physics.

The general trend of thought on the issue of Mechanism and Vitalism is towards a middle position which might be roughly identified with 'Holism' of General Smuts. The old extreme positions are given up. Prof. J. S. Haldane said that biological processes were neither mechanical nor purposive. No conceivable extension of mechanism could explain how an organism maintained and reproduced its structure, yet this maintenance as a whole could not be described as purposive either. "The antithesis of mechanism and purpose is out of date," declared Prof. Hoernle, "the battle is one of Mechanism versus Vitalism." And Holism in biology means that under "the guidance of the concept of the living being as a self-maintaining whole" we should take as the important thing in our study the agencies by which it is maintained.

Senatore Croce had to defend his theory of fine arts against Miss V. B. Evans and M. Lunacharsky. For the latter theoretical aesthetics and the study of art for its own sake had little attraction, and he made a fervent appeal for the Communist attitude, in which the important things about art were its expression of popular feeling and its promotion of social betterment. The most noteworthy paper in the section was contributed by the 'grand old man' of the Congress, Professor Alexander. He took the question, 'How to distinguish truth, goodness, and beauty?', and suggested that there are two ways of doing this. The first way is "to observe the differences in the controls engaged in the creation of these values. For in all the three there enter two constituents: one is the mind itself, the other,

the material upon which it works " In art, the product is controlled by both these factors On the one hand, "the artist has to obey the nature of the stuff in which he works, whether paint, marble or words, on the other, the significance that this material gains from his mind. And the distinction of beauty from truth and goodness lies in this that "in truth and goodness this double control is replaced by a single one, in truth, control from the material and in goodness, control from the mind " We can distinguish them otherwise All values satisfy desire, and we can distinguish them psychologically through the desires they satisfy Thus the desire to be good is "the social passion or sentiment, sublimated by intelligence and insight " The desire for truth is "sublimated curiosity," the impulse we see in dogs and monkeys grown disinterested and socialized "The desire for beauty, rather hard to define, is described by Prof Alexander as "a sublimation of constructiveness, exhibited in various animals (bees, bears, ants and nightingales)" Croce in reply reaffirmed his doctrine that beauty is really what Alexander thought goodness to be, an expression, which, so far as it succeeded, was an expression simply and solely of the mind "

Did the new developments in Physics call for a large revision of one's thought of the structure of things, or in one's view of the nature of matter space and time or knowledge? These questions had come up for discussion We are eagerly awaiting the publication of the important and suggestive papers of Prof Zawirski of Posen, Prof Torgenson of Copenhagen, Prof Northrop of Yale and Mr C E M Joad, in extenso, dealing respectively with the problems of Quantum theory and causality, stuff of the material world, space and time and with the theory of knowledge

One general impression of the whole Congress is that though there is a good deal of thought ferment and subtle philosophical analysis, there are hardly any grand philosophical systems with their high claims and ardent exponents Much new work is being done in different departments, but it is awaiting proper interpretation and co-ordination Perhaps in the next few years to come our present philosophical speculations will find firm foundations on which to build a magnificent superstructure And we hope that in the building up of this superstructure India will make a valuable contribution.

N G DAMLE

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

The Sixth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress was held at Dacca on the 20th, 22nd and 23rd December 1930. On the evening of the 20th, Prof Wadia of Mysore delivered his presidential address, on "the Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi". The subject, though interesting, came more or less as a surprise to the professional philosophers assembled. During the course of his address, Prof Wadia dealt with the religious, ethical and political philosophy of the greatest living figure in the world to-day. Gandhi's religion was described as Ethical Theism. Religion, with him, is as inseparable from politics as from ethics. He does not believe in any Government, in the strict sense of the word. In his ideal state there will be no place for doctors, lawyers and even teachers. There will also be a ban on machinery. Prof Wadia would not agree with Gandhi when he condemns modern civilization as a 'curse', but would appreciate Gandhi's sincere attempt at a synthesis of philosophy as a way of life and philosophy as a criticism of life, and as a harmony of thought and action.

In the General Session of the Congress on the morning of the 22nd a Symposium on "The Psychological Basis of Personal Identity" was arranged. Prof H D Bhattacharya (Dacca) in opening the symposium, held that personal identity is essentially based on the fact of memory, so that the limits of memory are the limits of personal identity. Prof G C Chatterji (Lahore) opposed this thesis and pointed out that personal identity is the fundamental thing and the continuity or lapse of memory is to be taken rather as the product of the feeling of identity and not as its basis. Dr N N Sen-Gupta (Lucknow) criticized the substantialistic concept of the self and argued in favour of the dynamic view of self-feeling which is but an efflorescence of the cumulative psycho-physical processes in the body. Dr Hakim's assertion that the very subject of the symposium is a false problem came like a bomb-shell and gave a new turn to the discussion, and consequently the subsequent speakers had to justify the question of the psychological basis of personal identity as a genuine and legitimate problem.

The addresses of Presidents of different Sections were delivered on the morning of the 23rd. Prof Sully (Metaphysics

Section) during the course of his address, expressed his personal belief in the reality of many minds or selves. This is, according to him partially borne out by the idea underlying the Philosophical Conferences. Philosophical thought is the product of the co-operative process of thinking carried on by different minds. He contended that we have a much more intimate knowledge of other minds than Alexander would grant. Dr G Bose (Psychology Section) observed that Indian Philosophy, as compared with Western Philosophy, shows a predominant psychological interest and outlook. This is especially the case in the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya. He, further, contended that if we bear in mind this psychological outlook and read the texts by the help of 'empathy', there will be no difficulty in understanding and interpreting many apparently dark, obscure and mystic passages in the Upanisads. In illustrating his method he referred to a passage which says "During the practice of Yoga, the realization of Brahman is preceded by the appearance of mist, smoke, lightning, crystals and moon" and suggested that the appearances mentioned here are nothing but after-images which an aspirant perceives when he begins to practise introspective method and attend to subjective impressions. Dr M N Sircar's (Indian Philosophy Section) subject was 'the Conception of Reality in Indian Philosophy'. He emphasized the intuitive approach to reality in Indian Philosophy especially in the Vedānta. Dr. Hakim (Ethics Section) spoke on the 'Ethics of Islam'.

Sectional Meetings were held in the afternoon of the 22nd and 23rd. Papers were read and discussed in these Sectional Meetings. But for want of space we cannot give any account of the proceedings in the Sectional meetings.

D. G. LONDHE

NEWS FROM PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATIONS IN INDIA

THE POST-GRADUATE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY.

Our Post-graduate Philosophical Society was founded in December 1930, with the object of developing and spreading the knowledge of Philosophy by reading papers, holding discussions, and arranging for a Reading room and a Library. We hope to deepen and enlarge the interest of the members in Philosophy by providing them with opportunities for discussion and criticism to suggest new lines of thought.

In the beginning of December last, Mr Ikram Ali of the M. A. Previous Class, to whose enthusiasm we owe very much, convened a constituent meeting at which the constitution was adopted and the elections held. The following is the list of the office-bearers of the Society for the session 1930-1931.—

Patron—Mahamahopādhyāya Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, M.A.,
D Litt, LL D, Vice-chancellor of the University
President—Prof R. D. Ranade, M.A., Head of Philosophy
Department

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On the 22nd of December 1930, Prof. S. K. Belvalkar, M.A., Ph.D., of the Deccan College, Poona, gave us the Inaugural Address on "The Present Methods of Philosophical Investigation." Dr. Belvalkar, commending a historical and humanistic attitude in Philosophy argued that Philosophy being a criticism of life should not be divorced from it, or treated as an abstract science in a series of formal arguments in the style of Spinoza. The evolution of any system of Philosophy should be studied in a vast historical perspective. He warned students against an uncritical attempt to seek verbal parallelisms and cheap analogies between the development of Indian thought and the thought of any other people, say the Greeks or the Germans. Dr. Ganga

Nath Jha, who had done us the honour of presiding at the meeting, in the course of his address spoke eloquently of the value of Philosophy, and wished the Society every success.

Mr. Razauddin Ahmed, of the M. A. Previous Class, read a paper on "The Basis of Morality" on Wednesday, the 11th of February, 1931. Rejecting Rationalistic ethics as abstract and formal and Hedonistic ethics as insufficient, the speaker upheld the Voluntaristic ethics of Aristotle and Green, for the act of choice and the freedom of the will were, according to him, the most fundamental facts of morality.

Mr. G. S. Bedi of the M. A. Final Class read a paper on "Spiritualism" on Tuesday, the 16th of February, 1931. Giving a short account of early spiritualistic phenomena beginning with the visions and prophecies of Swedenborg down to the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research, the Speaker described some of the cases which could hardly be explained on the theory of Unconscious Mental Activity or Thought-Transference. Mr. A. C. Mukerji, M. A. in the course of his presidential address remarked that the Spiritualistic theory had to be brought in line with modern knowledge about the relation of body and mind.

Before we conclude, we wish to express our profound gratitude to Prof. R. D. Ranade, the President of our society, for it was chiefly owing to his suggestion and enthusiastic help that the society was founded and under his guidance it hopes to prosper.

S. A. RAZA
Secretary

THE LATE REVEREND DOCTOR ROBERT ZIMMERMANN.

On the 8th of February 1931 passed away at Feldkirch (Austria) Reverend Doctor Robert Zimmermann, S.J., Ph.D., late Professor of Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy, St Xavier's College, Bombay. He was born at Dottingen in Switzerland on October 24, 1874. After his early education in Switzerland he entered the Society of Jesus in Feldkirch and was ordained priest in 1907. He studied Philosophy at Valkenburg (Holland) and Theology at St Beunos (North Wales) and then proceeded to Berlin to study Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy. During his five years of work at the Berlin University under the eminent professor Dr. Ludeis he mastered the Sanskrit language and made a close study of Indian and Greek Philosophy. After taking his Ph.D. from the Berlin University he came to Bombay in January 1914 to join the staff of the St Xavier's College. After sixteen years of unremitting toil in the field of education and research he retired and sailed for Europe in May 1930 completely broken in health.

Since Father Zimmermann made Bombay his own he was a familiar figure in the University and College life of the Presidency. Beyond the precincts of the St. Xavier's College he was known even to students of other colleges as a professor always ready to help students in difficulties. He combined in himself German thoroughness with classical academic discipline, which resulted in the considerable literary output during the sixteen years of his life in Bombay. He contributed innumerable articles on Sanskrit literature and Indian Philosophy to various periodicals in India and Europe. In all his writings we notice a meticulous accuracy of thought and expression, not to say a zest for dispassionate and methodical research. He knew French, German, English as also Latin and Greek very well. Some of his important articles are the following —

1. The Chronology of the Upanisads (Indian Antiquary Vol. 44)
2. The Genuineness of the Vrttis (Ind. Anti. Vol. 47)
3. Śāṅkarācārya and Kant (Jour. B. B. R. A. Society)
4. Truth and its Criterion (Indian Philosophical Review, Vol. 2).

- 5 The Logic of Śāṅkarācārya and Aristotle (Bhandarkar Institute, Poona, 1920)
- 6 Anubhava, the Criterion of Truth in Śāṅkara (Indian Philo Review, Vol III)

The above list is by no means complete but it shows his literary and philosophical interests. In spite of his deep absorption in research work he maintained a practical interest in the educational activities of the Bombay University of which he was a Fellow for years, besides being an Examiner and Professor. He was Vice-president of the B. B. R. A. Society several times and was elected Vice-president of the Anthropological Society of Bombay this year.

By the premature death of Father Zimmermann the intellectual world has sustained a severe loss. The Academy of Philosophy and Religion has in particular to share a greater part of the loss as he was a Fellow of the Academy and also a member of its Academical Council. When the inauguration of the Academy took place in 1924 under the presidency of Mr. S. B. Dhavale, I. C. S., Father Zimmermann who had specially come from Bombay for the function, made an impressive speech on the ideals of the Academy. He was a member of the Board of Contributors to the Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy in 16 vols projected by the Academy, a portion of Vol I on the Philosophy and Religion of the Vedas being assigned to him. Had he been spared the necessary time and health the Academy was confident that with his remarkable assiduity and conscientious regularity he would have fulfilled his promise.

P K GODE

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- 34 Vedic Magazine, Gurukul-Kangri.
35. The Mehar Message, Nasik.
36. Rivista degli Studi Orientali, Roma.

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- 51 The Aryan Path, Bombay
52. Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society,
Rajamundry.
53. The Prakriti, Calcutta
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- 55 Aus Zeit und Ewigkeit, Leipzig.
- 56 Peace, Prattipadu (South India).
- 57 The Hindu (Educational and Literary Supplement)
Madras
- 58 The Dayalbagh Herald, Agra
- 59 The Vaitarini, Cuttack
- 60 Shri Madhvamunidasa Monthly, Bombay.
- 61 The Mystic World, Chicago
62. The C. S. S Review, Poona.
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Parashuram Krishna Gode, M. A. Secretary, at the Branch
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THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

DR S K MAITRA, M A, Ph D

II

The psychological approach to the problem.

In my first article I have discussed the broad features of the metaphysical and axiological standpoint from which the problem of value can be approached. But there is another side from which the problem of value can be approached. It is believed that value rests upon a peculiar experience and that no discussion of the problem of value can be regarded as complete which does not analyze this peculiar experience. Even when we have settled the question of the *content* of value-experience, the question of form will still remain. Is the value-experience a feeling, or a desire or a volition? Is it a simple psychosis or a complex one? If complex, what is the relation of the intellectual to the non-intellectual element in it?

These psychological questions necessarily arise in connection with the problem of value and my object in this article is to examine them and give them their proper place in a general discussion of the nature of value. After I have done this I will deal briefly with the relative merits of the metaphysical and the psychological modes of approach and lastly, I will discuss the position occupied by the philosophy of values in the history of philosophy.

It was the two Austrian philosophers, Meinong and Ehrenfels, I think, who were the first to draw attention to the existence of a peculiar experience which they called value-experience. Ehrenfels makes desirability the measure of value but goes on to add that desirability is measured by the strength of the desire which corresponds to it. He first states that value is proportional to the desirability of the object, but he passes from this to the absolutely unwarrantable assertion that it is proportional to the strength of the actual desire. Now, as Urban has shown,¹ the two parts of this statement have no connection with each other. The funded meaning of an object is its desirability. But from this it does not follow either that the judgments of worth are determined by actual desire or that the worth of an object is proportional to the strength of the

1 Urban *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, p 36

actual desire. The transition from the first part of the statement to the second is absolutely unwarrantable. From the fact that value is proportional to the desirability of the object, it does not at all follow that it is proportional to the strength of the actual desire. To say that it does is to commit a mistake similar to that committed by Mill. Value, in fact, so far from being an actual desire, is only a possible desire or a desire-disposition. "When I think of an absent friend, I may feel his worth to me without the slightest trace of actual desire for his immediate presence, although the presupposition of that feeling is a disposition so to desire"²

Ehrenfels further states that the strength of desire is determined by the difference of the place of the object in the hedonic scale. This statement is severely criticized by Urban.³ Urban says that if feeling is to be a cause of desire, it must be actual, that is, a present state of consciousness. But according to Ehrenfels, it need not always be so. But if it is not a present state of consciousness, the absurdity will arise that the pleasure accompanying a not-yet-existent object becomes the determinant of desire. Nor is anything gained by saying that the determinant of desire is the difference between the present feeling and the not-yet-existing feeling attending a not-yet-existent object. For this difference is either an unfelt, unrecognized difference, and thus an abstraction, or else it is a new feeling following upon the judgment of the difference between the actual present feeling and an imagined feeling arising from the assumption of the existence or non-existence of the object. In the former case, a conceptual abstraction will become the cause of desire, which is impossible on Ehrenfels's theory. In the latter, a feeling-difference becomes the object of judgment and then there will be a value-moment prior to desire. Therefore Ehrenfels is found to modify his statement and to include feeling-disposition among the determinants of desire. But feeling-dispositions are not psychical states. Moreover, desires cannot by themselves, as already shown, be the worth-experience. Hence value remains without a psychical correlate in Ehrenfels's theory.

Moreover, as Laird points out⁴, it is not possible to speak of a desire being conditioned by a not-yet-existent object. A man's desire ceases when he becomes convinced that its object is quite unattainable. "Indeed it might be said that no one

2 Ibid

3 *Vide Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, p. 37

4 *Vide Idea of Value*, p. 139

is really convinced of the impossibility of any of his desires until he has ceased to have them" Ehrenfels in departing from his first position that desire is conditioned by an actually existent object and accepting the possibility of desires being conditioned by non-existent objects really strikes at the root of the principle upon which his theory of values is based, namely, the close connection between value and existence

Another philosopher who has likewise insisted upon the connection of value with desire is Thomas Hill Green. According to Green, the good is that which satisfies some desire. This satisfaction of desire is attended with pleasure. "We cannot think of an object as good, that is, such as will satisfy desire, without thinking of it as in consequence such as will yield pleasure, but its pleasantness depends upon its goodness, not its goodness upon the pleasure which it gives"⁵ The moral good Green distinguishes from good in the following way "On the other hand, regarding the good generically as that which satisfies desire, but considering the objects we desire to be by no means pleasures, we shall naturally distinguish the moral good as that which satisfies the desire of a moral agent, or that in which a moral agent can find the satisfaction of himself which he necessarily seeks"⁶ Green evidently sees a vicious circle in defining the moral good by means of the moral agent, for immediately after this passage he says, "It may be argued therefore that we either know what the moral good in this sense is, and accordingly, have no need to infer what it is from our moral nature, or else we do not know what it is, in which case neither can we know what the moral nature is from which we profess to infer what the moral good is"⁷

To escape from this vicious circle Green points out that we already know what our moral capability is. We know it by what it has already achieved, and by reflection on this we can form at least some negative conclusion concerning its complete realization. We cannot indeed describe the state of complete realization, yet we have a conviction that there must be such a state, and this conviction has a supreme influence over our conduct⁸

Sidgwick objects that there is here a confusion between two views (1) that desire gives the quality of good, and (2)

5 *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 194

6 *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 195

7 *Ibid.*, p. 196

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97

that satisfaction does so.⁹ Secondly, he says Kant's definition of moral good is ambiguous and combines wider and narrower views of man's true good. It is realization or full realization (1) of capabilities, (2) of moral capabilities. Taking the narrower notion first, moral agent is equivalent to rational self-conscious agent, and it does not seem why he should be supposed capable of doing or being anything more than what we already know him as doing or being, i.e. self-objectifying, self-distinguishing and combining. Now such self-objectification and self-distinction are already realized in his present stage and do not need to wait for any ideal condition¹⁰ If, again, we take 'realization of capabilities' in a broader sense, how is it to be measured? Some capabilities we find realized even in the lowest depths of vicious life. In fact, we are always realizing capabilities to some extent, in every action, sensation, emotion, thought.¹¹

From the point of view of the capability, therefore, it is not possible to distinguish between the good choice and the vicious choice. The distinction, if it is possible from Green's point of view, will have to be made on intellectual grounds. The wrong choice is due to an illusion, to seeking self-satisfaction when it cannot be found. Moral delinquency, therefore, ultimately rests upon an intellectual defect.

Thus the volitional and the intellectual elements in desire coincide with each other, and value becomes as much determined by volition as it is by the intellect. In fact, the identity of desire and knowledge is one of the central themes of Green's book and makes his theory of good a complex one. The identity of desire and knowledge Green establishes, by showing that they both rest upon the same spiritual principle. Just as our knowledge of nature is not a natural event, not a mere play of sensations but a reference of them to the consciousness of a single self, so our desires are not mere animal wants but exhibit a process of reference to, and unification by, a single spiritual principle, namely, our self. Green thus sums up the essential identity of desiring and knowing. "The real agent called Desire is the man or self or subject as desiring, the real agent called intellect is the man as understanding, as perceiving and conceiving, and the man that desires is identical

9 *Ethics of T. H. Green etc.*, p. 41

10 *Ethics of T. H. Green etc.*, p. 48

11. *Ibid.*, p. 49

with the man that understands" ¹² He expresses this also in the following manner: "The man carries with him into his desires the same single self-consciousness which makes his acts of understanding what they are, and into his acts of understanding the same single self-consciousness which makes his desires what they are." No desire which forms part of our moral experience would be what it is, if it were not the desire of a subject which also understands: no act of intelligence would be what it is, if it were not the act of a subject which also desires ¹³

But Green is not content merely with showing the fundamental identity of desire and knowledge as due to their common source, namely, the spiritual principle of self. He shows further the similarity of their functional activity. "The exercise of the one activity, he says, is always a necessary accompaniment of the other. In all exercise of the understanding we notice the play of desire. Conversely, any desire, as soon as it has become more than an indefinite yearning, as soon as it has become really desire for some object of which we are conscious, necessarily involves an operation of the understanding upon the conditions of the real world which make all the difference between the object as desired and the object as realized" ¹⁴

To this identification of desire and knowledge, Laird objects on the ground that knowledge involves an objective or universal standpoint which desire does not. "A man may knowingly adopt as the object of his desire something which is at variance with the public benefit. If, on the other hand, he refers in his thoughts to a world which is nobody's world but his own, we have to say that he is mad" ¹⁵

It is therefore not possible to seek the element of value in desire alone. Desire may be an ingredient of value but it is not certainly the sole ingredient or even the chief ingredient. This is the view of the complex theory of value propounded by Meinong.

Meinong regards all value as primarily personal. Personal value he defines as "the suitability of an object, by virtue of its composition and position to become the object of the worth-experience of a subject." ¹⁶

12. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 5th ed., p. 146

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47

14. *Op. cit.* pp. 151-52

15. *Idea of Value*, p. 145

16. *Zur Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Wertheorie*, p. 143.

From this definition, as Laird points out, the double character of value as subject and object, emerges clearly. Value does not pertain merely to 'things', it has reference to the worth-experience of a subject. On the other hand, Meinong equally strongly insists upon the objective side of value. A fire-place is valuable because of the agreeable feelings of warmth that come from it, but these agreeable feelings are not themselves value. The value is constituted by the fire-place as yielding these agreeable feelings. "If the agreeableness of the warmth," says Meinong, "were the value-experience, then I could at most attribute value to the fire-place as long as it was warm, whereas everybody when he heats the fire-place does it because he thinks also of the future warm fire-place"¹⁷ So also, he says an article of food can have a value, because it is tasteful, nevertheless the good taste, even when one considers only the feeling-side, is no value-experience.

This value-experience, however, is a complex of many elements. The most essential element, of course, is feeling. But along with it, Meinong thinks, there must be present a cognitive as well as a conative element. Meinong illustrates all these elements by examining the case of a musician who places great value upon his musical instrument. What constitutes the value-experience here? The musician must experience joy not only in the fact that there is a musical instrument, but in a special measure in the fact that it is his property, or at least, that it is in his possession. Moreover, it is clear that the musician could not have regarded his musical instrument as valuable without thinking of it and judging about its existence and its quality.¹⁸

But over and above these elements there must be present a conative element. Supposing the musical instrument is stolen, then in place of a purely passive attitude there arises at once an active attitude. The musician *desires* to get back his instrument, he *wills* to get it back. In place of a passive feeling, there emerges here an active desire. In fact, it is impossible to desire that which has no value. Desire is thus one of the ways in which we react upon a conceived object according to its value.¹⁹

Meinong, however, is of opinion that it is feeling which is the worth-fundamental, desire being in the position of an

17 Ibid, p 50

18 Op cit p 35

19 Ibid, p 36.

auxiliary worth-experience (Nebenwerterlebnis) If we are given the choice, he says, whether we shall look upon the feeling or the desire as the value experience, or more correctly, whether we have to regard the feeling or the desire as the value-experience, our decision must certainly be in favour of feeling.²⁰ Such a choice, however, we are seldom called upon to make. The distinction, Feeling or Desire?, hardly ever presents itself before us. As a matter of fact, both feelings and desires are blended together in the conception of value. Feelings, however, must be given the higher place as worth-experiences. Feelings without desires may serve as worth-experiences but not desires without feeling. Thus feelings can very well be called chief worth-experiences (Hauptwerterlebnisse) and desires auxiliary worth-experiences (Nebenwerterlebnisse).²¹

We come now to what is perhaps the most important point in Meinong's theory of value. Meinong denies the character of worth-experiences to mere sensuous feelings. Sensuous feelings only acquire the character of worth-experiences when there are joined to them what he calls judgment-feelings. These judgment-feelings he thus defines: "The existence or continuance of an object is always conceived with the help of a judgment to which a feeling, namely, the value-feeling, so thoroughly clings that the object judged can at the same time yield the object of feeling. A feeling of this nature is most appropriately called a judgment-feeling."²²

The whole theory of Meinong is, in fact, an oscillation between the recognition of the subjective or emotional element of value and that of the objective or intellectual element. Neither of these elements Meinong seems to develop much. The intellectual element, for instance, if it is developed a little further, would take us to a problem very similar to that of epistemology, namely, what is the nature of the objective reference in value? Meinong, however, does not want to push the intellectual element so far. Thus, he says, with reference to the question of pushing the objective reference further: "What, however, is to be determined in this way has not appeared to me to be value, at least

20 "Sind wir vor die Wahl gestellt, ob wir das Gefühl oder die Begehrung als das Wertlebnis betrachten oder eigentlich, ob wir Gefühl oder Begehrung als das Wertlebnis zu betrachten haben, dann kann die Entscheidung zu Gunsten des Gefühls ausfallen." (*Zur Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Werththeorie*, p. 44)

21 Ibid, p. 46

22 Ibid, p. 61

not value in its proper sense, but only in an extended sense, for which the expression "dignitative" or, better still, "dignity" has seemed to me more free from the possibility of misunderstanding"²³ This "dignity" or, as he also calls it, the "timological" element, however, he has not examined. This, in the opinion of Laird, is a serious omission. Thus he says "In short, once we grant that *all* our ideas signify something beyond themselves, we are logically bound to continue the investigation of this important matter. For some of them signify not inadequately and others very inadequately indeed. Consequently, we have to examine the adequacy, range and validity of their significance with the most scrupulous care"²⁴

Meinong's undecided position here is much to be regretted. Is value personal or is value objective? Meinong seems to avoid this question and answers equivocally. If the objective element is stressed to the detriment of the personal element, value gives way to 'dignity'. Yet 'dignity' is but the logical extension of value.

Meinong himself at the very outset wants to insist upon values having an objective reference. Yet value exists in a value-experience, and that value-experience is personal. That value-experience may also be impersonal does not seem to have occurred to him. He always thinks that because value is given by a value-experience, therefore, its connection with personality is something inalienable. This mars the value of whatever concession he makes to impersonal value in the last section of the last chapter of his book. Thus, he says "Does it lie in the very nature of value that it cannot be anything but relative to a subject? This is due to a reason which makes it quite self-evident. This reason lies, as we have seen, in the intimate connection between value and our emotional life. If value cannot be separated from this, then the connection with the subject experiencing the emotion is also an indispensable one"²⁵

The real solution of this undecided position is perhaps to be sought in the limitations of the psychological method which Meinong adopts in investigating the nature of value. If the key to the nature of value is to be found in the analysis of the value-experience, then it is inevitable that the main stress should be laid upon the personal character of the value. But Meinong at the same time wanted also to bring out the

23 *Zur Grundlegung etc.*, p. 51

24 Laird *Idea of Value*, p. 181

25 *Zur Grundlegung etc.*, p. 151.

metaphysical implications of value. Hence his complex position in which the personal and the impersonal nature of value are both adhered to, but are very loosely connected with each other.

Even this small intellectual element in Meinong's theory of value is found too much by Urban who finds fault with it for its recognition of the indispensableness of a judgmental factor. According to Urban, all that value requires is a *presumption* and not an explicit judgment of reality. Thus he says, "My appreciation of the work of an object does not, however, necessarily, and in every case, rest upon such explicit judgment of existence, but at most upon a primary undisturbed *presumption* of reality. By this primary presumption of reality, of a reality, however, in which the more specific existence meaning has not yet been differentiated, is to be understood the mere act of acceptance, taking for granted, prior to the explicit *taking up* of the object into a pre-determined sphere of reality through the existence predicate. Such presumption must be carefully distinguished from both *judgment* and *assumption*. The existential judgment arises, as we shall see, only after disturbance in a sphere of reality already presupposed, it is an act which takes place only after some position, some tendency to recognition, or to renewal of attitude of feeling or will meet with opposition or arrest. It must be equally clearly distinguished from the later, more developed, attitude of assumption of existence which presupposes dispositions already created by actual judgment" ²⁶

But what Urban apparently forgets is that even presumption contains a good deal of intellectual element, and that its difference from judgment is more a matter of degree than of essential quality. Urban admits that without a reality feeling there cannot be any value. So the essential point in Meinong's theory, namely, the connection of value with a reality-feeling, is admitted by Urban. What, then, is the difference between a presumption and a judgment of existence, on the score of which Urban believes his standpoint is essentially different from that of Meinong? The difference lies in this, that while in a presumption there is only the question of acceptance or rejection, a judgment implies another element, namely, belief or disbelief. But even an acceptance involves a belief, however inchoate it may be. Where belief is absolutely wanting, there

26 Urban *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, pp 43-44

cannot arise even a presumption. If we accept Bosanquet's view, then every cognition is a judgment, and as a judgment, possesses a categorical or existential import. Thus the term existential judgment does not denote any particular class of judgment, since all judgment (and indeed, all cognition) possesses an existential import.

We have dwelt at some length upon Meinong's theory because it is perhaps the most important attempt to deal with the problem of value from the point of view of psychology. Its defects also are the characteristic defects of all theories which approach the problem of value from the psychological standpoint. The fundamental disability from which all psychological value-theories suffer is that when analysis reveals the value-experience to be complex, psychology is not in a position to estimate the relative importance of the different elements. The undecided position of Meinong is also due to this. It is because his value-experience is a complex of intellectual, emotional and conative elements that his psychological method is not in a position to give us any guidance on the question which of these elements is to be regarded as more important than the others. The metaphysical method of approach, therefore, will have to take up the problem at the point where the psychological method has left it.

This, however, does not mean that the metaphysical approach is always to be preferred to the psychological. Value belongs to a region where the subjective factor must be taken into account. And for the treatment of this subjective factor the assistance of psychology is essentially needed. The metaphysical method is quite helpless here. Even when we deal with the objective phase of value, the question arises whether it is the object of knowledge, or of emotion or of desire. And this question can only be handled by the psychological mode of approach.

A combination of the two methods is the best mode of dealing with the problem. Meinong himself has attempted it partially but without much success. The reason for his failure is the preponderance of the psychological bias. Dilthey has perhaps, of all recent value-philosophers, most successfully combined the two methods. He has built his whole theory of value upon the principle of *Erlebnis*—experience as lived, not experience as a matter of history. This *Erlebnis* differs in one important respect from the 'value-experience' of Meinong. Although it is a complex of thinking, feeling and willing, it is

not a complex of presentative and representative factors. For this reason it can enter as an element into more complex groupings which Dilthey calls the *Zusammenhänge* (connections) of 'Erlebnis'. It is in the building of these 'Zusammenhänge,' or rather the *Strukturzusammenhänge* (structural connections), that the metaphysical interest in Dilthey's theory of value mainly exhibits itself. These 'Strukturzusammenhänge' are organizations of purpose which differ widely from one another. In their highest form, they are 'systems of culture' or the ultimate values. The systems of culture or the ultimate values cannot be brought under a common denominator, and so far Dilthey's philosophy is pluralistic.

My object, however, is not to give an exposition of Dilthey's philosophy but to show in what manner the psychological and the metaphysical approaches to the problem of values can be combined to the mutual advantage of both. The way can best be described as making the psychological approach the basis upon which to found the metaphysical structure of the philosophy of values. The basic experience of value *qua* experience must be fully analyzed psychologically and the subsequent groupings of this basic experience must be viewed in their objective character or from the view-point of metaphysics.

In presenting in this way the essential features of or combination of the two approaches, *I ipso facto* give an indication of the relative merits of the two modes. The psychological mode must be the original and the basic mode of approach. The metaphysical must be the later one. Its main function is to lay bare the objective implications of the value-experience. It is rather an interpretation or a translation in the language of objectivity of the original value-experience discovered by the psychological method. Given this original value-experience the metaphysical method can function and give a complete theory of value. But without it it is absolutely helpless. This we notice clearly in the system of Münsterberg where the psychological ballast for the metaphysical treatment of value is completely wanting. Witness his failure to perceive that desiring is also willing.

I now come to the last part of my task. What is the place of value in the scale of reality? What is the reality-status of the conception of value? I have already shown to what absurd lengths Rickert and if it is to go in their attempt to maintain the distinction between reality and value. The difficulties of

their position clearly show the hopelessness of the attempt. The separation between reality and value would spell ruin not only to metaphysics but also to religion. As A. E. Taylor says, "if this absolute and rigid divorce between fact and value can be maintained, it must follow at once that there can be no religious, and *a fortiori* no theological, implications of morality. Hence even if the philosopher finds himself able to assert any convictions about the being of God or the destiny of man, these convictions cannot be expected to dignify life by opening new vistas of spiritual values to be achieved." ⁷ No religion is possible unless facts are invested with the character of values. To quote Taylor again, "if there is none but an accidental conjunction between reality and value, the Is and the Ought, any conceivable theology must share this fate, since every theology will be a *mere* statement of fact, a theology for the unreligious. Where there is nothing to adore, there is no religion, and no man can adore a bold fact as such, irrespective of its quality, any more than he can really adore an ideal admitted to be a mere figment of his own imagination." ⁸ Bosanquet's statement, therefore, is very true, namely, that "in morality we know that the good purpose is real, in religion we believe that nothing else is real."

This statement, of course, does not mean that evil is unreal. Evil, indeed, is not unreal, in fact, there cannot be any such thing as the unreal. The unreal is nothing but the real with a lesser degree of reality. Evil is real, but its reality-status is lower than that of good. The grade of value and the grade of reality correspond very closely to each other, the greater the value of a thing, the higher the degree of reality which it possesses.

On the analogy of Alfred Fouillée's 'idea-force', we may say that everything is ultimately a reality-value, — reality when we view it purely from its metaphysical side, and value when we consider it in its relations to human aspirations.

There is no room for two Absolutes, Reality and Value. Those who make an absolute distinction between reality and value seem most conveniently to forget this. And what is worse, they generally end by subsuming the one under the other. Thus, Rickert, who is more emphatic than anybody else in his insistence upon this distinction, ends by merging all values in the World-whole, which is the Rickertian Absolute.

27 A. E. Taylor: *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. I, p. 29

28 *Op cit*, p. 41

When two Absolutes cannot be maintained, it is a difficult question to decide which to keep and which to sacrifice. Reality has held the palm for so many centuries that philosophers generally have retained it and sacrificed value. This explains why Munsterberg and Rickert have felt an irresistible attraction for the Hegelian Absolute and have not hesitated to sacrifice value.

But in sacrificing value, these philosophers have sacrificed more than they bargained for. For they have sacrificed what they held most near and dear to them, something which they regarded as absolutely their own, like the 'free act' of Munsterberg. There is no doubt that to the philosopher of value, reality appears to be too stern and aloof, too neutral and impartial and it must have caused them a sharp pain, when at the altar of logic they were found to sacrifice their dearest possession for the sake of the stern God, Reality.

There is a pathos, therefore, in this self-abnegation of Value in favour of Reality. The development of philosophy from Fichte to Hegel is perhaps the best illustration of this pathetic self-abnegation of value. What can be more tragic than that the sparkling, vitalising ethical idealism of Fichte should end in the colourless logicism of Hegel? As Perry remarks, "it is significant that idealism loses its pragmatical value, its fruitfulness of application, in proportion to the refinement of its logic". His complaint that "the old inspired idealism of art, literature, and life, the idealism that made a difference, has been discredited by idealists themselves" is very just. In the panlogicism of Hegel, "the specific characters of the spirit" were completely dropped and their place filled by formal categories, such as relation, unity, coherence.

The apotheosis of logic leads ultimately to the identification of the spirit with things as they are. If the Hegelian is asked what the nature of the spirit is, he will point to the actual course of nature and of history. It is against this de-spiritualization of spirit that the philosophy of values raises its voice of protest. Its motto is: Back to the spiritualism of Fichte, as against the logicism of Hegel.

This does not mean that the philosophy of value must cling to the voluntarism of Fichte. In fact, the association of the philosophy of values with voluntarism is merely accidental. So long as the essential characteristics of the spirit

are preserved, it is a matter of indifference to the philosophy of values whether the spiritual element is viewed from the voluntaristic or from the emotional or from the aesthetic point of view

The real protest of the philosophy of values is against the neutralism or indifferentism of the purely logical view of the world. It raises against Hegelianism the same cry which Hegelianism raised against the philosophy of Schelling. For the value-philosopher the logicism of Hegel is as much a philosophy of indifference as the identity-standpoint of Schelling or Spinoza

How to escape this neutralism is the chief problem of philosophy to-day Bergsonism, pragmatism and the philosophy of values have each contributed their share to the solution of this problem There is nothing which Bergson abhors so much as this neutralism It is the inevitable product of intellectuality with its two great offshoots, mechanism and mathematicism. Pragmatists also equally avoid the cold neutral Absolute of the Hegelians and substitute for it a more human standpoint That is why Schiller wants to call his system Humanism The philosophy of value also similarly makes a plea for the human point of view

But unfortunately, force of tradition has driven it along paths which take it farther and farther away from its goal There is as much craze for respectability among philosophers as among ordinary people There is still abroad the idea that to be respectable a philosophical system must adopt the measured gait and dignified pose of classical idealism If, therefore, Munsterberg ends in an Over-Self or Rickert in a World-whole, this is the tribute which they pay to respectability The air is still full of philosophical conventions established a century ago No philosopher dare defy them

The battle of the twentieth century is going to be fought over the question of personality Bergson and Rabindranath Tagore on the one side and the neo-Hegelians and realists on the other — such will be the fight for the philosophical world-view This fight will be carried on also outside the domain of philosophy. There is already a keen struggle going on between personality and machine This struggle, as Tagore has put it, is the struggle between Jack and the Giant—"the Giant who is not a gigantic man, but a multitude of men turned into a gigantic system "

THE PROBLEM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

PROF A C MUKERJI, M A

Since the dawn of reflective enquiry into the nature and meaning of existence, the Self has been one of the most fascinating objects of human interest, and has rightly occupied a very prominent place in the vast array of problems that are generally recognized as philosophical problems *par excellence*. Like every philosophical problem, however, it has come to manifest, in the history of thought, an enormous vitality and stands to this day as one of the most slippery problems of philosophy. In ancient India, as is well known, the realization of the highest purposes of existence was made conditional on the right knowledge of self, and the perplexities which were born of the controversy led to the formulation of a number of theories, some of which were very similar to those that are still in the forefront of philosophical thought. Similarly, in the history of Western thought self-knowledge has been one of the ideals of philosophic adventure since the time of Protagoras and Socrates, and it is still disputed whether the supreme problem set by the inscriptions on the temple of Delphi has been really solved. It is, however, not difficult to see that the controversy, either in the East or the West, has something to do with the different attitudes with which philosophers have approached the problem of knowledge. The different solutions of the problem of self-consciousness and the different views of its complexity are, therefore, intimately connected with the different ways of interpreting knowledge. And while there is difference in the latter, it is idle to expect unanimity in the former. Thus, every theory of self-consciousness or self-knowledge has been historically associated with an implicit epistemological theory.

Now, confining ourselves to the course of speculative development in the West, the real puzzles of consciousness and self-consciousness came into prominence once philosophy realized the futility of prying into the secrets of existence without a preliminary enquiry into the universal conditions of experience. Whatever exists must reveal itself, should at least have the possibility of revealing itself, in experience; and consequently, a careful study of the transcendental conditions of experience is evidently indispensable for preparing the ground

for ontology or the philosophy of existence. To have realized this clearly was the great merit of Kant, though he may have failed in the detailed execution of the plan, and to minimize the importance of the transcendental enquiry as a preliminary to "the thinking considerations of things" has been the great misfortune which the recent revival of interest in the psychological method has brought in its train. Its effect on the problem of knowledge in general and that of self in particular has been disastrous, in so far as it tends to transform the conditions of experience into objects of experience. That is, the psychological method, which is the popular method of the day, has always the tendency to treat that without which there can be no knowledge, no experience and no intelligible assertion, as an object knowable in the same way as any other object within experience. This is evidently tantamount to holding that a theory of knowledge cannot be fundamentally distinct from psychology, and this opinion is not only widely held but often defended with uncommon skill in an influential section of contemporary thought. For those who have accepted the psychological method as a sort of philosophical panacea the problem of self-consciousness is more or less imaginary, as there is no essential divergence of method between, say, our knowledge of the table and that of the self.

The continuity of the tradition which began with Kant's famous criticism has been, however, kept up by a number of acute thinkers who, while differing from the master in numerous details, recognize him as the pioneer of a really fruitful method in philosophy, and are generally known as the neo Kantians and the neo-Hegelians. It is their settled creed that the only effective method of grasping the morphology of existence is to begin with an examination of the morphology of knowledge. Agreeing so far, however, they do not think that the problem of self-consciousness is fraught with such insuperable difficulties as Kant fancied. Self-consciousness, they hold, far from being a challenge to thought, is the highest category in the light of which the universe is to be comprehended, all other categories being mere differentiations of this highest form of thought. Hence, though it is an error to think that the self is only an object in the same sense in which the table is an object, yet, it is not only not unthinkable and unknowable, but self-consciousness is "the knowledge *par excellence*", and the "highest fruit of knowledge is the deepening of self-consciousness".¹

1 E Caird *Hegel*, p 187

It would be, however, a mistake to think that these two apparently conflicting trends of speculation have exhausted all the alternatives in respect of the problem of self-consciousness. For, the puzzles have been sometimes reinforced by philosophers who do not altogether belong to either of the two schools of thought already mentioned, yet, who have come to their work with all the advantages of the post-Kantian development of philosophy, psychology and science. Thus, it is found that the problem of self and the allied problem of self-consciousness, even when approached through the gates of a psychological laboratory or a psycho-neurotic hospital, bids fair to survive the organized attacks of speculative philosophy and scientific psychology

We propose in the following lines to emphasize the element of truth contained in the contentions of those who have regarded the perplexities of self-consciousness as something more than imaginary. And, for this, it is necessary to begin with Kant's formulation of the problem, as he was the first to detect the origin of the puzzles, though the direction in which he sought to solve them may not appear to be correct. It is perhaps true that finality in a philosophical enquiry is bound to remain as a mere ideal, yet, that is no reason why fresh attempts should not be made to narrow down the sources of error. This is our only apology for the admittedly difficult task of adjudging the merits of a number of well-established views on self-consciousness; and it may perhaps appear in the sequel that the march of philosophical theories after Kant has been a bit too rapid, if not also rash, in respect of this supreme problem of thought

The problem of self-consciousness, as formulated by Kant, is contained in the well-known passage of his criticism of rational psychology where it is pointed out that the ego "is so completely empty of all content that it can not be called even a conception, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all conceptions. This *I*, or *He*, or *It*, this thing that thinks, is nothing but the idea of transcendental subject of thought—X, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and which apart from them can not be conceived at all. We turn round and round it in a perpetual circle, for we can make no judgment about it without making use of the idea of it in our judgment. Nor can this inconvenience be avoided, for consciousness in itself is not so much the distinct idea of a particular object, as a general form of all the ideas through which the knowledge of

*Kant's statement
of the problem*

objects is to be obtained, and indeed the only form of which I can say, that without it I can think nothing whatever"²

Before considering how this problem of self-consciousness has been handled in the history of post-Kantian thought, we may conveniently group all the different theories of self under two broad heads. Those theories that are based, either consciously or unconsciously, on the rejection of the Kantian distinction of the self as subject from the self as substance may be called the psychological theories of self; while those that accept the Kantian distinction as a most valuable discovery in the field of speculation but reject the ultimate validity of his analysis of self-consciousness for other reasons may be called the epistemological theories of self. Further, it will be convenient to consider the epistemological theories only after we shall have surveyed the psychological theories, for the obvious reason that the latter being further removed from the Kantian theory than the former, our discussions on the psychological theories will bring out clearly the value as well as the short-comings, if any, of the epistemological theories. For this we may begin with a general consideration of the contrast between these two attitudes

The psychological attitude towards the problem of mind first established itself with the 'celebrated Locke' who is the pioneer of that line of thought which passing through our psychologists, particularly W. James, has penetrated the vast region of contemporary speculations. This attitude essentially consists in "treating the faculty of knowledge merely as an attribute of certain beings in the world, by which they are characterized and distinguished from other beings, so that, e. g. as weight is the attribute of a stone, thought is the attribute of man"³ That this is the properly psychological attitude is clearly accepted by James "To the psychologist," he tells us, "the minds he studies are *objects*, in a world of other objects. Even when he introspectively analyzes his own mind, and tells what he finds there, he talks about it in an objective way."⁴ His opinion on the cognitive relation is equally clear and emphatic. "*The psychologist's attitude towards cognition will be so important in*

The psychological and the epistemological approach

2 Watson's *Selections*, p. 148

3 E. Caird *The Critical Philosophy*, I, p. 12

4 *Principles of Psychology*, I, p. 183

the sequel that we must not leave it until it is made perfectly clear. It is a *thorough-going dualism*. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither *makes* the other. They just stand face to face in a common world, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its counterpart."⁵ This attitude, however, he warns his reader, in the preface, is peculiar to psychology which claims to be a natural science, and it is one of the assumptions which may stand in need of a metaphysics to "overhaul them clearly and thoroughly."

When, however, the restrictions of psychology, as pointed out by James, are removed and the psychological attitude is universalized, we get a metaphysics of the type which is represented, for example, by Professor Alexander. It is then no more a postulate of psychology as a particular branch of knowledge, but it is the universal attitude that "in respect of being or reality, all existences are on an equal footing" and that mind has no privileged place in the democracy of things. "This attitude of mind imposed by the empirical method," we are further told, "is and may fairly be called in philosophy the attitude of realism."⁶ And the realistic metaphysics of mind, it is clearly seen by him, is only "borrowing a page from psychology."⁷

The epistemological attitude, on the other hand, is distinct from the psychological, and it was developed in the attempt to tackle with the difficulties in which thought was involved owing to its psychological attitude. The pioneer of this attitude was Kant. The essence of the epistemological attitude consists in treating the knowing mind, not as one object among other objects, but as that which is presupposed in everything known or knowable and in treating knowledge not as an attribute of a particular thing but as the medium through which all objects reveal themselves. The epistemological attitude in respect of mind and knowledge, of which Kant was the protagonist, has almost always been maintained by post-Kantian idealism and is still defended by those who are generally called the neo-Kantians and the neo-Hegelians. They have no quarrel with the psychologists in so far as psychology is treated as a special

5 Ibid. p. 218.

6 *Space, Time and Destiny*, I, p. 6.

7. Ibid. p. 9.

science having for its objective the description and explanation of the mental processes as one group of objects among other objects. The difficulty begins when psychology, not content to remain as a special science, seeks to offer a theory of knowledge, and when the psychological attitude is taken to be identical with the epistemological. Thus Liebmann and Schultze, Green and Caird, distinguish between the norms of thought and the laws of psychology, and protest against the confusion of epistemology with psychology. The whole method of empirical psychology which claims to offer a theory of knowledge, according to Green, rests on the supposition that "the process of consciousness by which conceptions are formed is a series of psychical events" and it is "in principle the same false procedure" as that of the geologist "who should treat the present conformation of the earth as the result of a certain series of past events, and yet, in describing these, should assume the present conformation as a determining element in each."⁸

Similarly, with regard to the ego, it is remarked that the really prolific element in Kant's system is the view of the noumenon "which he calls the ego, as the source of the categories, and thus at once of the order of phenomenon and of our knowledge of it, and again as itself constituting an intelligible world of ends freely pursued."⁹ These remarks of Green on the nature of knowledge and of the ego may fairly be taken as representative of the epistemological attitude. And the contrast between the epistemological and the psychological attitude as is apparent from this short description, is as strong as vital.

Now, reverting to the problem of self-consciousness, as formulated by Kant, it is well-known that philosophers with the psychological attitude of mind as well as those who insist on the necessity of the epistemological attitude have their respective quarrels with Kant. These quarrels, however, have been too long in the field to admit of an easy and short compromise. Fortunately, however, the internal differences between these two attitudes have become so sharply defined in contemporary philosophy that a careful consideration of these differences will throw a flood of light on their respective attitudes to Kant's analysis of self-consciousness. It is necessary, then, to begin with a critical estimate of the psycho-

Self as the basic issue in the idealism-realism controversy

8 *Works*, I, p 165

9. *Works*, III, p 127

logical and the epistemological theories of the self, and then and then only will it be useful to consider how far the difficulties of self-consciousness, as pointed out by Kant, have been substantially removed in the history of post-Kantian thought. Any serious attempt to appreciate the Kantian standpoint, therefore, must branch out into two parts, namely, (1) a critical consideration of the respective merits of the two contradictory attitudes, and (2) a restatement of the Kantian position in the light of the conclusions arrived at in the first part. However complicated and cumbersome such a proposal may appear to be, there does not seem to be an alternative and less tiresome method of approaching the problem of the self. In fact a short cut to a solution has been effectively closed by these long years of controversy during which the problem has developed in a multiplicity of unforeseeable directions, and he must be a bold adventurer who would at once come between the points of such mighty opponents as have ranged themselves on opposite sides and carry away the trophy.

We believe, on the contrary, Prof. Alexander is essentially right when he identifies the psychological with the realistic attitude. From this it follows that for a proper appreciation of the different theories of self one must regard realism and psychologism – if we may use the term in this sense – as two aspects of the same problem. The age-long controversy between idealism and realism has been concentrated on the status of the so-called external world in relation to the knowing mind, and the dust that has been raised is already too thick for even accomplished thinkers. A better atmosphere, we venture to think, is likely to prevail, if following the insight of Prof. Alexander, the centre of the controversy be shifted from the external world to the knowing self. For the most essential difference between the idealist and the realist does not so much lie in the status of the external world as in their respective conceptions of the self. The realist affirms that the self in knowledge is but one thing among other things in the democracy of the universe. And it is exactly this notion of the self which the idealists from Kant onward have made the main target of their attacks. By concentrating, therefore, on the problem of the self we may be in a better position to detect the excesses committed on both sides, and at the same time see clearly the difficulties of self-consciousness which, as remarked above, it was Kant's merit to have first accentuated in the history of modern philosophy.

Now, we have tried to show on another occasion¹⁰ that the reality and independence of the external world has never been challenged by true idealism, and that whenever idealism has tended to deny this belief of the plain man, it has done so only by drawing a false conclusion from true premises. The realist on the other hand has rejected the true premises on account of the false conclusion. Having wrongly supposed that the doubt about the independence of the external world is a necessary consequence of the initial presupposition that the world is a systematic whole, the realist has as a rule thought it necessary to start his anti-idealistic campaign by exposing this presupposition. Thus both idealism and realism have ignored the question whether there is not a *non sequitur* vitiating the whole situation. We have tried, on the contrary, to show that the so-called idealistic presupposition being the ultimate logical implicate of knowledge has been the inspiring ideal of all our attempts to interpret the universe, and that intellectualism when identified with this attitude must be the universal attitude of science and philosophy. But this attitude, when rightly interpreted, does not destroy the common-sense belief in an independent world as a world of real things other than any judgments we may form about them. The difficulty which realists have experienced in the idealistic analysis of the knowledge situation, as we have ventured to suggest, is due to their uncritical identification of otherness with externality. And this, in its turn, is due to the identification of the self as a subject with the self as a mind. Hence the real contrast between idealism and realism lies in their respective conceptions of the self or ego. This identification between the self as the subject and the self as a mind, we have further shown, to be the fundamental fallacy arising out of the psychological attitude, and to this we have traced some of the outstanding confusions besetting contemporary thought. Once it is clearly realized that what escapes determination through the categories is a void, a mere X for thought which cannot provide a ground for the explanation of anything, mind will appear to be only one of the determinate things of the world distinguished from other things by its peculiar property. And more this important truth is emphasized, the greater becomes the necessity of avoiding the confusion between the mind and the subject. The subject as the source of

10. Vide *Allahabad University Studies*, Vols VI and VII

the categories of all knowledge, as the radiant centre by reference to which and in the light of which the universe exists, far from being identical with mind, is the inexpugnable pre-supposition of "objects in general", and consequently of mind as well

"The greatest writer" it has been rightly remarked by Green, "must fall into confusions when he brings under the conceptions of cause and substance the self-conscious thought which is their source; and nothing else than this is involved in Locke's avowed enterprise of knowing that which renders knowledge possible as he might know any other object".¹¹ When mind is identified with the subject, Green points out elsewhere, "the duality in unity of subject and object at once lapses, and the old gulf between thinking substance and extended substance, between external phenomena and internal phenomena reappears"¹² The epistemological theories, on the contrary, have never lost sight of this important distinction between them, and so far they confirm the Kantian thesis. And Green is careful to remark that the chaos of antinomies which led Locke to perpetually shifting conceptions of the mind can be solved only by the method "of which Kant is the parent" and which traces the antinomies "to their source in the application to the thinking Ego itself of conceptions, which it does indeed constitute in virtue of its presence to phenomena given under conditions of time, but under which for that very reason it cannot itself be known"¹³ It is of paramount importance, therefore, to remember that "all knowing and all that is known, all intelligence and intelligible reality, indifferently consist in a relation between subject and object" and that the generic element in our definition of the knowable universe is "that it is such a relation".¹⁴ "'Matter' in being known, becomes a relation between subject and object, 'mind' in being known, becomes so equally. It follows that it is incorrect to speak of the relation between 'matter and mind'—'mind' being understood as above—as if it were the same with that between subject and object"¹⁵

¹¹ *Works*, I, p. 109

¹² *Ibid* p. 387

¹³ *Ibid* p. 112

¹⁴ *Ibid* p. 386

¹⁵ *Works*, I, p. 387

The point emphasized here is so vitally connected with the problem of self-consciousness that it will be useful at this place to refer to the views of another prominent thinker who has but recently been taken away from us. In order that we may really appreciate the place of the ego in knowledge, it is emphatically maintained by the late Lord Haldane, "we have ever to avoid the stereotyping of a general principle into the form of an image.... Two of the most dangerous kinds of these have their origin in an unduly loose use of the conceptions of cause and of substanceThe whole of the Berkeleian theory, and the essence of what is now called Mentalism, seem to depend on mind being regarded as a substance and knowledge as an activity or property of that substance. But the New Realists generally appear to make the same sort of assumption as the Mentalists about the adequacy of the category of substance, for they treat knowledge as the causal result of the operation of one set of things in the external world on another set of things there, the nervous system, imagined as copresent with them in a fundamentally real time and space".¹⁶ But the category is not adequate, for, in the knowledge relation, "the object is not a thing confronting another thing, but arises solely by distinction made within knowledge which is really indivisible, and which appears as broken up only in virtue of acts of abstraction made by and within itself"¹⁷ In this sense, therefore, knowledge should be regarded as foundational, and we should not seek to represent what is foundational by the analogy of anything but itself. "Its only appropriate terms are its own terms We must not think of consciousness as a property, the consciousness of a person The person is consciousness"¹⁸ All the difficulties in the analysis of the knowledge situation, it is remarked further, "seem to have arisen as soon as I fixed on the notion that my mind was a kind of thing, and that knowledge was a property of this thing".¹⁹

To understand the place of the ego in knowledge, it is added, one has to recognize further that knowledge "creates its own distinctions within itself, and excepting through it and in its terms there is no intelligible significance to be found for

16 *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol IX

17 *The Reign of Relativity*, p 288

18 *Ibid* p 320

19. *Ibid* p 150

either the self that knows or for the objects to which it is related. Knowledge thus may turn out to be the *prius* of reality, and, like the *Élan* of Bergson or the Will of Schopenhauer, itself the ultimate reality, capable of expression in no terms beyond its own, inasmuch as creation is meaningless outside its scope. Things and our reflections on them must alike belong to it. If indeed the *Élan* or the Will is intelligible it can, in this sense, be so only as the result of distinctions made within knowledge of some sort, and must fall within it as its own mere form and not as reality independent of it".²⁰ Now, it is not necessary to repeat what we have already said about the meaning of 'reality independent of knowledge'. But in so far as the problem of self-consciousness is concerned, these remarks of the idealists on the distinction between the subject and the mind, we believe, represent one of the invaluable truths to ignore which is to open the gate to endless confusions in philosophy. Yet, it has been persistently ignored by thinkers who have otherwise shown keen insight into the nature of human mind and intelligence. It is, however, interesting to note that Kant who was the first to recommend the epistemological attitude in place of the psychological attitude of Locke foresaw that, contrary to all the warnings of criticism, a sort of transcendental illusion tempts us to misapply the categories, and that "nothing is more natural or seductive" than the transcendental illusion. However natural this illusion may be, it is at least clear that the problem of self-consciousness as formulated by Kant is essentially connected with the epistemological distinction between the ego as the ultimate presupposition of knowledge and the ego as mind which is only one thing among other things of the world.

It follows from these considerations that no criticism of the Kantian problem can be really effective which is ultimately based on the transcendental illusion that is avowedly inseparable from the psychological attitude. Yet Kant's critics in general have tried to expose the hollowness of his theory on the assumption that the ego in knowledge is simply one thing among other things and that knowledge is a property of that thing. As a result, it has been often questioned whether there is a special problem of self-consciousness at all. Having assumed the essential correctness of the psychological analysis of know-

20. Ibid p 151

ledge as implying a knowing mind, an object of knowledge and the act or process of knowing, philosophers proceed, with all the resources of analytic subtlety which they can possibly command to discuss a number of questions which are supposed to be vital for understanding the nature of the knowledge situation. Does perception involve an act of thought over and above the content of the act and the object perceived? Is the physical object which is perceived a mere content of the conscious act or is it only the stimulus which stimulates the sense organs? Is knowledge a peculiar re-action of the nervous system? Is it anything more than a characteristic of the total process from stimulus to re-action? What then again is consciousness? Is it a function or an entity, a relation or a quality? Lastly, what is the self? Is it anything more than the causal nexus among a series of events, or the group of mental events? Is it a material structure possessing emergent qualities? Is not mind, quite as much as matter, derived from a neutral stuff which is neither mental nor material? These are some of the questions on the right solution of which, it is supposed, will depend our success in understanding the mechanism of knowledge.

Now, it may perhaps be admitted that all these questions have their own importance for a scientific study of mind and the mental processes, much as the scientific study of heat and electricity, light and magnetism has its own importance for the physicist. But, just as the investigation into the nature of light does not throw any light on the conditions under which alone it can be an object of thought, similarly, the psychological study of mind leaves unsolved the specifically epistemological problem of ascertaining the ultimate implications of knowledge. It is true that many an admirable attempt has been recently made to build up a psychological theory of knowledge. These attempts, however, we venture to suggest, are foredoomed to failure due to an initial assumption which is as seductive as it is erroneous. This assumption, to put it shortly, is that knowledge is a relation between two things. That it is a very seductive stand-point is sufficiently proved by the wide acceptance and respectful treatment which it has always enjoyed in the past, and it is as strongly proved by the incapability of even accomplished contemporary thinkers to appreciate the alternative stand-point. What is not adequately realized is that if knowledge be a relation between two things, then, the things which are related must have properties by which they

are respectively distinguished, and these properties must already be within the knowledge of the psychologist who is offering an analysis of the total situation, namely, A knows B. If we make P stand for the psychologist, then, we can easily see the difference between A in relation to B and P in relation to AB. It is very tempting, no doubt, to think that the knowledge relation is adequately explained when A, B and the relation obtaining between them have been separately grasped. But, then, it is entirely forgotten that, epistemologically viewed, the relation between A and B presupposes the relation of P to AB. Once the latter relation drops out of sight, all the ingenuity of the world which the psychologist may bring to bear upon the former relation will not help him to discover what is involved in the latter. In other words, while AB alone is the object of our enquiry, we are not even in sight of the logical implicates of there being such a fact as A-knowing-B. This, we believe, ought not to be overlooked in a theory of knowledge.

Yet, the predominant objective attitude of contemporary philosophy has been nowhere more disastrous in its consequences than in its theories of knowledge. It may perhaps be asserted without the risk of being contradicted that the most pervasive characteristic of contemporary theories of knowledge is to reject explicitly what they cannot but accept implicitly. Thus, for instance, a philosopher will boldly attack the universal validity of the Law of Contradiction, while making a number of universal assertions himself, or he will address himself to a genetic explanation of experience as it passes in succession through a number of stages, and then turn round all on a sudden to attack the wisdom of accepting as real the abstract time of science in the place of the concrete perceptual time, or, once more, he will seriously discuss whether consciousness exists or not, and thus carry his inquisitiveness far beyond the universal doubt with which Descartes began, who, however, could not doubt the fact of his doubting. Much unfruitful controversy, we submit, would come to an end if every epistemological discussion had been preceded by an analysis of the factors present in the relation of P to AB as above described. In the absence of such an analysis, it is immaterial whether A is conceived as a causal nexus, a material structure, the carrier of an intelligence quotient, or what not. When, on the contrary, we look carefully into the logic of our own procedure and consider how a fact comes to exist for us, it may not be difficult to see that the fact of A-knowing-B, quite as much as other facts of the world, must

imply the constitutive principles of unity and causality, space and time, and, above all, a synthesizing subject which is the source of the fundamental principles of knowledge and existence. Till this is clearly seen the subject will continue to be identified with mind, and consequently, the problem of self-consciousness will remain as one of those problems which are popularly believed to have their origin only in the unusually sophisticated minds of philosophers

One need not, however, go far to illustrate the disastrous consequences of the objective attitude in a theory of knowledge, and thus to prepare the way to a just appreciation of the conclusions to which a philosopher is committed by his unfortunate omission of the synthesizing subject, or, what is the same thing in another language, by his attempt to describe knowledge in terms of something other than itself. With the naiveté of pre-Kantian empiricism, contemporary theories of knowledge would fain offer to prove to the hilt that knowledge can be adequately explained without bringing in such terms as mind, self, thought or consciousness, and if these terms loomed large in the old theories of knowledge, the reason presumably was that genetic and comparative psychology was then in its lisping infancy. But the twentieth century psychology with its emphatic protest against regarding the human mind as intrinsically different from the animal, and with its concentration on the behaviors of such animals, as rat and chimpanzee, has shown the superfluity of these terms for an unbiased study of the knowledge situation. The difficulties involved in the appeal to comparative psychology for explaining knowledge, which we have considered elsewhere, may be briefly summarized in the words of one of the clearest thinkers of our time. "What makes it seem possible for the scientific investigator to begin at the beginning," it has been remarked by Prof. Ritchie, "is the fact that he is not doing so. The student of the amoeba happens to be, not an amoeba, but a specimen of a highly developed vertebrate and knows at least something about the differentiated organs and functions of his own body."²¹ The real force of this criticism is entirely missed if it be replied that we can interpret the lower by means of our knowledge of the higher, "while at the same time recognizing that the actual process has been a development of the lower upwards towards the higher."²² For the really important point is, not

21 *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. I, p. 59

22 James Ward *The Realm of Ends*, p. 146

whether man has come to be what he is through a long series of evolutionary stages, but whether evolution has a meaning except in the light of those principles which are generally recognized to go with self-conscious thought. In other words, if there is a real development, then it has a meaning only for a self-conscious individual who can interpret given facts according to the principles of unity, causality, etc. This shows the futility of describing knowledge in terms of something other than itself. And it is as much illustrated in the genetic explanation of knowledge as in the other types of description which abound in contemporary philosophy. Because, when knowledge is supposed to be either a form of conditioned reflex or a phenomenon that can exist only in relation to the satisfaction of desire, what is not seen clearly is that a reflex or a desire exists only for a subject and is inconceivable except in terms of knowledge. Similarly, when it is denied that any "mental occurrence has, in its own intrinsic nature that sort of relational character that was implied in the opposition of subject and object, or of knower and known",²³ it is altogether ignored that even this denial reasserts the subject-object relation, thus showing the utter impossibility of bringing it under any other relation. The self-refutation of all such attempts to go beyond knowledge could be avoided, as suggested above, if, contemporary thinkers, without rushing to startling theories, had stopped to enquire into the implications of there being a world of facts, rather than indulging in speculative details about the nature of facts. We shall see, on another occasion, how the problem of self and the allied problem of self-consciousness have been distorted on account of these psychological prejudices.

THE PROBLEM OF SENSА.

PROF D G LONDHE, M. A.

The sensа are the immediate data of sense-perception. They are what we are immediately aware of through our sense-organs of sight, hearing, touch etc and also in motor and organic sensations. The sensа are variously signified by such terms as the 'sensibles', the 'sensible appearances', or the 'objective constituents of perceptual situations'.

What is the problem about the sensа? This question may be answered by considering how this problem arises. The problem of sensа arises in the treatment of the problem of perception in general. Perception, as ordinarily analyzed reveals a distinction of what perceives and what is perceived of the knower and the known, the subject and the object. If I am aware of blue, my awareness of blue will be analyzed, from the standpoint of common sense and also from that of the philosophy of common sense, into the act of being aware of blue, on the one hand, and the blue patch, on the other. It will be observed that on this analysis, the blue patch as it 'appears' to me is taken as being identic 1 with the blue patch as it 'is' in itself. Further reflection, however, on the situation in question creates a suspicion in our minds that the blue patch as it appears is not wholly identical with the blue patch as it is in itself, and that in some respects at least the former is different from the latter. Supposing the blue patch in question is the surface of a book, its appearance is not, strictly speaking, rectangular in shape, when the book is seen from aside, while its surface as we know it is rectangular. Again, if the book is seen from a distance it will appear smaller in size. Similarly the appearance of a penny, except when seen right down from above, is elliptical, while we know that the penny in itself is round. This distinction between the appearance of an object and the object as it is in itself, is hardly recognized in the case of the manifold objects of ordinary experience, but it is marked in the case, say, of a stick half immersed in water and it becomes even notorious in the case of a white shell which appears yellow to a man who has taken santonine or in that of the shell which presents the illusory appearance of

silver Thus in the light of these perceptual situations the two-fold analysis of sense-perception into the act of awareness on the one hand and the object on the other, is found inadequate, and therefore, a further distinction on the object-side itself, is sought to be made, between sense-data or *sensa* and the physical reality. This distinction naturally leads to the belief that we immediately perceive the *sensa* and on the basis of these *sensa* we make such judgments as "I see a table", "I hear a bell" etc The problem of *sensa* may be stated thus What is precisely the nature of *sensa*? Or, in other words, what is the metaphysical status of *sensa*? It will be observed that this problem can be tackled by considering the question whether *sensa* are physical, or mental and any attempt to solve this question will have to take account of the relation of the *sensa* to physical objects on the one hand and to minds on the other

Various views have been held by different philosophers as regards *sensa* It has been maintained, for instance, by Alexander that the *sensa* need not be regarded as being different from the physical objects, and that they are simply identical with perceived features of the physical objects Stout is of opinion that *sensa* are not identical with perceived features of physical objects, and that they are material, that is, they fall on the side of matter and not of mind According to Russell *sensa* are mere modifications of the brain, while according to McTaggart they do not exist at all, as they are neither material nor mental Dr. Broad, however, believes that *sensa* are 'concrete, particular existents of a peculiar kind' They are neither physical nor mental but have a kind of existence which is different from the mode of existence which we attribute to the physical or to the mental As Dr Broad has dealt with this problem in a thorough-going manner, considering it in almost all important aspects, it will be better from the point of view of practical convenience of treatment to take up the issues as he has raised, and suggest our view by a critical consideration of his position

What are the grounds for the distinction of the *sensum* and the physical object and the consequent recognition of the *sensum* as an 'object' distinct from the material things? The grounds that Dr Broad has adduced are, firstly, that there must be *something* which has the quality which the thing appears to have When a penny looks elliptical there must, naturally, be *something* which has the quality of being

elliptical, and as the penny obviously has not that quality but some other quality, viz that of being round, the object in the one case must be different from the object in the other. Secondly, according to the scientists, the physical objects are not 'really' hot or red, that is to say, temperature and colours do not 'really' belong to matter. Now, if this be true, Dr Broad thinks that there must be some objects other than the material ones, which have colours and temperature. These objects are, according to him, nothing but *sensa*. The *sensa*, thus, come to be recognized as being objects other than, and over and above, the physical things. The *sensa*, therefore, are called "the objective constituents of perceptual situations" and the physical things are described as "the external reference of the perceptual situations". The *sensa* have such properties as shape, size, hardness, colour, roundness etc. They are "concrete particular existents like coloured or hot patches, noises etc". We get a brief and clear statement of Dr Broad's theory of *sensa* in the following—

"This theory allows that the objective constituents of perceptual situations really do have all the positive characteristics, which on careful inspection they seem to have. And it allows that these characteristics inhere in the objective constituents in the straightforward dyadic way in which common sense supposes them to do. But it cannot admit that the visual situations of a number of observers, who say that they are "seeing the same object", contain a common objective constituent. On this theory then, the objective constituents of most, if not all, perceptual situations cannot be spatio-temporal parts of physical objects. No doubt, they are really extended, they really last for so long. But they are not in any plain straightforward sense, in the one Physical Space in which the physical objects are supposed to be. .. They are on this view, particular existents of a peculiar kind; they are not physical as we have seen, and there is no reason to suppose that they are either states of mind or existentially mind-dependent. In having spatial characteristics, colours etc they resemble physical objects, as ordinarily conceived, but in their privacy and their dependence on the body, if not the mind, of the observer, they are more like mental states. I give the name of '*sensa*' to the objective constituents of perceptual situations, on the supposition that they are *not* literally parts of the physical objects which we are said to be perceiving, and that they are transitory particulars of the peculiar kind which I have just

been describing. And I call the theory which assumes the existence of such particulars "The Sensum Theory" ¹

The central point of the sensum theory, as may be seen from the above statement, is that the *sensa* are existents-concrete particular existents having the characteristics of the objects. Their nature is admittedly peculiar and even odd, but the fact of their concrete existence is frequently emphasized. The difficulties of the sensum theory arise, in our opinion, from this very point. It will be clear to any one that the existence that is here sought to be attributed to the *sensa* is of the same sort as that of the substances and not that of the adjectives. But we find it difficult to admit the substantival existence of the *sensa*. For, what is really meant by the substantival existence of an entity is that it exists in itself and by itself, that is, it does not depend for its being upon anything other than itself. In other words, the entity which is a substance, that is a concrete particular existent, *has* qualities or attributes, but it is not itself a quality or an attribute of anything. Now, if we try to analyze and see whether this essential requirement of substantival existence is fulfilled in the case of *sensa*, we find that it is not fulfilled by the indubitably known and the universally accepted facts about the *sensa*. When a penny appears elliptical, what is elliptical cannot, on any liberal interpretation of the facts of the case, be said to be existing in itself. Its existence in a plain and literal sense, depends on the existence of the penny. However indefinitely localized it may be, its existence seems to be pinned to the penny. And this is exactly the mode of being possessed by an attribute. When we say that a particular object is beautiful, we cannot precisely localize the quality of beauty. The characteristic of beauty seems to be more or less a 'floating' adjective. Similarly when we perceive absence of a book on a table, the absence in question is certainly a characteristic of the table, though it is very vaguely localized. What we want to point out especially in this connection is that the difficulty about placing the elliptical sensum in precisely the same portion of space as the round penny or the cognate difficulty viz. how one and the same object be at once elliptical and round, is not, taken by itself, a conclusive argument to prove the existential difference between the sensum and the object. It may as well be that the sensum is only a transitive attribute of the

1 *Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp 180-82

physical object, and it need not be an existence substantially different from the material object, as Dr. Broad is anxious to maintain in his sensum theory

The main reason why the *sensa*, in such a theory, are taken to be concrete, particular existents, is that they appear to have all the characteristics of the physical objects such as colour, temporal duration etc. But we think that it may be shown that the characteristics which are supposed to be belonging to the *sensa*, are as a matter of fact, the characteristics of the physical objects. When this is not so, the characteristics are erroneously perceived as belonging to the objects. The colour of the sensible appearance of the penny is brown. Now, this colour is the same as the colour of the penny; however close and persistent our analysis may be, we fail to see any difference between the brown of the sensum and the brown of the penny. According to the theory we are here considering, the colours must be different individually, that is, as belonging to two different entities. But this is not borne out by all veridical perceptions. The only ground for considering them as different is the supposition that they belong to two different entities. And if it is asked, why the entities are supposed to be individually different, the only answer, from Dr. Broad's view-point, will be that they are different, because the characteristics possessed by them are different. But this is certainly arguing in a circle. For, if we leave aside the hypothesis of the *sensa* being existentially different from the physical objects, as something yet to be proved, there is no justification in facts for supposing that the brown of the sensum is different from the brown of the penny. The same is also true of the temporal characteristic of the *sensa*. Every sensum seems, no doubt, to have some temporal duration, but this duration of the sensum cannot in any way be separated from a part of the duration of the physical object. The sensum cannot be said to be directly and literally in time; the temporal duration it possesses does not stand on its own account, so to say, but it is due to the fact that the sensum itself belongs as a characteristic, to the thing of which it is a sensum. It will, thus, be clear that the contention that the *sensa* are existentially different from the object because they possess characteristics of their own, as the objects do, is still open to dispute. If the fundamental point that the *sensa* possess separate characteristics is not granted, and we think it cannot be granted for the aforesaid reasons, the argument

which seeks to establish the sensum theory appears to suffer from a logical weakness and thus it is by no means conclusive and convincing

Let us now consider the distinction between the veridical and the illusory perceptions as implied in this theory. The distinction in question is illustrated by the distinction between such situations as "I see a penny", as is ordinarily said by a man who sees a penny, and "I see pink rats", as is said by a drunkard². In the one situation, the object which the man says he sees is there, while in the other the object is not there. For common sense this distinction is adequate, but it is not adequate for the sensum theory. When the *sensa* themselves are taken, in this theory, as being objective constituents of perceptual situations, we think that a further distinction between the 'real' and the 'illusory' *sensa*, so to say, must be recognized in the *sensa* referring to one and the same physical thing. For, in the penny situation, the elliptical *sensum* alone is illusory, while the brown *sensum* and the other *sensa* are real. So also, in the 'yellow shell' situation the yellow *sensum* alone is illusory, while all other *sensa* are real. But in the "pink rat" situation the *sensa* of colour, size, shape etc. are all unreal. It will be observed that in this further distinction among the *sensa* themselves the reality or illusoriness is judged by that very standard by which the reality or otherwise of perceptions is determined in the ordinary distinction, viz. the presence or the absence of the corresponding object. Now, it will be recalled that in the sensum theory the term 'object' has got a special meaning inasmuch as the *sensum* itself is an object. It may easily be seen that with this special significance attaching to the term, the ordinary standard of reality viz. the presence of an object is quite futile here, and therefore, a fresh distinction of the real and the unreal among the *sensa* themselves has got to be recognized. But we find that Dr Broad's *sensum* theory has not recognized such a distinction. He has attributed one and the same ontological mode of being to all *sensa*. In his theory, all *sensa* enjoy, so to say, an equal metaphysical status.

It will be interesting to see what conclusions can logically be deduced from the view that all *sensa* have an equal existential status. If we take any *sensum* of the 'shell-silver' situation (that is, the situation where silver appears in the

² Cf. *Ibid.* p. 155

place of a shell,) and allow that it is a concrete particular existence, in the plain sense in which a brown sensum of a penny is taken to exist, one result at any rate will be inevitable, viz, we shall be altogether deprived of any means of distinguishing the veridical perceptions from the illusory perceptions. For, in both cases, objects, in the sense in which the Sensum Theory understands them, do exist. It will not, therefore, be correct to say roundly that one perceptual situation, i.e., that of a penny, is veridical and another i.e., that of 'shell-silver' is illusory. But it shall have to be further specified with regard to each situation, what sensa are veridical and what are illusory.

Another conclusion that necessarily follows makes the position of the physical objects altogether precarious. The theory, that regards sensa as objective constituents of perceptual situations and also holds that what we perceive are sensa and nothing but sensa, must, if courageous and consistent, abandon the concept of the actual existence of the physical reality as being wholly gratuitous. For, the belief in the existence of the material objects, though natural and universal cannot be logically justified. For, it cannot be supposed that there must be something of the physical nature which should be the cause of the sensa. The belief in the physical object as the cause of the sensa may, if at all, be justified by some such argument. The sensa are perceived to have some qualities, there must, therefore, be some material object which should be the cause and which, as cause, should have qualities similar to those that are perceived as belonging to the sensa. This argument however, is not sound. It is here taken for granted that the cause must be similar to the effect. But the principle of the similarity of cause and effect is true only when a general similarity is meant. And such general similarity is useless in the present case. What is needed for this argument is a specific similarity of particular qualities but this is not available in most cases. When a stick half immersed in water appears bent, the shape of the sensum which is supposed to be the effect is quite different from the shape of the stick which is supposed to be the cause. Here there is dissimilarity, rather than similarity between cause and effect. Again, as McTaggart has pointed out, when a red-hot iron is perceived, the principle of similarity of cause and effect holds good in the case of the sensum of form, that is, of shape only, and fails in the case of the sensum of colour etc. For, on the scientific view which the

Sensum Theory also accepts, the material object is neither coloured nor hot.³ So it is in the case of some sensa only that the material object which is supposed to be the cause, is shown to be similar to the sensum which is taken to be the effect. Thus it is clear that the principle of similarity of cause and effect which the sensum theory invokes for support, is really of very little avail so far as the question of the rational justification of the belief in the existence of the material object is concerned.

The case of the 'red-crystal' sensum leaves no doubt as regards the unsatisfactory nature of the simple causal relation of the physical object and the sensum. In this situation, the crystal cannot be taken as the cause of the red quality of the sensum, as the crystal is not red in itself but it looks so in virtue of the adjacent red flower reflected in it. In such a complex case, the simple causal view breaks down completely.

The retention of the existence of the physical object in spite of the logical difficulties, raises a difficult problem as regards the adjustment of the group of sensa with the material object. Here the question is: How is the world of sensa to be accommodated in the world of physical objects? Dr Broad thinks that the task is not difficult. For, the scientific concept of the world of physical objects means only a general scheme of things—a whole composed of parts which have more or less definite shapes, sizes and positions. And this general scheme is not still decisive as regards the number of dimensions, its 'geometry', and thus it leaves ample scope for many contending theories, concerning the exact nature of objects. His contention, therefore, is that the groups of sensa might find a place in the general scheme of things. He says: "With the traditional views about the nature of space, Time and Matter, it is extremely difficult to fit the world of sensa and the world of physical objects together into a coherent whole. But, once the immense number of possible alternatives within the scheme is grasped, the devising of the theories of the physical object which shall give sensa a *locus standi* in the physical world, will be a winter evening's pastime for the symbolic logicians."⁴ Later on, speaking about the status of the sensa in the world, he tells us analogically, that the groups of sensa have the same status in the world of physical objects, which the members of a family within a larger fundamental family possess with regard to the

3 *The Nature of Existence*, Vol. II, p. 47

4 *Scientific Thought*, pp. 271-272

members of the fundamental family⁵ But this analogy does not help us to make the relation of *sensa* to the physical objects intelligible in any way. On the contrary, the anxiety displayed here to find for *sensa* a *locus standi* in the physical world, certainly seems to go against the main point in the statement of the *Sensum* Theory that the *sensa* are not physical. So on the whole we find that the task of fitting the world of *sensa* with the world of physical objects is not "a winter evening's pastime".

Now let us take the question of the relation of *sensa* to minds. Some philosophers hold that *sensa* are mental. The arguments in favour of this view are based upon (1) the privacy of *sensa*, (2) the similarity between *sensa* and bodily feelings, and (3) the analogy between *sensa* and images. Let us see whether Dr Broad's criticism of these arguments is tenable. He urges that the privacy of *sensa* may be accounted for by the unique position of the body of each observer. We venture to think that the privacy in question does not mean some character determined by some unique position of observer's body. The privacy of *sensa* ultimately means some unique, 'unshareable' experience of each individual self. That the privacy in the case of *sensa* is mental, is made still more evident by the fact that the body by itself does not see. It is only an ensouled body, that is, a mind having a body as its instrument that 'sees'. Seeing seems to be mental in a significant sense. This argues for the probability of *sensa* being mental, rather than physical. The character of what we see is determined, to a great extent, by our mental attitude and expectations. This is, of course, wildly true in the case of illusions and hallucinations but in a moderate sense this is true of all our perceptions.

The argument based upon the similarity of *sensa* and bodily feelings may be briefly expressed thus: All *sensa* can be arranged in a series of which the *sensa* of colour and sound are the top members and the *sensa* of toothache etc. are the bottom members. Now, it is evident that the *sensa* of toothache are mental in the sense that in these situations, the object is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the act of sensing and consequently an unsensed toothache is inconceivable. There is obviously a continuity of series between these *sensa* and the *sensa* of blue or red, and therefore, the latter also may be regarded as being mental. In criticizing this argument Dr

Broad points out that even if unsensed toothache is inconceivable, unsensed red-patch is not inconceivable, and thus he virtually denies continuity of these sensa with those of toothache etc. He says "I do not find the slightest intrinsic difficulty in conceiving the existence of unsensed red-patches or unsensed noises"⁶ We venture to suggest that there is an intrinsic difficulty in conceiving unsensed red-patches or unsensed noises. The intrinsic difficulty is that if they are really unsensed, one cannot be justified in believing that they are colour patches or noises or whether they are red or green, etc. If we analyze the mental situation in conceiving unsensed red-patches, we find that they are not really red or even coloured patches but colourless ideas of red-patches. So it turns out that there is an intrinsic difficulty in conceiving unsensed red-patches, though there is no such difficulty in conceiving ideas of red-patches.

Now, as regards the argument which is based upon the analogy of sensa and images Dr Broad admits the resemblance of sensa to images, but doubts whether images are existentially dependent on the mind. He says "I do not see any very obvious reason why there should not be 'unimaged' images" This at any rate is going too far. The obvious reason for the impossibility of there being "unimaged" images is that there can be images only when we will them. And this is also true of sensa. The sensa will not have any definite character without the requisite attentive attitude of the mind. In this sense at least, sensa may, with justification, be said to be mind-dependent. Dr Broad here urges that the fact that there will not be images, if no one wills them, is true not only of images but of many other things, but we do not regard those things as mind-dependent for this simple reason. He further makes out that most chemical reactions come about only when some one wills the particular mixtures concerned, but they are not taken to be mind-dependent on that account. Now, any one will easily see that this is more like a retort than a sound logical argument. For, obviously there is a fundamental difference in the two cases. Chemical reactions and such other things can exist and have definite individual characters, even if the will that has called them into existence has ceased to be, but the images and also the sensa will not exist and have peculiarly individual characters, when the will and the attentive attitude of the mind are not present.

We, therefore, contend that Dr. Broad has not conclusively and finally refuted these arguments in favour of the mental character of the *sensa*. Moreover, the *sensa* in the perceptual situations in dreams show that at least some *sensa* are not caused by physical objects and that they are mental, that is, they are existentially dependent on the mind of the percipient. The claim of the data in dream perceptions to being regarded as *sensa* at all, might be disputed. But as McTaggart has observed, no reasonable objection to such a claim can be put forward.⁷ There is also one positive consideration in favour of regarding dream-percepta as *sensa*, it is this that the dream objects also are perceived as having the characteristics of colour, shape etc. If then, the claim of dream-percepta to being regarded as *sensa* be granted, we need not be content with saying that *sensa* are neither physical nor mental, but can state definitely that some *sensa* are decidedly mental in the sense that they are existentially dependent on the mind of the percipient. And with regard to others we may say with sufficient justification that mind is essential to their being in a more vital sense than either the sense-organs or the objects. This conclusion is forced upon us partly, by the failure of the *Sensum* Theory in satisfactorily explaining the 'concrete, particular existence' sought to be attributed to *sensa* and partly, by its failure in successfully refuting the arguments brought in favour of the mental character of *sensa*.

7 *The Nature of Existence*, Vol. II, p. 46.

ARISTOTLE ON PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

PROF. K. V. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. A.

1. Aristotle's complaint against Plato's theory of knowledge is that the Ideas or Universals, which according to him form the real objects of scientific knowledge, do not help us towards the knowledge of other things, for the ideas are not the substance of things, and if they were substance, they would be *in* things and would lose their non-sensuous immaterial character. It may, however, be remembered in connexion with Plato's theory of knowledge that Plato was first to distinguish 'Science' from 'Opinion'—a distinction which affects the thought of succeeding philosophers. Plato further maintained that the world of Ideas was the appropriate object of Science, while the physical world was supposed to be the proper object for Opinion. Plato's Ideal World is, in fact, a system of clearly defined logical concepts each standing in immutable relation to the rest. The physical world was not considered to be a fit object for science, as it cannot be analyzed into pure logical concepts on account of the irreducible sensuous factor that it contains. Science, then, which deals with causal 'connexions', gives you results that can be proved logically and that are valid at all times and for all persons, while Opinion, which is satisfied only with 'conjunctions', gives you only a probable account. Plato, therefore, regarded all true science as 'transcendent and beyond the range of any possible experience of sense'.

Science, in fact, begins only where sensuous experience ends. Aristotle, on the other hand, rejects the transcendent and exclusive reality of Plato's Ideas, or the 'cogitable Universals' and makes the concrete individual the starting-point of his epistemology. He does not regard the Universals as standing apart from the individuals but as immanent in them, and places complete reality in the sensible particulars. He, therefore, makes experience of sense the foundation of his epistemology. He agrees, however, with Plato in distinguishing the region of Opinion from that of Science, and in assigning the one to the sphere of the individuals, and the other to that of the universals. Like Plato, he thinks that there can be no knowledge of the individuals since they are infinitely numerous and distinct from one another, and that there can be knowledge of the universals only. But, as Grote points

out, 'his universals are very different from those of Plato: they are not Self-existent realities, known by the mind from a long period of pre-existence and called up by reminiscence out of the chaos of the sensible impressions' but they are first principles of Demonstrative Science (Grote, *Aristotle*, p 208 ff) Aristotle explains the progress by which we get the knowledge of the universals or the principles of Science in the following way: 'all men are naturally born with faculty of sensation; from sensation memory is produced, (*Met* 980 a 29) and 'from memory experience, for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience, (*Met* 980 b 29) Science and art arise when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced (*Met*. 981. a 5-7) While experience is knowledge of individuals, art is knowledge of universals (*Met* 981 a 16) Thus starting from the apprehension of the particulars we form some crude generalities which serve us as basis for what we may call experience, and then proceed from experience by induction, and get the universal propositions But Wisdom, Aristotle tells us, is the knowledge of first principles and causes (*Met* 981 b 28). Here in the explanation of the process of our knowledge of these first principles we see clearly the Platonic influence on the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. When the discursive thought has done its work, the active intellect or Rational Intuition comes into operation, and apprehends the first principles or universal propositions directly, immediately and intuitively Here we may remark that to Aristotle belongs the great credit of having shown, (as Wallace puts it) that 'the last stage in the process of development may represent the original *a priori* conditions of the development itself', and that what is last in knowledge may be first in existence Experience and Intuition, then, are both equally necessary for the building up of knowledge Di-cursive thought by itself is impotent, it must be confirmed and made valid by intuition. Thus the final authority lies with Intuition, which remains, even according to Aristotle, the faculty of first principles Aristotle, therefore, though he begins with Naturalism ends with Platonism

- 2 The second point of Aristotle's criticism is directed against the Platonic conception of Dialectic, the Science of all sciences Plato arrived at this conception by distinguishing the four grades of cognition which we find described at the end of the
- (a) *Plato's Dialectic*

sixth book of the Republic. The first grade is that of 'inferior opinion' representing the mental condition of the savage or the child, which Plato calls 'guess-work', images which are its proper objects are not here distinguished from solid physical realities. 'Superior Opinion', which is the second grade, marks a more advanced stage of development, and is designated by Plato as 'belief', the mental state of a man who thinks the particulars of sense alone as truly existing and does not distinguish the substance from shadow, the real from the unreal. The 'belief' corresponds to what we may call the knowledge based on the induction from the experience of the particulars of sense. A further state in the development of knowledge is attained when we pass, to the third grade, namely 'lower science', which is the knowledge furnished by the mathematical sciences which deal with pure logical concepts, using the particulars of sense, e.g. the diagrams, as aids to the imagination. The highest ideal of knowledge, which these mathematical sciences only aim at, is fully realized in the supreme science of Dialectic, which forms the fourth and the last grade of knowledge. Dialectic deals with Ideas or Forms, pure logical concepts, without any aid of sensuous representation. Its procedure is two-fold, analysis followed by synthesis. It treats the ultimate principles of the other branches of mathematics as only 'hypotheses', and by a comparison of their principles reaches the most supreme principle, which is unhypothetical and self-evident. From this are deduced the principles of all other sciences, and through them their consequences. This supreme principle Plato calls the Idea of Good, which, as the Sun of the world of Ideas, is at once 'the source of knowledge and illumination to the knowing mind, and the source of reality and being to the objects of its knowledge.'

Now Aristotle objects to Plato's Dialectic first on the ground that it abolishes all other sciences, for, the Platonic doctrine that the constituent elements of Ideas are also the elements of all things, leads him to suppose that the constituent elements of the objects of all sciences are the same, and therefore they all fall within the perview of one supreme Science, namely Dialectic, of which all other sciences are mere logical deductions. Aristotle, who was first to introduce a classification of sciences by distinguishing the speculative sciences from the practical, and 'first' philosophy

(b) *Aristotle's
criticism of
Platonic
Dialectic*

from 'second' philosophies, naturally complains against the subsumption of all sciences in one supreme Science. Further Aristotle's idea of Dialectic is quite different from that of Plato. He takes it to be an extreme antithesis of what he conceives to be the Demonstrative Science or Necessary Truth, inasmuch as the former 'deals with an unbounded miscellany of subjects' while the latter confines itself to 'a few special subjects', and though the process of syllogism is common to both the conclusions of the former are only 'hypothetically true', while those of the latter are 'true universally, absolutely and necessarily' (Grote, *Aristotle*, p. 208)

Again, the universal propositions or the first principles are intuitively apprehended, and they cannot be demonstrated, and the Dialectic according to Aristotle aims at defending these first principles against the objections of their opponent by starting from his own premises and showing how they lead him to absurd consequences. Secondly, Aristotle contends that the process of analysis into constituent elements is applicable in the case of substances alone and not in the case of other categories, for substance Aristotle holds to be capable of being divided into two constituent elements, namely form and matter, but these elements cannot be found in other categories, for things that are not substances contain no matter (*Met* 1044 b 8). Plato, however, supposes that all knowable objects are constituted of the same elements and that therefore there is only one science of them all. But, says Aristotle, 'one certainly cannot discover what are the elements of which activity or passivity or straightness is composed, therefore it is an error to seek the element of all existing things or to think that one has found them' (*Met.* 992 b 20-24). Thirdly, Aristotle argues that granting that everything can be analyzed into elements viz the One, and the Great and the small, as Plato supposes, how are we to suppose that these are the ultimate elements? In other words, nothing proves that these are the ultimate elements of things, and that the analysis cannot be carried further. There will always be a difference of opinion among the scientists as to the ultimate elements of things. No result can, therefore, be established in this case (*Met* 993. a 2-7). As Taylor well remarks 'this objection of Aristotle against Plato holds equally true in the case of Aristotle's own analysis of a thing into form and matter'. Fourthly, Aristotle says if all things are composed of the same constituent elements, one would know the objects of sense without having the corresponding organ of sense-perception

(*Met.* 993 a. 7-10). Aristotle contends that on this theory it would follow that a Platonic philosopher, though born-blind, will have the perception of all the colours of the spectrum. But what is presumed by Aristotle in this argument is that every physical object is, according to Plato, completely analysable into pure logical concepts, since the elements of Ideas are the elements of all things. But this is exactly antithetical to Plato's real view about the physical objects. Plato regards them to be incapable of being the objects of true science, exactly because they cannot be analyzed into pure logical concepts on account of the irreducible sensuous factor they contain. Plato's contention in reality amounts to saying that the real objects of all exact Sciences are pure logical concepts, and we find him to be substantially right in this respect.

3 The final point of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of knowledge turns upon the method of learning and consequently on the Platonic Doctrine of Reminiscence. In the *Meno* the question of the possibility of learning is mooted, and the following dilemma is presented there. If you already know a thing, then you need not learn it, and if you do not know it already then you *cannot* learn it, for even after learning it how can you determine that this was exactly the thing that you wanted to learn? Plato's answer to this dilemma is that you do not learn anything new; you simply recollect what you had already learnt in your previous lives, but have forgotten when you entered this life. All knowledge is, therefore, recollection of what had been learnt in former lives. Aristotle does not accept this theory as a solution of the dilemma, which he solves by distinguishing two grades of cognition, one complete and absolute, and the other incomplete and partial, and he declares that learning is impossible in the first case, while it is possible in the second, where we bring to completeness our incomplete cognitions. Aristotle, therefore, thinks that all learning presupposes and depends upon previous knowledge. Thus he says, 'all learning is effected through previous acquaintance with some or all of the matters concerned. This is true alike of learning by demonstration, by definitions, and by induction' (*Met.* 992 b. 30-34). Demonstration involves the process of syllogism so to learn the truth by demonstration requires previous knowledge of the premises on which the proof is based, similarly, learning it by definition presupposes previous knowledge of the meaning of the

Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Doctrine of Reminiscence

terms used in the definition; and learning it by induction requires previous knowledge of the individual instances, on a comparison of which the induction is based. But, 'if, as the Platonists assert, there is a universal science of everything, he who learns it must have no previous acquaintance with anything (*Met.* 992 b 29), and this absence of all previous knowledge would, according to Aristotle, render the very process of learning impossible. 'But if it be suggested that the knowledge of this science is really innate', Aristotle argues that 'it is surely a mystery how we possess the most excellent of sciences, and yet we are unconscious of the fact' (*Met.* 993 a 1-3). Taylor rightly remarks that Aristotle's arguments only prove the necessity of some self-evident truth, and are invalid as against Plato's Dialectic, since they involve a *petitio principii*. Further, Aristotle inconsistently, and perhaps unconsciously, accepts the doctrine of immediate, intuitive apprehension of the first principles, which is only another name for 'innate knowledge' that he is here trying to refute.

MŪLĀVIDYĀ-NIRĀSA OR ŚRĪ-ŚĀṆKARA-HRDAYA

(A Reply to Professor K. Sundararama Iyer, M. A.)

BY Y. SUBRAHMANYA SARMA.

In the September number of this valuable journal for the last year, I find Prof. Sundararama Iyer's erudite review of my work under the above title. The effects produced by the appearance of this work are highly gratifying, though not unexpected. It has been furiously attacked by the defenders of the Post-Śāṅkara doctrine which has been long suffered to hold the popular imagination. The spell at last is broken. The fury, unsupported by reason or fact, will soon spend itself and truth will emerge all the brighter and stronger. To the conservative tendency in man, a change in outlook and in long-nursed beliefs though compelled by inexorable facts, is unwelcome. Still when the dust and noise of the fight subside, human nature will, I am sure, hasten to make the required adjustment.

The venerable Professor has been long known for his scholarship and devotion to Vedānta, and if in my reply I may challenge and refute every one of his statements, I hope, I shall not be supposed to be wanting in my personal regard and esteem for his deep learning and zeal for tradition.

I shall pass over his charge of my 'avowed disregard for the tradition,' for it is not true. I have throughout adhered to the earlier tradition handed down to us by Śāṅkara and Sureśvara, and have rejected the later, because it is opposed to the earlier, and, what is more, to truth.

The writer of the English Introduction to my work is next assailed. This is ungracious. Neither the Professor nor I can interfere with the freedom of men to hold their own particular views. The Professor's deprecation of "our new Western education" of which he is himself a distinguished product, and his belittling of the value of Kant's discovery, are to me most unintelligible. "No true Śāṅkarite," he remarks, "can accept Kant's *a priori* forms and presuppositions of the intellect as the conditions which alone can enable anything to be accepted as the object of knowledge." Nobody has said that they alone

can. But suppose one so claims, how does one cease to be a true Śāṅkarite, I wonder? What is the latter's theory of knowledge? How does it undermine Kant's? As to the understanding when developed giving us a knowledge of things in themselves—a statement ascribed to Kant—the Professor must take the sole responsibility. If Kant so declared, it would still be a dogma bereft of any speculative value. In all sincerity, I believe that a transfusion of new blood into Indian thought would remove its isolation and be beneficial to the interests of philosophy. It would effect immediate cure of certain maladies of the mind to which want of free intercourse with foreign thinkers has made the Indian specially prone. Truth is not confined to East or West and even Vedic truth, as truth, must conform to reason and experience. No walls of prejudice can bound its domain.

Stating my position pretty correctly, the learned Professor proceeds to deal with my explanation of *adhyāsa* as identical with *avidyā*. Before dealing with his criticism, a brief history of the doctrine will, I believe, be helpful. Now neither in the Upanisads nor in the writings of the Vedāntins anterior to Śāṅkara, is the term '*adhyāsa*' (superimposition) to be found. '*Avidyā*,' '*anādyavidyā*,' '*mūyā*,' '*bīja*,' '*śakti*'—these are the terms widely used to denote the nature of the unreal world. The rational-minded Śāṅkara felt them to be too vague for a scientific conception of truth, and it is to his incomparable genius that we owe the idea of superimposition. It is his own priceless contribution to thought and is a universal solvent of philosophical doubts. It will thus be evident why he identifies the received doctrine of *avidyā* (ignorance) with *adhyāsa*. "It is *adhyāsa* so defined that wise men call *avidyā*" (S B). The term *avidyā* is extremely indefinite in import, while *adhyāsa* is a solid fact of experience. Thus Śāṅkara raised *avidyā* to the rank of an unquestionable element of practical life. '*Mūyā*' and '*avidyā*' whose connotation was amorphous, nebulous, were forced by a bold stroke of genius, to assume a distinct form for the first time. The later commentators failing to recognize the value and significance of *adhyāsa* confounded it with other concepts of the time-bound intellect, and thus bungled over it. For superimposition rises superior to time which is its own creature. It must be therefore beginningless, that is, causeless. To ask for the cause of that which begets causation and time, is to be incapable of rigorous thinking, is to misconceive superimposition, is in fact intellectual bank-

ruptcy The error is fundamental. *Adhyāsa*, of course, presupposes ignorance or want of true knowledge But this is a logical presupposition, a necessary implication of thought No positive entity like the unfortunate *Mūlāndyā* can claim precedence in time over *adhyāsa*, for, as already said, time itself is its product Vedānta which predicates the unity of Brahman will be shattered to pieces, if a second entity not subjected to or originating from *adhyāsa* be for a moment conceded to exist The reality of the not-self (*anātman*) follows necessarily from its not being *adhyāsa*, superimposed. I submit this vital aspect of the system to the learned Professor for his deep consideration.

Let us now turn to what the venerable critic has to urge in opposition First it is alleged that when Śaṅkara states that "the *adhyāsa* thus defined, learned men (pandits) consider to be *andīyā*", Śaṅkara does not refer to his own view but only to that of some learned men The Professor tries to justify his surmise by quoting a parallel instance at the beginning of the eighteenth chapter of the *Gītā* where Lord Kṛṣṇa after declaring the views of *kāms* etc., unfolds his own at the end This plea, I submit, is invalid, for the analogy is illusive I do admit that pandits are not infallible, but the object of referring to their opinion is either to adopt or reject it In either case the context alone can justify our conclusion The extract from the *Gītā* plainly indicates that Lord Kṛṣṇa's views differed from those of the *kāms*, because the Lord himself so declares in his own words, but the sentence quoted above from the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* contains nothing to favour the pure fancy that Śaṅkara takes exception to the identification of *andīyā* with *adhyāsa* The contrary is the precise truth For later on after establishing the practical possibility of *adhyāsa*, Śaṅkara clearly adopts its identity with *andīyā* by using these remarkable words "तमेतं अविद्याव्यात्मनोऽन्तर्गतं तद्विद्यामम्" Now if we were to reject this notion as not owned by Śaṅkara, we have for a like reason to discard also the other view of the pandits, appearing in the next sentence, namely "तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपनिर्वाणं विद्यामाहुः" "The determination of the true nature of a thing by discriminating it from that which is wrongly superimposed upon it, (the pandits) declare this to be *andīyā* or knowledge" Is the Professor prepared to reject this also? I suppose not. For every one will admit that wisdom consists in discriminating between the true and the false Put into the mouth of Śaṅkara the words would mean, "What I have shown as *adhyāsa* is just what pandits term *andīyā*" (तमेतमेवंलक्षणं अध्यासं पण्डिता अविवेकितं मन्यन्ते) There is no

evidence that any pandit anterior to Śankara had been familiar with the term *adhyāsa*. Śankara was the first to introduce it into Vedānta linking it with the hoary tradition by identifying it with the well-known *avidyā*. Even in the Gītā, the word 'pandits' is not invariably used in a disparaging sense (cf. "पण्डिता. समदर्शिनः", "नानुशोचन्ति पण्डिता"). If Śankara and Gaudapāda deplore the ignorance of pandits in regard to subtle truths of Vedānta, they never leave the reader to conjecture the disparagement. Coming now to the point at issue, I must remark that there is not a syllable in all the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* that this particular view of the pandits is discredited. The whole of the Introductory Chapter being devoted to *adhyāsa*, no other principle not identical with it, can by any exercise of ingenuity be shoved into it.

On the other hand, the theory of *Mūlāvidyā* is an invention of the Post-Śāṅkaras which the Professor has taken upon himself to support. This term betrays its own origin. The idea that *adhyāsa* demands a cause for itself, gave rise to the notion of a *Mūlāvidyā* which is put forward as *kāranāvidyā* to distinguish it from *adhyāsa*, which is styled *kūryāvidyā*. Thus the venerable critic by his endeavour to defend *Mūlāvidyā* unconsciously assumes the very identity of *adhyāsa* with *avidyā* against which he fights so strenuously. What still more impairs his position is, that the Post-Śāṅkara commentators themselves have not questioned the identity. Where is his adherence to tradition now?

The second argument advanced is still weaker if possible. The Professor quotes Śankara as saying "The causal phenomenal ignorance (मिथ्या + अज्ञान) is the cause of the मिथुनीकरण (identification), that is, *adhyāsa* of the real with the unreal". And then the Professor builds up his fabric. "Here", says the Professor, "Śankara expressly states his view that *ajnāna* (avidyā) is the material cause of '*adhyāsa*' the identification (*mithunīkaraṇa*) of the real self with the unreal not-self". This is verily building on quicksands. Neither the inference nor the premises are admissible. As to the premises, Śankara says that the *vyavahāra* exhibited in practical life in the form of 'I am this', 'this is mine' proceeding from *adhyāsa* by which the real is confounded with the unreal, is due to wrong knowledge (अन्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्माश्चाप्यस्य इतरेतराविवेकेन, अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणो मिथ्याज्ञान-निमित्तं सत्यावृत्ते मिथुनीकरणं, अहमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः). It is clear that the Professor's rendering 'मिथ्याज्ञान' as 'causal phenomenal ignorance' has no warrant in the original and is wholly unaccept-

able There is no reason on earth why मिथ्याज्ञान which is used by Sankara in the sense of मिथ्याप्रत्यय, an expression used by himself towards the end, should be split up into मिथ्या + अज्ञान, instead of being taken in the natural form 'मिथ्या + ज्ञान' (false knowledge) analogous to मिथ्या + प्रत्यय (false notion) And where is room in this simple combination of two words for packing in 'the causal phenomenal ignorance,' which can have no place in a section dedicated to *adhyūsa*? How can we, then, justify the Professor's gratuitous inference that Śaṅkara here states his view that ignorance (*andīyā*) 'is the material cause of *adhyūsa*'? In fact the word '*andīyā*' never occurs in the section till far later on, where it makes its appearance only to lose its identity in *adhyūsa*. As already shown *adhyūsa* wants no cause and brooks none, for causation is its offspring. To distinguish, therefore, between a subtler cause *andīyā* and a grosser effect *adhyūsa* is labour lost.

In the next place, the Professor's interpretation presents innumerable syntactical difficulties. There are in the sentence two participles 'अभ्यस्य', 'मिथुनीकृत्य' and three substantives 'मिथ्याज्ञान-निमित्त', 'नैसर्गिक', 'लोकव्यवहार'. Here by no possibility can we provide for a causal relation between *adhyūsa* and 'मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त', for अभ्यास does not occur as a substantive to be equated with the other. Hence मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त can qualify only व्यवहार the other substantive, and the latter namely व्यवहार is plainly stated to be the effect of मिथ्याज्ञान. I do not see how 'अभ्यास' can creep in here. If 'मिथुनीकृत्य' is understood as 'अभ्यस्य' and 'मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त', which immediately precedes it, should be taken to mean that it is the cause of मिथुनीकरण implied in मिथुनीकृत्य, then 'अभ्यस्य' which occurs first, must claim priority over both, and cannot be subordinated to 'मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त' which occurs later. Further if 'the causal phenomenal ignorance' were meant, it would not be referred to by a special instance of it (धर्मधर्मिणोर्मिथ्याज्ञान). And where is the ground which warrants the forceful insertion of 'phenomenal' to mean a material cause? Even if the unnatural splitting up of मिथ्याज्ञान into मिथ्या + अज्ञान were allowed, how could it be construed to mean that it is related to *adhyūsa* as cause to effect, in face of the fact that अभ्यस्य is a participle, and मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त as a substantive can only qualify the other substantive व्यवहार? Again, why is *Mulāvīdyā* never named in the whole section, if it is, as its advocates claim, the corner-stone of the system? Why is it thrust in by unnatural efforts, by an act of deliberate violence to logic and grammar? Such attempts are ruinous to the interest of truth. Evidently Śaṅkara means

adhyāsa or want of true knowledge whenever he uses the word '*avidyā*' which can have no other import for him. There is not a single instance in which he has disclaimed this identity of *avidyā* with *adhyāsa*.

I shall now advert to the Professor's third reason. "In his *Bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* I, 4, 3," says the venerable critic, "Sankara speaks in express terms of the unmanifested state of the world before creation and calls it '*avidyā*'." His words are "The *Bija-Sakti* (the causal potentiality of the world) is of the nature of *avidyā*." At the outset I may be permitted to remark that expressions like 'expressly', 'in express terms' repeatedly appear in the learned review, but they happen to be delusive. The expectations they raise are, as we proceed, totally belied. With reference to the above quotation from Sankara, the Professor observes "Here Sankara emphatically and expressly affirms the existence of '*mūlāvidyā*'." Where in the above passage, I humbly ask, is the slightest justification for this complacent conclusion? Is there any mention of a *Mūlāvidyā* which is but interpretative fancy? Sankara says that the primordial condition of the world is *avidyā*, or is of the nature of *avidyā*, and what he means by this is transparent from his own use of the expression in II, 1, 4, as equivalent to *अविद्याकल्पित* (created by ignorance) *अविद्याकृत* (caused by ignorance), all which he uses as variants of *अविद्यात्मक* (of the nature of *avidyā*). It is these, name and form, that are there explained as identical with the seed of *samsāra*, which are undefinable and which are named variously as the Lord's *Māyā*, *Śakti* or power and, and *Prakṛti* or nature. Sankara adds that the Lord's rulership, omniscience, and omnipotence, depend on the limitations of *Ātman* created by *avidyā* and when this is overcome by *vidyā* the whole brood of attributes dissolve and disappear. *Avidyā* is here indubitably used as the equivalent of *adhyāsa*, for it alone can vanish at the dawn of knowledge. *Avidyā*, I repeat, cannot be used in any other sense than *adhyāsa*, which is the invariable principle Sankara applies to establish Brahmic unity. Even in I, 4, 3 he makes this point crystal clear. When the *Sāṅkhya* declares that *Pradhāna* must be accepted by all as the primordial condition of the world, which would make for the duality of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, "No" says Sankara, "there is no room for dualism here. We do admit a previous condition, but only as dependent on the Lord, and not as enjoying an independence of its own as you assert. It is *Bija*, *Śakti*, *Māyā*, *Ākāśa*, *Avyakta* (unmanifested) and it is *Avidyā*—

tmaka (of the nature of ignorance) liable to be burnt up by the fire of knowledge" What, I question again, but *adhyāsa* or false identification through want of knowledge can be destroyed by knowledge? To imagine a *mūlāṇḍyā* as having been intended by Sankara here is fatally to forget the universal key to the system which Śankara's unrivalled intellect has supplied to a correct understanding of it, which he has taken such pains to explain in a chapter entirely devoted to it, and which has been ruinously ignored by his too officious interpreters

"Śankara," says the learned critic, "it must be noted, does not say that it (*āṇḍyā*) is ever known by the name of 'adhyāsa' " This he regards as a complementary negative proof lending additional force to the positive ones already advanced But as the positive proofs have been shown to be bereft of weight or value, this negative one must share a similar fate For the pith of my contention is that Sankara was the first to reveal the nature of *āṇḍyā* to be *adhyāsa*, and naturally it could not have been known as such before

The fourth point raised by the Professor that "Sankara has elsewhere taught us that all instances of *adhyāsa* have their producing cause in the similarity (*sārūpya*) existing between the objects (identified)," lacks point and force by its involving as he himself acknowledges the fallacy of mutual dependence from which the *bijāṅkuranyāya* which is only another name for the flaw, cannot save us We are here concerned not with any one instance of *adhyāsa* which occurs in time and must be preceded by a cause whether involving *sārūpya* or not, but with the general principle of *adhyāsa* inherent in human nature and giving birth to causation and time In commenting on the fourth chapter (अलतज्ञानंति) of Māndūkya Kārikā, Sankara has overthrown the reasoning known as *bijāṅkuranyāya* Further, *sārūpya* itself being *adhyāsa*, cannot explain the principle of *adhyāsa* Thus the *adhyāsa*, which the Professor thought to dispose of as a preliminary point, turns out to be a primary obstacle stopping all progress

After setting out my 'central theme' under eight heads, the learned critic undertakes to refute it on two fundamental points. He declares that "Sankara does postulate (1) that in deep sleep 'avidyā' exists in a positive form (*bhāvārūpa*) and (2) that there is no pure bliss but only a kind of phenomenal and conditional bliss in the same state"

Before considering the passages relied on by him to prove the persistence of *āṇḍyā* in deep sleep, I must be allowed to make

one preliminary observation. I have proved, as far as proof is possible, that Sankara means *adhyāsa* whenever he uses the term '*andīyā*'. The onus probandi now, therefore, falls entirely on the shoulders of the advocates of M A * to make good their contention that Śankara taught an ulterior *andīyā* as the cause of *adhyāsa*. As to the term *Mūlāndīyā*, it is conspicuous by its absence in the accredited writings of Śankara. Hence to quote passages in which the term '*andīyā*' occurs cannot serve the purpose of my opponents. Still I shall examine § them to see if the learned critic's position is at all tenable.

With regard to his quotation from Śankara's comment in Māndūkya I. 1, 5, which, he believes, supports him, I must observe that this is leaning on a reed. For in expounding the next Mantra (VI) where the *Prājña* of deep sleep is identified with the Lord of all, the source of all, Śankara says, "It is he, here in his own state, who is the Lord of all", and in commenting on the second Kārikā on the same mantra "Although the Brahman who is Sat (Existence) is here denoted by the word '*Prāna*', we take it only as of the nature of a seed that can produce the *Jīva*". Observe Śankara refers to no '*Jīva*' in deep sleep, but says that the Brahman there is the producer of *Jīva*. Hence the Brahman referred to here is the Lord with power, the First Cause in a potential condition. It might be questioned, Where then is the Lord divested of this creative power mentioned? Śankara replies at the end of his note on the same Kārikā in these pregnant words "The seedless, the uncreative nature of the Lord, free from the states of waking etc. which are connected with the body, Brahman as the Highest Reality, is separately explained in the sequel where the Lord intimated by the word *Prājña* is himself shown to be *Turiya* or the Fourth" "तामसीजावस्थया तस्यैव प्राज्ञशब्दवाच्यस्य तुरीयत्वेन". This promise is fulfilled in Mantra VII. The key to the whole system is furnished by Śankara's comment on it. Says he, "It has been said that this Ātman of the real and unreal aspects is four-footed. His unreal aspect due to *Andīyā* refers to the three feet (waking etc.) which are the sphere of the seed-and-shoot relation (causality), and this has been already described. Now the true nature of the Ātman, the Highest Reality, free from the

* The abbreviation M A will be used for *mūlāndīyā* hereafter.

§ I regret that want of space has prevented me from undertaking a detailed examination of all the passages. At the desire of the Editor, I have had considerably to abridge this portion of my reply.

nature of a seed, is taught just by a denial of the characteristics of the three states. For it is the real ground on which the illusion of the three states rests. It is the rope which is taken for a snake." But how is the Fourth to be known? Śaṅkara replies that "The Śruti teaches the Ātman, the Turiya, has to be realized only as that which appears as the three states. For if the Fourth were something different in essence from that which persists in the three states, there would be no means of knowing it, and the teaching would be meaningless, necessarily landing us in nihilism." From the foregoing statement three or four points ought to have been made clear. (1) There is not the slightest allusion to M. A. in deep sleep. (2) On the contrary the states themselves are explained as due to Avidyā in the form of the superimposition of the states on Ātman. (3) All relationship of cause and effect is based on this superimposition. (4) In reality the Prājña or the Lord in deep sleep is identical with Turiya, the Highest Reality. In expounding an abstruse system like Vedic Monism, the difficulty is felt by the seers of the Upanisads, and by Śaṅkara their exponent, of having to refer to the natural, the naive view of the intellect and then disclose the higher view leading to knowledge. If we stop at the former, we take pebbles for gems and tinsel for gold. For what does it profit a man to know that the mind and the senses are in a potential condition swallowed up in the vital principle or in M. A. during sleep? Is that what we seek, the Highest Truth or Reality? And if our examination of deep sleep should lead to no better result, then as Śaṅkara points out we should despair of ever knowing the truth. "We have no other door of knowledge," says Śaṅkara, whose system is confined to common experience and recognizes no exercise of barren faith. The Fourth or the Ātman is simply the Prājña or the Lord disclosed in deep sleep, which is a superimposition upon Ātman through *adhyāsa* or *andya*. Śaṅkara never considers that *adhyāsa*, should in its turn, be traced to another ulterior principle as its cause, and as the notions of waking, dream, and deep sleep are all due to *adhyāsa*, if still there should be an M. A. winking in a corner of deep sleep, it must find itself to have lost its vocation and been overpassed. For, M. A. together with its abode, is caught in the grip of superimposition and goes to smash.

It may be justly questioned why Prājña alone is identified with the Highest Reality and not *Viśva* or *Tajasa*. The answer is given in III, 2, 7 of Sūtra Bhāṣya. True, Ātman

persists throughout the states as their eternal basis, but in the other states the elimination of un-Ātmic elements, the *Upādhus*, is difficult to effect. In deep sleep, on the other hand, owing to the absence of the *Upādhus* we have an experience of oneness. The *Srutis* are therefore right in adopting their teaching to the expressions of life and in selecting deep sleep as the cornerstone of the Vedāntic edifice

The Professor next refers to certain passages in the *Prasna*, *Chāndogya*, and *Māndūkya Bhāṣyas*. Why the venerable critic goes on from text to text, if in any one of them his point can be established, passes my comprehension. All the same, let us take up the passages in order and see how far they are helpful to the critic

Prasna (4-6, 7). — There is no mention of M A here. The critic draws two conclusions, and adds a warning that the state of blissful peace referred to, should not be taken for the pure bliss (*ānanda*). Why he interjects his *obiter dictum* where Sankara's comment is the only subject of discussion, one can hardly understand. The reader will find Sankara's own view in a passage from the *Bhūmādhikaraṇa* quoted in my book (p. 182) "यदपि तस्यामवस्थाया सुखमुक्त तदद्यात्मन एव मुख्यरूपत्वविवक्षयाक्तम्". In commenting on *Bṛhad Up* IV, 3, 33 which the above *adhikaraṇa* discusses, Sankara remarks—"This only, to wit the *samprasāda*, is the highest bliss, for here one sees not another, hears not another. Hence it is Abundance (*Bhūmā*), being Abundance it is Immortal." Sankara expressly states here that the *samprasāda* bliss—the very same that the learned Professor warns us not to confound with pure bliss—is unlimited (*Bhūmā*) the highest (*parama*), and imperishable (*amṛta*). Sankara's comment on *Prasna* (4, 7) is also against the Professor. "Ignorance, desire and action become non-existent in sleep." The rendering of '*śāntāni*' as 'stilled' cannot be accepted, not only because Sankara has elsewhere (*Bṛhad Up* IV-3-21) paraphrased the same expression by "अविद्याकामकर्मणि न सन्ति", but also in this very passage under discussion observes that "in the absence of these (viz ignorance, desire, and action), the nature of the self, which owing to limiting conditions is imagined as something else in the other states becomes One without a second, the Good, the Tranquil."

Chāndogya (8-3-2):—The text says that "every being goes to Brahman (the treasure) every day in sleep; yet through ignorance no one realizes the fact." This is obviously inimical to the critic's position. As to 'स्वरूपान् बहिरपकृष्टः' it should be

noted that there is no reference to *auḍyā* in sleep, as knowledge its opposite cannot arise in sleep. It evidently points to ignorance of Brahmic nature which beings display in the other states, waking and dream. This is elucidated in the comment on VIII, 3, 4 "Having become united with his own self the *Sat* in *śuṣupti*, he becomes pure, and rids himself of the impurity due to conjunction of the senses with their objects in waking and dream." The attempt to locate *auḍyā* in deep sleep proves abortive again.

Prasna (4-4, 5) —The Professor argues as follows: One who has true knowledge is here compared to a sacrificer and the Brahman attained by him is likened unto *śaṅga*. Hence the attainment stated is but a eulogy of the state of a man of knowledge. But what is the truth? Sankara says that the *Śruti* wants us to know "that the enlightened man is not an *akarmi*, one who omits to do karma" (तस्माद् विद्वान् नाकर्मस्यैव मन्त्रस्य इत्यभिप्रायः). This unravels the mystery of the eulogy which is seized upon as a second open sesame by the venerable critic. Real getting into the *Ātman* in sleep is not denied here or elsewhere either explicitly or by implication. The eulogy has nothing to do with that. It is only intended to discountenance the vulgar view in respect of a man of true knowledge as one who neglects the sacrifice. No, says the *Śruti*, the enlightened man is a sacrificer in a truer sense, for while the ordinary sacrificer expects *Śaṅga* as the fruit of action occurring after death, the former realizes his *Śaṅga-Brahman* every day in deep sleep.

The theory of eulogy formulated by the Professor as applicable to all statements of the identity of the *Jiva* with the Brahman in deep sleep, would open the door to chaos. If this identity is not taught as experienced in deep sleep, where is it to be found? For, as Sankara says, the three states exhaust life. If, again, it is to be realized in the experience of the enlightened, how is the experience to be acquired without a previous knowledge of the identity? Thus enlightenment presupposes experience of identity, but the experience of identity must follow enlightenment—a logical see-saw from which rescue is impossible even with the aid of the gods. Besides, the special mission of Sankara was to overthrow the notion of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, who explained away all passages indicating identity on this same principle of eulogy disastrous to Vedānta. Hence no Vedāntin can now revert to that antiquated and exploded position unless he turns his back upon the twelve centuries of Vedāntic history.

persists throughout the states as their eternal basis, but in the other states the elimination of un-Ātmic elements, the *Upādhis*, is difficult to effect. In deep sleep, on the other hand, owing to the absence of the *Upādhis* we have an experience of oneness. The Śrutis are therefore right in adopting their teaching to the expressions of life and in selecting deep sleep as the corner-stone of the Vedāntic edifice.

The Professor next refers to certain passages in the *Prasna*, *Chāndogya*, and *Māndūkya Bhāṣyas*. Why the venerable critic goes on from text to text, if in any one of them his point can be established, passes my comprehension. All the same, let us take up the passages in order and see how far they are helpful to the critic.

Prasna (4-6, 7). — There is no mention of M A here. The critic draws two conclusions, and adds a warning that the state of blissful peace referred to, should not be taken for the pure bliss (*ānanda*). Why he interjects his *obiter dictum* where Sankara's comment is the only subject of discussion, one can hardly understand. The reader will find Sankara's own view in a passage from the *Bhūmādhikaraṇa* quoted in my book (p. 182) "यदपि तस्यास्यवस्थाया सखमुक्त तदायात्मन एव मुखरूपत्वविवक्षयोक्तम्". In commenting on *Brhad Up IV, 3, 33* which the above *adhikaraṇa* discusses, Sankara remarks—"This only, to wit the *samprasāda*, is the highest bliss, for here one sees not another, hears not another. Hence it is Abundance (*Bhūmā*), being Abundance it is Immortal." Sankara expressly states here that the *samprasāda* bliss—the very same that the learned Professor warns us not to confound with pure bliss—is unlimited (*Bhūmā*) the highest (*parama*), and imperishable (*amṛta*). Sankara's comment on *Prasna* (4, 7) is also against the Professor. "Ignorance, desire and action become non-existent in sleep." The rendering of '*Śāntāni*' as 'stilled' cannot be accepted, not only because Sankara has elsewhere (*Brhad IV-3-21*) paraphrased the same expression by "अविद्याकामक्रमाणि न सन्ति", but also in this very passage under discussion observes that "in the absence of these (viz. ignorance, desire, and action), the nature of the self, which owing to limiting conditions is imagined as something else in the other states becomes One without a second, the Good, the Tranquil."

Chāndogya (8-3-2):—The text says that "every being goes to Brahman (the treasure) every day in sleep; yet through ignorance no one realizes the fact." This is obviously inimical to the critic's position. As to 'स्वरूपान् बहिरपकृष्ट.' it should be

noted that there is no reference to *andyā* in sleep, as knowledge its opposite cannot arise in sleep. It evidently points to ignorance of Brahmic nature which beings display in the other states, waking and dream. This is elucidated in the comment on VIII, 3, 4 "Having become united with his own self the *Sat* in *susupti*, he becomes pure, and rids himself of the impurity due to conjunction of the senses with their objects in waking and dream." The attempt to locate *andyā* in deep sleep proves abortive again.

Praśna (4-1, 1). —The Professor argues as follows. One who has true knowledge is here compared to a sacrificer and the Brahman attained by him is likened unto *satya*. Hence the attainment stated is but a eulogy of the state of a man of knowledge. But what is the truth? Sankara says that the *Śruti* wants us to know "that the enlightened man is not an *akarmī*, one who omits to do karma" (तस्मान् विद्वान् नाकर्मन्निव मन्त्रय इत्यभिप्रायः.) This unravels the mystery of the eulogy which is seized upon as a second open sesame by the venerable critic. Real getting into the *Ātman* in sleep is not denied here or elsewhere either explicitly or by implication. The eulogy has nothing to do with that. It is only intended to discountenance the vulgar view in respect of a man of true knowledge as one who neglects the sacrifice. No, says the *Śruti*, the enlightened man is a sacrificer in a truer sense, for while the ordinary sacrificer expects *Satya* as the fruit of action occurring after death, the former realizes his *Satya-Brahman* every day in deep sleep.

The theory of eulogy formulated by the Professor as applicable to all statements of the identity of the Jiva with the Brahman in deep sleep, would open the door to chaos. If this identity is not taught as experienced in deep sleep, where is it to be found? For, as Sankara says, the three states exhaust life. If, again, it is to be realized in the experience of the enlightened, how is the experience to be acquired without a previous knowledge of the identity? Thus enlightenment presupposes experience of identity, but the experience of identity must follow enlightenment—a logical see-saw from which rescue is impossible even with the aid of the gods. Besides, the special mission of Sankara was to overthrow the notion of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, who explained away all passages indicating identity on this same principle of eulogy disastrous to Vedānta. Hence no Vedāntin can now revert to that antiquated and exploded position unless he turns his back upon the twelve centuries of Vedantic history.

Chandogya (6-8-6) — The Professor's claim here that "the Jivātman is said to have passed into 'Sat' (existence) beyond even 'susupti' through the gaining of true knowledge" is not warranted by the quotation from Sankara. The context is the process of retraction of the several elements of life at the time of death. The passage that the venerable critic quotes and translates according to his convenience, runs thus "तदा एव क्लेशोपसहते स्वप्नल प्राप्ते च मनसि, तत्रस्थो जीवोऽपि सुषुप्तकालवत् निमित्तापमहारादुपसंहियमाण मन् सत्याभिसन्धिपूर्वकं चेदुपगमिष्यन् मदेव सपश्यत्, न पुनर्देहान्तराय सुषुप्तादिवोत्तिष्ठति" — "When thus in its turn the mind is withdrawn into its cause, the Jiva in it, becomes likewise withdrawn (into Sat), just as during the time of sleep. If the Jiva so withdrawn into self had previously been meditating on Satya (Brahman,) he attains to Sat only and does not arise again from it to assume a new body, as he does from a state of deep sleep." Now this is as clear as can be wished. Here is clearly no reference to "Sat beyond susupti". It is the same Sat from which ignorant men daily return to empirical life and from which the enlightened never emerge. There is thus no justification for the venerable critic's conclusion that "Sankara says therein, clearly and in so many words that, between attaining the 'Sat' only and the state of deep sleep, the special difference is not only that, in the former case, there is true knowledge (*abhisandhi*) while, in the latter case there is *avidyā* and its elements". Well, in so many words? Where are the words? We find none. But I never fancied that the Professor's fervour would raise him to this pitch of facile penmanship. No twisting or torturing, however, can draw blood out of a post. The passage is quite innocent of all the implications which seem to dwell as fixed ideas in some minds. The Professor himself quotes a passage showing that the Jivas "attain to Sat daily in 'susupti' but do not know that they are going to attain or have attained to 'Sat'". Now, this is all that I claim.

Māṇḍūkya Kārikā : *hūṣya* — (1) 'आनन्दमुक्', 'आनन्दस्य', and 'वीजशक्ति' have been already disposed of as relating to the lower or naive view. The other extracts will be taken up now as they seem to be put in as the central stone of the Professor's argument. The cognitions 'I knew nothing', 'I slept blissfully' with which a man awakes are evidently waking cognitions referring to *susupti*. This reference is the stock argument of the advocate of M. A. to prove the presence of *avidyā* in deep sleep. I then now let Sankara himself explain the phenomenon. It can be said that the absence of cognition

in deep sleep is also due to *andhyā*, we deny it. For this absence of cognition is natural to Ātman" (Tait II, 8). Again, "It is asked, why in deep sleep one does not cognize himself or the external objects. Listen to the cause of this ignorance. It is the very oneness of Ātman. For in deep sleep there is non-existence of *andhyā* which is the prime source of all multiplicity" (Brhad IV, 3, 21). After this, can there be still a lingering doubt as to the utter baselessness of the theory of M. A., so far at least as Sankara is concerned?

(2) The Bhāṣya on the first Kārikā of Āgama Prakaraṇa rightly rendered reads, "The idea is that as the states occur by turns and as by means of the memory 'He is I' (that is the witness of the states is no other than myself), we realize this truth, the self is proved to be different from the three states, to be one, pure, and unattached." There is no reference here to "an answering previous cognition." So the whole structure built upon this mere fancy crumbled up, hopelessly collapses. As to the memory of sleep, every psychologist will admit that this memory behaves altogether differently from empirical memory, which is related to a conscious past experience involving duality. That the former memory so-called is a *vikalpa* is not my view alone, but has the support of Suresvara * "न सुषुप्तिग-
विज्ञानं नात्राभिप्रेक्षितं स्मृतिः । कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वात् न ह्यात्मस्थमनोऽनन्तरम् ॥ न भूतकाल-
स्मृत् प्रत्यक्षं न चागासिद्धिर्गोचरं । स्वार्थदेशं परार्थोऽथा विकल्पस्तेन स स्मृतः ॥"

That no distinction can be made between dream and waking as to their equal unreality when contrasted with the Ātman, and their equal reality when each is considered intrinsically that is, within itself, why, that is the fundamental doctrine of Advaita taught unquestionably by both Gaudapāda and Saṅkara (vide *Vantathya Prakaraṇa* 5, 6, 7). "Dream and waking states pandits declare to be one, as the objects of cognition in both are of the same nature, because they are but cognized." "They are illusive like mirage though the ignorant look upon them as real. As they have a beginning and an end, they are unreal." It may be questioned, why then does Saṅkara distinguish between them when he attacks the Buddhist doctrine of the unreality of waking (II, 3, 29) or when he declares that 'dream' is entirely *Māyā* (as in III, 2, 3). The Buddhist has

* This same writer explicitly states that there is no *andhyā* but only the immutable Ātman in 'su-upti'.

तनु द्वितीयं नेहास्ति तमाऽनर्थस्य कारणम् ।

द्रष्टाद्रिह्यसम्भेदाद्यत्यक्षेज्जागे यथा ॥

अविद्यादेरभावात्स्या कूटस्थस्यैव भण्यते ।

(Brhadvārtaka 4, 3, 1519)

no eternal principle as the basis of the two states if these are to be regarded as illusions. For no illusion can occur unless a basic reality is admitted. Hence both Bādarāyana and Śāṅkara put forward the common experience of dream stultified by waking as an unanswerable argument against their opponent. The Advaitin, on the other hand, is free to predicate unreality of the waking, for he is provided with a ground for the illusion in the Ātman, which is a witness of the three states and which as such can never be stultified. Śāṅkara calls, indeed, the waking objects परमार्थवस्तु (real things), but that is only, as he himself explains, in a relative sense. He denies their *pāramārthika* nature in III, 2, 4, where he says the whole world, is of the nature of *Māyā* only.

My view of *Pratyabhinyā* has been wholly misunderstood. Recognition of identity depends on memory which though sufficient for practical life, cannot, by its very nature, vouch for the reality of the past experience which it objectifies. It is despotic and is beyond the sway of any other rational principle to check or corroborate it, direct perception being out of the question. The Professor's criticism of this view is, and must be for all time, invalid so long as human nature continues to be what it is. If practical life proceeds upon the validity of the conviction that an object is identically the same for any two moments of experience, who questions its use or value in empirical life? But that this sense of identity is illusive from a higher point of view is what I regard as unascertainable.

The Professor concludes his review of what he calls my central theme with the following remark — "It has also been shown, on the support of various Bhāṣya passages from several Upanisads, that there is not an atom of support for the author's contention that there is no phenomenal experience of 'avidyā' (ignorance) or of blissfulness (?) in *susupti*." I have shown in the preceding pages that not one of the quotations cited by the learned critic can lend an iota of support to his unproven conclusions. No authority has been produced to show that Śāṅkara has anywhere mentioned M. A., or denied the attainment of the Jīva to Brahman in deep sleep. Passage after passage has been quoted with confidence only to fizzle out at the end. To show how my quotations, on the contrary, have the virtue of being direct and unequivocal, and require no additional padding in the shape of a second interpretation on our part to convey their sense, I subjoin a few references to the Bhāṣyas on the Upanisads and the Brahmasūtras.

ABSENCE OF AVIDYA IN DEEP SLEEP.

Taittiriya- II,	8	सुषुप्ते अप्रवृत्तमात्रं अविद्याकृतमिति चेत्, न ।
Prasna — IV	7	एतस्मिन् काले अविद्याकामकर्मनिवन्धनानि कार्यकरणानि यान्तानि भवन्ति ।
Bṛhad — IV, 3, 21		यत्र अविद्याकामकर्मणि न सन्ति ।
IV 3, 22		अविद्याकामकर्मनिवृत्तमेव तद्वत्, यत् सुषुप्ते आत्मनो गच्छते प्रत्यक्षत इति ।
IV, 3, 32		यत् पुनः स अविद्या सुषुप्तं स्वप्नप्रत्युपस्थापिका यान्ता ।

ONENESS OF BRAHMAN AND JĪVA IN SLEEP.

Sutra — I, 3, 19		सप्रसादज्ज्ञेयं जीव स्येन रूपेण अभिनिपद्यत इति ब्रह्म स्वरूपापन्न दर्शयन्
I, 3, 20		सप्रसादज्ज्ञेयं पर ब्रह्मापसम्पत्
I, 4, 18		सप्रसादकाले च पेरुण ब्रह्मणा जीव एकता गच्छति
II, 1, 6		सप्रसादे च प्रवृत्तिर्गन्धर्वेण सदात्मना सपते
II, 3, 40		स्वमात्मन परं ब्रह्म प्रवृत्त्य सप्रसादावस्थायाम् ।
III, 2, 7		ब्रह्म स्वनपायि सुप्रस्थानम्
III, 2, 11		येन ब्रह्मणा सुषुप्तं यदिपु जीव उपायुपस्थानात् सपद्यते
Prasna — IV	7	स च जलमर्थकार्तादप्रतिविम्बस्य मूर्त्यादिप्रवेक्ष्यते परे अक्षरे आत्मनि सप्रतिष्ठत ।
Chandogya — VI, 8, 1		सुषुप्ते एव स देवतारूपं जीवन्निवृत्तमुक्त
VII, 3, 9		ब्रह्म लोके ब्रह्मलोके, तस्मिन्महर्षिच्छन्त्योऽपि सुषुप्ति-काले
Bṛhad — II 1, 17		स्ने आत्मन्याकाशे जने स्वाभाविके असमागते ।
II, 1, 19		गवामागम्यमानांते वर्तते स्वापकाले ।

PURE BLISS IN DEEP SLEEP

Sutra — I, 3, 8		यदपि तस्मा अवस्थायाम् सुप्तमुक्त तदवस्थामन एव सुख-स्थाननिवृत्तमात्मनम् ।
Bṛhad — IV 3, 31		एव एव सप्रसादलक्षणं परम आनन्द । तत्रहि नात्यन्तं परमं नात्यन्तच्छरणं । अतो भूमा, भवत्वादसुत ॥

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SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS

Since sending my reply to the learned Professor's criticism of my views, I have received through the courtesy of the Editor, the second part of the same. I do not see in it anything that calls for the retraction of a single syllable of my reply. Still, I shall briefly refer to a number of mistakes and misconceptions which mar the whole of the Professor's article.

(1) He has totally misunderstood my quotation from Śankara's comment on Gaudapāda, which was intended to show that neither Śankara nor Gaudapāda favoured the doctrine of beginninglessness of cause and effect. Śankara rejects the illustration of seed and sprout as involving the identical crux (सम्यसम्). As to the passage quoted from Sūtras II, 1, 35 and 36 where an empirical explanation of the origin of the universe is offered, the Professor in his overzeal has just forgotten the note of caution which Śankara had already sounded at the end of Sūtra II, 1, 33 "The creation mentioned in the Śruti is not the ultimate truth. It is only to be accepted with reference to the apparent world characterized by name and form, the offspring of *avidyā*. It is to serve the purpose of teaching the higher truth viz that Brahman is the self of everything." The reader will remember that I have already referred to Sūtra I, 1, 4 wherein Sankara condemns the doctrine of beginninglessness by likening it to the procession of the blind. Besides, the beginninglessness predicated in Sūtras II, 1, 35 and 36 is plainly with reference to the phenomenal universe and not to *avidyā* as the Professor quietly assumes, for those that assert that the world had a beginning cannot escape from the necessity to point out a cause of the inequalities in life. It is from this view that Sankara regards the doctrine of beginninglessness as superior to the contrary conception, not certainly because he supports the theory in any sense, for all these problems arise only in the field of *avidyā*. The relation, claimed by the Professor, of mutual cause and effect for *Mūlāvidyā* and the phenomenal universe, is one which has been unknown to the advocates of *Mūlāvidyā* hitherto, and makes non-sense of the very term '*Mūlāvidyā*,' which has been put forward as the original cause of all. If *Mūlāvidyā*, while being beginningless, is also the effect of a beginningless world, and both are positive entities, we are hopelessly lost in a circle of beginningless cause and effect, from which even an Omniscience cannot rescue us. And in this case what is the place to be given to poor *adhīṣṭa*, which according to Sankara is also entitled to beginninglessness? Heaven keep us from such confusion!

(2) The Professor's contention that an object of illusion should come under the law of universal causation is evidently the result of a palpable confusion. The snake in the rope-snake illusion is not an element of empirical life and cannot be conceived to have sprung from a race of illusory snakes; but the mistaken perception is certainly an empirical reality, and

both can and must be traced to a cause. To confound these two is a kind of metathetical ideation rare among men of erudition and correct thought.

(3) In his criticism of my position, the learned Professor has all along confounded *avidyā* which I invariably use in the sense of *adhyāsa* with *Mūlāvidyā* which is advocated by the later Sankarites and which my whole book is devoted to denounce. He has unaccountably mistaken *a priori* views for settled conclusions, and in many places his renderings are inaccurate and misleading. As I fail to see even a particle of reason advanced against my clear position, I am only fortified in my conviction that although the Professor has done the very best he could for *Mūlāvidyā*, he could not succeed in establishing it. For it is both unphilosophic in principle and unsupported by Sankara. The Professor's failure, however, is natural, for no learning however deep, and no intellect however acute, can succeed in the advocacy of a bad cause—and the cause of *Mūlāvidyā* is hopelessly bad.

(4) The worst complaint I have to make against the venerable critic is that except in a single instance he has not said a word against the arguments I have used in assailing the doctrine of M. A. or the authorities I have quoted throughout in support of my position. I might discuss in detail the relevancy or otherwise of every one of the numerous passages adduced by him, but in the light of what I have already written, I believe any further handling of the subject would only lengthen my article without adding to its force. If the Professor can single out any one passage at a time on which he relies, I shall always be prepared to argue it out.

(5) Finally the learned critic has not pointed out a single instance where *adhyāsa* is described by Sankara as *desideratum a cause*.

REVIEWS

"MULAVIDYĀ-NIRASA OR SRĪ-SANKARA-HR-DAYA" by Y SUBRAHMANYA SARMA—Published by the Adhyātma Prakasha Office, Bangalore City

II

In the previous part¹ of our review, we have stated that the 'bījānkura-nyāya' has finally been accepted by all Sankarites as the chief support of Śankara's doctrine of Mūlavidyā. Śankara himself states and supports the same view in his Sūtra bhāṣya. We have to make this point clear in order to show that our author is under a misapprehension regarding Śankara's treatment of the 'bījānkura-nyāya' in his 'bhāṣya' on Gaudapāda's Kārikā and its relation to the statement of it as contained in his Sūtra-bhāṣya. This point is very important, as it will enable us to perceive how entirely pointless is his objection to the Vedāntic doctrine of Mūlavidyā and its basis in the *bījānkura-nyāya* as accepted by Śankara himself on the authority of the Sruti only.

Our author makes the following statement:—"The use of the argument of Anādi as Brahmastram (a final weapon in ancient Indian war, the use of which would crush the enemy beyond the possibility of recovery) has its root in ignorance of the (opponent's) reply to it." What is this reply of our author's of which he thinks so highly? We shall translate the entire passage — " In truth there is no *anaditva* (beginninglessness) of any kind which can be rationally established. If it be said that illustrative examples have been adduced, even that (procedure) is not such as can be agreed to as suitable. For, we cannot decide a matter in dispute by simply adducing an illustrative example. Further, having brought forward an example, we must show how far the analogy can be extended to the matter on hand. But, in the matter we are now considering, no example can be found to suit at all. For, we can never find either a seed or a sprout without a beginning. Nor, also, is anywhere to be found seed and sprout in a continuing series. Further, be it here granted that only 'avidyā' is 'anādi',—not a continued flow of fragments of 'avidyā'. We agree to the existence of phenom-

* Published in Vol. I, No. 1, p. 33-41

al fragments due to the action of 'avidyā'. If 'avidyā' has a beginning, there is also the need of its cause among various causes, and a cause for that cause too, and so we end in a succession without finality (*anavasthā*). If it be argued that we need not agree to the destruction of 'avidyā' as a fact, there can be no reference at all to liberation as a possibility. Further, if you adopt the view that the original seed of 'avidyā' is 'anādi' by simply following the 'śloka' of our predecessors, according to which 'there are for us six objects which are 'anādi', viz., Jīva, Īśvara, pure knowledge (or intelligence), the difference between Jīva and Īśvara, 'avidyā' and its (false) identification with Intelligence, — and if thereby you avow the fault attaching to both views,—let it be so. We do not see how the view adopted by you is not open to objection. For, an 'avidyā' which is 'anādi' cannot be destroyed, (our author here means that what has no beginning can have no end too) — and so here too we reach the conclusion that liberation cannot be attained. There is no example to illustrate the view that a thing may be 'anādi' and yet be capable of destruction."

Having thus quoted at full length our author's views, we proceed to state our criticisms thereon as follows — *Firstly*, Sankara expressly says that the principle known as *bhāṅkura-nyūya* can be correctly utilized to show that 'mulāvidyā' and 'saṁsāra' follow each other in an endless chain of cause and effect, and therefore, both are 'anādi'. We refer our author to Sankara's 'bhāṣya' on the following two Sūtras of Vyāsa. In II, 1-35, the Sūtra itself gives the objection and answer as follows — "If it be objected that it (the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of there being no distinction in Karma (before the creation), we refute the objection on the ground of (life in phenomenal world) being 'anādi' (without a beginning)." Sankara's 'bhāṣya' on the Sūtra puts the objection and answer as follows — "*Objection.* The Śruti says,—Before creation the one Sat only existed, and without a second. Hence, as before creation there was certainly no distinction (*avibhāga*), there was no Karma to bring about inequality in creation. In the time subsequent to creation, if we hold that 'karma' depends on the distinctions of bodies, etc., and that distinctions in bodies depend on 'karma,' this involves reasoning in a circle. Hence, the Lord may be considered as making his activity dependent on merit only after inequality has arisen in the world. As 'karma', the cause of diversity, did not exist before such diversity (i.e., before creation) the first creation must have been without

inequality *Answer.* This objection would hold if the world of phenomena had a beginning. But as it is beginningless, like seed and sprout connected with each other by the relation of cause and effect, there is no logical objection to maintaining that there is a similar relation (of cause and effect) between 'karma' and the inequalities of creation." The next Sūtra (II, 1-36) is as follows — "The 'anāditva' above spoken of is supported by reason and by the finding of authoritative Sruti passages." Sankara's 'bhāṣya' here is as follows — (A) as regards reason, "If the world had a beginning and sprang into existence without a cause, it would follow that even released souls would again have birth therein. Also, the varying degrees of happiness and misery would spring into existence without previous Karma as their justifying cause. That the supreme personal God (Īśvara) is not the efficient cause of inequality in life has already been explained. Nor can mere 'avidyā' be the cause of such inequalities, as it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, 'avidyā' may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from Karma produced by the mental impressions (vāsanās) due to wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions. Without 'karma,' no one can possibly secure another body,— and, again, without a body no 'karma' can possibly come into existence. Hence, (on the doctrine of the world having a beginning) we are landed in the logical fallacy known as *anyonyūśraya* (mutual implication as cause and effect). If, on the other hand, 'avidyā' is accepted as 'anādi,' everything is rationally accounted for on the principle known as *bijūñkura-nyūya*, and all the difficulty ceases. (B) As regards authority, Sankara says — "the fact of the beginninglessness of the phenomenal existence is seen in Sruti and Smṛti." He then goes on to quote and explain the relevant passages of Sruti and Smṛti. In explaining their purport, Sankara says — "We have the Sruti passage,— 'Let me enter in the form of this living self, etc.' Here the circumstance of the embodied self (or individual soul) being called, previously to creation, the living self—a name applying to it on account of its association with the sustaining principle of the prāṇa (vital breath)— shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning (*anādi*). For if it had a beginning, how can the embodied (individual) soul, having previously been without association with the 'prāṇas', be designated, at the time of the beginning of the world's creation, by a name which implies the bearing of (and association with) those

'prāṇas'. Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future holding of the 'prāṇas' — it being a settled principle that a past relation (of association) as being already existing, is of greater force and validity than a relation not yet come into being.—Moreover, 'the creator formed the sun and moon as formerly'—and this 'mantra' intimates to us the existence of former 'kalpas' (cycles of creation)" Śāṅkara quotes also Smṛti and Purāṇa passages to the same purport

Our author, however, in the extract from his work above translated, bases himself on two Kārikā ślokas of Gaudapāda given in the foot-notes at the bottom of pages 157 and 158, and on Sāṅkara's bhāṣya on the latter of these. This bhāṣya-passage is not quoted in full by our author. The importance of the part not quoted is, as we shall show, very great, and fully exposes to us how our author's difficulties and misunderstandings of Sāṅkara in regard to this doctrine of 'anāditya' have arisen. We shall now take up the discussion of the whole matter and set it in a proper light.

In the first place our author, having in view the *first* of the Kārikās above mentioned and Sāṅkara's 'bhāṣya' explaining its import, puts forward the following observations — "We have found neither a seed nor a sprout without a beginning. Nor also is anywhere to be found seed and sprout in a continuing series, apart from the individual objects (vyaktis) which seed and sprout are found to be. Hence by this illustration alone no one can establish *anāditya*." In the *first* place, neither Śāṅkara nor any of his followers have held the principle of *digāṅkura-nyūya* to mean that every seed and sprout is 'anādi'. Śāṅkara also says in his 'bhāṣya' on this very Kārikā — "We have no single instance of a succession (*santati*) of seed and sprout or even of cause and effect, being agreed to by those who hold the doctrine of 'anādi' apart from the (corresponding) seed and sprout." Sāṅkara, therefore, goes on to say — "The intention here is to state that there is another unsoundness (in the illustration), and no 'chala' — i.e., argument for deceiving or outwitting an opponent—is resorted to." Further, Sāṅkara finally explains the true import of the second line of the Kārikā as follows — "Ordinarily in the world, when a conclusion has to be established, an illustration which is only analogous to the conclusion to be proved is not made use of by those who are versed in the methods of proof." This very idea is actually contained in the second verse of the Kārikā. Only, as Sāṅkara points out, the word "*hetu*" is used in the sense of *drṣṭānta*

(illustration). In the first line of the Kārikā, Gaudapāda points out that "the illustration known by the name, *biṣṇākura*, is in every case only *sūdhya-sama*, analogous to that which is to be proved". In the case on hand, we have two objects which are *mutually* cause and effect viz. *mūlā avidyā* and the phenomenal manifested universe, and hence the doctrine of 'anādi' applies to them. Hence the *biṣṇākura* illustration is only *sūdhya-sama* (analogous to that which is to be proved). In all ordinary cases of mutual cause and effect, logicians are eager to adduce the fallacies of *mutual implication* (*anyonyūśraya*) and *regressio ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). But no such difficulties apply in the present topic of the Vedānta where we deal with *mulāvidyā* and *prapañca* (or manifested universe)

Our author's difficulties in regard to Sankara's Vedāntic doctrine of 'anādi' would not have arisen if he had taken the trouble needed for *fully* appreciating the significance of Sankara's 'bhāṣya' on Gaudapāda's Kārikās, Prakaraṇa-IV, śloka 30. He quotes only the following 'bhāṣya' sentence—"We do not in the world find any object which is 'anādi' and also having an end (*antavān*)". On this statement as his fancied authority, he triumphantly asserts his view as follows—"an 'avidyā' which is 'anādi' cannot be destroyed, and so here too we reach the conclusion that liberation (*mukti*) cannot be attained". But Sankara, in the sentence just previously occurring in his 'bhāṣya,' has guarded himself against misunderstanding by the following statement, viz., "to the 'saṃsāra' which is 'anādi'-i. e., which does not exist in any previous form (*atīta-kots*)—no end (*samāpti*) can possibly, by a mere process of reasoning (*yuktīh*), be established as a settled fact". The words in italics, viz. by a mere process of reasoning (*yuktīh*), are not quoted by our author as they should have been. Sankara clearly tells us, by the use of the word, *yuktīh*, that, in his view, the Vedāntic doctrine of *amūḍita* cannot be established by mere reasoning, but only by reference to the doctrine as contained in the Upanisads. Sankara has stated this same view in a series of passages almost without number in his bhāṣyas on the Sūtras of Vyāsa and on the Upanisads, ten in number, which alone he seems to have regarded as canonical for his Vedāntic doctrine in addition to the Bhagavadgītā. We shall here refer to one instance only taken at random from the Sūtra-bhāṣya on II, 2-38. "The Brahmovādin establishes his doctrine regarding the nature of cause etc., on the strength of Scripture (*āgamabalena*) and hence is not under any religious

obligation (*nyama*) to render all his tenets conformable to the facts of direct sense-perception (and reasoning based on it alone)

We now take up the consideration of our author's lengthy discussion, as a part of what he calls *Svapra-kriyā* and under various headings, of the topic of *Avidyā*. We shall take these headings one after another, and offer brief criticisms on his treatment of each.

I — *Avidyā-Visaya*

Our author states his view as follows — "In regard to the self (*Ātman*) there is no possibility of its having a *visaya* (object of perception) for, it is *visayi*, the witness of the object. Nor is the view accepted that *avidyā* is the object of what is only a not-self. Hence a doubt arises and it deserves to be considered and cleared that, if *avidyā* is not an object of perception to the self, it cannot also be destructible by self-knowledge. Hence, it is necessary to settle what it is to which 'avidyā' is the object of perception." To all this we reply as follows — As the *Ātman* is the witness, what he sees is *anātman* (not-self), and so the latter must be either 'avidyā,' or a material object of which 'avidyā' is 'upādāna-kāraṇa' (material cause). How can there be a witness without there being also an object of perception? To deny this would amount to a contradiction in terms. Evidently, when our author speaks of the 'ātman' here, he is thinking of the unrelated pure self. If so, he is not entitled to call it a 'visayi' (witness of an object). He ought to have known that, when the Vedāntin speaks of the 'ātman' as 'visayi', he refers only to the living (or related and bound) *Ātman*, who has become involved in the eternal cycle of 'samsārika' life in the universe through the operation of the recurring triplicity enumerated by Sankara — *avidyā*, *kāma*, *karma* — causally connected with each other in a never-ending, still-beginning succession and giving rise to an interminable series of rebirths for the 'jīvātman' till 'avidyā' is destroyed by *vidyā* (knowledge of the true self). 'Avidyā' or 'Māyā' is the root (*mūla*) of all phenomenal existence through the *adhyāsa* arising from the kinetic action of 'avidyā' in the Jīva and producing in him the cognition of ego (*asmad-pratyaya*) as Sankara calls it — he is enabled to become *visayi* the witness of the 'visayas' constituting the world of phenomena. Our author objects as follows to the view that "the *Ātman* is the object (*visaya*) of *avidyā*"... "If we ask, to

whom are we to attribute 'adhyāsa', we shall be forced to ascribe the attribute of being an object also to 'anātmā' on the ground that knowledge or intelligence is the essential nature or attribute of the 'ātman';" and so it cannot become an object. To this our reply is that 'anātmā' is the object of the living self (jīvātman), not of the pure Ātman which alone is one and unrelated and has Intelligence as its essential nature (svarūpa). The truth is that we can maintain two propositions (1) that the living self is the 'visayi' (witness) and has 'anātmā' as 'visaya', and (2) that there exists—and it is patent to all of us—in the mind of the living self the ignorance of the pure self. Hence, we can rightly hold that 'avidyā' has caught hold of the Ātman, and the Ātman has become the object within its grasp. Our author says, evidently anticipating this reply. "In it (the Ātman) there can be no connection with 'avidyā', even as there can be no combination of darkness with sunlight." To this our reply is that our author ought to be aware that Sankara himself has anticipated this objection and answered it at an early stage of his Adhyāsa-bhāṣya—"Visaya and Visayi (the object and the subject)—which, whether we consider them as notions or material objects, are as opposed to each other as darkness and light, cannot be mistaken the one for the other, and much more therefore, also their respective characteristic attributes. Still, owing to the failure to distinguish the two entities and their characteristic attributes from each other, and that in spite of their being completely distinct, it is a natural procedure on the part of man, and one prevalent from the original epoch of creation, that owing to the phenomenal ignorance which has as its effect the superposition of the Unreal on the Real, he couples both together and uses such expressions as "*I am this, mine is this*" Our author himself says here—"the Ātman, during the period of his existence in the phenomenal world, becomes an object of the cognition of the ego, and so turns out as if he is an object of ignorance." Also he says:—"We have never said that Ātman becomes the object itself, but only that it seems as if it has become the object," and quotes in a footnote a bhāṣya-passage as his authority for his view. This, indeed, is a strange conclusion, for him to reach after inditing a reasoned discourse to show that neither the Ātman nor 'avidyā' can be a 'visaya',—the one of the other, or either of them its own. This, however, is not the view of Sankara. For he says "The entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as real (*satya*) so long as the knowledge of Brahman as

being the self of all has not risen, even as the appearances in a dream are considered to be real until the sleeper awakes." As there is much misapprehension prevailing on this point, in spite of its frequent exposure as groundless, it is worth repeating over so many times that, according to Śāṅkara, the 'sāṃsārika' world is a *practical reality and not at all unreal* to all 'ordinary' people, and that it is unreal only to the *Jñāni*, to the man who, possessing the preliminary qualifications needed, has been taught by a competent teacher (Guru) the methods of realizing the Ātman in its true and essential unity and freed from all false superpositions of plurality arising from the original ignorance of the same.

II — *Āśrayasraya* (the substratum of 'avidyā')

Our author states his view as follows — "No reason can be assigned for holding that 'avidyā' has an *āśraya* (substratum)" We give a translation of his argument as follows — "To what does Avidyā attach itself in order to make the Ātman its object? Not a material object (*viśaya*),—for it cannot possibly have *jñāna* as its substratum (*āśraya*), as it is certain that knowledge and ignorance cannot remain without an 'āśraya'. But knowledge and ignorance can remain together only when we admit that there is another (i.e. third) substance free from all relation to, and yet different from, both of them, viz., the knower (or experiencer) of the association of either the one or the other of the two with the Ātman. But such a third substance, distinct from both self (*ātman*) and not-self (*anātman*) is not accepted (in theory) nor experienced (in practice). Hence the only conclusion is that 'ajñāna' has no substratum. If it has not a substratum for itself, whence, is it to take its rise? Still more how can the Ātman become its object (*viśaya*)?" Our author continues his argument as follows — "The above argument will hold good if we acknowledge it as an actual fact that Ātman is the *viśaya* (object) of 'avidyā'. But this objectivity is attributed to it only from a phenomenal point of view, and there is good reason for holding that this attributed objectivity, and 'avidyā', too, has a (similar) attributed substratum. Already we have held that the *cidābhāsa*, the apparent knower, the self who is phenomenally fabricated, is the substratum for 'adhyāsa'. But, as a matter of really existing fact, it is not possible to demonstrate that there is an object or a substratum for 'avidyā', for it is not possible to hold that that which really exists can ever cease to be." To all this

argument we reply as follows:—*First*, our author denies the existence of a knower (*upalabdha*) as a third substance different from both *ātman* and *anātman*. But Śāṅkara admits it when he distinguishes *vyavahāra* (phenomenal existence) from *paramārtha* (Vide *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, II, 1-14). Śāṅkara here not only argues out the point, but specially mentions as his authority both the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Sūtras* of Vyāsa as supporting the distinction made by him. In Śāṅkara's doctrine, it is only *vyākhyāna* (the relative knowledge of the objects of the phenomenal world) that is opposed to the ignorance of such objects, not the *suddha cit*, the pure (unrelated) intelligent self. This latter is *svayamprakāśa* (self-illuminating), and it also brightens up all else,—i.e. both the 'avidyā' which conceals it from our living and limited self and the objects of the phenomenal world which spring out of 'avidyā' as its material cause. Hence all these can certainly have the 'suddha-cit' as its *attributed* substratum. For, without the help of its illuminating power, the latter cannot even be known as existing phenomena of the material universe. *Secondly*, as the "knower" (mentioned by our author) is *really* and ultimately identical with the *suddha-cit*, we can rightly hold that the latter is also the substratum—the *ultimate* substratum, in an attributed significance only,—for all the (phenomenal) ignorance of the former and for the (phenomenal) knowledge of his which helps to remove his ignorance. Further, it is 'avidyā' that makes possible the existence of the "knower", not the reverse. Even as, when a face is reflected in a mirror, the impurity of the mirror affects the reflection and the face reflected, so the limitation of 'avidyā' only affects the "knower", not the pure intelligence (*Suddha Cit*). On all these grounds, 'avidyā' when it resides in, and affects, the "knower" can be held to have also the pure *Cit* as its ultimate substratum. *Thirdly* our author asks "If it (*ajñāna*) has not a substratum for itself, whence is it to take its rise? Still more, how can it have an object?". Our answer to the first question is, *ajñāna* is *anādi*, as already fully established on the authority of Śāṅkara's *bhāṣyas* on the *Sūtras* and on the *Gaudapāda Kārikās* which latter our author makes his chief source and support for his attempted overthrow of the Vedāntic doctrine of the beginningless root-ignorance (*anādyā-mūlā*) and the 'bījaṅkuranyāya' which Śāṅkara himself accepts as an analogy which supports it. Hence, also, i.e., because 'ajñāna' is *anādi*,—it cannot be held, as is done by our author, "to take its rise" at any particular time or place. Also, our

author himself, in his very next breath, states his own answer to these questions as follows —“The objectivity is attributed (to the ātman) only from a phenomenal point of view; and there is good reason also for holding that ‘avidyā’ too, has a similarly attributed substratum ..Finally, as there is, according to Sankara’s Upanisadic doctrine, “One reality only without a second”, there is no other choice of a substratum possible. So we reach the conclusion that ‘avidyā’ has a substratum. From a preliminary (or practical) point of view, it is the living related self (or individual) which one calls the “knower”. In an ultimate sense, it is the *Suddha-Cit*, the one pure intelligence which is called Brahman.

The author at this stage goes on to state the following — “Material objects are (merely) fabricated (*kalpita*). The reason for holding that they are fabricated is that the substratum of ‘avidyā’ is also fabricated. For, the *Cidābhāsa* already spoken of—the (living individual) self, fabricated by the worldly-minded, is the substratum of ‘adhyāsa’”—which last word he makes synonymous with ‘avidyā’ for reasons which are fundamental with him and which have been overthrown by us already in full. To the view contained in the extract just quoted from his work, our author puts forward two objections: (1) “In truth it is not possible to establish that ‘avidyā’ has either an object or a substratum. For, how can there be a getting rid of what is only fabricated, viz the *visaya* (object without) and the *Cidābhāsa* (the substratum within)?” (2) “If you hold that by getting rid of ‘avidyā’ the getting rid of them (*visaya* and *cidābhāsa*) is secured,—(the reply is that) ‘avidyā’ too has only a fabricated existence, and on what ground can you establish that it can be got rid of?” To both these objections our reply is that material objects and the ‘*cidābhāsa*’ are not to be regarded as ‘*kalpita*’ (fabricated) from the ‘*vyāvahārika*’ point of view, which alone can concern itself with their existence and origin. From the absolute (*pāramārthika*) point of view there is “one existence only without a second”. Sankara says —“the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as real (*satya*) so long as the knowledge of Brahman as the self (of all) has not arisen, even as the appearances in a dream are considered to be real until the sleeper has awakened”. Sankara’s view is that phenomenal existence is real while it lasts—not “fabricated” or illusory. (3) Our author makes use, but without quoting it of a passage in Sankara’s *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* where he mentions three forms or aspects of ‘*ajñāna*’

viz (1) *jñānābhāva* (absence of knowledge) (2) *Samśaya-jñāna* (doubtful knowledge) and (3) *Viparīta-jñāna* (false knowledge). As regards (1), our author argues —“*jñānābhāva* is not at all competent to exist in its own essential form (*svarūpa*). For, where knowledge itself is present, the absence of it cannot also have a place” Our author clearly misapprehends the import of the Bhāṣya passage Sankara mentions the three forms of ‘*ajñāna*’, and proceeds to show that *ajñāna* in any form cannot be destroyed by ‘*karma*’, but only by ‘*jñāna*’ Sankara’s actual words are —‘Whether you regard ‘*ajñāna*’ as ‘*jñānābhāva*’, *samśaya-jñāna*, or ‘*viparīta-jñāna*’, all these are destroyed by *jñāna*, not by *karma*,—as it (*Karma*) is not opposed to any one of these three” If our author can rightly hold or argue that “*jñānābhāva* is not at all competent to exist” how can it be argued (as is rightly done by Sankara) that “it can be destroyed by ‘*jñāna*’, though not by ‘*karma*’” To say that a phenomenon or object is “not at all competent to exist”, and yet have an enemy which can destroy it, is a manifest absurdity The word *abhāva*, has both a positive and negative significance, according as the context where it occurs is taken into consideration In the context we are now concerned with, Sankara says that “‘*jñānābhāva*’ can be destroyed by ‘*jñāna*’”. Hence this particular *abhāva* is one which refers to a positive object For in Sankara’s doctrine of Vedānta, as has already been shown by us, ‘*avidyā*’ is the positive root-cause of the material world of phenomena, —and we have also quoted Sankara’s express statement that *mūlā*, *prakṛti*, *bīja-sakti*, and *avalīṇā* (or *mūlāvidyā*) are all synonymous terms meaning the primordial and unmanifested (*avyakta*) form of matter Hence, it will be easy to see that our author is entirely mistaken in holding that “*jñānābhāva*” or (*avidyā*) is “not at all competent to exist”, and so is only a purely negative conception. According to Sankara, *jñānābhāva* (or *avidyā*) can be destroyed by *jñāna*, though not by *karma* All phenomenal existence, including the ‘*avidyā*’ (or *jñānābhāva*) which is the *bīja-sakti* (the root-energy) which is the material cause (*upādāna-karma*) of the (phenomenal) universe is of the positive form (*bhāva-rūpa*) and not merely a negation Having this cardinal fact in view, we can easily see that our author’s entire discussion of this topic has no reality or useful purpose whatever, as indeed, his entire work itself Sankara’s doctrine is based on the existence of ‘*adhyāsa*’, and he begins his exposition of that doctrine by explaining its nature and origin That origin (or cause), as we

have shown at the very commencement of the very first part of our review is expressly stated by Śankara himself in his introductory Adhyāsa-bhāṣya itself, to be "*Mithyā-agnāna*", i.e., phenomenal ignorance, he has subsequently stated also that this *agnāna*, *avidyā*, *avyakta*, *māyā*, *bīja-sakti* are all synonymous terms—and offered various proofs to establish that, as *mūlā-vidyā* (*prakṛti*) is the cause of the material universe, it is positive in its nature (*bhūva-rūpa*).

Our author's treatment of the two other aspects of 'agnāna' need not detain us. For, according to Śankara, we have seen that *avidyā* in general, apart from its three particular aspects as mentioned by him is, as above stated, positive in nature (*bhūva-rūpa*) and must be positive, as it is the material cause of the manifested universe of phenomena. The inconclusive and often mutually-conflicting statements with which the author makes up his argument is chiefly due to the fact that, by confounding and mingling up phenomenal and noumenal (real) existence according to the needs of each argument or occasion, his statements lack definiteness and unity,—and hence we can nowhere get from him an indication that he has a clear hold and reasoned grasp of Śankara's Vedānta.

III — *Avidyā-kārya* (the fruit of *Avidyā*)

Our author first raises the question,—Is 'avidyā' the "kartā" i.e. the intelligent and efficient cause of the material universe, even as a potter is the maker of a pot, or the non-intelligent auxiliary cause like the potter's staff or wheel, or the non-intelligent material cause? His discussion of the first two points brings forth nothing new. Śankara's Vedānta adopts the third view, as we have already seen above. Our author denies its validity once more under the present heading on the ground that "'avidyā' is not a positive substance (*bhūva-draṇy*)", and that "there is no reaction of cause and effect between 'avidyā' and the world of phenomena (*samsāra*)". This is astonishing in one who has come forward to reveal "the heart of Śankara". Our readers are aware that we have already, in the first part of our review of this work, shown that Śankara fully accepts the fact of *mūlāvidyā* and that our author's attempt to refute his Vedānta doctrine on this topic is a stupendous failure. We have also in this second part, already established, both by clear statements of his reasoned views and by quotations from his 'bhāṣyas', that Śankara holds that *avidyā* (*māyā*) is the *bīja-sakti* which gets transformed into the manifested universe even as a seed grows

into a sprout, and thence through various stages of growth into a full grown and spreading banian tree

Our author then boldly puts forward his view as follows :—
 “As regards the unreal objects of the phenomenal world there is no desire to investigate into their cause” And what is his reason? He says :—“Because they are unreal, they are unfit to be distinguished as cause and effect” Sankara's view is the direct reverse of our author's. The law of cause and effect applies only to the sphere of the phenomenal universe. Sankara distinguishes “*Satyam*” and “*Anṛta*” i.e. Reality and Unreality as follows—“*Satyam* never deviates from what definitely appertains to it as its fixed essence *Anṛta* is that which deviates from what definitely appertains to it as its fixed essence” The former he frequently describes as “*Kātaṣṭhanitya*”, that which is permanent as undergoing no change at all, as distinguished from *parināmī nitya*, i.e. that which is permanent, while undergoing change in form It is free from all relativity or limitation (*aparichinna*), it is without parts (*niravasthā*), and without the attribute of personality (*nirguṇa*) It is the personal God (*saṁgha-brahma*) that is defined as the cause of the manifested universe, — creating, preserving, and destroying it Sankara holds, against our author, that the law of change through cause and effect applies only to the phenomenal universe in which we run our course of ‘*samsāra*’ and which has the various forms of change known as *bhūva-ukūra* In this same context, our author says also —“it appears to us that it is impossible to hold that ‘*samsāra*’ (phenomenal) existence can be the effect of *avidyā*” In unnumbered contexts, Sankara takes the directly opposite view —“The (phenomenal) ‘*avidyā*’ is the cause of *samsāra*” (Vide *bhāṣya* on I, 1-4). This is a statement taken at random What forms the introduction, as it were, to his *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* contains the statement that “the phenomenal *agnāna* (*mithyā-agnāna*) is the cause of the identification (i.e. *mithunīkārana* is the word here used by Sankara, but *adhyāsa* is also used by him) of the Real and the unreal” How, then, can our author be justified in saying that “*avidyā* is not a *bhūva-dravyam* (positive thing)”? As Sankara holds that “the (phenomenal) ‘*avidyā*’ is the cause of ‘*samsāra*’” that is known to our experience, both ‘*avidyā*’ and ‘*samsāra*’, both the cause and effect in this case, are positive in form. Sankara as we have frequently pointed out, calls *avidyā* by the name *bija-śakti*, the causal potentiality, of the world That is, the world springs out of ‘*avidyā*’ even as the tree rises out of the seed and goes succe-

sively through all its stages of growth " Our author fails, in this part of the discussion, to understand that the phenomenal reality of our waking consciousness is of a higher kind than that of the dream-state Even a European writer like Dr Thibaut has understood this difference For he states his view as follows :— "That the world perceived by waking men is *Māyā* in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming consciousness is an undoubted fact of the Śankara Vedānta." But our author's failure to understand Śankara reaches to such surprising heights as to induce him even to say that "if all things are the effect of 'avidyā', we cannot reasonably hold that there is a distinction between a substance which is *vyāvahārika* and what is *prātibhāsika*" (merely illusory or apparent, as a dream) His reasons are stated in forms which seem to us to bear witness to his capacity for bold assertion First, both have "the common feature of being *jada*" (non-intelligent). Secondly, "it is impossible to describe in words the difference between a piece of silver observed by us in the waking state and that which appears in our dream " As regards the first, we would put an analogous case before him Is there no distinction between a boy and a girl, simply because both have "a common feature" viz that of being children But our author is not to be frightened even by such a *reductio ad absurdum* as that He still argues thus —"It is impossible to prove that, when we have an apparent experience of silver, it has a material cause such as we find in regard to a real piece of silver actually existing before us which is connected with such a truly existing attribute (*tāttvika-dharma-sambandha*) as the presence or absence of a material cause " Further, "there is no argument to establish that 'avidyā' undergoes change " But, not only does Śankara hold, as pointed out above, that "'avidyā' is the cause of 'saṃsāra,'" but we have seen that he uses "bija-śakti" and 'avidyā' as synonymous terms,—and this shows that 'avidyā' undergoes transformation even as a seed undergoes transformation in successive stages into a tree Further, we have seen already that, when he distinguishes "Satya" and "Anṛta," he calls the former *kūṭastha-nitya* and the latter *parimāṇi-nitya* Further, we must not forget that *saṃsāra* includes both *vyāvahārika* (phenomenal) and *prātibhāsika* experiences whether the latter occur in our waking or dream life.—A further argument of our author's in this connection is "that it is not established that *ākāśa* (ether) has 'avidyā' for its material cause." Our reply is that 'ākāśa' is also included in the

phenomenal world of 'saṃsāra,' and so must be comprised within Śaṅkara's statement that "'avidyā' is the cause of 'saṃsāra'." But our author, who evidently anticipated this objection, has tried to get out of it by saying that "Māyā or 'prakṛti' is only the efficient cause of false knowledge, which latter has nothing as its material cause." But, just as in the case of a pot, the potter is its intelligent cause, the rod or wheel its auxiliary cause, and earth its material cause, so the material world of phenomena has Īśvara as its intelligent cause, his desire to create or the 'karma' of the individual soul as its auxiliary cause, and *avidyā* (māyā) as its material cause. Hence Śaṅkara calls *avidyā* by the name of *biṣṇu-sakti* the root energy (residing in Īśvara),—and when he calls 'avidyā' "the cause of 'saṃsāra,'" he can only mean its material cause. In the Gīta, Kṛṣṇa says.—"By controlling my 'prakṛti,' I bring into manifestation the entire collection of objects which has no will of their own owing to the inevitable sway of their (Jīvas') natural sinfulness (which is the effect of previous 'karma'). Obeying (the will) of me, its master, Prakṛti gives birth to both those which move and those which do not move." We have already also pointed out that Saṃsāra includes both *vijñānāhārika* and *pratibhāsika* experience, and so 'avidyā' as "the cause of Saṃsāra" must be the cause of both of them. Hence our author's every further argument in any context whatever with a view "to disprove the view that 'pratibhāsika' existence has no cause" must be regarded as futile. Further, to deny causation in respect of any portion of our experience in any of the three states (*avasthās*) of waking, dream or dreamless sleep is to go against the accepted principle of the universality of the law of causation in the 'sāṃsārika' world. Further, our author abandons his own contention when he says in this same context that *pratibhāsika* experience is "due to *doṣa* (fault) arising from not knowing the underlying object as it truly is." This is exactly what Śaṅkara means when he says that "avidyā is the cause of saṃsāra." The *bhāṣya*-passage which our author here quotes in his support in a footnote at the bottom of the page is as follows.—"He only perceives silver without substance (*kevala*) but no silver exists there." Śaṅkara means that perception is of two kinds,—first, a seeming awareness due to a personal factor which our author himself calls a '*doṣa*' (fault) due to ignorance of the true nature of an object before us not recognized as such; secondly, a sense-perception actually due to the presence of, and sense-contact with, an object recognized as present and in

its own form, size etc. In the *former* case, we perceive a creation of our "fault" of ignorance, and so it does not exist as we imagine it to be; in the *latter* case, we perceive what actually is before us and as it is truly. Our author later refers to, and condemns, certain views held in regard to "perception as 'idam rajatam'," and "this piece of silver now before me" as follows:—"An object which is 'mithyā' cannot have an origin (utpatti)". Does our author mean that here he has found an exception to the universal law of causation? Further, has he not already admitted that even *prātibhāsika* experience is due to "the *dosa* (fault) arising from not knowing the object as it truly is"?

Our author next attacks Sankara's position that all the effected objects of the material world are "*anuvacanīya* i.e., they cannot be described either as *real* like the Ātman or *unreal* like the horn of a hare, but occupy a middle position and are included in what we call *sāmsārīka* universe (*vyāvahārika-prapañca*) and are, for that reason, found to have a common material cause in what is known as *mūla-prakṛti*, *mūlāndiyā*, *hija-śukla* etc. His criticism is expressed as follows:—"Having found that whatever objects are phenomenal (*mithyā-vastuṇaḥ*) are *anuvacanīya* (in the sense above put forth) are you not ashamed of your endeavour to describe it in the words, as needing a material cause, or as found to have a common material cause"? This clearly shows that our author has utterly failed to understand that the exact nature and properties of an object before us may not be fully known and may even grow or vary according to our state of advance in scientific knowledge, but that such a state of things cannot prevent us from attempting to analyze and discover the elements entering into its composition and the external causes and conditions out of which it springs and endures and affects our interests and aims. All material causes and their effects belong equally to this same category of *anuvacanīya*. Further the word, *nirvacana*, in this context, means only a general explanation of the property and behaviour of all the objects comprised in the material world of manifested phenomena. Hence our author is entirely at sea when he says:—"as whatever object is incapable of being described either as existing (*sat*) or non-existing (*asat*) cannot be included in what is real, it is impossible to hold that it can have a material cause". This is a mere assertion and only betrays a want of knowledge of either the ancient or the modern conception of what matter is or how its various forms take their origin and find their place among the objects of the material universe. Our author

is also found in this connection to be able to make such an astounding statement as the following—"If one holds the view that 'avidyā', in its essential (or primary) import is the originating material cause of the universe of material objects, that amounts to saying that the world of material objects exists outside the world of material objects." A pot exists previously in the form of earth (*mrd*) and not in the self-same form of a pot in which we find it after the earth composing it has been kneaded and shaped into the pot which it is. In this case, can we say that our pot exists outside itself as a pot, because we hold it existed as *earth* before it took the form of a pot. Further, our author here asks—"Is this *avidyā* which is regarded as the root cause of the material world, *mūḥyā*, or not?" We answer,—it is as much '*mūḥyā*' (or *anirvacanīya*) as the material universe which springs out of it. Our author seems here to prepare himself for a fight with a wind-mill of his own fancy, and thinks that, if we further pursue our inquiry into causes after reaching '*avidyā*,' we shall be landed in the logical fallacy of *anavasthā*, absence of finality or conclusion. That this betrays a want of accurate and thorough acquaintance with Śankara's doctrine of Vedānta we have already shown at the commencement of our discussion in this (Second) part of our review when showing how Śankara fully accepts the *bījāṅkura-nyāya* both in his *Sūtra bhāṣya* and in this '*bhā-ya*' on the Gaudapāda-Kārikās.

IV — *Avidyā-nimitta*

We take up our author's next heading,— '*Avidyā-nimitta*' (the cause of *avidyā*). He asks,—What is the *nimitta* of *avidyā*? He gives a *first* answer himself as follows—"To raise the question is itself illogical, for the conception of time, space, and *nimitta* is itself the effect (*Kārya*) of *avidyā* Hence, all inquiry into *nimitta* falls properly within the range of the particular effect of '*avidyā*' which constitutes the cognition of *nimitta*." If so, why does our author raise the topic at all? His *second* answer is,— "In truth '*avidyā*' is neither the cause nor the effect of anything at all." And why? He gives the strange reply that "it (*avidyā*) has no *real* existence (*pāramārthika-sattā*)." That it has only a phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*) existence is the view advocated by Śankara,—and this is also, what is asserted in Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Śankara's *bhāṣya* thereon which our author quotes in a foot note given in the context. In explaining the first line of the Kārikā, Śankara says.— "The birth of the material universe can be reasonably

asserted as springing from a cause which exists as a positive phenomenon (*udyamānūt-kāranāt*), even the magical production of an elephant springs from (the magician's) power of 'māyā',—but it does not spring from a cause which is non-existent ('*asat*') i.e., like the horn of a hare. Still, it (the material universe) does not take its rise from the noumenal reality, the *Ātman*." The word, '*satah*' (सत) in the *Kārikā-Śloka* is interpreted by Śāṅkara as meaning '*vidyamānāt-kāranāt*',—i.e., from a positive phenomenal cause. What Śāṅkara means here is '*māyā*' (or *avidyā*)—and he says that it is "the cause out of which the material universe springs." Thus here too the doctrine of '*mūlāvidyā*' is asserted by Śāṅkara who likens it to the Indian magician's strange power of fabricating what for the moment assumes the form of an actual elephant before the spectator. But our author, failing to clearly understand Śāṅkara's words, thinks that the word "*satah*" means the noumenal entity of the *Ātman*. But Śāṅkara immediately after using the expression, "*udyamānūt-kāranāt*," refers to the analogy of the Indian magician's production of the elephant from the strange creative power he has acquired from the knowledge of his magical art. Further, it is a well-known fact that, in Śāṅkara's Vedānta, the pure noumenal Brahman is not the cause of the material universe. That position or function is assigned to the personal God known as *Īśvara* (vide *Bhagavadgītā*, Chap IX, verses 9 and 10). Further, our author is mistaken when he ascribes to Śāṅkara or his followers the doctrine that "the ever-pure Intelligence which is the *Ātman* had for some reason forgotten itself, and falsely fabricated *Avidyā* in itself, even as an owl falsely fabricates darkness for itself when the sun is shining." But both '*māyā*' and its fabricator are related to phenomenal or conditioned existence only in the sense in which we know phenomenal relatedness in general or the relatedness of cause and effect, and not to the noumenal existence which is "One only without a second." The relatedness of what is "*kalpita*" (the word here used by our author) i.e., fabricated or imagined, to its fabricator is purely imaginary and cannot be real (*pāramārthika*) — Śāṅkara gives another interpretation to the *Kārikā-śloka*, but it has the same aim and import as the one already given. We pass over our author's further remarks in this part of the discussion.

Śāṅkara's interpretation of the second line of the *Kārikā Śloka* is taken up by our author as his own and utilized as his third answer to the question—What is the '*nimitta*' of '*avidyā*'?

It is important as Śāṅkara therein points out that the fallacy of *anavasthā* (regressio ad infinitum), discovered here by our author but already overthrown by us as having no bearing at all in this connection, would arise only if we held that the material universe sprang from the noumenal Ātman as its cause, and not from *mūlāvidyā* (or *māyā*). Our author further says in this connection,—“We do not say that there is an *actual existence* called ‘*avidyā*’, but only that the Ātman is the essential nature of ‘*avidyā*’ and of its *kārya* (effect) and that, when that essence is known, both disappear leaving not the least remnant of any kind behind them,—even as mid-day time when the sun is shining in all its heat a very foolish person asks what is the cause of this darkness existing in the sun by which the owl, etc. are unable to see objects before them, and another replies that there is then no darkness except what is imagined by the owl” This means that our author himself regards as fruitless the inquiry into the *nimitta* of ‘*avidyā*’

At this stage our author hastens to state his conclusion that “non-inquiry (*avicāra*) is alone the cause of ‘*avidyā*’ which is of the nature of a negation” But *avicāra* is also itself a negation, and so cannot be the cause of ‘*avidyā*’ which, according to Śāṅkara, as we have shown in full is *positive in nature* (*bhāva-rūpa*) Further Śāṅkara says,—“To the same effect is the sūtra composed by the Ācārya (Gautama) and which is supported by valid reasoning, viz., final beatitude (*apavarga*) arises by the removal of each member in the series, *duḥkha* (sorrow), *janma* (birth), *pravṛtta*, activity, *doṣa* (fault i.e., desire and aversion or ‘*rāga-dveṣa*’, as it is called), *mūḥyā-ajñāna* (phenomenal ignorance) depending upon the removal of the member succeeding it” Hence, the final member of Gautama’s series has no cause, i.e., *mūḥyā-ajñāna* is the *beginningless* (*anādi*) root of all the members of the series preceding it until we reach *duḥkha*, by which is meant this phenomenal world which the Gītā calls “the abode of sorrow” (*duḥkhālaya*). Śāṅkara goes on to state in the very next sentence that “the removal of *mūḥyā-ajñāna* arises from the knowledge (*vijnāna*) of the (living) self as Brahman” As *vijnāna* is here said to remove *mūḥyā-ajñāna*, this latter (compound) word must be split into *mūḥyā* and *ajñāna*. Thus Śāṅkara makes it clear that it is impossible to deny the existence of ‘*mūlāvidyā*’ which is the positive root, the beginningless (*anādi*) cause of this phenomenal world of *samsāra*. Hence our author’s ‘*svaprakriyā*’ proves a misleading perversion of Śāṅkara’s Vedāntic doctrine

BEHAVIOURISM, A SYMPOSIUM - Edited By WILLIAM P. KING - Student Christian Movement Press; 58, Bloomsbury Street, London. W. C. I - pp 160. Price, 5 Shillings Printers Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh, 1930

Edited by William P. King, the symposium under review entitled "Behaviourism" to which well-known and distinguished psychologists—Josiah Morse, W. McDougall, C C Josey, W. E. H Garrison, R L Finney, Julius Mark, R M Jones, and F. J McConnell - have contributed their opinions about the value of Behaviourism, constitutes a veritable hymn of hate against the school of psychological theory and practice so ably championed and advocated by Dr J B Watson and others. From the standpoint of Christian Theology, *Behaviourism* is condemned as calculated to impose "annually on thousands of young students a view of man which denies him all moral responsibility and represents all moral efforts as an exploded superstition that ranks with belief in lucky numbers and black magic" (p 58) "Low water-mark of critical judgment in America" (p 46) - "behaviouristic poison" (p 26) - "palpably absurd" (p 109) - "inexcusable ignorance" (p. 119) - "no better than the first word of nonsense" (p 156) - such are the elegant expressions of criticism levelled against behaviouristic psychology

Poor Behaviourism! If the criticisms of the contributors to the symposium are to be taken seriously, it can only mean that they are engaged in a theologico-religious propaganda against behaviourism. In India laboratory-facilities for psychological research are notoriously lacking, and yet, it seems to me that behaviourism has come to stay in America its congenial home. If quantitative measurement and precision are to prevail in psychological investigation, the only way is to consider life as a series of responses to stimuli external and internal, and certainly, there is nothing wrong in the exaltation of Behaviourism as the best view-point in psychological research and study of life-phenomena if quantitative interests are to prevail.

By waxing eloquent over the questions of "freedom of will", "ethics", "feelings", et hoc, the contributors to the symposium have imported extra-psychological and theological considerations into what should have been strictly a psychological study, and so far they are bound to be considered as having put themselves out of court decidedly. Threats of trouncing and torture in hell which would be the lot of unbelievers,

would never dislodge Behaviourism from its position to which it has been raised on account of its ability to determine responses quantitatively

Indian psychologists are watching the derision and condemnation of the Behaviouristic outlook and method in the West, but one thing is certain According to Indian Psychology embodied in Sanskrit texts, metaphysics is the ultimate referee and psychology and other sciences and disciplines will have to be sooner or later brought before the bar of general philosophy—the Vedānta. If it only retains an open mind in regard to spiritual values and confines itself to its legitimate sphere of investigating the responses which are mechanical and of quantitatively determining their nature, Behaviourism need not at all be alarmed; nor need it feel nervous at the exhibition of impatience and explosion of wrath by the contributors to the symposium. Well, after a pretty careful perusal of the volume, I feel Behaviourism has come to stay. It has a place in the sun.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA.

VEERA SAIVA PHILOSOPHY OF THE ŚAIVĀGAMAS

By MR. S D PAWATE, B A, LL B—Published by MR W B BILEANGADI, B. A, LL B, Hubli, 1927, pp. 107, Price Rupee One

This is an essay on the Veera Saiva Philosophy of the Saivāgamas. The Publisher informs us that it was evolved out of a lecture delivered by the author on Veera Saiva religion at the Second Universal Religious Conference held at Madras in 1923. The work is divided into two parts. Part I (pp. 1-33) deals with the Saivāgamas and the Philosophy of the Āgamas. Part II (pp. 1-40) deals with Veera-Saiva Philosophy and Religion and its influence on Kanarese literature. The Essay is concluded with a corrigenda of 13 pages, which is rather abnormal for a publication of 94 pages. But for this defect the printing is well done.

The present essay is an attempt to show "that the Lingāyat religion as taught by Basava has its beginning in the time past and is equally old and consistent with the Vedas" (p. 1). The Saivāgamas are believed by the Lingāyats to be coeval with and complimentary to the Vedas themselves (p. 2). The Āgamas and the Vedas are both revelations dependent upon each other (p. 2).

Though the seeds of many of the later philosophies may be traced to the Vedas, and the idea of Śiva is not an exception, yet it is difficult to agree with the statement of the author that the Śaivāgamas are coeval with and complimentary to the Vedas. The general trend of the author's arguments is to make out a case for the remote antiquity of the Lingāyat religion and to put it on as high a pedestal as possible. The references made by Brahmanic writers to Āgamas or Śiva worship (pp. 6-14) as interpreted by the author do not show the Āgamas to have equal antiquity with the Vedas but they appear to point out that the development of the Āgama literature must have occurred during the early centuries of the Christian era. That there are references to Linga-worship in the Mahābhārata (pp. 9-10) and the date of the Mahābhārata being 14th Century B. C. it follows that the Linga worship is as old as 14th Century B. C.—this medley of nebulous chronology and philological evidence is hardly a convincing proof for the antiquity of the Āgamas. In the same manner the study of parallel passages in the Āgamas and the Bhagavadgītā leading to the author's conclusion (p. 11) that the Gītā is the borrower from the Śaivāgamas and not vice versa proves only the existence of this parallelism, the question of borrowing being left undecided for want of definite chronology for either of the two sources.

Leaving aside the above-mentioned controversial issues regarding the antiquity of the Śaivāgamas contained in Part I, the author's study of the Veeraśaiva Philosophy proper in Part II will prove more useful not only to a student of this philosophy but even to a lay reader. For the study of our ancient systems of philosophy a doctrinal synthesis based on a chronological analysis of facts is likely to yield better results than a partisan study of these systems as conducted by some of the Christian writers on Indian Philosophy and Religion. Facts in Religion and Concepts in Philosophy, if recorded and evaluated in a thoroughly scientific spirit, make the study of any Religion or Philosophy more fruitful and interesting. The writer of the essay under review in so far as he has followed this method has given us a stimulating study of the Veeraśaiva Philosophy of the Śaivāgamas. We hope he will continue these studies and lay under obligation not only the followers of the Veeraśaiva religion but all lovers of religion and philosophy.

P. K. CODE.

INSPIRATIONS OF TUKĀRĀMA—By P. R. MUNGE, Printed at the Times of India Press and published by the author at Dattatraya Buildings 4/55, Bombay, No 7. — 1930—pp 47.

This is a Selection of the *abhangas* of the Mahārāstra Saint Tukārāma translated into Marathi by Mr P. R. Munge accompanied with a preface and a short sketch of the Saint's life. The book is meant for an English reader and hence such of the 'abhangas' as contain mythological and other references have been specially excluded from this Selection. The total number of the selected passages is 99. Tukārāma's *abhangas* are verily a mine of worldly and spiritual wisdom but the present selection has provided us with topics mainly ethical and spiritual such as 'Prayers', 'Devotees', 'Equanimity', 'Yearnings', 'Character', 'Hypocrisy', 'Forgiveness' and so on. Mr Munge has supplied in the foot-notes parallel passages from the Bible which proves, if any proof is needed, the common belief that all good thought is heritage of mankind. Translations of the 'abhangas' are neatly done avoiding as far as possible a cumbersome phrase or an abstruse word which is likely to scare a lay reader away. Printing and typography are excellent. The selection is representative of Tukārāma's thought and will go a great way in acquainting the English readers with the greatness of the Saint, the central pivot of whose teachings was liberation through '*samsāra*' on the strength of *bhakti* alone and not by renunciation of worldly life.

P. K. GODE

TO CHRIST THROUGH THE VEDANTA (A SYNOPSIS OF) PART I — SANKARA, by P. JOHANNES, S. J. — Price 6 annas.

This pamphlet which is published in the 'Light of the East Series' tries to give in a nutshell the main tenets of the theoretical and practical philosophy of Sankara, and tries to build on the material they supplied a comprehensively constructive Philosophy of Catholicism. The author seems to have studied carefully the philosophical works of Śāṅkara whose philosophy he explains in almost a Spinozistic fashion, in a very systematic and cogent manner. He evinces a truly catholic spirit in trying to use the principles supplied by the study of the theoretical and practical philosophy of Śāṅkara in building a system of philosophy of his own that would throw

new light on Catholicism. This is a novel, positive and constructive method of uniting the East and the West and is likely to prove more effective in making the two peoples understand and imbibe each other's culture more intimately than all the external methods that are tried by so many institutions and associations. We heartily congratulate the author on this method and wish him every success in his work. His scheme as outlined in the synopsis is very ambitious and deserves to be worked out in detail, in order that its value may be fully estimated, and appreciated. His distinction of *reductive* and *deductive* philosophy seems to be confusing, and we are sure that an impartial study of the independent works of Śrī Śankarācārya rather than his commentaries on the classical works will induce the author to revise his opinion about the mystical philosophy of Śankara, which is very comprehensive and thoroughly rational, leaving the author no need of going to any other philosopher for his so-called deductive philosophy. To describe Śankara's practical philosophy as only reductive is to show an imperfect knowledge of his system, particularly of his mystical philosophy, which is more comprehensive and adequate than the mystical system of any other philosopher of India.

K. V. GAJENDRAGADKAR.

LONG MISSING LINKS, BY VADUVUR K. DURAISWAMY IYENGAR, B. A.—The Oriental Home University, Triplicane, Madras 1931. Vol. 1. pp. 691—Price Rs. 10—(Foreign 15 shillings.)

For the cause of Hindu-Muslim-Christian Unity, Universal brotherhood and world peace, Mr. Duraiswamy Iyengar has written the volume under notice in the course of which he has endeavoured to restore to the proper coupling "Long Missing Links" and effected 'marvellous discoveries about the Aryans, Jesus Christ and Allah'. The central or cardinal conclusion sought to be maintained by the learned and talented author would appear to be this—"The whole of research conducted in the pages of this book relates to the elucidation of the conceptions and significance of the gods of the three great religions and that the three religions have emanated from a common source and are identically the same" (p. 19 preface). The arguments advanced in support of the thesis of the author are presented in the form of a "random talk" between the author and an inquirer.

After an elaborate examination of various linguistic mechanisms, the author maintains that "the parent of all the modern languages of the whole world is *our blessed Tamil* (*italics mine*) (p 12) For the benefit of general readers, I may indicate some of the discoveries made by the author (1) Jesus Christ far from being a historical personage is a personification in a human form of the God-spirit (p. 17) (2) The name "Aurangzeb" is the same as "Arangasavi" The Moghul Emperor's name was that of a Vaisnava God (p 91) (3) Christ means the Will or Son of Krishna (p 209) (4) Babylon and Dwarka are identical (p 339). (5) The Old Egyptian Emperors were Ayyangar Brahmins, and the Namam and Sathari have come to India from Egypt (6) The Avatars of Visnu are so many diverse conceptions of Godhead (7) Hiranyan and Ravanam were old Persian Kings

Ex pede Herculem Philological researches, investigations into languages, penetrating and deep study of the Bible, critical quest of the truths contained in accounts of the myths of Babylonia and Assyria have enabled the author to formulate certain conclusions which deserve the most careful consideration at the hands of students and scholars interested in matters of Indian history, philosophy and religion Reviewers will find it as easy or as difficult to differ from the author as to agree with him!! I have no hesitation in commending Mr Duraiswamy Iyengar's work to the readers of the "Review of Philosophy and Religion" as a source of powerful stimulus to further research and investigation The conclusions formulated by the author are startlingly novel and some of them reveal a family resemblance to those arrived at by Mr Iyer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, whose researches in Biblical lore are so well-known In conclusion, I desire to emphasize the fact that Mr Duraiswamy Iyengar's volume deserves to be placed in every public library, in schools and colleges, and in literary clubs and reading rooms

R NAGA RAJA SARMA

A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF HINDUISM, BY S SOUNDARARAJA AIYENGAR, B A, B L—Published by Vaman & Co Madras, 1930—pp 84

This little book covers in a small compass the wide and intricate field of Hinduism in some of its salient aspects. The

author clearly explains on p 17, as to what he means by Hinduism. "In considering any religion, therefore, we have to look to the practices and beliefs in its higher phases, as observed by its most enlightened professors and not be guided by what we see among the masses." And he is perfectly justified in doing so. For Hinduism in its wide sense is, to quote from the Census Report 1891 (p 192), "a fluctuating mass of beliefs, opinions, usages and observances, social and religious, the exact details of which it is impossible to reduce to anything like order." By confining his attention only to the salient and essential aspects as expounded and laid down in some of the representative works on Hinduism, such as the Bhagavadgītā, Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Manusmṛti, Yājñavalkya Smṛti, the Mītāk-sarā commentary on the latter and some of the more important Upaniṣads and Sūtra works, the author has, in fact, been able to bring order out of this chaos and to give a definite form and substance to the amorphous and bewildering mass of doctrines, beliefs and practices passing under the name of Hinduism.

In the Introduction (pp 1-8) the author emphasizes the importance of the co-ordination between Science and Religion, and shows how, in the final analysis, Science and Religion are not subversive of each other, but, on the contrary, mutually subservient. He further shows that religion alone which is not divorced from the truths of science can stand the test of time. In other words, it is only a "scientific" religion that can have any pretensions to being accepted as the Universal Religion of the future world-state. And such a scientific religion he claims with great plausibility of argument for the groundwork of the Bhagavadgītā. The author shows how some of the most important truths of science such as the laws of Causation, Evolution, Conservation of matter and Conservation and Dissipation of Energy are embodied in the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā. The religion of the Bhagavadgītā and with it Hinduism also in its pure, chastened and sublimated form as presented to us by the Lord's song deserves in every way to become the Universal Religion of the great and glorious future that mankind has before it.

In the following section which is called "Mahatma Gandhi and the Sanatan Dharma," the author shows how Mahatma Gandhi forms "a type in whom both the religions of the East and West can find a common solution of all the problems that vex them." Mahatma Gandhi, in other words, is to the author of the book under review, as he is to all that have had an

opportunity of studying his mind as revealed in his speeches and writings, a living illustration of all that is good and beautiful and noble in Christianity and Hinduism. And a religion that could produce such a superb type of humanity surely bids fair to be one day the Universal Religion of the world.

In the rest of the book the author dwells upon some of the more important aspects of Hinduism, such as the Hindu Scriptures, the Hindu idea of Godhead, the relation between God and man, the Universal and the Individual Soul, the daily duties of a householder, the feasts, fasts and ceremonies observed by the Hindus, the routine of life of a typical Hindu from his embryonic stage to his death, Marriage Ceremony, Exequies, the Caste system, Hindu Law and Hindu Ethics. A mere glance at this list of the subjects handled in the book will give the reader an idea of the wide range of topics that come in for treatment at the hands of the author. The treatment is remarkably simple, lucid and exhaustive. The book is profusely interspersed with quotations (in English translation) from and references to original texts, which enable the reader to verify the statements of the author and to satisfy himself as regards the validity of the author's position. Altogether the book forms a fitting introduction to the Study of Hinduism and makes very delightful and stimulating reading for a couple of hours.

M V PATWARDHAN

ANEKĀNTA is a monthly magazine but here we find two issues, the 11th and the 12th combined together. This completes the 1st year of this magazine for which the annual subscription is Rs 4. It seems to have been ably edited by Mr. Jugalkishor Muktar. On the title page we find a circular lotus with अनेकान्त as pericarp and several opposite pairs like happiness and misery as petals. In the present issue there are interesting articles on philosophical and historical subjects. Out of these the contribution of Pandit Sukhlal may be singled out for ingenuity and the wider scope it gives for further research work. Side by side the editor has furnished the readers with सुभाषित or apposite sayings in four different languages, Prākṛt, Sanskrit, Hindi and Urdu, and seven small poems in Hindi on various topics. Besides this there

is a three-coloured picture having Ahimsā as its basis. We hope that the editor will exert himself more to cultivate the taste for research work amongst the readers of the magazine

H R KAPADIA.

NAVAYUGADHARMA-MĀLĀ, edited BY Mr S. K. PHADKE, Panvel, Dist Kolaba, Bombay. Annual Subscription Rs 6.

We have received a specimen copy of this Marathi bi-monthly that proposes to discuss many vital questions regarding the recent tendencies in the religious movements of India. The editor, Mr Phadke, who is a profound scholar, has already published a separate volume offering a critical appreciation of the two Northern currents, Brahma Samāj and Deva Samāj. Through this series he proposes to finish that work gradually. In addition to this work of historical criticism, he intends to discuss, in these issues, various knotty yet common problems like Truth or Non-violence etc. The peculiar feature of this periodical is that the whole of it is to be the work of a single author. The style of this issue is attractive and arguments therein many times sufficiently convincing. We wish the series every success.

S V DANDEKAR

DHARMA-KOŚA—The Prājanpāthasālā, Wai (Dist. Satara) has under preparation an Encyclopaedia of Extracts from the Hindu Dharmasāstras (Dharma Kosa) topically and chronologically arranged. The value of such a compendium, especially when the material is scattered over innumerable texts from the Vedic to the Paurāṇic times, is undoubted not only for the study of the Dharmasāstras and Sociology but also for the study of the History of Hindu religion which has survived during centuries the varied shocks of political and religious upheavals. The work is being carried on under the supervision and direction of Pandit Narayan Shastri Marathe and is mainly financed by Mr Vamanrao Naik of Hyderabad (Deccan). The estimated cost of the work is rupees one lac and the time for its completion is estimated to be six years. We wish all success to this onerous undertaking. Intending subscribers should write for more particulars to the Secretary, Dharma Kosa Sangraha, Prājanpāthasālā, Wai, (Dist. Satara).

THE KAIVALYADHĀMA (from October 1924 to March 1930)-Published by KUALAYĀNANDA, DIRECTOR, KAIVALYADHĀMA, Lonavala (Bombay), 1930.

This is a short pamphlet of 34 pages giving complete information about Kaivalyadhāma founded at Lonavala by Srimat Kuvalayānanda on the 7th of October 1924. The ideal of this institution is the co-ordination of Western and Eastern thought and with that end in view it is conducting research in the field of Yoga to begin with. It has under training several students, some of whom are research scholars conducting experiments while others act as subjects upon whom such experiments are made. Before undertaking researches in the field of metaphysics or psycho-physiology, it was thought desirable to proceed with the scientific interpretation of the physical culture and therapeutical sides of Yoga, as this was considered to be the best way to popularize higher scientific research in Yoga. By X-Ray and other laboratory means the physical culture value and therapeutical value of Yogic Exercises have been critically examined. The results of these experiments have attracted the attention of many eminent Indians, several Indian States and even of two Provincial Governments. With a view to record these results the Director has been conducting regularly a Magazine called Yoga-Mīmāṃsā, which has been much appreciated in and outside India. Besides these intellectual activities the institution has also its social activities. It maintains a special health resort called Rugna Sevā Mandir, where patients suffering from several diseases are cured by means of Yogic therapy. It has also started a 'Spiritual Service' members of which are equipped for work of uplift of the rural population at present steeped in ignorance.

The above résumé of the activities of such a useful institution as the Kaivalyadhāma will speak for itself. The Director of the institution, who is a Sanyāsīn, is conducting the work in a purely self-less, and humanitarian way and deserves every encouragement not only from persons interested in the revival of Yogic culture but also from those who value social and humanitarian work for its own sake.

P. K. GODE.

SOME POEMS.

BY SHRIMAN NARAYAN AGARWALA.

(1)

As a beautiful bud of rose
Conceals in itself a lovely flower,
That shall delight the passers by,
That shall give ecstasy to weary travellers,
That shall add to the happiness of the world,
And beautify the ugly surroundings,
So, O dear brother,
True and eternal happiness lies hidden
In the recesses of thine heart ;
Let thy glorious heart blossom forth
Into an exquisite flower of divinity ,
Purge it of all darkness of ignorance,
And it will give out unending bliss

(2)

All sorrow and depression means the want of Love,
For Love repels all tribulations,
And invites joy and intense delight.
O how happy is he who is in love with Nature
Love of Nature, O brother,
Is the love of everything,
It is the love of Life itself,
Thou canst not exclude anything.
Individual love and attachment
Gather the moss of misery and transience,
But the eternal love of Nature,
Dances on the face of the Divine.

(3)

As the lovely moon of immense beauty
Illumines the dark world
When the night has its sway,
And leads the travellers on the Path,
So, O my love, is he
Who has washed away his evils
In the Lake of the White Lotus
Ah ! have but a glimpse of the beautiful Lake,
And thou shalt never retrace your steps
Towards the fleeting creation.

(4)

As a fly wandering here and there,
 With no ascertained motive and purpose,
 Comes to an intricate web of a spider,
 And at last gets entangled in its meshes,
 So do we forget our illustrious Harbour,
 And wander ceaselessly in many directions,
 At last the world spreads its profane mantle
 And shrouds us miserably
 Happy are those, O brother,
 Who have found their eventual Shelter

(5)

As the lotus leaf lets not the water
 Touch its being,
 Though in the water doth it reside,
 So, O my dear brother,
 Live in the world,
 And yet be beyond its entanglements
 Happy is he, O Love,
 Who moves in the world like a spider,
 Getting not entangled in the numerous pleasures,
 Though living cheerfully on the web itself

(6)

O brother,
 As a river without water,
 A tree without leaves,
 And a mountain without a snowy peak
 That gives rise to various streams,
 So is the man,
 Who knows no love for his fellow-beings

(7)

The Real lies embedded in the Real,
 O brother,
 Lest all should behold It
 Is the Real so shy, my Lord ?
 Ah ! the Real is immune from shyness,
 It is humanity, O brother,
 That fights shy of the Reality,
 Lest it should be dazzled by the Light

NEWS FROM PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATIONS IN INDIA

THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNION, POONA

One of the aims of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, founded by Prof. R D Ranade in 1924 is the organization of "Lectures in Philosophy and Religion at various Centres" in India. With a view to do some work in accordance with this aim as also to bring together all those who were interested in philosophical, religious and allied studies Mr S G Bhalerao, B Ag. convened a meeting of some of his friends early in January 1930 at which Messrs. P K Gode, N. G Damle, K H. Kelkar, S V Daudekar and Phadke were present. It was decided to start, without any formalities of membership etc., a Philosophical Union and organize different discourses on the first Thursday of each month. Mr Bhalerao was unanimously elected Secretary and was entrusted with all further work of the Union. He succeeded in drawing up a fixture of lectures for the year with the co-operation of different lecturers and presidents to whom, no less to the energetic efforts of the Secretary Mr Bhalerao, the Union owes a deep debt of gratitude. Towards May 1930 Mr. Bhalerao informed the Union that he was transferred to Nadia and would shortly leave for the place. He was, therefore, requested by the Union to persuade any one from among his friends willing and competent, to carry out his work. He nominated Mr Thakar who has faithfully carried out all the work of the Union with the same initiative and enthusiasm as Mr Bhalerao. The lectures of the Union are generally held in the evening in the buildings of the Maharashtra Education Society's High School in the Sadashiv Peth for the convenience of the audience. The Union is very much thankful to the authorities of the M. E. Society for allowing the use of their buildings and premises for purposes of the lectures. The

192 News from Philosophical Associations in India

lectures delivered during the course of a year under the auspices of the Union are as follows :—

No.	Date	Subject	Lecturer	President	Remarks
1	2-2-30	"God"	Swami Vishvanand	Prof. S V Dandekar M A.	Opening address.
2	6-3-30	"God or Absolute"	Rev H Verrier Elwin		
3	3-4-30	"Individual Immortality"	Mr S G, Bhallerao, B A	Mr L. R Gokhale	*A Series of Seven lectures was arranged after this lecture on this subject at the Anandāśram, Poona
4	1-5-30	"नैतिक सुल्लाचे स्मिर्त्तव्य"	Mr G M Joshi, B A & L C	Mr Babasaheb Patwardhan	
5	5-6-30	Do.	Mr Babasaheb Patwardhan	Mr Babasaheb Potdar	
6	3-7-30	"Philosophy of Dreams"	Prof Naralkar, M A	Do	
7	7-8-30	"Motave to Philosophy"	Prof S. G Sathe, M. A	Prof N G Damle, M A	
8	4-9-30	Jñāneśvara & Śaṅkarācārya	Prof Dandekar, M A	Mr Babasaheb Potdar	
9	13-11-30	Arabindo Banu's Glimpses into Indian Renaissance.	Prof K H Kelkar, M A	Prof N G Damle, M A	
10	4-12-30	सुखदुःखे समे कृत्वा लामालायी जयाजयो	Prof S. V Dandekar M A	Sardar K. C Mehendale B A	
11	8-1-31	Reality of Appearances	Mr M D Vidwansa, M A, I.L. B	Prof N G Damle	

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The "Tamil" Edition of the above useful publication has been undertaken by the Editor of the **Indian India**, Madras. The work is now in completion and the Publisher Mr V. Srinivasa Raghava Acharya is endeavouring to place the books on sale at the cheap rate of Rs. 1-2-0 per copy.

of the 'Indian India' } V SRINIVASA RAGHAVA ACHARYA,
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REVIEW
OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Being the Journal
OF
The Academy of Philosophy and Religion

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Printed at the Aryabhushan Press, House No. 936/2, Peth Bhamburda,
Poona City, by Mr. Anant Vinayak Patwardhan, and Published by
Parashuram Krishna Gode, M. A. Secretary, at the Branch
Office of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion
near the Bhandarkar Institute, Poona 4

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

Rs. 4/- (Inland); 7 s. 6 d. or 2 50 dollars (Foreign).

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WAS ŚĀṆKARA A PANTHEIST ?

PROF KOKILESWAR SHASTRI, M A

It appears from a careful perusal of Sankara's commentaries that a kind of Pantheism was current in his time and it went by the name of one Vrttikāra who held it. Vrttikāra reduced unity to multiplicity—Brahman or the self to the changing nāma-rūpas. In this view, Brahman is looked upon as a whole and the differentiations of names and forms including the finite spirits, as parts of the whole—as modes of its self-expression—as mere reproduction of the whole. Thus the Vrttikāra made Brahman as composed of parts (अनेकान्मक). But yet, most inconsistently, he looked upon both the unity and the multiplicity to be equally real.¹ He failed to develop the logical consequences of his own premises.

Sanl. ri, in several parts of his commentaries on some of the most important Upanisads and on the *Brahmasūtra* and on the *Gītā* has criticized this theory. He put the theory to severe test and exposing its inconsistency and inaccuracy, exploded it. It cannot, in the face of such criticism, be held that Sankara's own theory is no more than Pantheism, as supposed by some of his critics. We would quote here the opinions of one or two of such critics—

The writer of the "*Indian Theism*" thus observes—

"India has always been recognised as so determinedly *Pantheistic* in its religious thoughts that '*Indian Theism*' will seem to many an unnatural collocation of words. There are some who will maintain that whatever can be so described is really foreign to the Indian spirit."

Yet another—

"The later doctrine of Sankara may be named *Pantheism*—strange as its pantheism is—for it says that Brahman is all, because all but Brahman is false."

Dr Flint in his "*Anti—Theistic Theories*" says—

"In the *Pantheism* of the Vedānta doctrine the finite is lost in the Infinite. Along with the affirmation of an impersonal God, there is the negation of the reality of the worlds—both of

1 Vrttikāra's view has been thus stated by Sankara in Bṛ. Sū. 1.1—
 "एवञ्च द्वैतात्मकं ब्रह्म यथा । अत्र सत्त्वं । जगत्त्रयम्—कृत-बुद्धि-भक्त एव, यथा च जलं सत्यं तदुद्भवाश्च
 नर-कन-समुद्रादिव समुत्पन्नाः सन्ति । परमावयव एव । etc. And so also in other places.

form of this world with a view to reveal, to a certain extent, the infinite and inexhaustible treasure which His nature contains, and the world of nāma-rūpas—although distinguishable from Him, being a partial expression of Himself—cannot be taken as a separate and independent whole—

“यदात्मके नामरूपे यत्र ताभ्या नामरूपाभ्यां विलक्षण, स्वतोनित्यशुद्धबुद्ध-
मुक्तवभाव ” (३० भा० १४७)

“नदिं वृष्टं स्रष्टुं रथान्तरं”, तस्यैव तेन तेन रूपेण सायाविवत् अवयवानात् ”

—४० भा०—आ० गिरि, ११५

“Names and forms have their essence in Brahman and are therefore non-different from it. But Brahman is different from these names and forms.”

“The created world is not something different and not a separate entity from the Creator, for, it is the Creator Himself who stands in the form of such and such objects, like a juggler (मोहनी) who is himself under different assumed form—without being affected or altered by these objects, or forms.”

With a view to impress upon us this fact, the Śruti declares—
“एष रूपं प्रति पौ—‘वदित्य’—(नदिं वृष्टं) i.e. स्वेन अविवृत्तन रूपेण आकाशवत् ”)

—४३० भा०, ११०

“He has Himself assumed the forms of the innumerable nāma-rūpas, but yet He stands beyond them—that is to say the world is to be regarded as only a very partial and inadequate expression of the infinite and unfathomable depth of His resources, and thus the world is *distinguishable* from Him, though it is not a separate or a different (अन्य) entity.”

“यथैव हि ब्रह्मणा जगत्प्रसूतिं श्रूयते, एव त्रिकाशब्दान्मेकैर्वापि ब्रह्मणोऽस्त्यान्”
श्रूयते” (ब्र० सू० अ०, २.१.२१)^१

“As the world has come out of Brahman, so also Brahman stands beyond the world distinguished from it.”

Sankara asks “why has Brahman taken upon Himself the various forms of names and forms?”—

“किमर्थं पुन प्रतिरूपायमन तस्य श्रूयते ?”

He thus enquires—

“अदि इ नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अम्यात्मनो निष्कारिक रूपं प्रजागमनाम् न
प्रतिदृश्याथेत यदा पुन नामरूपे व्याकृते सन्त, तदा अस्य रूपं प्रतिष्ठाप्यते”

—३० भा०, २११

1 Cf. “अस्य नामनाम पाम शणनाम ॥ सायकारणरूपाय सायमिदं प्रत्यक्षं विदुः ॥ सायं विनष्टं भवति कोऽयं मद्रादयमा ॥” भा० ५१) The point is that the sustaining ground of the modulations of names, which, if removed from behind them will have all these modulations annihilated.

WAS SAṆKARA A PANTHEIST ?

PROF KOKILESWAR SHASTRI, M A

It appears from a careful perusal of Sankara's commentaries that a kind of Pantheism was current in his time and it went by the name of one *Vittikāra* who held it. *Vittikāra* reduced unity to multiplicity—Brahman or the self to the changing *nāma-rūpas*. In this view, Brahman is looked upon as a whole and the differentiations of names and form, including the finite spirits, as parts of the whole—as modes of its self-expression—as mere reproduction of the whole. That the *Vittikāra* made Brahman as composed of parts (अंशकत्मक) But yet, most inconsistently, he looked upon both the unity and the multiplicity to be equally real¹. He failed to develop the logical consequences of his own premises.

Sankara, in several parts of his commentaries on some of the most important Upanisads and on the *Brahmasūtra* and on the *Gītā* has criticized this theory. He put the theory to severe test and exposing its inconsistency and inaccuracy, exploded it. It cannot, in the face of such criticism, be held that Sankara's own theory is no more than Pantheism, as supposed by some of his critics. We would quote here the opinions of one or two of such critics—

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"India has always been recognised as so determinedly *Pantheistic* in its religious thoughts that '*Indian Theism*' will seem to many an unnatural collocation of words. There are some who will maintain that whatever can be so described is really foreign to the Indian spirit."

Yet another—

"The later doctrine of Sankara may be named *Pantheism*—strange as its pantheism is—for it says that Brahman is all, because all but Brahman is false."

Dr Flint in his "*Anti—Theistic Theories*" says—

"In the *Pantheism* of the Vedānta doctrine the finite is lost in the Infinite. Along with the affirmation of an impersonal God, there is the negation of the reality of the worlds—both of

1 *Vittikāra's* view has been thus stated by Sankara in ब्र. भा. 5. 1. 1—
'एवञ्च द्वैताद्वैतायामेव न यथा तत्र समुदायस्यैव काल-बुद्ध्या मते एव, यथा च जलं सत्यं, तद्बुद्ध्या
नरा-कल-बुद्ध्याय समुदायस्यैव एव . . . परमात्मन्येव' etc. And so also in other places,

form of this world with a view to reveal, to a certain extent, the infinite and inexhaustible treasure which His nature contains, and the world of nāma-rūpas—although distinguishable from Him, being a partial expression of Himself—cannot be taken as a separate and independent whole—

“यदात्मके नामरूपे यश्च ताभ्यां नामरूपाभ्यां विलक्षण, स्वतोनित्यशब्दबुद्ध-मुक्तस्वभाव” (बृ० भा० 147)

“ नहि सृष्टं सृष्टृरर्थान्तरं, तस्यैव तेन तेन रूपेण मायाविवत् अवस्थानात् ”

—बृ० भा०—आ० गिरि, 145

“Names and forms have their essence in Brahma and are therefore non-different from it But Brahma is different from these names and forms”

“The created (world) is not something different and not a separate entity from the Creator, for, it is the Creator Himself who stands in the form of such and such objects, like a juggler (मायावी) who shows himself under different assumed forms—without being affected or altered by these objects or forms”

With a view to impress upon us this fact, the Sūtra declares—
“रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो—‘बहिश्च’—(बहिश्च’ re स्वेन अविकृतेन रूपेण आकाशवत्”)

—कट० भा०, 5 10

“He has Himself assumed the forms of the innumerable nāma-rūpas, but yet He stands *beyond* them, that is to say, this world is to be regarded as only a very partial and inadequate expression of the infinite and unfathomable depth of His resources, and thus the world is *distinguishable* from Him though it is not a separate or a different (अन्य) entity”

“यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिं श्रूयते, एवं त्रिकारख्यातरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते” (ब्र० सू० भा०, 2 1 27)¹

“As the world has come out of Brahma, so also Brahma stands beyond the world distinguished from it”

Sankara asks “why has Brahma taken upon Himself the various forms of names and forms” ?—

“किमर्थं पुन प्रतिरूपागमनं तस्य द्रव्यच्यते ?”

He thus answers—

“यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपायक रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिव्यायेत यदा पुन नामरूपे व्याकृते भवत, तदा अस्य रूपं प्रतिव्यायेत”

—बृ० भा०, 2 5 11

1 Cf “यस्य आत्मनोऽप्यस्य क्षणमात्रात् सार्यकारणरूपाय सर्वमिदं ह्यनन्तं विध्वंस्य भवति विनष्टं भवति, सोऽन्य” सिद्ध आत्मा (कट० भा०, 5 4) Brahma is thus the sustaining ground of the modifications of नामरूप, which, if removed from behind them, will have all these immediately annihilated

" If there were no unfolding of the names and forms in the world, there would be no manifestation of the Absolute which is eternal consciousness in its nature. Through the unfolding of the names and forms, His nature becomes manifested, — His consciousness found its expression "

The नाम-रूपs which are the multiple expressions of the nature of Brahma cannot, therefore be independently real, but they are real only in connection with the unity of Brahma of which they are the expressions. It follows therefore that the 'unity' is the true reality. A thing cannot be both 'one' and 'multiple' in its true nature. If it be one, it cannot be manifold. If it be manifold, it cannot be one. The relation between the unity and multiplicity—is not like the temporal relation of succession which obtains between the antecedent and its consequent phenomena. The unity stands *unaffected*, amidst the multiplicity. It is a relation, says Sankara, like the relation of a piece of rope and the serpent appearing upon it —

"रज्ज्वादेहरगाद्यै सम्यग्भवदस्य दृश्यसम्बन्धः"—Sankara's *Sūtra-mūlāṇana*, 72.

Also —

"रज्ज्वाभिव सर्पः"—वे० भा०, 16

That is to say, Sankara's idea is that there is an intimate relation between the two, yet the unity stands behind the multiplicity of names and forms *unaffected* by it. The unity cannot be reduced to the multiplicity. The Vīrtikāra, Sankara thinks, is possessed by a feeling of Divine immanence, rather than Divine transcendence. The world, to him, was the *direct* representation of the Divine. He was satisfied with looking upon सामानाधिकरभ्य (relation of identity or co-ordination) between God and the world.

(1) Sankara in numerous places has employed certain illustrations to bring out the relation between the Absolute Reality Brahma and the appearance of नामरूप. Some of the illustrations are—the sea-water and the forms of wave, billow, ripples, bubbles etc, the clay and its successive transformations, viz the fragments (powders) चूर्ण, the lump (पिंड), the pot (घट) etc, the tree and its successive developments in the forms of sprouts, branches, flowers, leaves etc. We are not to understand by these illustrations the ordinary phenomenal relations which subsist between the antecedent and consequent states of things.

" न हि जननमरणायनर्थशतमहत्त्वभेदममाकुल समुद्रवनादिवत् सावयव अनेकरस ब्रह्म—ध्येयत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन वा श्रुत्या उपदिश्यते"—वृ० भा०, 511

"Nowhere the Śruti holds the nature of Brahma (ब्रह्म) as composite, as consisting of thousands of differences and distinc-

did not appear to have abolished the individuals. Sankara in his criticism of the Nyāya theory of causality, has incidentally shown that all objects have a स्वरूप and a बाह्य-रूप or सम्बन्धि-रूप, that is to say the objects must be something for themselves ere they can be something to one another. The connection of individuals shows that they all depend on a common ground and this makes possible that interaction among themselves—

“ परस्परोपकार्योपकारकत्वं तदेकमामान्यात्मकं एककारणात्मकञ्च दृश्यम् ।

If you assume, like the Pantheists, that the individual is simply its relations, then it may be deprived of any being for itself (स्वरूप) in one Identity—in the whole—which comprehends all, where all the elements are determined in relation to one another and to the whole. But, if in one sense the qualities or universal relations belong to the Reality as a whole, these are grounded in the various activities of individual objects. But in this immanent view, the distinctive differences which separate the experiences of oneself from another would be unintelligible. But the Transcendental Principle does not reduce these individual centres to mere appearances, but connects and correlates them so that each may serve the purpose of the whole, yet it allows to each its own functions and activities, as it distinguishes itself from them and is not lost in the elements it unifies and connects.

(5) Now, we shall collect some passages where, and the manner in which, the theory of Pantheism is described, criticized and refuted by Sankara—

(1) “ ननु अनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म । यथा वृक्षाऽनेकान्नाम्न, एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म । अत एकत्वं नानात्वं च उभययोर्माप सत्यमेव । यथा वृक्ष उन्मेषत्वे, शाखा इति च नानात्वम् । तथा मसुदात्मना एकत्वं, फल-बुद्बुदात्मना नानात्वम् । यथा सुदात्मना एकत्वं, घटजगतादात्मना नानात्वम् ।

नेवं स्यात् । प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्तं राग्यत्वावधारणात् । (1) न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मण परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपन्नम् । न हि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मण अनेकधर्मश्रियत्वं सम्भवति । (2) न च यथा ब्रह्मण आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनं, एव जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित् फलाय अवकल्पते । न हि परिणामित्व-विज्ञानात् परिणामवत्वमात्मन फलं स्यात् । ”

We give the sense of the above—It is the cause which transforms itself into effects. It is the cause which is ‘one’ but has divided itself into ‘many’ forms and appeared as the world of names. The sea is one, but it has taken the forms of wave, bubble, ripple etc. The clay is one, but it is many in the form of plates, pots etc. The tree as tree is one, but it has manifested itself as twig, branch, flower etc. The Absolute Reality (Brahma) has appeared as the world of many qualities, forms, activities etc. That is to say, this world is His nature, there is no other nature

"If there were no unfolding of the names and forms in the world, there would be no manifestation of the Absolute which is eternal consciousness in its nature . . . Through the unfolding of the names and forms, His nature becomes manifested, — His consciousness found its expression "

The नाम-रूपा which are the multiple expressions of the nature of Brahma cannot, therefore be independently real, but they are real only in connection with the unity of Brahma of which they are the expressions . It follows, therefore that the 'unity' is the true reality . A thing cannot be both 'one' and 'multiple' in its true nature . If it be one, it cannot be manifold . If it be manifold, it cannot be one . The relation between the unity and multiplicity — is not like the temporal relation of succession which obtains between the antecedent and its consequent phenomenon . The unity stands *unaffected*, amidst the multiplicity . It is a relation, says Sankara, like the relation of a piece of rope and the serpent appearing upon it —

"रज्ज्वाक्षरगर्वे गमकव्युदस्य दृश्यसम्बन्धः" — Sankara's *Sūtra-mūlāṇa*, ? 2

Also —

"रज्ज्वास्मिन् सर्पः" — अ० भा०, 1 6

That is to say, Sankara's idea is that there is an intimate relation between the two, yet the unity stands behind the multiplicity of names and forms *unaffected* by it . The unity cannot be reduced to the multiplicity . The Vrttikāra, Sankara thinks, was possessed by a feeling of Divine immanence, rather than Divine transcendence . The world, to him, was the *direct* representation of the Divine . He was satisfied with looking upon सामानाधिकरण्या (relation of identity or co-ordination) between God and the world .

(1) Sankara in numerous places has employed certain illustrations to bring out the relation between the Absolute Reality Brahma and the appearance of नामरूप . Some of the illustrations are — the sea-water and the forms of waves, billows, ripples, bubbles etc, the clay and its successive transformations, viz the fragments (powders) चूर्ण, the lump (पिंड), the pot (घट) etc, the tree and its successive developments in the forms of sprouts, branches, flowers, leaves etc . We are not to understand by these illustrations the ordinary phenomenal relations which subsist between the antecedent and consequent state of things .

"न हि जननमरणायनर्थशतगृहसंभेदगमाकुलं समुद्रवनादिवत् सावयव अनेकरमं ब्रह्म — धेयस्त्वेन ज्ञेयस्त्वेन वा श्रुत्या उपदिश्यते " — अ० भा०, 5 1 1

"Nowhere the Sṛuti holds the nature of Brahma (ब्रह्म) as composite, as consisting of thousands of differences and distinc-

did not appear to have abolished the individuals Sankara in his criticism of the Nyāya theory of causality, has incidentally shown that all objects have a स्वरूप and a बाह्य-रूप or सम्बन्धि-रूप; that is to say the objects must be something for themselves are they can be something to one another The connection of individuals shows that they all depend on a common ground and this makes possible that interaction among themselves —

“ परस्रोपकार्योपकारकत्व तदेकगामान्यात्मकं एककारणात्मकञ्च दृष्टम् ।

If you assume, like the Pantheists, that the individual is simply its relations, then it may be deprived of any being for itself (स्वरूप) in one Identity—in the whole — which comprehends all, where all the elements are determined in relation to one another and to the whole But, if in one sense, the qualities or universal relations belong to the Reality as a whole, these are grounded in the various activities of individual objects But in this immanent view, the distinctive differences which separate the experiences of oneself from another would be unintelligible But the Transcendental Principle does not reduce these individual centres to mere appearances, but connects and correlates them so that each may serve the purpose of the whole, yet it allows to each its own functions and activities, as it distinguishes itself from them and is not lost in the elements it unifies and connects.

(5) Now, we shall collect some passages where, and the manner in which, the theory of Pantheism is described, criticized and refuted by Sankara —

(1) “ ननु अनेकात्मक ब्रह्म । यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाख , एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्त ब्रह्म । अत एकत्व नानात्व च उभयमपि सत्यमेव । यथा व्रक्ष इत्येकत्वं, शाखा इति च नानात्वम् । यथा समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, फल-बुद्बुदात्मना नानात्वम् । यथा मृदात्मना एकत्वं, घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम् । नैवं स्यात् । प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यत्वावधारणात् । (1) न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मण परिणामधर्मत्व तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् । न हि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मण अनेकधर्माश्रयत्वं सम्भवति । (2) न च यथा ब्रह्मण आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षमाधनं, एवं जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित् फलाय अवकल्पते । न हि परिणामित्व-विज्ञानात् परिणामवत्वमात्मनः फलं स्यात् । ”

We give the sense of the above — It is the cause which transforms itself into effects It is the cause which is ‘one’ but has divided itself into ‘many’ forms and appeared as the world of नामरूप The sea is one, but it has taken the forms of wave, bubble, ripple etc The clay is one, but it is many in the form of plates, pots etc The tree as tree is one, but it has manifested itself as twig, branch, flower etc The Absolute Reality (Brahma) has appeared as the world of many qualities, forms, activities etc That is to say, this world is His nature, there is no other nature

than this world which may be said to be separate from the world. For Brahma has entirely manifested Himself—His nature—in the changing forms

Describing in this way his opponent's view, Śaṅkara criticizes thus.—

A thing cannot be one and also many at the same time. If the 'one' be real, the 'many' must be unreal. Again, if 'many' be real,—if you regard the various changing states to be real, in that case, the 'one' cannot be real. When an object is changed into various forms and qualities, it loses its one-ness, it is now composed of many forms etc. Since it was one, which is now present in the shape of many forms, its unity has disappeared. Brahma is thus something composite, manifold (अनेकामक) in its nature. This is the view of Divine immanence, there is thus a सामानाधिकरण्य between Brahma and the world. This is वृत्तिकार's idea.

Śaṅkara then goes on to state his own theory, thus :—

These manifested changes, no doubt, constitute the world, but Brahma transcends them all, and hence it is separate, and distinct and distinguished from them. Brahma has got a nature of its own different from the changing object,—names and forms. It has appeared as the world, has assumed the forms of नाम-रूप, remaining unaffected by these, in its own nature. No finite form can adequately manifest Him. The world cannot reveal the depth of the Divine nature. It exists beyond all changes, all transformations. It is not its entire nature that has appeared in the form of the world. In and through all changes, the identity of its essence can be recognized. You cannot, therefore, look upon the nature of Brahma as composed of these changes.

(b) Śaṅkara thus observes in वृ० भा०, 2 1 20 —

‘यदि च ब्रह्मण चित्रपटवत् वृक्षममुद्रादिवच्च उत्पत्त्याद्यनेकधर्मे विचित्रता विजिघ्राह-
यिषिता, एकरसं अनन्तरमबाह्यमिति नोपपत्तिरित्यतः ‘य इह नानेव पश्यन्ति’ इति
निन्दावचनं न प्रायेक्ष्यत”।

“His unity does not become composite by the productions of नामरूप, like a tree composed of its branches, flowers etc., and a cloth dyed with variegated colours. Then Brahma would not have been described as of uniform nature (एकरस)”.

Pantheism, as we have stated above, reduces finite self also to certain states and activities, certain relations. The sum-total of these qualities, relations, senses etc. constitute the nature of the individual self. But Śaṅkara has shown that the real nature (स्वरूप) of the finite, empirical self is what underlies those relations and qualities, unaffected by them —

“समस्तस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपादिश्यते । ब्रह्मात्मत्वमभ्युपगम्यमान, स्वाभाविकस्य शारीरात्मकस्य व्यक्तं सम्यजते... न अनेकात्मकमह्य कल्पनावकाशोऽस्ति” ।

(c) Brhadāranyaka, II, 1, 20 —

“अनेकव्यसमाहारस्य सावयवस्य परमात्मनः पूर्वस्थानावस्थस्य वा परस्य एकदेशो-
विक्रियते, सर्वेव वा पर परिणमेत् । अथ नित्यायुतमिद्रावयवानुगत अवयवी पर आत्म्य,
तस्य तदवस्थस्य एकदेशो विज्ञानात्मना, — तदापि सर्वावयवानुगतत्वात् अवयविन एव
अवयवयतो दोषो गुणो वा इति । विज्ञानात्मनः संसारित्वदोषेण पर एवात्मा सम्बध्यते —
इयमपि अनिष्टा कल्पना ।”

“Some hold the view that Brahma is the whole, and what constitutes that whole must be its parts. What we find in the form of manifestations, must necessarily be the parts of Brahma—the whole. He has divided Himself into several parts and the manifested names and forms constitute those parts. For, the sum-total of the parts gives us the whole. How can the parts then exist apart from the whole? The faults and merits belonging to the parts must necessarily affect the whole. For, how can the whole exist apart from the parts constituting it? The finite Selves also being the constituent parts of Brahma—the whole, must affect Brahma when they are affected by pleasures or pains. But the pain which I feel cannot, at one and the same time, be my pain and a part of God's perfect experience.”

Sankara also remarks here that it is the essence of the conscious self to be for self, to distinguish itself from all other things. How can the finite minds as consciousness, interpenetrate or merge into one another? But in the Pantheistic view, the finite self would lose its own स्वरूप, for, it would merge in God's consciousness --

“एकदेशिकदेशिकरूपता च ब्रह्मणि अनुपपन्ना एतेषु पदेषु अनिमोक्षप्रसंग,
समारात्मत्वानिवृत्तिः, निर्गुणैः च स्वरूपतात्प्रसंगः”

(d) Brhadāranyaka, IV 3 30 --

“अत्र केचित् व्याचक्षते—आत्मनस्तु न स्वत एव एकत्वं नानात्वं च । यथा गोद्रव्यतया
एकत्वं, मासादीनां वर्माणां परस्परतो भेदः । तथा निर्गवपेषु अमूर्तवस्तुषु एकत्वं नानात्वं च
अनुमेयम् । न, अन्यपरत्वात् । न च निरवयवेषु अनेकात्मकता शक्यते
कल्पयितुम् । सा च क्रिया वा जिवधर्मो गमयति, तथा वर्मभेदाः ।”

“Ātmā, the Pantheists say, is one and many in its nature, as a cow in its character is a cow is one, and also in its various qualities (such as having dewlap, colour etc.) is many. But this, says Sankara, cannot hold good in Ātmā which has no parts (निरवयव). Ātmā cannot be ‘many’—composite—i.e. manifold in its qualities or actions which really belong to नामरूपस्य—not to the underlying Ātmā.”

1 Cf “यत् गतं यत् आत्मनमेवेन अभ्युपगच्छति, तस्य तस्य नामरूपान्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात्”

(बृ० भा०, २ 1 20).

When my self comes in contact with certain objects beyond it, it stimulates in myself certain reactions (through my senses and mind) All these reactions in the form of my states, feelings etc cannot really affect or change the self My अन्तःकरण is transformed and as such I falsely identify my consciousness with those mental transformations But it is not परमार्थ Of "सर्वो हि लोकव्यवहार ब्रह्मण्येव कल्पितः, न परमार्थः" (ब्र० भा०, 1410) My consciousness seems to be changed But really my consciousness remains unaffected by these —

" न ब्रह्म ... ब्रह्मणि अतद्धर्मोऽप्युपपन्नो नाम्नीति " (ब्र० भा०, 1410)¹

The idea is that through the changes of the states, activities etc the real substratum of these changes, the real essence of the soul, does not at all change Sankara humourously illustrates the fact thus—

" न हि लोके गौमिच्छन् वा गोर्भवति, गयानस्तु अयमादिनायन्तरमिति । यद्धर्मको य पदार्थः स देशकालावस्थान्तेरेष्वपि तद्धर्मैक एव भवति "

" The essential nature of a thing is not subject to change or alteration, under the changes of its states, actions, place and time You call a cow a cow when she is sleeping, but when she gets up and begins to walk, can you call her a horse? "

Thus it is that what constitutes the essential nature of Brahma remains the same, is not changed and affected, under the appearance of the changes of नामरूप As soon as the modifications of नामरूप appear, our Avidyā imagines the underlying unity of Brahma as entirely reduced to these नामरूपः, as if Brahma has become सावयव i.e. compound of parts — " न हि अविद्या-कल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु सम्यगेत "—ब्र० सू० भा० 2197) But in reality Brahma retains its own unity It is our बुद्धि, says Sankara, which imagines Brahma to be सावयव (composite) through changing नामरूपः imposed on it — " बुद्धिकल्पितेभ्यः सावयवेभ्यः विकार-संस्थानोपपत्तेः " (छा० भा०, 622).

(6) Other arguments used by Sankara in disproof of Pantheism may be noticed here —

(a) The qualities or relations are accidental—आगन्तुकः, are produced by stimulating causes (" अभिव्यक्तिसाधनापेक्षता "—ब्र० भा०) and therefore, they are not permanent How can these constitute the nature of the self which is eternal and permanent (" नित्याभिव्यक्तः ") ? They are manifestations of its nature, they represent that nature very inadequately and partially, they always change their character

¹ i.e. The Reality is Reality, but we refer this or that predicate or characteristic to it

(b) For this reason Śankara has remarked more than once that no co-ordination (समानाधिकरण्य)¹ is possible between "तत्" and "सर्वम्"—Brahma and the world (vide ब्र० सू० भा०, 131). How can then 'one' and 'many' both constitute the nature of the self, as the Pantheists want us to believe? If there be समानाधिकरण्य between one and many the theory would be like that held by the stoics—spiritual would be material—no distinction.

(c) Then again, Śankara asks—what is the final emancipation (मुक्ति)? To get rid of 'many'—pleasure, pain and other changes—is to be free from their power. But if they constitute the nature of the self, how can they be got rid of? For, you cannot rob a thing of its essential nature—

"न हि स्वाभाविकेन धर्मेण कस्यचित् वियोगो ऽष्ट" —(ब्र० भा०, 438)

and "एकस्य अनेकत्वभावाजुपपत्ते" —(ब्र० सू० 3१21)

(d) It is proved therefore that the real nature of a thing is what lies behind the changing states etc., unaffected by them, and the latter very inadequately express that nature. A thing cannot have more than one nature. All these changing states, far from constituting the nature of the self, are rather the 'object' (ज्ञेय or विषय) and being 'object,'² the subject or the self must be different from it. It is only the ignorant who look upon them as constituting the nature (धर्म) of the self—

"शब्दावाकारावभासा नस्यैव 'विषयभूता' उत्पद्यमाना .. आत्मन एव 'धर्मा' विक्रियारूपा इत्यविवेकिभिः परिकल्प्यन्ते" —(ते- भा० 21)

"अनामानं देहेन्द्रियादिसञ्चान आत्मनो दृश्यमानमात्रं (ie 'object'—ज्ञेय) घटादिवत्, आत्मत्वेन गृह्णाति अविद्यया मामुद्यमान" —(क० भा०, 314)

ie "They are presented as 'knowable objects.' Only the ignorant people construe them as 'essential qualities' of Ātmā."

(e) Another point noticeable is—they being परार्थ, they work in the interest of the self which must be other than these. They cannot therefore be held as constituting the nature of the self. The 'object' cannot affect the real nature of the subject—"न हि यस्य यो विषय, स तेन हीयते वर्धते वा" —(सा० का० 5 or 6 मन्त्र)

We cannot understand how in the face of these arguments advanced by him, the charge of Pantheism could have been found possible to be levelled at Śankara's poor shoulders by some of his modern critics and interpreters.

1 समानाधिकरण्य—Occupying the same level (समानाश्रय) नामरूपस्य really occupy a lower level (than ब्रह्म's level). For, they are incomplete manifestation and विषय (not विषयी)

2 "कवः कर्मभूतं सत्, कर्तृस्वरूपद्रोहि विज्ञेयम् (धर्मं) म्यात्? कर्म हि वस्तुक्रियया व्यापमानं भवति अ-उ-च वा य, अन्यत् व्यापकं, न तेनैव तत् व्याप्यते?" (बृ० भा०, 446).

THE NOTION OF THE ABSOLUTE

*in various forms of Tradition **

GASTON DE MENGEL

There is, in the *Absolute*, nothing other than the Absolute itself, the Infinite, called, in the Vedic doctrine, *Brahma nirguna*, and in the Jewish Kabbala, *Ain-Soph*, that is to say Limitless.

The Infinite is beyond being. For we derive the notion of being from finite things, hence we cannot apply this notion to the Infinite univocally, and even should we apply it to the Infinite analogically, that which would there be called *being* would so surpass the being of finite things, that it would be more exact to call the latter "non-being," because, compared to the Infinite, the finite becomes so to speak null — this comparison may be symbolized, transposing it in terms of abstract quantity (where the infinite is in reality the indefinite), by the mathematical expression $\infty = 0$. But this designation of "non-being," applied to finite things, would be too contrary to our human habits of thought, and we find it more natural to invert the comparison, and to apply the expression "Non-being" to the Infinite, but, as points out the Kabbalist Isaac Meyer, this expression must be translated "non-Ens" (not a being), and not "non-Est" (is not). Besides, scholastic philosophy defines, or rather explains (since a true definition is impossible where, as in the notion of *being*, there is neither *conus* nor *difference*, those essential elements of definition) being as "all that which exists," or at least, "all that which is capable of existing" (*id quod competit esse*), which, be it noted, would not even permit the application of the term "being" to the Infinite considered in its relation with the finite, that is to say, in so far as God the Creator (*Īsvara*), nor to anything which, besides the Creator, belongs to the category of the Non-manifestable. Furthermore, being is already a determination (though the first of all), even if taken in a more extended sense than the scholastic, for it implies certain properties, such as unity, which themselves imply a distinction, incompatible with the Absolute, outside Which nothing is.

There is nothing outside *Brahma*, for *Brahma* is the Infinite, and "that outside which there is something cannot be infinite,

* From the French in "Le Voile d'Isis," No 114, June 1929

being limited by that very thing it leaves out" (René Guénon, *Man and his becoming according to Vedānta*) "Outside Brahma there is nothing," declares Sankarācārya in "Ātma-Bodha," "all that which seems to exist outside It can exist only under the mode of illusion, as the appearance of water in the desert" And so Mohyiddin ibn Arabi ("Risālatūl-Aḥadīyah") "There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that is outside Him (Allah)"

If outside Brahma there is nothing, that is because everything otherwise is, speaking analogically, contained in Brahma, and the contents cannot be outside the container Brahma contains all things, for It is present in all things by Its active virtue (all things having their being through It alone), now, the incorporeal present in a thing by its active virtue contains that thing ("because *being in* assumes on its part the character of a hold and a kind of enwrapping" explains Father A. D. Sertillange, commenting Question 8, article I, reply 2, of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas) and is not contained by it (St. Thomas, S. Th. 1^o, q. 52, I c.) So, in the Bhagavadgītā, IX, 4, the Supreme, incorporated by His Word in Kṛṣṇa, declares "All beings are in Me, but I am not in them"

This notion of the transcendental character of the Absolute, which is beyond even being, and hence the avowal of the powerlessness of merely human intelligence to reach it, are common to all forms of Tradition, though, in the theology of the Catholic Church, the distinction between the Absolute and God the Creator is not always adequately made (whereas, in the Jewish tradition, to the Absolute corresponds "El Elyon" i.e. the All-Highest (Jahvé), and to God the Creator corresponds "Shaddai" i.e. the All-Powerful (Elohim), a distinction which appears, in corrupt form, in Gnosticism, as between the "Abyss" and the "Demiurges")

"God is not a being," comments Father Sertillange, on the strength of St. Thomas (De Potentia Q. 7, art. 2, ad 1). He is the Source of being in the proposition "God is", the verb "to be" does not signify real being, being considered as an attribute, it is only the logical link in a true proposition, and is used in a sense which would be equally correct in the case of something without real being, as when one says "Blindness is"

"The Principle," says Tcheung-tseu, one of the great commentators of the Chinese Taoism "cannot be enunciated, what is enunciated, is not It" (Chap. XXII)

"Concerning God", says St. John Damascene ("On the orthodox Faith" L. I 4), "it is impossible to say what He is in Himself, and it is more exact to speak of Him by the rejection of

all terms He is, indeed, nothing that is Not that He is not in any way, but because He is above all that is, and above being itself "

"We do not cognize It", declares the Kenopanisad (khanda I) "and that is why we cannot teach Its nature It is superior to all that is known, and it is even above that which is not known "

"God," affirms St Denys the Aeropagite in the Mystical Theology (Chap V), can be neither named nor understood He is neither one, nor unity, nor divinity, nor goodness ..He is not spirit, as we understand spirit . He is nothing of that which is not, nothing even of that which is "

"Those terms Father, God, Creator, Lord are not divine names," says St Justin (Apologia, II), "they are appellations derived from bounties and works."

"It is by His works that we say we know God," similarly writes St Basil (Letter to Amphilochus, 234-1), "but we do not pretend to reach His Essence To know that we cannot know Him, such is the knowledge we have of Him "

"When we advance towards God by the way of exclusion," explains St Thomas (Commentarie on the Sentences L 1, Dis- XIII, art 1, ad 4) we first deny Him corporeal things, then intellectual things themselves in the form they take in creatures, such as goodness and wisdom Then nothing remains in our mind but this He is, and nothing more But, in the end, that same being, in the form in which it is found in created things, we again deny Him, and then He remains in a sort of night of ignorance, and that ignorance is - which unites us to God in the most perfect way, so far as belongs to this life "1

The Sama-Veda echoes St Thomas "Not to have complete ignorance of Him is not to know Him

And so Tehoang-tsen (Chap XXII) "Not to know It, is to know It, to know It (in so far as Its external manifestations) is not to know It "

"Never be satisfied with what you know of God," counsels St John of the Cross (Spiritual Canticle, Str 1) "cling rather to what you do not know of Him For, the less you understand Him distinctively, the nearer you are to Him "

"We speak of God," exclaims St Augustine (Sermon 117, 3,) "what wonder that you do not understand ' If you understand, it is not God."

1 It is to be noted that Catholic theologians deny the possibility of "jivan-mukta."

And similarly pronounces the Kenopanisad (khanda 2) "by him who thinks that Brahma is not understood, Brahma is understood, but he who thinks that Brahma is understood, knows it not "

From this transcendence of the Absolute follows that, strictly speaking, one cannot apply to It any affirmative attribute whatsoever "Those", declares St Denis ("On the Divine Names", I, 5,) "who are raised to a higher degree of Knowledge speak of God solely by negations, and this is eminently suitable for they were supernaturally illumined by that truth, that God is the cause of all that is, but is nothing of that which is " In like manner, in the Vedic doctrine, to the supreme Brahma are applied negative terms, and It is declared without origin, indivisible, immutable, eternal, alone (and hence "spread everywhere and in all things," but "affirmed in the Vedānta as absolutely distinct from what It penetrates" says Sankarācārya in the Ātma-Bodha, for "Brahma does not resemble the World," which, though a reflection of Itself in Itself, represents it only as distantly as the finite is separated from the infinite) To those terms of the Veda correspond the "negative attributes" of Catholic theology asety, simplicity, immutability, eternity, unity, immensity, which are nothing other than the negation of cause, composition, change, succession, multiplicity and location Let us make a rapid survey of those negative attributes (to which we must add infinity, or the negation of limitation), in the order in which they are usually expounded, taking note previously that those attributes are considered as non-distinct from the essence of God

Asety is, in affirmative form, the negation of cause, for the assertion "God is through Himself" (A s'), implying that God derives His being from himself, cannot, in all strictness, be applied to the Absolute, which is beyond being The most that can be said is that, God being by definition the First Cause the necessity of which has been proved didactically by Aristotle and St Thomas, along the "Five paths", He cannot be caused by anything else

Infinity is a strictly negative attribute, being the absence of limitation All limitation implies a limiting cause, but the First cause being by very definition beyond all cause, It is hence beyond all limitation

Simplicity is, though apparently affirmative, in reality a negation that of all composition Every compound is limited by the number of its components, number which cannot be infinite,

and besides, implies a cause uniting those components; but God is without limit and without cause, hence cannot be compound. There cannot even be in God a metaphysical composition, that, otherwise, of essence and existence¹, and consequently of potentiality and act, of substance (द्रव्य) and accidents, for the union of essence and existence demands an efficient cause, as also the passing from potentiality into act, of which the apparition of accidents is but a particular case. As a corollary, it follows that there cannot be, in God, really distinct attributes, attributes being nothing also than accidents, and distinct accidents would constitute as many partial acts, now, as we have seen, there can be in God neither accidents nor parts. Brahma is thus in very truth "nirguna"

Immutability is by its very form a negative term. God cannot be mutable, because all change implies a passing from potentiality into act. now in God there is no potentiality, potentiality being a limitation, moreover, as we have already noted, the passing from potentiality into act implies an efficient cause, and God is beyond all cause.

Eternity is not, as many erroneously think, duration without limit, but, quite on the contrary, the absence of all duration as of all sequence, for the notion of duration is derived from that of time, itself derived from that of succession, but all succession is a change, and in God there is no change, as has been said.

Immensity is, in affirmative guise, the absence of location. To be in a place implies limitation. furthermore, a localized being is potentially able to pass from one place to another, but these implications are incompatible, as we have seen, with the nature of God. The affirmative point of view of immensity, implied in the dogma "God is everywhere," is justified only in relation to created beings. every place is the result of the presence of a being created by God, and every thing, even though it be, as regards its attributes, the effect of secondary causes, holds its being immediately from God, and there where God gives being, there is he by His power,² which is not different from Himself. He is then in all things and therefore in all places.

1 The scholastic philosophers employ the term "existence" to denote the principle which immediately produces existence, much as सृष्टि in Sankhya, "essence" then corresponding to द्रव्य.

2 This is the sense in which should be understood the proposition, oft occurring with the scholastics "God is in all things,"—Cf. Bṛhadganyakopaniṣad, III, 7, 15 य सर्वेषु ह्येतेषु तिष्ठन् । य सर्वानि भूतान्यन्तरो ऽवस्यति ॥

"Before the world was," says St Bonaventure, "God was where He is now. Do not ask me now where he was; outside Him, nothing was. He was therefore in Himself"

"Ask me not if the Principle be in this or in that," says Tchoang-tseu (chap XXII), "It is in all beings as end of the norm. Let us take ourselves, in spirit, beyond this world of dimensions and localisations, and there will then be no occasion to wish to situate the Principle"

Unicity is, strictly speaking, the quality of being unique, and, in that affirmative form could not rigorously be attributed to the Absolute, for to be declared unique implies comparison, and the absolute can be compared to nothing, since there is nothing outside it. But that expression can be considered as equivalent to negation of multiplicity. There could not be two First Causes, because the First Cause is infinite, and there cannot be two infinities, as if there were two infinities, one of them would be distinguishable from the other, and all distinction implies limitation, which is contradictory to infinity.

"Allah-be He exalted"—declares Mohividdin ibn Arabi ("Risalatul Ahadiyah"), "is without like whatsoever, as He is without rival, contrast or opponent whatever"

Though the Absolute allows of no composition nor distinctive qualities, as we have explained when we spoke of its "simplicity," the Kabbala situates in Ain-Soph three supreme "middoth," but this without contravening the absence of composition. "There are three distinct degrees (of the Ain-Soph), though they all make but one, they are united together, and do not separate themselves one from the other," (Zohar, II, 65a). "The Supreme Spirit," does it again say (Zohar, III, 26a), "is composed of three united spirits which are but one." We are here in presence of the mystery of the Trinity. Necessarily, every thing having been produced by a ternary action and under a ternary modality, the ternary is in its principle, to be found in the First Cause, but that which is multiple in its effect may be one in its principle. We are here, moreover, beyond unity, and, in the Absolute, Trinity must be considered apart from its action, in other words "virtually" and not "actually" (We use the terms "virtual" and "actual" analogously to those of "potentiality" and "act", respectively, without being their equivalents, they are, it may be said, potentiality and act analogically transposed to the plan of Pure Act—*Actus Purissimus*). Now we must conceive of that which is virtual as being "non-multiple," though passing to multiplicity when becoming

actual (this is a conception such as can properly be grasped only by the supra-human faculty of intellectual intuition (*ब्रह्मसंज्ञा*) The "virtual Trinity" of the Absolute does not then invalidate its "simplicity," *virtually*, the Father is no other than God, neither is the Son nor the Holy Spirit, though *actually*, they will become distinct by their relations, the Bhagavat of the Gītā identifies Himself with the Supreme Brahma, with which equally Purusottama is identified, and by that latter name it is that the Bhagavat Himself is celebrated, according to his own declaration (*Bhagavadgītā*, XV, 18) Brahma the Supreme, Bhagavat the Supreme Lord, Purusottama (*Ātmanā*) the Supreme Spirit, are the same, *virtually*, and will give rise to distinction, *actually*, only in *Brahma saguna* (*Īśvara*)¹

1 For the Correspondences with the Hebrew Supreme "Middoth" in the Tantric doctrines of the author's article on "Quelques aspects de la Shakti" in "Le Voile'd 1915" No 144, Dec 1931, pp 740-741

ANCIENT CONCEPTS OF MATTER.

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA, M A, B L

Various attempts have been from time to time made to connect philosophically Matter and Spirit which to Descartes seemed to be two independent realities. The early Greek materialists looked upon some form of Matter as the fundamental reality and all phenomena as evolved from it. To a school of present-day scientists also, Matter-stuff is the primal substance and Consciousness, one of the products or bye-products of the brain. It seems that in ancient India too, there was a class of thinkers who were extreme materialists. These philosophers, *cārvākas* as they were called used to contend that the material elements were the ultimate realities and consciousness, only a bye-product of them. Idealism, on the contrary, tends to deprive Matter of much of its importance. To some of the extreme idealists, Matter is an illusion. To others, eg the Hegelians, it is not an independent reality but a form or mode of the self-estrangement of the Absolute,—the *other*, in and through which it realizes itself. In India, we have the *Inānādvaita* school of the Buddhist *Viśācāra* school, according to which all phenomena of the world, including Matter are essentially but idea and we have also the school of *Rāmānuja* who maintains that *Aśut* or matter is intended for and in-formed by the Spirit. The *Jaina* philosophy is opposed to materialism on the one hand and to idealism on the other. Like the Christians, the *Jains* frankly maintain that Soul and Matter are equally real substances and neither of them is derivable from the other. They call matter *Pudgala*. The word occurs in some places of the orthodox and the Buddhist writings as well, but there it means either Soul or Body. *Pudgala* has thus a peculiar sense in the *Jaina* metaphysics.

The early Greek philosophers were ever in search of a primordial substance which might be regarded as the basal Element of all the things of the world. Thales looked upon Water as the ultimate element, Anaximenes declared it to be Air. Heraclitus regarded Fire as the primal substance of which all things were transformations, to Empedocles, Earth, Air, Fire and Water were the four "roots" of things. The *Bhūtas* (material Elements) of Indian philosophy are generally conceived to be akin to these primordial Elements in Greek thought. But this is

most probably an erroneous view. For, while the Elements in Pre-Socratic philosophy were conceived as *living* substances, Matter in Indian thought was purely *material*. The early Greek philosophy was hylozoistic while the Indian systems, so far as their conception of matter was concerned, were rigidly materialistic.

Coming to the doctrine of the ultimate particles of material Elements, we see that the '*Parmanu*' of the Indian philosophy is essentially different from the '*Atom*' of the Greek thought. Here also the Indian theory seems to be nearer to the scientific conceptions of the present day than the Greek doctrine. To the Hellenic atomists, an Atom was an ultimate particle of substance which could not be divided ('*cut*') any further. A gross material thing is extended and the space, occupied by one such gross thing, cannot be occupied by another such thing while the former occupies it. The Greek atomists applied these characteristics of a gross material thing to the Atom also and held that the Atom, small as it is, is an extended substance, absolutely hard and impenetrable. The scientists of modern day have doubted whether we are justified in regarding Extension and Impenetrability as primary attributes of Matter and for the matter of that of an Atom. When we come in contact with a material thing,—what we feel is simply that some force in us has met with a force outside us. Hardness and Extension (i.e. filling space) are thus secondary attributes of Matter. Primarily, Matter and likewise an Atom is a force. Accordingly, the modern physicists e.g. Bose, etc., have eliminated Extension and Impenetrability as primary attributes of Matter and are disposed to hold that an Atom is rather a point endowed with inertia and certain powers of mutual attraction and repulsion. It may be doubted whether inertia and the powers of mutual attraction and repulsion are sufficient to explain the variedness in material phenomena and whether we should not suppose additional potentialities in Matter. But this much is certain that according to scientific thought an ultimate material Atom is but a *point*, a seat of potentialities or forces, as modern science calls them.

In the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, the *Sthūla Bhūtas* or gross material Elements are said to evolve from the *Tanmātras* or subtle Elements. These *Tanmātras* are of *Rūpa*, of *Rasa* etc. etc. This clearly means that the *Tanmātra* or the subtle Element is devoid of all the characteristics of a gross material thing. It is not conceived as a hard or impenetrable substance, filling space. It is rather a potentiality becoming explicit in its explaining

Form (*Rūpa*), Taste (*Rasa*) and so on. With reference to the characteristics of a gross thing, the subtle material Elements of *Sāṅkhya* philosophers, far from being hard and space-filling Atoms, may be treated as almost immaterial. They are potentialities. This practically immaterial character of the subtle Matter in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is further apparent from the fact that the *Tanmātras* are said to have come out of *Ahankāra*,—not certainly a hard and impenetrable substance,—but an immaterial principle from which the senses are generated. At any rate, Matter in the *Sāṅkhya* system is only a potentiality and has not certainly Extension and Impenetrability as its primary attributes.

The ' *Anu* ' of the *Nyāya* philosophy also is not identical with the Atom of the Greeks. We are told that ' *Manas* ' or Mind is an *Anu* [Vide *Nyāya-Sūtra* 3 2 63]. This doctrine seems to set aside all attempts to identify *Anu* with the impenetrable and space-filling Atom, for *Manas* cannot be said to be a hard substance. As regards the nature of a material *Anu*, *Gautama* states significantly in aphorism 4 2 20 — that there is no ' *within* ' or ' *without* ' in an *Anu*. What can it be, then, but a geometrical point,—a metaphysical centre? An impenetrable and extended substance like an Atom, however infinitesimally small it may be, must have an interior and exterior and if ' *Anu* ' has no ' *Antar* ' and ' *Bahir* ', as *Gautama* contends, it is certainly different from the Atom of the Greek thought. In the *Nyāya* system, Senses are said to be material in essence. This is perhaps another argument in support of our contention that so far as *Gautama* was concerned, he did not look upon Extension and Impenetrability as the primary attributes of matter.

Coming to the *Jaina* conception of *Pudgala*, we find that it stands for Matter in both its gross and subtle states. In its subtle state, *Pudgala* no doubt exists in space, but it is more like a mathematical point than a hard and extended substance. The author of the *Pañcāsti-kāya-samayasāra* describes subtle Matter as " *Nānavakāśo* ", i.e., spatial and as " *Nā Sāvakāśo* " i.e., non-spatial. The contradiction which is apparent in such a description will disappear only if the *Pudgala-Paramāṇu* be conceived as a geometrical point, a seat of potentialities. That Matter in its extremely subtle state is not conceived primarily as an impenetrable, extended substance will also appear from the *Jaina* enumeration of the *Pradeśas* in *Pudgala*. A *Pradeśa* is that much of space which is occupied by one indivisible *Paramāṇu* of Matter. Now, *Pudgala* is said to have (i) numerable, (ii) innumerable and (iii) infinite *Pradeśas*. The *Pradeśas*, obstructed

by the *Paramāṇus* forming a particular compound thing can be counted while the *Pradeśas* occupied by all the *Paramāṇus* which exist in the *Lokākāśa*, a limited space after all, are obviously innumerable. But how can Matter be said to have infinite *Pradeśas*? The *Jaina* thinkers point out that the number of *Pudgala-Paramāṇus* in a subtle state may be infinite and hence the *Pradeśas* of *Pudgala* may be infinite. The author of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra-vārttika* distinctly says, "You cannot say that the *Paramāṇus* cannot be infinite in number as there is no infinite number of rooms for them in the universe. The *Paramāṇus* in their subtle state can interpenetrate or *in-form* one another." The subtle *Paramāṇus*, then,—any number of them—can occupy one and the same space simultaneously. This is possible,—it need scarcely be said—only if the subtle *Pudgala* be a geometrical point.

It thus appears that the Indian conception of *Paramāṇu* is essentially different from the Greek idea regarding an Atom. While the Greek Atom is but an infinitesimally small bit of Matter, impenetrable and extended,—the Indian *Paramāṇu* like the modern scientist's Atom is primarily a geometrical point in space. Accordingly, the '*Ap*' of the Indian philosophers is not correctly understood, if it be identified with the Water of Thales. Water is a compound substance and the Greek philosopher was wrong in looking upon it as the primordial Element. We venture to think that the '*Ap*' of Indian philosophy is a force or potentiality which accounts for the *Rasa*, liquidness or taste of a thing. And so about the other *Bhūtas* or *Dhātus*. All of them are like the mathematical centres or seats of potences, explaining the gross material phenomena which are the objects of our perception. They are neither gross matters, as we ordinarily suppose, nor infinitesimally small bits of extended gross matters, as the early Greeks supposed the Atoms to be. In a sense, the *Bhūtas* of Indian philosophy seem to be subtler than the Elements of modern science. The Elements produce material phenomena which are perceived by our senses. *Bhūtas* may be understood even to go beyond and permeate these Elements of modern science and explain the genesis of the material phenomena arising from them. The *Bhūtas* are ultimate principles which *in-form* every Element of modern science. It is of course not denied that one Element is different from the other but all the Elements are similar in this respect that their products are variously perceptible by our senses. This similarity points to the *Bhūta*-potences underlying the Elements and regulating their products and phenomena.

At any rate, if, as many scientists suspect, many of what we call Elements may be but compounds which we have not succeeded in decomposing and if the Elemental Atoms accepted by modern chemistry may probably be molecules made up of still more ultimate atoms,—the *Bhūtas* were meant and understood as something like such primordial substrata, by the early Indians. The Elements are the basal principles of the material phenomena which appeal to our senses and the *Bhūtas* may be said to be the ultimate forces or potentialities, underlying the Elements themselves, and explaining their capability to be the basis of the sensible phenomena. The fact that the *Bhūtas* are actually supposed by some of the Indian philosophical systems to be the material basis of our Senses, shows also that the *Bhūtas* were meant to be the ultimate principles, explaining the sensibility of phenomena.

The *Chārṇāka* thinkers in India contended that *Kṣiti*, *Ap*, *Tejas* and *Marut*,—ordinarily translated as Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—were the four primordial *Bhūtas*. Of these, *Kṣiti* is the principle which explains Odour (*Gandha*) of things, *Ap* accounts for their Taste (*Rasa*), *Tejas*, their Colour (*Rūpa*) and *Marut*, their Touch (*Sparsa*). From this some philosophers maintain that each of the *Bhūtas* has only one quality,—*Kṣiti* has *Gandha*, *Ap* has *Rasa* and so on. Probably, the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy would lend support to such a theory. The *Naiyāyikas*, on the contrary, while admitting that each of the *Bhūtas* has a prominent quality characteristic of it,—assert that *Kṣiti* has four qualities, Odour, Savour, Colour and Tangibility, *Ap* has three qualities viz., Savour, Colour and Tangibility, *Tējas* has two qualities viz., Colour and Tangibility and *Marut* has only one quality viz., Tangibility [Vide 3 1 64 — *Nyāya-Sūtras*]. The *Vedānta* which, while proclaiming the nothingness of the world, admits its reality for practical purposes, maintains essentially the same theory.

According to the *Jānas*, “material substances are possessed of Tangibility, Taste, Odour and Colour” [Vide *Tattvārthadharmasūtra* v 23]. In other words, with the *Jānas* also, the above four are the qualities of Matter. But while the other Indian schools maintain that there are more than one *Bhūtas*,—all essentially different from one another, the *Jānas* contend that all Matter is but one substance, having the aforesaid four attributes. We may call Matter *Kṣiti*, *Ap* etc according to the prominence in it of one of those four qualities but we must not forget that all Matter, whether it is *Kṣiti* or *Ap* or *Tejas* or *Marut*, has all the four characteristics and as such, all *Bhūtas* are

but essentially one. One may think that in this *Jaina* theory of the one-ness of ultimate Matter, we have a foreshadowing of the conjecture of the present-day scientists that the so-called Elements may be but compounds of one or two ultimate simple substances.

The *Bhūtas* and the *Pudgala* are thus ultimate material principles, explaining the phenomena which appeal to our sense-organs. But what about Sound? The *Nayānyikas* as well as the *Vedāntins* agree that our auditory sensations are to be explained by the supposition of another *Bhūta* viz. *Ākāśa*. *Ākāśa* is ordinarily translated as Ether. It is said that the quality of *Ākāśa* is Sound. In 2124 of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*, *Kaṇāda* says that sound must be supposed to be the quality of *Ākāśa*, because of the argument that "every quality found in the effect must be referred to the quality in the cause." In other words, Sound is said to be possible because of the existence of *Ākāśa* a material *Bhūta*. And just as *Kṣiti*, *Ap*, *Tejas* and *Varuṇ* are supposed to be the material constituents and basis of our sense-organs of Smell, Taste, Sight and Touch respectively, *Ākāśa* is the Element, of which our Sense of Hearing is made. Sound is thus a quality. The *Nayānyikas* contend that this attribute is to be found in *Ākāśa* and *Ākāśa* alone. The *Vedāntins*, on the contrary, maintain that while it is the sole and distinctive quality of *Ākāśa*, it is nevertheless present in all the other four *Bhūtas*.

The *Jainas*, however, deny that Sound is a quality. It is according to them only a modification of *Pudgala*,—not one of its qualities. "Sound results from *Skandhas*" says, *Kundakundācārya*. "*Skandhas* are the aggregates of *Paramāṇus*. When these molecular masses or aggregates strike against one another, Sound is produced, which may be natural or artificial." Sound, according to the *Jainas*, is thus not an attribute of *Pudgala*—*Paramāṇu*, like Taste, Smell, Touch and Colour, it is only a mode of the molecular mass i.e., it is produced only when a gross substance strikes against another. If, then, Sound is not a quality, there need not be any material Element viz. *Ākāśa*, having Sound as its distinctive quality. Accordingly, the *Jainas* do not admit the reality of *Ākāśa* as a material substance.

It is to be noted, however, that although *Ākāśa* is no *Pudgala* or material Element, according to the *Jainas*, they admit the reality of *Ākāśa* as a non-psychical substance. It is characterized by the quality of giving space to all spatial things. "The attribute of *Ākāśa*," says the author of the *Tattvārthadhigama Sūtra* "is to give room to all substances." It is Space which is one pervading Substance. It seems that the *Vedāntins*, although

it attributes Sound to *Ākāśa*,—is inclined to admit the *Jaina* theory of *Ākāśa*. In the fifty-fourth stanza of the second chapter of *Pañca-dasī*, its author distinctly says: “*Ākāśa* is the first modification of *Māyā* and is characterized by *Avakāśa*.” *Avakāśa* is emptiness in which things are contained or rather, which makes the spatial existence of things possible. The philosophers of the *Sāṅkhya* school also maintain that the characteristic of *Ākāśa* is that things are contained in it. In 2-1-20 of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* *Kaṇāda* criticizes this *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, but he admits that *Ākāśa*, although it is a material Element having Sound as its attribute, is not atomic. It is according to him also one and an all-pervasive substance. One man is happy but another is unhappy at the very same moment, this leads us to admit the multiplicity of souls but in the case of *Ākāśa*, we have the quality of Sound in every part of it,—this is how *Kaṇāda* establishes the one-ness of *Ākāśa*.

Pudgala is thus Matter of which things having forms or shapes are made. According to the *Jainas*, the bodies, speech and acts of inhalation and exhalation,—all these are due to *Pudgala* being attached to the *Jīva*. It is Matter sticking to a Soul which accounts for the latter's births and re-births in the *Samsara*. It follows that pleasure and pains experienced by a soul in the world, its very life and death here are all due to its attachment to *Pudgala* which is so foreign to its essence.

GUṆAS OF PUDGALA

The *Jaini* philosophers consider a substance from two view points viz. of its Qualities and of its Modes. It has already been observed that according to the *Jainas* Matter is characterized by four primary attributes—touch, taste, smell and colour. Of these, touch is said to be of eight kinds,—soft (*Mṛda*) hard (*Kathina*), heavy (*Guru*) light (*Laghū*), cold (*Śīta*), hot (*Uṣṇa*), smooth (*Smadha*) and rough (*Rukṣa*). Taste is of five varieties—pungent (*Tikta*) sour (*Kaṭuka*), acid (*Āmla*), sweet (*Mañjura*) and astringent (*Kasāya*). Two kinds of smell are recognized,—fragrant (*Saṃdha*) and bad (*Asaṃdha*). Flues are said to be of five kinds—they are blue (*Nīla*), Yellow (*Pīta*), white (*Śukla*), black (*Kṛṣṇa*) and red (*Lohita*). Without entering into finer details, we may say that the thinkers of the other schools of Indian philosophy also, nay the philosophers of ancient schools as a rule,—admitted that the attributes of colour, taste, smell and touch inhere in Matter. This doctrine

seems to have been a very ancient one and a common conception among the philosophers of old.

But what about Sound? The thinkers of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools maintained, as we have already noticed, that sound is a quality, inherent in an invisible, all-pervading substance, 'Ākāśa'. "Every sound," says the author of the *Bhāṣya-Paṇcheda* "inheres in Ākāśa, it is perceived by us when it is produced in our ear. According to some, it is produced like a succession of waves; while others contend that the phenomena resembles the *Kadamba-bud*." The meaning is that a violent contact or separation of hard substances effects a contact or separation in Ākāśa pervading those substances. The vibration thus caused in the Ākāśa in which sound as a quality is inherent makes sound explicit which coming in contact with the Ākāśa in the hearer's ears makes itself heard. In sum, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* theory is that (1) Sound, as we hear it, is carried to our ears as a vibration or an on-coming wave. (2) This vibration is of or rather in an all-pervading substance, called Ākāśa, of which sound is a quality.

With the orthodox *Mīmāṃsakas*, the *Vedas* were the absolutely infallible authority. The *Vedas*, however, consist in Sound. Hence if Sound were nothing more than an attribute of a substance, it seems that the *Vedas* cannot be looked upon as the eternal and the immutable authority. Accordingly the thinkers of the *Mīmāṃsā* school enunciated the curious doctrine that Sound-in-itself or the Noumenal Sound is a real substance. They contended that underlying the varied phenomenal sounds (*Dhvanis* as they called them) there is the eternal and the unchangeable Noumenal Sound (the *śphṛta*), which is a substance.

Roughly speaking, according to the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, sound is a quality while according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, it is a substance. The *Jaina* theory of Sound seems to be a mean between the two. The *Jainas* do not recognize Ākāśa as a material substance, nor do they look upon Sound as a quality of Matter. They admit that sound, as we hear it is carried to our ears as a vibration or an on-coming wave, but on this account, it need not be an attribute of a substance, Ākāśa. Sound is a mode of Matter, it is Matter itself, modified in a certain way. Sound is heard when that peculiarly modified Matter,—Matter in vibration—is carried to our ears.

But although the *Jainas* reject the *Nyāya* doctrine of Sound and seem to agree with the *Mīmāṃsakas* to some extent, they differ from the latter on very important points. First of all,

the *Jainas* maintain that all Sounds are non-eternal, temporary phenomena, on this point, they agree with the *Nayāyikas* and differ from the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophers, according to whom, there is a Noumenal Sound which is eternal and unchanged. Secondly, although the *Jainas* admit that Sound is substantial, their doctrine is that it is not Matter as it is in itself, it is only a mode of *Pudgala*, a peculiar modification of it, — a passing phase

PARYĀYAS OF PUDGALA

Coming to the consideration of Matter in its modifications i.e., the aspect of its *Paryāyas*, we find the author of the *Dratyā Saṃgraha* stating, "Modifications of Matter are Sound, Combination, Minute, Gross, Shape, Separation, Darkness, Shadow, Brilliance and Heat." Of these, the nature of Sound has already been briefly described.

With regard to these modifications of *Pudgala* the author of the *Pancash-kāya* speaks of its four possible state or conditions viz., *Skandha*, *Skandha-Pradesa*, *Skandha-Desa* and *Paramāṇu*. The first is Matter in its gross form — material body having all the physical qualities without exception while the last, the *paramāṇu* or *Skandha-Desa*, is described as the half of *Skandha* and *Skandha-Pradesa* the half of *Skandha-Desa*. Thus, while *Skandha* is a complete molecular constitution, *Skandha-Desa* and *Skandha-Pradesa* are incomplete masses although both of them are aggregates of *Paramāṇus*. Of the four modes of Matter, just described, *Skandha* and *Paramāṇu* are the most important, for they exhibit Matter in two of its extreme forms.

We shall close this essay with a further short consideration of the *Jaina* doctrines of *Paramāṇu* and *Skandha*.

PARAMĀNU.

The essential nature of the ultimate Matter-stuff has already been touched upon. The *Paramāṇu* is eternal in as much as it was never created by any Being and as it will never be destroyed. Sound is a modification of Matter according to the *Jainas* and as such, does not belong to the ultimate Atom. The *Paramāṇu* is accordingly described as '*Asabda*' i.e., silent or unsounding. There can be no Matter-stuff finer than the *Paramāṇu* which is thus the limit of all molecules and gross material substances. All things having form are the aggregates of *Paramāṇus* and so, logically, at least, the *Paramāṇu* must be conceived as of corporeal form. Earth, Water, Air and Fire were looked upon as the primal material element by some of the early Greek

thinkers. The author of the *Pacūsti-Kāya-Samaya-sara* distinctly says that the *Paramānu* is subtler than these Elements in as much as it is "*Dhādū-chadukkassa Kāraṇam*" i.e., the cause of these four Elements. The *Paramānu* is *spatial* as it is undoubtedly a point in space, but this does not mean that it is a minute, hard, impenetrable substance like the Atom of Democritus. The *Jaina* philosopher call the *Paramānu*, *non-spatial* also, so that their theory resembles the modern scientific conception of the Atom as a geometrical centre of force.

According to the *Jainas*, it is the *Paramānu* which by its motion from one space-point to the immediate next determines the minutest instant of time, in other words, an instant or the shortest point or period of *Kala* corresponds to the motion of a *Paramānu* from the spatial point occupied by it to the immediate next. A *Paramānu* is thus the *measure of time*. The quantity or density (*Dhṛṣṭi*) of a material mass as well as the extent of space (*Kṣātra*), occupied by it, depend obviously on the *Paramānu*—the constitutive elements of the mass. The temporal order (*Kala*) of the mass is also dependent on the *Paramānu*s. And finally, the *Paramānu*s through their aggregation and disintegration determine the varied modifications (*Bhāva*) of a material substance. For these reasons, a *Paramānu* is looked upon as the '*Paṭiballa*' or '*Sankha*' i.e., determinant of the number or quantity of a material mass.

The constitutive *Paramānu*s thus are what differentiate one *chandra* from another. They by their combination or disintegration make or unmake the *Skandhas*. It is doubtful if the mystery with regard to the actual mode of the *Paramānu*s, combining with one another has been satisfactorily solved. What so far the scientists have been able to determine is that a peculiar combination of elemental atoms yields a peculiar effect but the question *how* the atoms do actually combine remains unanswered still. We need not enter into details here of the *Jaina* account of the combination of the *Paramānu*s. According to *Unā-Srāṇi*, the atoms of Matter unite, because of their attributes which he calls '*Smṛṣṭhata*' or smoothness and '*Rukṣata*' or roughness. He says that an Atom with the minimum degree of smoothness or roughness cannot combine with another, that Atoms with equal degree of smoothness or roughness of the same state cannot combine with an Atom of their own or of the opposite state, that in order that an Atom may unite with another, there should be a difference of two degrees of smoothness or roughness between them. It is difficult indeed to correctly understand the implica-

tions of these doctrines of the author of the *Tattvārtha-Sūtram*. One thing, however, is certain—that he did not intend the terms, *Smadha* and *Rukṣa* to be taken in their literal sense. We have tried to show how the *Paramānu* or the ultimate stuff of Matter was conceived by the Jūdrin philosophers, not as hard and impenetrable material particles, but rather as mathematical centres, almost immaterial, so to say. The attributes, Smoothness and Roughness, as ordinarily understood, can belong only to a material mass or massive Matter, they cannot apparently mean anything when applied to non-spatial space-points, as the *Paramānu*s are. We are accordingly tempted to think that the attributes Smoothness and Roughness when applied to the ultimate Atoms, can only mean a peculiar capacity and a responsive reciprocity in them to combine with one another.

There is another point regarding the *Paramānu* which we want to notice very briefly before we finish our consideration of the nature of an Atom. *Putakā* has been described by the *Jūnys* as characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour. The *Paramānu* as the ultimate stuff of *Putakā* must accordingly be thought of as a potentiality which makes the e-s-sential phenomena explicit in the *Skandha* or material mass. Now Touch has been said to be of eight kinds, 'Taste' of five, 'Smell', of two and colour', of five varieties. The *Jūni* philosophers, however, maintain that an Atom has single taste, colour and smell and two contacts. Are we, then to suppose that Atoms are of different kinds, rather of different stuffs,—so that some are red colour-atoms, some, blue-colour-atoms, some, yellow-colour-atoms, some cold-touch-atoms, some rough-touch-atoms, some acid-taste-atoms, some, sweet-taste-atoms, some fragrant-smell-atoms, some loathsome-smell atoms, and, so on? We think, the fundamental doctrine of the *Paramānu*, as enunciated by the *Jūnys*, would not permit the recognition of any such qualitative differences in the Atoms. Atoms in themselves are all strictly similar to each other not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. This means that all the varieties of touch, taste, smell and colour are implicit in each and every Atom. Every Atom is capable of producing any colour, any taste, any smell and any touch. What, then, is meant when the *Paramānu* is said to be of only one single taste, colour etc.? We think, here the nature of the *Paramānu* is considered with reference to its corresponding gross material mass. A *Skandha* or a molecular mass, as every one knows can have only one taste, it cannot have all the five tastes at one and the same time. So, as regards smell, it is either

agreeable or disagreeable,—cannot be both. Similarly, with regard to colour, it is either red or yellow etc and cannot be of more than one colour at one and the same time. And lastly, as regards touch, a material gross thing can have two i.e., a pair of compatible touches at one time e.g. heat and roughness, cold and smoothness and not all the eight forms at once. It seems that when the Atom is said to be of one taste etc etc, all that is meant is that so far and so long as you consider the characteristics of a particular *Skandha* you must attribute the same qualities to its constituent Atoms. Thereby, however, the capacity of an Atom to develop different characteristics in different *Skandhas* is by no means denied. When we have a particular *Skandha* manifesting particular characteristics we are to attribute only those particular characteristics to its constituent *Paramāṇus*, this does not mean that those *Paramāṇus* can on no account evolve different characteristics. While commenting on the doctrine that a *Paramāṇu* has a single taste colour etc etc, Professor Chakravarty says, "This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are identical material units." He stops abruptly, creating an impression that we are here faced to face with a contradiction in the *Jaina* theory,—a riddle which it is impossible to explain. The contradiction, it seems to us, would disappear if we remember that an atom is to be said to be of one colour one taste etc etc, only in reference to the gross thing of which it is a constituent part. A *Paramāṇu* in itself is a potentiality for any of the sense phenomena. Thus, in the technical terms of the *Jaina* epistemology, we may say that from the view-point of their *Draṅga* or essential substance all the Atoms are similar and there is no qualitative difference among them but that from the view-point of their *Paryāṇa* or modifications in gross material things, an Atom has only one single taste smell etc, so that there is to be admitted a qualitative difference among the Atoms.

While expounding this above view of ours, we are not unmindful of what *Akubhika* states in the connection "The *Paramāṇu*," he says, "is to be known as of one taste, one smell. Why? Because it has no varied parts." He argues that while a peacock, as a gross thing, may have different colours, you cannot attribute more than one colour to the Atom. Closely viewed, the theory of *Akubhika* does not go against what we have stated. When he says that a peacock has varied colours all that he means

is that the different parts of a peacock's body have different colours. We agree with *Akalanka* in admitting that a particular colour,—and no other colour,—is to be attributed to those Atoms which constitute that part of the peacock's body which bears that particular colour. But this does not mean that those Atoms are eternally of that colour only and that they are never capable of producing any other colour. *Akalanka* must have meant that when those Atoms combined to make that particular part of the peacock's body, they developed only that one single colour,—the capacity for producing other colours being allowed to remain dormant, rather in abeyance, in them, for the time being.

SKANDHA

Skandha, as said already, is a complete molecular constitution. Although the term *Pudgala* is strictly applicable to matter in its ultimate form, that is to say, to *Paramāṇu*. *Skandha*, a gross body as it is, is also called *Pudgala*. In a *Skandha*, we have the material qualities of touch, taste, odour and colour in their explicit manifestation. It is defined as "*Sakala-samastham*" (*Sakala-samasta*) i.e., a complete molecule. Such a molecular body is said to be capable of existing in any of the six forms—

1 *Būdhara-būdhara* a solid thing. Under this class come those substances which we ordinarily call solid and hard.

2 *Būdhara* a liquid thing. The characteristic of such a substance e.g. Water is that its parts become combined as soon as they are separated.

3 *Sūkṣma-būdhara* a substance, appearing as solid. Instances of such a substance are Darkness, Lightning, Shadow—a mass of which can neither be broken nor separated nor caught.

4 *Būdhara-Sūkṣma* a small particle, capable of being perceived. A substance under this class is very minute, although it is perceptible by the senses of touch, taste, smell and hearing.

5 *Sūkṣma* a particle, so small as to be imperceptible. *Karma-Pudgala* is a substance of this nature which is so minute as to be imperceptible.

6 *Sūkṣma-Sūkṣma* an extremely small particle. Such a substance is minuter than even *Karma-Pudgala*. It is *skandha* all the same and may be an aggregate made up of two *Paramāṇus* only.

"The six forms of molecular aggregates", says *Kundakundīcārya*, "are Earth, Water, Shadow, the Objects of the four senses, *Karma* and Molecules beyond *Karma*". Obviously, this list is only illustrative and not a complete one.

PHENOMENALIST PSYCHOLOGY OF

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(I)

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1 *Definition of Psychology the psychical event, as such*
Bradley and Bosanquet

In Bradley's treatment of Psychology as a special science, we find the complementary aspect of his theory of judgment, as worked out in Logic. In an article in *Mind* ('A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology') Bradley makes a clear and definite statement of his position. There we are told that Psychology has to do with psychical events which, for the particular purpose in hand, must be taken to mean adjectives qualifying the soul and happening to it. These facts are events in time, and each has a place in the history of the real world in general as well as of a particular soul. And apart from this, Psychology has to study these events in their relations of sequence and of co-existence within one soul. "The mere course of psychical events, as such, happening within a single organism and the laws of co-existence and sequence between these events will then be the object of Psychology".¹ The words 'mere' and 'as such' in this definition have been inserted in order to indicate the abstraction by which Psychology is taken as a special science viz the abstraction from the content and meaning for which the bare psychical event stands. And that is the reason why in Psychology no question regarding ultimate truth need be raised, as that involves the use of meaning, and significant contents.

Bosanquet also seems to adopt a similar view with regard to the scope and province of Psychology. According to him, no special province can be marked off for Psychology as its special subject-

* This article forms part of a Thesis, written in 1927-28 under the supervision of Mr G R G Mure, Merton College, Oxford and the guidance of Professor H H Joachim, Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and was approved by the University of Oxford for the degree of Bachelor of Letters.

1 *Mind* (1900), p 28

matter. The limit here is one of "point of view" only. The psychological and logical modes of regarding the 'contents' of the mind are to be distinguished. The "formed world" as it exists for me is more than an event in my mind, "but it is an event in my mind, and it is only from this latter point of view that Psychology considers it. What 'more' it may be is a question for other sciences."¹

2 *The process of apprehending is the object apprehended: the process seems empty.*

We have here a definite statement about the scope and nature of Psychology and it should not be a difficult task to investigate whether the definitions given by Bradley and Bosanquet can be consistently maintained. We have first of all to meet the difficulty whether 'the psychical events' which are the object of study in Psychology, according to the definitions given above, are the fleeting and transitory parts of a unique and singular process which is equally fleeting and transitory, and if so, how they can form the object of study of a science. In other words, it may be asked, 'What exactly has been left for the psychologist to study?' If we retain the distinction between process of apprehending and object apprehended then the supposed psychical event, be they ideas, images or symbols and their inter-relations are always found to fall on the latter side of the division and thus appear as logical contents rather than *mere* or *bare* psychical events. The supposed psychologist is really a logician in disguise, for he is studying a portion of the subject-matter of Logic, and he is doing so imperfectly in so far as he either does not recognize fully what he is doing or is at least pretending that he does not.²

3 *The bare psychical event refuses to enter into a system of laws or generalisations.*

But apart from this initial difficulty the definitions given above involve another inconsistency, as is evident if we make clear the implications of the terms employed. Not only have we to observe and to study the fleeting 'psychical events', abstracted from their contents and meanings, but we have also to find the laws of coexistence and sequence between such elusive beings. And this seems to be a task more difficult than the former. For a formulation of laws about certain matters means and implies that we are dealing with 'universal contents' and meanings, but this

1 *Psychology of the Moral Self*, pp. 1, 5

2 Joachim *Mind* (1909), p. 78

is exactly what we as psychologists are forbidden to do. The bare 'psychical event' must either refuse to enter into a system of laws, or it no longer remains a bare event. It assumes a meaning and significance and clearly passes beyond the scope of the psychologist. Thus if Psychology is to be the science which Bradley and Bosanquet make it to be, it has a self-defeating and a contradictory task. The only way out of the dilemma seems to be by a frank admission that Psychology does deal and must deal with contents and not with 'pure psychical event' whatever these latter might be.

4 *The relations of succession and coexistence between events*
Atomistic suggestion

Apart from the difficulty of arriving at general laws about the unique psychical events, there is a more serious objection to the language that Bradley, for instance, employs in his definition of Psychology. When we talk of studying the psychical events in their relations of sequence and coexistence we are suggesting that each event is a complete unit by itself, by opening in the soul either together with or before or after another equally complete and independent event. The psychologist has nothing to do with any other relation that might exist between the content or meaning of such events. So that for the psychologist and phenomenologist, there are only the relations of succession and simultaneity between these closed and complete units, called events. And this is exactly the position of Atomistic Psychology, against which Bradley strongly protested. But it seems that in spite of his repeated attacks on Atomism, he could not help catching the infection himself - a fact which is clear from the language he uses. And it is very probable that the infection went beyond the language and affected the thought underlying it. For the succession and coexistence of events in the mind suggest once a collection of pebbles in a box, and this language notion he used, if that misleading atomistic suggestion is to be avoided.

It is interesting to compare the language used by Bradley in the above definition of Psychology with what he says elsewhere about the connection between Psychology and Atomism. In an earlier article in *Mind*, he attacks the English school for turning their "dogmatic Atomism" into the formulations of psychological laws (for instance, the notorious laws of Association) and says that "whatever it might be as a statement of 'first principles', Atomism "had no right to interfere with an empirical science" ¹

¹ *Mind* (1887), p. 306

Little did Bradley suspect, while making that statement, that he would himself, in his formulation of a definition for empirical psychology, be guilty of unconsciously importing the essence of the Atomistic theory

5 *Association, a matter of universal content, is not a topic for Psychology*

It is, however significant to notice that, in his attack on the Atomistic formulation of the laws of Association, he suggests a constructive theory of Association, which seems to take Association, beyond the possibility of being treated by Psychology according to his own definition of that science "Hence the Atomism must go wholly, and the 'associative links' must be *connections of content*, not conjunctions of existences, "in other words, *association unites only universals*"¹ Here Bradley is clearly in conflict with his definition of Psychology which cannot deal with "connections of content" whatever that phrase exactly means. It has to limit its functions to investigating "the relations of sequence and coexistence" between psychological events and also, if it is to remain an empirical science, to admit that there *are* any other relations between such events. In other words it has to do with 'conjunctions of existences', the coming together in the same or successive times of atomistic events and not with Association or its laws because that is rightly described by Bradley as the linking of contents. And with the advance of Bradley on the old theories of Association, we have to admit not only that Psychology has nothing to do with Association but also (and this is a greater trouble) that Psychology has to rest satisfied with an implicit Atomism which, by its own definition, it can neither discuss nor reject.

6 *Bosanquet in perfect agreement with Bradley*

Bosanquet seems to be in perfect agreement with Bradley with regard to the whole position. We shall always have Atomism in principle, until the content of the soul connects *things together*, and in order to do this it must go beyond events to meanings. So long as events are connected instead of contents, we continue to have psychological confusion"² Now all this is very true, but what, it may be asked, has Bosanquet done towards the clearing up of this confusion in Psychology? Obviously he has advanced no further than Bradley and it is apparent that (1) so long as Psychology deals only with events and not with meanings

1 *Ibid*, p. 358

2 *Psychology of the Moral Self*, p. 21

it cannot deal with Association at all, because it is the meaning or content that is associated and (ii) it cannot go out of "Atomism in principle", because, by its very definition, it cannot step beyond events.

7 *Another definition of Psychology — the facts immediately experienced*" (Bradley)

The same antithesis of Psychology as complementary to Logic is implied quite differently in another article in *Mind*, where Bradley defines Psychology as follows: "The facts immediately experienced within a single organism or soul, and those facts regarded merely as events which happen, make the object of Psychology."¹ In the above definition of the subject-matter of Psychology, it is interesting to make explicit the doctrine of immediate experience which is tacitly implied and to compare it with some other statements of Bradley about the relation of immediacy to mediation. In the note appended to that definition he explains the use of the term 'Immediately' thus: "'Immediately' negatives and excludes phenomena so far as their content is used beyond their existence: truth e.g. as truth is not merely psychological."² Here it is clear that Bradley regards 'truth' as having two sides or aspects, a mediate and an immediate one, and it is only with the latter that Psychology has to deal and not with the former. This statement implies that an aspect of immediacy accompanies all thought-relations and distinctions. But, in the same Essay, when he goes on to show how Thought proper develops from the "beginnings of soul-life" he seems to imply quite a different view of 'Immediate Experience'. He says: "In the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented, what is and is felt, or is rather *felt* simply." There are in short no relations and no feelings, only feeling."³ Again "there is at first no self-feeling, even though we mean by that merely one aspect of the whole, and still less is there anything like a subject and object."⁴ And from this beginning of mental life in 'feeling' is developed by a slow and gradual process, through the effect of pleasure and pain, a distinction of self and not-self and finally the fully developed relation of thought. But in this development, thought is divorced from existence and feeling, and is never wholly self-satisfied. It longs "for a fuller, a more

1 *Mind* (1887), p. 304

2 *Mind* (1887), p. 354

3 *Ibid*, p. 363

4 *Ibid*, p. 365

concrete completion, in which *as thought* it would no longer survive"¹ And in this description of thought, Bradley has given up the aspect of immediacy altogether

8 *Two opposed views of Immediate Experience in Bradley*

As a matter of fact, we find, even in his other work, two quite opposed views of Immediate Experience, between which he oscillates. On the one hand, Immediate Experience or Feeling is what we begin with as an actual fact in the history of mental life. It is a stage where distinctions and relations have not yet arisen, not even the distinction between self and not-self, subject and object. Out of this relationless mass of feeling, all distinctions and relations arise, and in this process we transcend the 'immediacy' of feeling altogether. It is only at a higher stage of experience that we can look forward to an immediacy again, but this time it is not purely relationless, but contains all relations in itself, harmonised and brought into an immediate unity. When in this strain, he restricts 'thought proper' to a mediate and relational scheme—a middle region between two poles of immediacy, one below distinctions and the other above them. "Both the 'this' and Reality, we may say, are immediate. But Reality is immediate because it includes and is superior to mediation. It develops, and it brings to unity, the distinctions it contains. The 'this' is immediate, on the other side, because it is at a level *below* distinctions"² In this mood Bradley regards error, appearance and truth alike as belonging to "the intellectual middle-space, the world of reflection and of sundered ideas and of explicit relations."³

9 "Immediacy, a moment in all thinking", the sound view—its connection with the antithesis of Logic and Psychology in conflict with the 'suicide' doctrine of thought

The other view, which is also equally clearly expressed by Bradley in some of his latest works, upholds immediacy as a factor in all experience. It is not true that, when relations and distinctions of self and not-self arise, immediate experience ceases to exist. There is still an immediate background, on which all experience depends and from which it develops. "At no stage of mental development is the mere correlation of subject and object actually given. What is experienced is more than the mere relation. It involves a felt totality, and on this

1 *Mind* (1887), p. 381

2 *Appearance and Reality*, p. 225

3 *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 269

inclusive unity the relation depends"¹ Again, "Immediate experience is not a stage, which may or may not at some time have been there and has now ceased to exist. Every distinction and relation still rests on an immediate background of which we are aware. Thus in all experience we still have *feeling* which is not an object"²

It seems that we should take the latter view as representing the real mind of Bradley—both because it is expressed quite unambiguously in his later work and also because it is in harmony with his general view of relations viz that all relations and distinctions do presuppose a unity in which they exist and from which they diverge. Thus, immediate experience always accompanies mediate thought as an essential phase or moment of complete thinking. This seems to be, on the whole, the sound view of the relation of Immediacy to mediation. And it is interesting to notice that Bradley's antithesis of Logic and Psychology, as dealing with the mediate and immediate aspects of thought respectively, does hang together with this view. Now this antithesis between two special sciences, dealing with two complementary aspects of thought, does not seem to be a tenable one at all. For on the one hand Logic, though it discusses mainly the discursive aspect of thinking, cannot dispense with the immediate unity, in and through which alone the discursus has a significance.³ Psychology, on the other hand, in its attempt to deal with the "immediate facts" of consciousness, slips automatically into the region of mediated contents and indeed cannot do without them, for otherwise it finds itself confronted with a "bare" immediacy, an empty unity of "mere" feeling, about which nothing can be said. Thus though the antithesis maintained by Bradley cannot be tenable, his insistence on it (in the *Terminal Essays in Logic*) at least indicates clearly his mature view about immediacy. And this view is obviously in conflict with his doctrine of thought as a "mediate and relational scheme." With this latter view goes his theory of the "ideality" of thought, viz the divorce in judgment of the content from existence, the "what" from the 'that'. Thought has to work within this distinction, and cannot transcend this dualism. In desiring to transcend it, thought is aiming at suicide. Here, thought is taken to be merely relational and discursive, and has

1. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 209

2. *Ibid.*, p. 173

3. See Section 10 below

no moment of immediacy. "To make it (thought) include immediate experience, its character must be transformed. It must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach *something other than truth*. Thought, in a word, must have been absorbed into a fuller experience. Now such an experience may be called thought, if you *choose* to use that word. But if anyone else prefers another term, such as feeling or will, he would be equally justified."¹

Thus Bradley reduces thought to pure mediation and is consequently forced to hold the suicide doctrine. It is only if we take thought to be purely mediate and discursive that we are obliged to say that in its completion it commits suicide. If there is a moment of immediacy in all discursive thought, then thought in its self-completion will be a perfectly coherent whole, wholly immediate in the sense that the mediation and discursus is all complete within its unity but in no way essentially different from finite thought, except in the character of wholeness and perfection.

Thus, Bradley's antithesis of Psychology and Logic and his view of thought as 'committing suicide' in its own self-completion do not hang together. The distinction, of thought as mediate and logical from thought as immediate and psychological, presupposes that Mediation is not the whole of thought, but only one phase of it, and the other phase of immediacy equally belongs to the essence of thought. And if so, there can be no question of thought's committing suicide, for the 'immediacy', in which thought is merged in its self-completion, is not foreign to it, but is an essential moment throughout its life.

10 *Thought, even as logical, not purely discursive and mediate*
Bosanquet's "Implication" "This or nothing"

But we may finally ask is thought as considered by the logician really pure mediation? Of course, it is true that judgment and inference are primarily discursive activities of the mind, but it is a gross error to resolve them wholly into such a discursus. A certain character of immediacy — the oneness of knowing and being — is necessary for all knowledge. Even in such a purely discursive thinking as the syllogism of Formal Logic, we find that the value of the argument lies in the immediate grasp of the truth contained in it as a whole, rather than in the formal, discursive process. It is this systematic character of logical thought ("implication" as Bosanquet calls

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 171

it ¹) which justifies us in denying a 'level of' consciousness, which could be called "one of mere mediation" It is in view of the immediacy and wholeness of knowledge that we can assert about a judgment or argument "This or nothing" And thus even for Logic, as dealing with judgment and inference, it is wrong to exclude the immediacy of thought, as that would be to rob thought of its most vital element Thus there remains no ground for Bradley's assertion that thought or truth can be considered in two ways, logically and psychically Neither is there any support for his other contention that thought in its self-completion aims at suicide

11. *Bradley's detailed treatment of different Psychological topics*

We have so far considered the two points of view from which Phenomenalist Psychology has been defined by Bradley and we came to the conclusion that neither (i) as dealing with events as opposed to contents, nor (ii) as dealing with "facts immediately experienced" as opposed to mediate truths, can Psychology stand as an object of study, as a special science complementary to Logic But setting aside these objections for a moment, let us ask the question, 'What is the scope of this supposed science? What, for instance, are the topics to be discussed within its province and what would be the method of treatment?' For it might be said that, whatever more or less a-priori objections against the definition might be made, if such a science in fact exists, and is found useful so far as it goes, then Bradley's point of view would be justified, for nothing more was claimed for Psychology as a special science, and we are unjust in demanding ultimate truth from the psychologist Looking the matter from this point of view, we have to go to Bradley's own treatment of the different 'psychological' topics, and to enquire whether he has been able to apply his definition consistently in such a treatment We have first of all to refer to 'Association,' about which it has already been noted ² that it is excluded on Bradley's principles from any psychological treatment And we can argue similarly about other topics which Bradley has tried to treat 'psychologically,' that they are not really so treated It is only because Bradley has deviated from the narrow terms of his own definition that he can claim to have given us a psychological account at all

¹ *Implication and Linear Inference*, pp 92, 166.

² See Sec 5 above

12 *Attention, Conation etc etc - All treatments of 'contents' rather than of bare events*

Let us begin with Bradley's treatment of Attention. That topic is discussed by him in two articles in *Mind*, written at different dates and called "Is there any special activity of Attention?" and "On active attention" respectively. In the first of these, Bradley discusses the question which he puts at the head of the article and gives a purely negative answer. But what is interesting from our point of view is the positive theory of attention that he brings forward. He there comes to the conclusion that when I resolve to attend, I have the idea of myself attending and this idea of myself in such a character "*dominates*" by its pleasure or other associations, and thus prompted by an interest I am so engrossed with the '*dominant idea*' that I am said to be "attending". But there is no specific act of attention, apart from this dominance of a certain idea, because of its interest, intrinsic or associative, direct or indirect.¹ In the second of his articles mentioned above, Bradley departs to some extent from his earlier position, as he now takes attention always in the sense of '*active attending*'.² But without going further into those details, it is interesting to find that Bradley is constantly talking of the "ideal development" of objects in me, as involved in active attending. "Wherever on the other hand an *ideal content* is so interesting in itself as of itself to produce apart from my will, whatever is required for its own psychological maintenance, that maintenance is not active attention and cannot be taken as the work of myself."³

In these discussions on 'Attention' which are clearly meant by Bradley to be psychological, he seems to forget the limits which he himself has fixed for the psychologist, viz that the latter should not go beyond discussing the relations of coexistence and sequence of events, in order to arrive at general laws. But in his own treatment he clearly goes much further. He is asking questions about the nature and meaning of certain ideal contents, e.g. whether they are "*dominant*" and "*interesting*", and if so, whether the interest that they have is "*direct*" or "*indirect*", and so on. But all these questions are clearly questions about the relations of the contents of the mind, not as events, but as significant contents. Thus we find that strictly speaking, Bradley could not

1 *Mind* (1896), pp. 314-316

2 *Mind* (1902), p. 2

3 *Ibid*, p. 10

keep within the narrow bounds imposed by his definition, because that would have resulted in making Psychology purely barren.

The same objection may be made against Bradley's treatment of Conation,¹ Desire² and Volition respectively. With regard to the last (for instance) he says that it is "the self-realisation of an idea with which the self is identified",³ and Psychology must deal with Will in this sense only. But, then, surely Psychology is not confined merely to the treatment of the 'bare event' happening in the soul, for the idea to be realised in volition is clearly more than a bare event. It is full of meaning and relations and no treatment of it could be possible, if we abstracted its happening in the soul from the fullness of its meaning. Indeed, throughout his treatment of the various psychological topics, Bradley has always included the complex contents in his discussion of the psychical events, and it is only by so doing that he has been able to make his discussions useful and intelligible. Had he confined himself strictly within his definition, he could not have made any useful contribution to the subjects treated.

The fact that Bradley could not help bringing in the working of "ideal content," in his psychological discussions, is abundantly clear from an article in *Mind* on "Memory and Inference," (which has been included in the volume "*Essays on Truth and Reality*") where he does not even try to distinguish a psychological treatment of Memory from a logical treatment of it. In fact, though Memory is sharply distinguished from Imagination or fancy, it has been partially identified with judgment and inference. Memory is as much an ideal construction as inference, and it has a sequence and a continuity which is necessary, but the difference is only of degree of 'logical control'. In Inference the necessity is wholly intrinsic, while in memory it is not wholly so. The conclusion in memory is not the result of a development "intrinsic" to the subject from its own nature.⁴ Whatever conclusion we may come to regarding the value of Bradley's treatment of memory, it is clear that as soon as we embark upon the discussion of ideal content, we are stepping into the domains of Logic, and at any rate we are very far from the science (if such a science exists at all) that deals with psychical events, as such. And we have seen that though Bradley has avoided

¹ *Mind* (1901), pp. 437-451.

² *Mind* (1898), pp. 11-25.

³ *Mind* (1902), p. 437.

⁴ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 365-368.

open conflict by unconsciously bringing the ideal content to his aid in psychology, whenever necessary, yet, in so doing, he has given up the position that Psychology, as a science, can abstract from the logical contents and deal with the aspect of lapse or succession of these contents in the soul. If a distinction between the sciences of Logic and Psychology was meant to depend upon that abstraction, Bradley by his own treatment of Psychology has broken down the distinction and made Psychology an introduction to Logic, inasmuch as it deals with the ideal content at a lower stage of development. The absolute distinction of the two sciences has disappeared in his treatment.

FURTHER LIGHT ON THE GAUDAPĀDA KĀRIKĀS *

B N. KRISHNAMURTI SARMA, B A (Hons)

माण्डूक्योपनिषद्गता सुविदिता श्रीगौडपादस्य ये
श्लोकास्तानिह विभ्रमादुपनिषत्वेनैव मेने तथा ।
तद्वाक्या च समातनोत्सुविपुलमानन्दतीर्थस्मृषी-
रित्यद्वैतिजनोक्तदाषदलने बद्धोत्पवोस्म्यादरात् ॥

In the course of a paper contributed by me to the Sixth All India Oriental Conference, Patna, on the Gaudapāda Kārikās and since published in Vol II, No 1, of the *Review*,¹ I maintained that Sri Madhvācārya has been wrongly accused of having mistaken the first twenty-nine Kārikās of Gaudapāda—the grand-preceptor of Sankara—on the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* as part of the original since these twenty-nine Kārikās have been treated as *Śruti* texts by all the prominent exponents of the three Schools of Vedānta such as Sankara,² Ānandagiri, Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda, Rāmānuja, Kuranārāyaṇa, Mahācārya,³ Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsarāja Svāmīn, Rāmācārya etc. It would appear therefore, that Gaudapāda was never at all credited with the authorship of the Kārikās of the first or *Āṅgama Prakarana* as it is called—a designation not without significance in this connection—and that Madhva was propounding no new or startling theory when he identified these twenty-nine 'Kārikās' as part of the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* in his commentary on the same in consonance with early Advaitic tradition also. The testimony of the early Advaitic sources to be set forth in detail in the following pages will amply reinforce this view.

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1 The present article is a continuation from p 56 Vol II, No. 1 of the *Review*.

2 *Vivekaśūdanam*, sl 406

3. *Advaita-Vidyā-Vijaya*

IS THERE ANY PROBLEM AT ALL?

Quite expectedly, my article on the Kārikās has evoked a lot of interesting and hostile criticism on the one hand and some amount of ad hominem criticism on the other. I shall dispose of the latter in a few words. A very learned friend of mine remarked to me that all my endeavour at the 'problem' of the 'Kārikās' is 'love's labor lost'! I can only trust that my friend was not serious at the time. Another competent authority, Mr. A. V. Gopālācārya of Trichinopoly, writes "I do not know" if any of the modern exponents of Advaitism maintain that the *Āgama Prakāraṇa* is not part of the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* but is only a production of Gaudapāda and I should be surprised if such a position should be taken up. There are many other opinions possible on this matter to the Advaitins who considered being no two themselves bound by their Sampradāya. I do not believe that any of them will disown their Sampradāya" (*Italics mine*).

All this amounts to a simple query—Is there anything like a 'problem' of the Kārikās at all? My friendly critics seem to think there is none whatsoever and that I am simply attacking a spectre and a ghost of my own creation! I do not blame them, for they know not what they say. But I must however enlighten them that the admission of the early Advaitins like Sankara notwithstanding, the later Advaitins, their present-day descendants and representatives—mostly English-educated scholars—stoutly maintain that Sri Madhva has committed a serious blunder in misreading the twenty-nine kārīkās of Gaudapāda as part of the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*. In fact, I myself have heard the same charge against Madhva, urged by one of the greatest Sanskrit scholars now living, Mahāmahopādhyaya Vidyāvācaspati Professor S. Kuppasvāmī Sāstriar of the Presidency College, Madras. And I can even say that I owe the first impulse to my recent researches into the Kārikās to a criticism of Madhva in regard to his attitude to the Kārikās which emanated from him. That I am attacking no ghost of my creation would be clear when it is revealed that already at least two prominent scholars (one of them a Professor from Mysore and the other Mr. R. Krishnasvāmī Sāstri, a scholar from the south) have already resolved to refute my position and establish that "so far as the Advaitic position is concerned, there is irrefragable evidence that all the four books were composed by Gaudapāda." It is quite superfluous to add that the noblesse of European scholars and savants generally regard the disputed Kārikās as part of

Gauḍapāda's work for the very simple reason that they are not aware of any other tradition to the contrary. Weber, in his *History of Indian Literature*,¹ opines "The *Māndūkyopaniṣad* is reckoned as consisting of four *upaniṣads*, but only the prose portion of the first of these is to be looked upon as the real *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, all the rest is the work of Gauḍapāda."² Dr A. B. Keith, holds that the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* are "215 memorial verses written by Gauḍapāda, of which the first part deals with the short *Māndūkyopaniṣad*."³ And accredited exponents of Indian Philosophy such as Dr Sir S. Radhakrishnan, also hold the same view.⁴

And quite apart from contemporary critics, it appears that at one time, later Advaitins themselves happened to forget and miss the real position of the first set of Kārikās and attribute it to Gauḍapāda. This initial mistake of the later Advaitins dates from the 18th century or thereabout. This mistake, it appears, began with certain latter-day commentators on the well-known Advaitic works e.g., Rāmānand Tīrtha, commentator on Suresvara's *Mānasollāsa*, Jñānottama,⁵ commentator on Suresvara's *Nāṣkamya Siddhi* and Kṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha, commentator on Appayya's *Siddhāntakhaṇḍa Sūpāṭha*—who seem to regard the first

1 Tr. by John Mann, and Theodor Zehner, Tübingen, 1882.

2 Ibid., p. 161. The Professor unfortunately, confuses the four Khandas of the Upaniṣadic text (prose), with the four chapters of the Kārikās.

3 *History of Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 475-6. Dr Keith, to whom was sent an off-print of my original article, promptly admitted "No doubt there is evidence that the first set of Kārikās is not by Gauḍapāda and very possibly this is the case. It is, not however, clear what he means by this halting and vague confession."

4 The resolute silence maintained by many reputed scholars of Advaita and Professors of Indian Philosophy in general, and the jealously [non-committal] attitude adopted by others in reply to my requests for an expression of their minds only confirms my suspicion that they would fain adopt the excellent policy of giving a dog a bad name and hang him. But such tactics cannot still be repeated with impunity.

5 cf. अथ सङ्क्षेपे नञिद्वितीयेति यदुक्तं तत्र यम, जलवन माहवादीयवाक्यमुदाहरति। अथयति ॥ The text quoted by Suresvara here is वाचकाण्यवर्गं नञि (I, 11), *Nāṣkamya Siddhi* with comment of Jñānottama, p. 192 *Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛit Series*.

twenty-nine kārīkās as Gaudapāda's own. And even as early as the last century, the illustrious Triyambaka Śāstri, is reputed to have found fault with Madhva for his mistaking the Kārīkās of Gaudapāda for *Śruti*. And quite recently, the late lamented Rāmasubbā Śāstrigal of Trivisanallur, a scholar of no mean repute, actually raised the question of the Kārīkās in his criticism of the *Tātparyi Cūḍikā* of Vyāsarāja. In fine, there is historical continuity in the charge against M. dhva, albeit untenable, and the criticisms, veiled attacks, and suppressed sighs of modern scholars against Madhva are simply a recrudescence of the old complaint. As early as the 17th century A.D. the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta Taruṅgi* which is a criticism of the *Advaita Siddhi*, adverts to the problem of the Kārīkās and puts up a defence of Madhva. And it is obvious that it was a burning question of the day. It will thus be seen that I am attacking no ghost of my creation but a stern reality and facing a problem which deserves to be squarely faced by one and all interested in a satisfactory solution of one of the most intriguing of textual problems in Indian philosophical literature.

V

Since the publication of my article, in the March number of the *Review*, I have been carrying on further researches into the problem of the Kārīkās and I propose to place the results of my investigations before impartial scholars and critics in the following pages.

I must herein mention that Dr. A. B. Keith, of the Edinburgh University, acknowledging receipt of an offprint of my article writes under date 7, vi 31 —

"I have read your paper on the *Gaudapāda Kārīkās* with interest. No doubt there is evidence that the first set of Kārīkās is not by Gaudapāda, and very possibly this is the case.

I am very doubtful whether it is the case that Gaudapāda is a plagiarist (pp 12,13). The evidence of Viṇāṇa Bhikṣu in citing the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* is insufficient and so also his mere reference to *Śruti*"¹

I have already referred to the reported criticisms of my article by two scholars from South India. Needless to add I await their threatened action¹.

¹ These and other objections of Dr. Keith will be dealt with in a separate note.

I have been accused by some critics of partiality¹ to Madhva in undertaking a vindication of his attitude toward the Kārikās. To such my only answer is that they are using the term partiality in the wrong sense. Indeed, on such a view, any one writing on any topic can be accused of partiality to that topic or the subject of his writings. No man can thus afford to escape the charge. But as Zeller has it, real philosophical impartiality lies not merely in the absence of all pre-appositions but in bringing to bear presuppositions that are true. The case is not different with historical or textual problems. My point is that Madhva has been *wrongly* accused of misreading the Kārikās of Gaudapāda as part of the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*, and if one were to point out to such critics that Madhva is not at all responsible for the original identification of the disputed Kārikās as part of the *upaniṣad* but that the identity had long been established before him and accepted as valid by all prominent Advaitic and Viśiṣṭādvaitic writers, where is partiality in this?

Another criticism warns me that I am wrong in saying that Gaudapāda is a plagiarist.² Here again, there is a slight misconception. My point here is that if we are slow to recognize that Gaudapāda incorporated the existing explanatory mantias of the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* into the body of his separate work, no doubt with the best of intentions, we are driven to the unhappy necessity of suspecting him of plagiarism since textual evidences enable us to trace some of his well-known Kārikās occurring in

1. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gangānāth Jha, for instance has been kind enough to remark, 'Your work shows to the neutral man traces of sectarian bias. But I submit that in the light of further evidences brought together in the present article, it would be clear that only a false sense of loyalty to alleged Advaitic traditions prevents many scholars from realizing that Madhva is not the original sinner in treating the disputed kārikās as *śruti* but that all earlier Advaitins too have themselves followed the same procedure.

2. Dr. Keith's objection to my dubbing Gaudapāda a plagiarist relates not to the first set of Kārikās but to some others occurring in the other portions of Gaudapāda which are traced to earlier sources in later works. Since Dr. Keith admits that very possibly Gaudapāda is not the author of the first set of Kārikās the question of his plagiarism also does not arise in the absence of any claim on his behalf to the authorship of those Kārikās.

the other (undisputed?)¹ parts of his work to still earlier sources—a fact which justifies a similar suspicion being entertained in the case of the disputed *Kārikās* as well (which turn out to be *Śruti* texts on Sankara's and his followers' own showing)

Of course, it was not the central thesis of my article that Gaudapāda must be a plagiarist. Rather, I was demonstrating that the accusation of mistaking the *Kārikās* of Gaudapāda for *Śruti* texts against Madhva would, critically examined, lead to the inevitable nemesis of engendering a charge of plagiarism against Gaudapāda himself and casually pointed out what may be regarded as evidences in this direction by citing Vijñāna Bhikṣu. Dr. Keith's objections against the evidence of Vijñāna Bhikṣu are extremely volatile and will be dealt with in some other connection.

But to return to my point, it is my firm belief that the presence of the twenty-nine *Kārikās* *qua* *Kārikās* in Gaudapāda can be satisfactorily explained otherwise than as a plagiarism. I have set forth my explanation sufficiently clearly on an earlier occasion. I do not hold Gaudapāda to be a wilful plagiarist who wanted to hide his real colors. My complaint is against the modern Advaitins who seem to have missed the real truth about the *kārikās* and who by thoughtlessly accusing Madhva have created a veritable quagmire around themselves. I have clearly anticipated that Gaudapāda did not care 'for what we call originality'. I merely drew attention to the two quotations in Vijñāna Bhikṣu to corroborate the possibility and probability of Gaudapāda's having embodied the twenty-nine '*Kārikās*' of the

1. Whatever we may think of Wallace's startling disclosures regarding the authorship and authenticity of the fourth chapter of Gaudapāda which even jeopardized the very existence of an individual author of the name of Gaudapāda, the parallel passages in the *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāṣavivēka and in Gaudapāda deserve attention from a different point of view viz. of determining how far Gaudapāda could have drawn from his undisputed Buddhistic predecessor. Dr. S. K. Belvalkar's (Babu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta, p. 183) ultimate suggestion of "the possibility of the *Tarkajvālā* referring to an independent text or author that may have been also drawn upon by the author of the *Gaudapādīya-Kārikās*" cannot still absolve Gaudapāda of a habitual aptitude for 'drawing' without acknowledgment from earlier sources or writers (it does not much matter whether these are Buddhistic or even earlier 'Vedāntic writers' cf. op cit., p. 183, f. n. 2)—an attitude which may have its own value in regard to the question of his authorship of the first set of *Kārikās*. Want of space forbids an entry into these controversial issues.

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad into his more elaborate treatise—being presumably struck by the apparent Monistic tenor of the 'Kārikās'.

From the evidences that I have already set forth in my previous article, and others still which will follow, it would be utterly impossible to deny that the disputed Kārikās were from very early times regarded even by early Advaitins as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Granted this, the authorship of Gauḍapāda must collapse. One cannot serve two masters—nay not even the modern Advaitins, their present-day descendants and representatives. The disputed 'Kārikās' must either belong to the Upaniṣad or to Gauḍapāda. There is no half-way house between the two. And since the early Advaitins themselves have admitted them as *śruti* texts, the only way out of the difficulty is to admit that Gauḍapāda merely embodied them in his more elaborate treatise and did not want them to be mistaken for his own. If, however, and in Advaitins and their representatives desire to be more loyal than the earliest exponents of their School and insist willfully on the authorship of Gauḍapāda whatever the internal textual evidence to the contrary in the earlier works of their own School, one is constrained to draw attention to the inevitable nemesis of such misplaced loyalty. In the light of the unequivocal evidence in support of the upanishadic theory of the Kārikās in the recognized works of Advaita it would be little short of a gross petulance to insist on the authorship of Gauḍapāda. In other words, those who would still uphold the authorship of Gauḍapāda must do so at their own risk and at the risk of suspecting Gauḍapāda to be charge of plagiarism which is bound to be suggested by the voluminous evidence disproving his authorship. This is my final say on the matter and this I apply to such of my critics as have misunderstood the charge of 'plagiarism'.

VI

I shall now proceed to set forth further evidences from among the early Advaitic sources in support of the 'upanishadic theory' (as I have herein designated it) without further ado.

EARLY ADVAITIC SOURCES SURVEYED

(19) In addition to the express statements of Sankara, in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya*, the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, the *Nṛsinha-Tāpanī*

* The numbering of the points is continued from the first article in the *Review*, Vol II, No 1 p 56

Commentary etc., already quoted by me in my first article,¹ we shall herein notice one more statement from the commentary on the *Viṣṇu Sahasranāmā*. In the course of his exposition of the Holy Name *Viṣṇu*² Sankara quotes a number of *Śruti*s. He writes

ओमित्येतदक्षरं³ मिल्युपक्रम्य
 प्रणवोत्तरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च पर स्मृतः ।
 अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोवाहो न परः प्रणवोऽव्ययः ॥
 सर्वस्य प्रणवोऽस्मादि मायमन्तस्तथैव च ।
 एवाहिं प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यभुते तदनन्तरम् ॥
 प्रणवं हीत्थरं विद्यात्सर्वस्य हृदये स्थितं ।
 सर्वव्यापिनमोकारं मत्वा धीरौ न शोचति ॥
 अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्यापशमः शिवः ।
 ओकारो विदितो ह्येन स मुनिर्नैतरो जनः ॥ इति

ओतद्ब्रह्म, ओतद्वायुः, ओतदात्मा, आनन्त्यस्य इत्यादिभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः⁴ ॥

It is clear beyond a shadow of doubt that Sankara here quotes these as *śruti* texts. And the fact that he himself quotes later on, three other *Kārikās* from the undisputed portion of Gaudapāda's work and ascribes them expressly to Gaudapāda fully proves that he made a pronounced distinction between the two sets of *Kārikās* and identified the one as part of the *Śruti*. The *Kārikās* quoted from the undisputed portion are --

मनोविमृशितं चैतद्यत्किञ्चिन्मन्त्राचरः ।
 मनसाहमनाभावे द्वैताभावात्तदनुयातः ॥
 यद्यद्वैतं प्रपञ्चस्य तन्निर्वर्त्यहिंसेतमा ।
 मनोवृत्तिमयं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥
 यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं चित्तं चळति मायया ।
 तथा जाग्रदद्वयाभासं चित्तं चळति मायया ॥

इत्यादि गोडपादीयं⁵ ॥

(20) It would come as a surprise to my would-be critics that Sureśvara, the immediate disciple of Sankara, is heart and soul in favor of treating the disputed *Kārikās* as *Śruti* texts. A close scrutiny of his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya-Śloka-Tīkā* has revealed that he makes a clear distinction between the *Kārikās* occurring in the first chapter of Gaudapāda which he distinctly dubs *Śruti* texts and others occurring elsewhere in Gaudapāda which he quite faithfully attributes to Gaudapāda *by*

1 Ibid., pp. 50, 51

2 विषय विष्णुवचनद्वारा श्रुतमव्ययमक्षरम् ।

3 Opening sentence of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*

4 *Viṣṇu Sahasranāmā Bhāṣya*, *Viṣṇu Vilāsa Edn.* pp. 34, 35

5 Ibid. p. 24-5

name And Ānandagiri, who has fortunately commented on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śloka Vārtika* of Suresvara, also identifies the passages as *Sūti* texts or as those of Gaudapāda as the case may be Suresvara has —

अनिश्चिता यथारज्जुरिति न्यायोपबृंहित ।

स्फुटार्थं गौडपादीयं वच्चाऽर्थत्रैवगीयते ॥

wherein he refers to Gaudapāda by name, and quotes from the undisputed portion of his work Ānandagiri faithfully identifies this Kārikā —

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरधकोर विकल्पिता ।

सर्पयागादिभिर्भावैः तद्वदान्मा विकल्पित ॥

(II, 17)

with the remarks प्रत्यगज्ञानवता जगदिदं सप्रदायविदा वाक्य प्रमाणयति ।¹ These remarks of Suresvara and Ānandagiri have to be contrasted with Suresvara's —

स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावायो प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वप्ननिद्रया ।

इत्यादि स्थानभेदापि वेदान्तोक्तौ विनिश्चितः² ॥

and Ānandagiri's significant comment

स्थानभेदे श्रुति प्रमाणयति । स्वप्नंति । दर्शिनः श्रुतेरर्थं स्पृष्टव्यमिति । इत्यादीति³ ॥

Suresvara's next reference to a disputed Kārikā is as hereunder —

कार्यकारणबद्धौ नाविद्येन विभक्तौ नमो ।

प्राज्ञ कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु त्वयै न सिद्ध्यत⁴ ॥

in which Ānandagiri comments अज्ञानेन स्वापं जागगदोवज्ञानतन्मात्रं प्रतिबद्धं त्वमित्यत्र सागमाह कार्यति⁵ ॥ Notwithstanding the fact that Suresvara and Ānandagiri do not refer to this disputed Kārikā as a *sūti* in so many words, it is plain that they did regard it as a *sūti* since another verse preceding it in the text of the Kārikās and yet others following it are found quoted as *sūti* texts.

Suresvara further on identifies Gaudapāda Kārikā 1, 3, as a *sūti* —

वश्राहिस्थलमुडानेत्य तैजस प्रविविक्तभुक् ।

आनन्दभुक्तयाप्राज्ञ इति चागमशासनम्⁶ ॥

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śloka Vārtika* with comment Ānandāśrama Vāda, p 510.

2 *Gaudapāda Kārikā* 1, 14

3 Ānandagiri, p 556

4 Suresvara, *Bṛhadvārtika* 1, 4, 711 and Gaudapāda 1, 11

5 Ānandagiri, p 576

6 Suresvara, 1, 4, 744.

I have already, in my previous article¹ drawn attention to the significance of the term 'ūgama' in Sankara's commentary on the *Gaudapāda Kārikās*—ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्युक्तं । आगममात्रं तैत् ॥ Here also 'Kārikā' 1, 3, of Gaudapāda is referred to as an 'ūgama' i.e. a *Śruti* text. Earlier in this connection, we saw Suresvara remarking—वेदान्तोक्तौ विनिश्चितं which Ānandagiri fully clarified as a reference to *Śruti* स्थानभेदे श्रुति प्रमाणयति ॥ Here again, Ānandagiri clinches the matter to the utter consternation of critics when he remarks—अत्रापि श्रुति पठति । विश्वोद्दीति² ॥ I leave them to wallow this pill as best as they could.

Ānandagiri himself, elsewhere in his commentary on the *Vārtika* cites a passage from the disputed portion of the *Kārikās* and identifies it as a *Śruti* on his own authority. This same is also rather loosely associated with Gaudapāda by Sankara in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* to which reference had been made in my first article. It is this same text that is also quoted by Rāmānuja³. Ānandagiri, in the course of his commentary on the *Sambandha Vārtika* of Suresvara writes—ननु त्वत्पक्षेऽपि अत्रिया तदनादिर्त्वं तस्या बन्धकत्वं विद्यापोद्यत्वं चति बहुकल्पनायावयो नुक्त्या । नेत्याह कस्येति ॥ अविद्यानादिवानिर्वाच्यत्व-बन्धकत्वज्ञानापोद्यत्वादीना, अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदाजीव प्रवृत्त्यते⁴ । 'प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्चैव,' 'नामदासीन्नोसदासीन,' 'मायानु कृति विद्यात्,' 'मायाब्रह्मसमागम्या,' 'मायामेतां तर्गन्ति न' इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिविशेषे विदे न तान्यादिष्वपि कल्पत्येति कल्प्यानीतिमात्रं⁵ ॥

In the foregoing passage, Ānandagiri quotes a disputed *Kārikā* first and then follow other text of well-known *Śrūtis* and *Smृतis*. It is clear that the first passage from its very place at the head of the quotation must be a *Śruti* text since otherwise it would be little short of an unpardonable outrage to relegate the other *Śrūtis* to a second div place and give the first place of honor to a *Kārikā* of Gaudapāda. Ānandagiri, I am sure, would not plead guilty to such a charge. Everything is right when we remember that Ānandagiri has already identified many of the so-called *Gaudapāda - Kārikās* as *Śruti* texts and the passage 'अनादिमायया' is no exception.

Thus, it will be seen that a very clear, sharp and pronounced distinction between the disputed *kārikās* on the one hand and others occurring in the undisputed portions of Gaudapāda's work is made by Sankara, Suresvara and Ānandagiri. On an earlier

¹ *Review of Philosophy and Religion* vol II No 1 p 48

² Ānandagiri, comm p 582

³ R P R vol II, No 1 p 50, fn 4

⁴ loc cit p 54

⁵ Ānandagiri's Comm on *Sambandha Vārtika*, pp 57, 58

occasion,¹ I drew attention to a passage² in Ānandagiri's sub-commentary to Śaṅkara's commentary on the kārikās of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which on close scrutiny was shown to presuppose a decided distinction between the two sets of 'Kārikās' (one to be reckoned as part and parcel of the Upaniṣad, and the other as belonging to Gaudapāda) in view of the antithesis between the two phrases 'गौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान्' and 'आचार्य-प्रणीतान् श्लोकानपि'. It is really gratifying to note that such a distinction is really confirmed by internal textual evidence in Ānandagiri's commentary on the *Bṛhaduranyaka Śloka Vārtika* (besides the evidence of the original) and hence could not be dismissed, as may be sought to be done by critics, as resting on a tortuous and hair-splitting interpretation of Ānandagiri's words. Indeed, Sureśvara quotes³ in all, four Kārikās from the undisputed portion of Gaudapāda and attributes them to Gaudapāda by name whereas he quotes three disputed Kārikās and ascribes them in so many words to the *Śruti* in which he is expressly supported by Ānanda-

Summing up, therefore, we find that Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Ānandagiri are all three of them fully and unreservedly in favor of reading the disputed kārikās as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.

Other Advaitic works dating from after the thirteenth century will be examined on a later occasion. I am already working at them and the results of my investigation will be placed before scholars and critics in due course.

1 *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 44.

2 श्रीगौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान् माहृ स्यादतिषट्शतविंशत्यष्टाश्लोकान् आचार्य-प्रणीतान् श्लोकानपि अथवा १०० ॥

१ अविधिना यथास्वस्वगतं न्यासायकृत्तुम् ।
मृकटार्थं गौडपादाचार्यं वचो-धरय गीतम् ॥
११ शेषवदसिद्धान्तरिद्वन्द्वरूपि भाषितम् ।
गौडपादाचार्यैरद्वयस्तु यथास्मा मे प्रपाद्यतम् ॥
२४ इद्विद्वत्कृत्तुमिदं मृष्टिमात्रादिनान्दयम् ।
उपाय मोक्षनायकं नास्ति मेदं कथयन् ॥
श्लोकाश्चगौडपादादे यथाकार्यस्य साक्षिणः ।
असीयनेत्र यस्तेन मन्त्रदायविदः स्वयम् ॥
१२ यथाभागात्मन इदं तत्त्व इदं तत्त्व इदं तत्त्व ।
तत्त्वोक्तस्तदाकारम् तत्त्वोक्तस्तदाकारम् ॥
यदा न स्वीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते बुद्धिः ।
अविद्यमानमास निष्कारं ब्रह्मतत्त्वम् ॥

THINKERS OF IRAN

Prof M A SHUSHTARY, M A

AVESTAN PERIOD—1500 B C

Zoroaster is the earliest known thinker of ancient Iran. According to some great writers, he lived about 6000 years before the death of Plato. Others place him 5000 years before the Trojan war and his latest date given by the Greek writers is 600 years before the time of King Xerxes. Aristotle writes in his first book on philosophy that the wisdom of Magi (Iranian) was older than Egyptian. There is no doubt that the name Zoroaster had become mythical during the time of Achaemenians. Herodotus the father of Greek history has given a fair description of Zoroastrianism without mentioning the name of the founder. Pythagoras the great philosopher who was contemporary of Cambyses had visited Babylon and had studied under an Iranian sage, named Zoroaster.

Several Zoroasters have been mentioned by the Greek writers. The latest was the contemporary of Alexander the Great. It appears that the name had become sacred and adopted as an epithet to the learned men and sages of Iran. It might have been used even as an ordinary name.

In brief the following is the summary of what the Greeks thought of Zoroaster —

That he was a Median sage or reformer and a king of Bactria or an Iranian law-giver and founder of a ruling dynasty in Babylon, or a prophet who announced his teaching to a king of Bactria who followed him, that he knew astronomy, magic and left works on philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics and politics, and that his teaching was dualism.

It is possible that the Greek writers have mixed up the teaching of the first Zoroaster who lived in remote antiquity and of whom they knew very little with that of those who were his successors and lived close to the age of Achaemenians. There is no doubt that the Greeks never made a deep study of the Avesta. Their information concerning Zoroastrianism was superficial and in describing it they have given it a Greek colour.

PHILOSOPHY OF ZOROASTER IN THE GATHAS

Gathas are seventeen hymns, inserted in the portion of the Avesta named Yasna. These verses in comparison with the rest of the Avesta are more archaic and contain the main teaching of Zoroaster. As every religion is based on certain philosophical notions, so the Gathic teaching also has its philosophy, which may be presented under the following headings —

(I) *Being* according to the Gathas is "mainyu" which means spirit. There are two Mainyus, Spenta the good and Angra the evil. Both are spirits. Matter has no independent existence. It is a creation of Ahura the supreme being, perfect, eternal, boundless, unchangeable Creator of Heaven and shaper of the Universe. It is, while describing the manifested aspect of Ahura, that the language of Gathas becomes poetical, allegorical, and apparently dualistic. But Zoroaster is not exceptional in such descriptions of the one real hidden truth. All thinkers of the world, whether in the East or in the West, a philosopher or founder of a religion while giving the reason for the constant changes observed in Nature had to employ a dualistic form of teaching. Islam the most monotheistic doctrine has not been able to escape this difficulty. Zoroaster teaches that the supreme being who is one in essence, when manifested, is known in two aspects, one is permanent, constructive, light, life and good, the other as transitory, destructive, dark, death and evil. He persuades his followers to take the side of one which is permanent. This idea if taken in the light of the Advaitic school of Vedāntism may be explained as follows—

That Ahura has two aspects. One Vidyā, the other Avidyā. His true nature Vidyā is incomprehensible by human intellect. His Avidyaic aspect is known as Spenta-mainyu and Angra-mainyu. Both these are manifested everywhere in the universe, even in individual human beings. Thus the unity of Ahura in essence becomes a diversity in manifested nature.

As already said, matter has no independent existence. It is a creation of Ahura, a mirror in which Spenta and Angra are reflected, a battle-field or a receptacle of the two opposite forces.

(II) *Emanation* —

Ahura is mentioned two hundred times in Gathas, 'Asa' one hundred and eighty and 'Vohu-manah' hundred and thirty times. After them importance is attached to 'Kshathra Vairya' and 'Spenta Armaiti' next to 'Houvatat' and 'Ameretat'. These names are often mentioned two or three together and sometimes separately. Each has a certain significance as follows —

(1) *Vohu-manah* (Sk *Vasu-manas*) is the best mind - Ahura's son. This first emanation of Ahura pervades every thing in the creation.

(2) *Asa-vahishta* (Sk *Rta Vashishta*) is the best law, second emanation, the heat vitality, the life energy, in its concrete form represented by fire or light.

(3) *Kshatra Vairya* is the divine will, the divine kingdom, the divine desire, the divine power through which life is realized.

(4) *Spenta armaiti* (Sk *Aramati*) the devotion, the receiver of the divine will. Its concrete aspect is earth or the matter in its essence.

(5) *Haurvatat* (Sk *Sarva-tata*) is health, perfection, fertility, the space or the manifested aspect of the universe.

(6) *Ameretat* (Sk *Amrata*) is immortality, endless time.

The last two are always mentioned together, according to the Muslim thinkers of Iran (900 to 1700 A. D.). The Supreme Being is wholly incomprehensible to human intellect. He manifests Himself through reason. His reason has created the universal soul, whose essential attribute is life. Primal matter is manifested through souls, and formed into space and by its motion appeared time. Man possesses the same beginning as the universe. His real self is pure. He must strive for the Union with universal reason, by following the Divine will. This theory may be applied to the six Amesha Spentas of Ahura. *Vohu-manah*, the best mind is the first emanation, or in the language of the Islamic philosophers "the universal intelligence". *Asa*, the life energy is the universal soul. *Kshatra Vairya* the divine power is the universal will whose receptacle is *Armaiti*, the primal matter, which takes the form of Universe. These four work harmoniously to fulfil the object of manifestation in *Haurvatat*, the boundless space and *Ameretat*, the eternal time, or immortality.

A human being is the microcosm of the universal Existence. In him all the six qualities i.e. intelligence, soul, will, space and time are found. Hence what the universal does as a whole, man must do as an individual. This sublime teaching has been explained in poetical and metaphorical language and has therefore undergone various interpretations. It was repeated during the Islamic period by Iranian thinkers who thought that their native product was a foreign import. The idea was the same, but the method of explanation was different. It is true that under Islamic Khilafat the works of Plato, Aristotle and neo-Platonist philosophers were translated and studied in Iran, but we must see whether this was the first time that the Iranian came in contact

with the Greek philosophy. It is a well-known fact that the great Greek philosophers lived when either Iran was in direct touch with them, as in the days of the Achaemenians or when she was under their rule, as in the reign of Alexander and his successors. It was impossible that the Iranians as such could have remained ignorant of Greek wisdom, particularly when we find living examples such as Artabaz, Aryaratha, Huraodha Mithradates (of Pont) and so many others, who were all acquainted with Greek literature. King Khusroe the first of the Sassanian dynasty was a patron of philosophy. He had given protection to Greek philosophers who had left Roman territory and had taken refuge in Iran. There was a university at Gunde-Shahpur where medicine and philosophy were taught. A number of works by Aristotle and Porphyry had already been translated into Pahlavi and Syriac languages and all this is a proof that Greek philosophy was known in Iran before the Islamic Khilafat. We do know from Greek sources that Alexander ordered a number of Iranian works to be translated into Greek and that Greek philosophers, physicians, and statesmen were present in the court of the Achaemenians. Therefore, we may be convinced of the fact that Greek and Iranian, both have influenced each other in science, philosophy and literature.

If we say that Islamic-Iranian philosophy is nothing but a translation of Plato, Aristotle or Neo Platonism we are far from the truth. We may as well say that the 'yunani' system of medicine is wholly copied from Greece, because the meaning of the word 'yunani' is Greek and the system is supposed to have been received from Galen and other Greek physicians. Just as ninety percent of the 'yunani' system is either Iranian or Indian, and hardly ten percent Greek, so also is the fact in connection with Greco-Iranian Islamic Philosophy.

(III) *Soul* -- The human soul according to Gathas, is a creation of Ahura. It must uphold the constructive side of Ahura and gain immortality through right thinking, right speaking and right acting.

(IV) *Will* -- The Gathic teaching makes every human being responsible for his actions. Man is made up of soul, will, and matter and his will has the power of either spiritualizing or materializing itself.

(V) *Resurrection* is the consciousness of the soul as to its true nature. When the dark deluded material existence comes to an end, the soul realizes itself and according to its past inclinations and actions suffers or enjoys the new awakening.

ZOROASTRIAN ETHICS AND DUALISM.

As already said the thinkers of the East and the West, whether monotheist or polytheist, while explaining their Ethics have to become dualists. To explain good, one must also explain not-good. Life is not understood unless we know death and so forth. To solve this difficulty Ahura takes the attribute of Spent mainyu and Angra-mainyu. By separating good from evil making them the offshoot of a third supreme mover thinkers of the West and the East have become dualistic or monotheistic. Zoroaster taught us that the constructive effect cannot be result of a destructive cause. Man having will is free to go either with destruction or with construction. He is placed between matter and spirit, good and evil, mortal and immortal, darkness and light and can choose that which he wishes to choose. If he chooses virtue, he must think good, speak good and act good. Evil is not committed merely in doing evils but in even thinking evil. Not only the body but the four elements of fire, air, water and earth should be kept clean to the utmost possible extent. Man must be bold, full of courage, helpful, industrious, dutiful, obedient to the laws of nature, king and country, cheerful, content, philanthropic, under discipline, with self-respect, self-control, perseverance, prudent, modest, adventurous, conscientious, honest, tolerant, generous, patriotic, sweet and submissive to elders, kind and genial to equals and subordinates.

Such in brief is the moral code of the most ancient thinker of Iran.

We find a number of sages and thinkers mentioned in Avesta but nothing has been narrated about their wisdom. Such was Grehma who was an anti-Zoroastrian leader and must have had something of his own. Spenta, a common and famous name is supposed to have been a great sage and according to B. one of the earliest disciples of Zoroaster. He had a large number of pupils. Jamspa, Zarirwari, Mady-sunougha, Parshat-gao, Frashasotra, Spento-dāta, Peshu-tanu, Kavi-vā-jā and his father were ardent disciples of Zoroaster, who devoted their lives in promulgating and spreading his teaching.

ACHAEMENTIAN PERIOD - 600 to 300 B.C.

During three hundred years, the most glorious period in the history of Iran, we find very few names of Iranian thinkers. Cyrus the great is narrated by Xenophon as a thinker and an ideal man but his Cyropaedia is more a fiction than a biography.

In fact Xenophon has expounded Greek ideals under the name of Cyrus

Darius the first, no doubt, was an able administrator and a patron of learning and himself a learned man. His life and sayings are historical. The writer of this article is indebted to Mr. Sohrab Balsani for kindly giving him the following passage inscribed under the statue of an Egyptian aristocratic priest, now kept in the Vatican Museum. The said priest says —

'King Darius commanded me to come to Egypt while he was in Elam as great king of country and chief sovereign of Egypt, and to establish a hall of the house of life (medical college). I did as he commanded me. I was equipped there with all students from among sons of men of consequence. No sons of poor were among them. I placed them under the lead of individuals wise for all their work. I equipped them with all need, with all their instruments, which were in the writing according to what was there in aforetime.

His Majesty did this because he knew the value of the Art and in order to save the life of every one prone to sickness.'

Two important facts can be deduced from this passage —

(1) That Darius encouraged learning in the most remote part of his vast Empire and therefore must have done the same on a large scale in his motherland.

(2) Philosopher were also physicians as we find during the Sassanian and Ilkhanic periods of Persian history. Such was the system followed in Gande-Shahpur, where medicine and philosophy were taught together and students only from respectable classes were admitted.

The Achæmenians were more tolerant than the Sassanians and therefore the exchange of thought between Iranians and other nations must have been on an extensive scale. Darius and Artaxerxes both were patronizing foreign learning. Darius claims in his inscription at Behistan that he reared a people destroyed by Gaomata the usurper and gave them a religion to follow their religion. In his Greek inscription at Migeasia he praises his Satrap named Gaodatus for helping the cultivators and promoting agriculture. He and his pious son Xerxes were worshippers of Ahuramazda whom they called Began Vazarka (Big God). According to Iranian historians Artaxerxes the first founded colleges and encouraged learning.

Anagnus. According to Greek writers he was a musician and poet. He was a contemporary of Astyges and Cyrus the

great and had composed verses predicting the victory of Cyrus over Astyges

Ostanes was a famous name with Greek authors. He accompanied Xerxes in his campaign against Greece. He wrote on magic. Another *Ostanes* was a contemporary of Alexander the Great.

Astrampsychos, *Gaubruva*, *Hystaspes* and *Pazates* were also mentioned by the Greeks as thinkers and sages of this period. Unfortunately we know nothing about their teaching.

RELIGION OF IRAN AS NARRATED BY GREEK WRITERS

Though the Greeks and the Iranians lived as neighbours and rulers for a considerable time, yet Grecian knowledge of Iranian philosophy and religion appears to be not very deep. They wrote what they heard. There were few who took pains to study the Iranian language and literature, and the works of these few are lost. Herodotus says — "Persians have neither idols nor build temples nor erect altars. They offer sacrifice to Zeus on the summits of mountains and venerate the sun, moon, fire, earth, water, and air. They also worship Aphrodite (Persian Anahita) and Mithra. Lying is most disgraceful. They do not borrow money, fearing that for payment they may be forced to tell a lie. They do not spit, nor wash their hands in the river. Corpses are buried after the flesh is eaten by dogs or birds. Diogenes of Laerte says — "Magi believe in two powers opposed to each other. One is called Aromazdes, the other Areimanios." Hermippus writes — "Ormazdes sprang out of the light and Areimanios out of darkness. Ormazdes created six gods (Amesa Spenta) and to counterbalance the Areimanios created six demons. Ormazde decorated heaven with stars and put Sun at their head, also twenty other gods whom he placed in an egg but Areimanios created the same number of evil spirits who broke open the egg. Thus evil mingled with good. At the end Areimanios will perish."

Aristotle in his metaphysics says — "Pherecydes and others regard the first source of creation as the highest principle. In this they follow Magians."

Diodorus Siculus writes —

"That Darius the first was the sixth in number who studied the laws of Egypt. He associated himself with an Egyptian priest and learnt their theology and the contents of their sacred books." A Greek writer says — "That Alexander commanded that all

inhabitants of Asia should carefully extinguish the fire that the Persians call sacred "

Another writer says — "Keeping images was thought irreligious and therefore Xerxes commanded that the temples of Athens should be burnt as he considered it wrong to keep shut the gods whose dwelling place was the heaven "

Philo of Alexander (40 A D) writes — ' Magians investigate undisturbed the workings of nature to acquire a full knowledge of the truth

Vellenes Paterculus writes — "That a Magian predicted from marks upon his body that his life and fame would be those of gods. "

So much is enough to form an idea of what the Greeks thought of Zoroastrianism To summarize their impressions of Iran we may say —

- (1) That the Zoroastrian doctrine was dualism
- (2) That the Zoroastrians venerated stars and elements
- (3) They were not idol-worshippers
- (4) Study of philosophy and astronomy was prevalent among them
- (5) In their morals truth and cleanliness were the cardinal points
- (6) They also studied astrology, palmistry and physiognomy

PARTHIAN PERIOD — 300 B C to 200 A D

Alexander's successors were the Seleucide whose direct rule in Iran proper did not last for over eighty years They founded Selucia, on the banks of the Tigris This city was the centre of Greek literature and philosophy for a long time The Greeks had other small colonies in the interior of Iran Their literature and philosophy were studied by Iranians Among the learned men of Iran, who flourished in this period, almost all of them were scholars of Greek language and philosophy

(1) Huraodha — King of Iran, a contemporary of Pompey the great, was well acquainted with Greek language

(2) Artabaz — An Iranian king, who ruled over Armenia, knew well the Greek literature

(3) Mithra Borzanes — Lucian (120-180) writes that he had made a journey to the East to study philosophy. He reached Babylon where he met a learned man named Mithra Borzanes. He was an Iranian and taught him Iranian religion

(4) Mithradates the sixth, king of Pont in Asia Minor, was a warrior, a physician and an author He could speak in twenty-

two languages. A student of Greek wisdom, wrote books on medicine and botany, which were translated into Latin.

(5) Aryaratha the fifth, king of Coppedocia, whose family claimed decent from the Achæmenian rulers. He was known for his knowledge of Greek literature and philosophy.

(6) Antiochos the first of Commagene—Though his name is Greek he was an Iranian and claimed decent from Darius the first, and imitating him he has left an inscription in Nimrud Dag (North Syria) in which he speaks of his religion.

CHRISTIANITY IN PERSIA - 300 A D to 800 A D

Towards the last half of the Parthian period Jesus Christ appeared as the great founder of a world-religion. Inhabitants of Armenia and the western provinces of the Parthian Empire were among the earliest followers of Christianity. Selucia and Babylon became the Episcopal seat of the Iranian Bishopric. There were as many as forty Bishops in Iran and thirty-two in Armenia. Most of the Iranian bishops were natives and some were Chaldeans. Parthian rulers were tolerant to their subjects and had left them free to choose and follow the religion they thought best. Princes and other members of the royal clan took much interest in non-Iranian religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. When the Sasanians succeeded the Parthians, owing to the political situation and the influence of the Zoroastrian orthodox priests they persecuted Christians particularly in 327 and 343 A D.

A number of Syrian Christians who were subjects of Iran left the country and migrated towards the East. Some of them came to Malabar coast where they founded the Syrian church. Among the celebrated Christian Iranians were the following —

St GREGORIOUS THE ILLUMINATOR

Surena was the family-name of an illustrious clan, whose chiefs were hereditary rulers of Siestan and who had the privilege of placing the crown on the head of the king at his coronation. St Greogorios, the Illuminator, was descended from this family. He holds the same position in Armenia as St Patrick does in Ireland. Surena member of this family was the conqueror of Crassus, the famous Roman General. St Greogory's father was named Anak and was the Governor of Balkh. He sided with Artaxerxes Papakan the first Sasanian king against his own kinsman King Khusrav of Armenia, whom he murdered. Thereafter he also killed himself. With the exception of the infant

Gregory other members of his family were slain by Armenians. Gregory was carried away by his nurse to Cappodocia and brought up as a Christian. When grown up, he went to Armenia and succeeded in converting King Tirdād, who was the son of the murdered king Khusrao. Already Syrian missionaries had made some progress in Armenia, but the conversion of the king revived Christianity all over the country. Gregory built a number of churches. He had two sons named Aristakes and Vartanes. Aristakes succeeded him as the chief Bishop of Armenia, and after him Vartanes. St Narses and St Jacob were other illustrious members of the Gregorian family. St Gregorious retired in 331 and devoted the remaining days of his life in ascetic seclusion. He and some other members of his family were not only religious but also thinkers and writers on Theology.

IBN-DAISAN OR BARDESANES

He belongs to the Parthian clan. His father was named Nahama and mother Nahsiram. They left Iran and migrated to Edessa, where Bardesanes was born in 154-5 A. D. He was a class-mate of a prince and received good education. He was brought up in Syria and composed his works, particularly his celebrated hymns, in the Syrian language. He is therefore called a Syrian by some writers. At the age of twenty-five, he embraced Christianity and received Baptism from Bishop Hystaspes. He died at the age of 68, about 222-3 A. D.

He was a genuine poet, philosopher, astrologer and a theologian. According to Alberuni he and Marcion were among the thinkers who had derived their theology partly from Christianity and partly from Zoroastrianism. Bardesanes maintained the existence of the two principles of light and darkness. An-Nadim gives the following names of the works left by him — (i) The Light and Darkness, (ii) The Spiritual Nature of the Truth, (iii) The Unstable and the Stable. His philosophy is not much known. His most famous compositions are his hymns supposed to be the best pieces of poetry in Syrian language. Like other Iranian thinkers, he describes the origin of the world by a process of emanation from the Supreme being whom he calls "The father of the living." It is through destiny that intelligence is descended into the soul and soul into the body. Evil cannot be created by God. Human being has freedom of will but his body is subject to nature and his super-human affairs such as death, disease etc. are under the influence of Destiny. Hence will, nature and destiny constitute the life of man. He denied resur-

rection. As a Christian he believed that Christ was not born of Mary but through Marv. After him his disciples formed various sects. Some thought that the light (spirit) mixed itself with darkness with the idea of improving it, but itself became entangled in it. Others said that light feeling itself imprisoned in darkness strives for freedom. In Bardesanes system of theology planets play an important part and rule over the destiny of the human beings. There is a struggle between man's will and the Destiny and Man's emancipation consists in modifying or limiting the power of destiny over his action to the utmost extent.

BUDDHISM IN IRAN

Asoka the great is considered the first monarch who had despatched missionaries all over the known world. They went as far as Asia Minor, even Europe in the West. We cannot fix the extent of their success. After Asoka, Kanishka, the Kushan king of Eastern Iran and the Punjab followed the missionary zeal of his predecessor. It appears that a large number of Iranian nobles and princes who lived in the East then became ardent Buddhists, and took an active part in propagating Buddhism in Iran and China. Among them were the following:—

An Shu Kuo or *An Tsue*—A Parthian prince and heir-apparent to the Imperial throne or a principality in Iran. After studying Iranian literature and philosophy, he made himself acquainted with non-Iranian teachings, and when his father died he abdicated the throne in favour of his uncle. He became a Buddhist monk, went to India and studied the Buddhist work entitled *Sūtra-Pātska* and *Abhi-Dharma*, which he could repeat by heart. After travelling for sometime in Iran and India, he finally went to China and settled there at Loyang (in 148 B.C.). This city was the Chinese capital. He studied Chinese literature and translated the Buddhist works into that language. His translations were extant as late as 1700 A.D.

Arshaka or *An Huin*—Also a prince of Parthian blood, he embraced Buddhism and leaving Persia went to China. He was well received by the reigning monarch, who made him a general in his army. This prince also translated a number of Buddhist works with the aid of a Chinese learned man named Banfu-tav.

Tan-wu-ti—An Iranian aristocrat. He went to India and was converted to Buddhism. He adopted the Indian name of *Dharma-Satya*. From India as a missionary he went to China. He was also one of the many translators of Buddhist works into Chinese.

An fa huen — An Iranian seeker of truth He went to India and became a Buddhist, adopting the Indian name of Dharma-Bhadra From India he went as a missionary to China His name is included among the translators of Buddhist works into Chinese language

An fa Chun — An Iranian Buddhist who went to China and translated several works on Buddhism into Chinese language

SCHOLASTICISM IN ANCIENT IRAN

The great founders of the world have composed their revealed books in brief and metaphorical language Their works and sayings become sacred after them and are interpreted in different ways Theologians explain the philosophical conceptions of their religion in the light of theology and philosophers philosophize theology Mystics and poets turn even plain and simple ideas into deep and unfathomable mysteries The consequence is schism and formation of different schools of thought and various sects It was hardly over one hundred years after Muhammed when Quran received such varying interpretations and Muslims became divided into many sects, each explaining certain passages of Quran in its own way Islamic Theology was explained in philosophical language and received the name of *Al-Kalam* Its writers were called ' *Mutakallamin* ' The following were some of the subjects treated in a philosophical light by *Mutakallamin* or the Islamic dialecticians An overwhelming majority of them were Iranians — Unity of God, His attributes, Non-eternity of matter, invisibility or visibility of God, Divine will, Divine speech is created or uncreated, Freedom of human will, Immortality of soul, Condition of things, Non-existence is not a thing, Knowledge, Interpretation of Divine hearing, seeing, teaching, sitting etc as mentioned in the Quran, Death, Resurrection, Revelation, Miracles, Destiny, Divine Justice, sin, punishment, reward etc are among the numerous subjects dealt with

Among the Christians of Europe also Scholasticism tried to solve the controversial points in Christianity open to discussion and contradiction, such as — Relation of faith to reason, and intellect to will, substance, accident, existence, Divine will, Christ as God and as man, Trinity and Unity, Redemption, immortality, Creation, sin, resurrection, providence, corporeal movement, Godhood etc

We may trace the same causes with the same results in Zoroastrianism Paul, an inhabitant of *Dari-Shahr* who was a learned Iranian, and had embraced Christianity flourished in the

reign of Khusrao the first, of the Sasanian dynasty. He had studied philosophy in the school of Nisibis and Gunde-Shahpur, visited Constantinople and other places in the Roman Empire, and he was finally appointed the chief Bishop of Persia. He died in 535 A. D. in the 16th year of his Episcopate. King Khusrao who was much inclined towards philosophy used to hold meetings in which philosophical and theological subjects were discussed by learned men of Iran and Greece. King himself used to take part in such discussions. Paul was in great favour with the king and must have been present at such meetings. He has given a fair description of the various schools of thought which were prevalent in his time in Iran. He says (for detail see Casertelli's "Philosophy of Mazdayasnian religion during the Sasanian period")—

- (1) There are some who believe in one God ,
- (2) Others claim that he is not the only God ,
- (3) Some teach that He possesses contrary qualities ,
- (4) Others say that He does not possess them ,
- (5) Some admit that He is omnipotent ,
- (6) Others deny His power over every thing ,
- (7) Some believe that the Universe is created ,
- (8) Others think that all things are not created ,
- (9) Some say that God made the world from pre-existing

matter and so-forth

Zoroastrian scholasticism must have begun about 200 B. C. and ended in about 600 A. D. The points for discussion, solution and refutation were the following—Ahuramazda one Supreme being, Ahuramazda co-eternal with Angra-mainyu, both independent of each other but not equal, both equal and opposite, Spenta-mainyu and Angra-mainyu, offshoots of a third being, Theory of Zarvan-ā-Karana or the time eternal, Mithra as mediator between God and the Universe, descent of spirit into matter, encroachments and mixture of matter and spirit, reason for the mixture of matter and spirit, whether such mixture was intentional or accidental, matter has no intelligence and will, origin of man, his end, his salvation, his aim in life, position of ancient Aryan Yazatās, interpretation of the word Amesha-spenta, relation of the planets to life on earth, matter, time, space, etc.

Asaka or *Arask* is the earliest name, we find, among the scholastic philosophers or the founders of the new school of thought. He must have lived about the time of the rise of the Parthian dynasty. We know very little of his life. He is known to have been the expounder of the Zarvānic theory. The word Zarvān has been

mentioned in the *Avesta* but no importance is attached to it. Zoroaster does not make the position of Ahuramazda clear in connection with Angra-mainyu. Hence the question arises, why the evil power was created, whether he is an offshoot of Ahuramazda or an independent eternal being. The Zarvānic thinker cleared this difficulty by placing Time above Ahuramazda and Angra-mainyu. He called Zarvān (time) as ā-Karana or endless. This principle is the final cause of everything in existence, including Ahuramazda and Angra-mainyu. Zarvān (time), Thwasha (space) and Kshita (light) were regarded as one in essence with different aspects. Zarvān's idea of nothingness of the world caused the appearance of the Angra-mainyu and his knowledge of things brought forth Spenta-mainyu. In Zarvānic theology Thwasha (space) and Vāyu (wind) have a high place and were worshipped along with Zarvān. The twelve signs of the Zodiac were assigned to the space. Zarvānism was not a religion but a system of philosophy. Its followers called themselves Zoroastrians. Like Mithraism the planets had much importance, and believed to control the destiny of man by their celestial movements. Zarvānism was expounded as a philosophical conception, but it developed into symbolism, mythology and astrological speculations. It was prevalent all over Iran in the reign of the Parthians and the Sasanians. Some of the great Theologians of the Sasanian period were Zarvāniks, such as, Mehr Narseh, the prime minister and general of the Sasanian ruler. He had named his son Zarvān-Dāt (created by Zarvān) and daughter Zarvān-Dukht.

PARALLEL VIEWS IN INDIA AND ARABIA

In *Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad* the following line makes us believe that in India there was a school of philosophy teaching Kāla (time) as the first principle and the cause of creation. It says -

“ Svabhavam eke kavayō vadanti kālam
tathā anye parimuhyamānāḥ ” i.e.

Some wise men deluded speak of nature, and others of time (as the cause of everything). Again in the 6th chapter, in the first verse it is said - “Should time or nature or necessity or chance or he who is called the puruṣa etc.” In the *Quran* a Sura begins thus - “I swear by the time, most surely man is in loss except those who believe and do good and persuade others to take up the truth and have patience.”

Mum, the greatest and original thinker of the Sasanian period was also a Parthian on his mother's side. His father was

a respectable man of Nishapur. He migrated to Hamadan and finally settled in a village named Mardinu near Ctesiphon, the capital of the Iranian Empire. Mani was born about 215 A. D. and received good education under his father. He studied Greek literature and philosophy, music, painting, astrology and medicine. At the age of about 25, he proclaimed himself as a reformer.

His philosophy may be presented as follows —

Matter and spirit — He did not agree with the Zervānist who believed matter (darkness) and spirit (light) both were creations of Zarvān. Neither did he accept Zoroastrian teaching, placing Ahuramazda above everything. He further did not agree with the Avestan teaching that the worldly life, in essence is the work of Ahuramazda but corrupted through the influence of evil spirit. He conceived matter not as a receptacle (as in Zoroastrianism) of the spirit but as an absorber of the spirit in itself and that worldly life is a forced mixture of matter and spirit. In Zoroastrian teaching, matter has no real existence. It is receptive of good and bad forces which continue to fight each other till one is subdued by the other. Human soul, manifested as will through the light of intelligence, has to side with one of these and accordingly form its future destiny. But Mani makes matter the opponent of spirit and a true independent existence. He says that the visible world is the result of the mixture of darkness with a portion of light that light and darkness are two separate elements, one above and the other below. Their union is forced and unnatural and separation is necessary. Matter is blind, devoid of intelligence and will. Its activity is formed by mixing with the spirit. It must revert finally into its dark pit. Soul must try to release itself from material bondage. Therefore the God, who has created the world is devil and his creations are evil. The Supreme Being is called "Father of the kingdom of light." He is pure in his nature, eternal and wise. He is the truth, ever existent, glorious in his power and conscious of his self.

Cosmogony — Matter (darkness) thrust itself into the realm of spirit (light). The father of the kingdom of Light to repel its encroachments made the following successive evocations —

- | | | |
|---------|---|------------------------------------------------------|
| First | { | He the Supreme Being emanated as mother of the life, |
| descent | | who in turn produced the primal man |
| Second | { | 1. As friend of light (narasaf or mairyo Sanha) |
| descent | | 2. As Ban (builder) |
| | | 3. As Mithra. |

Third descent was in the form of visible light. As mother of life or the universal intelligence is an emanation of the father of light, she must be the same with the father in essence. Mother in turn produces the primal man or the universal soul (Indian Purusa), who is reflected in all individual souls. This primal man was appointed to the difficult task of subduing matter (darkness) but himself was vanquished and in the struggle lost a portion of light, which was absorbed or became mixed with the darkness and formed into the Universe. Thus darkness in consequence of the contact with light became tame and active. On the other hand, light was deluded and confused. The aim of the father of light in surrendering a small portion of light was to stop further progress of darkness into his realm and to gradually release the imprisoned light. Mani illustrates this with a parable that one shepherd to save his flock from the wolf, dug a pit and in it left a goat. When the wolf saw the goat he jumped into the pit and the shepherd at once lifted up the goat, leaving the wolf to die in the pit. In the same way a small portion of light is left in the pit of this world to attract matter. It will be lifted up gradually to join its original source.

Aim of Life is to rescue the imprisoned soul from matter. Man's soul (light portion) must be distilled by renunciation of material jugglery (pleasures) and after its purification from matter will be taken up through the sun and moon to the realm of light. A human being in his essence is the image of higher existence. He is the instrument of the father of light, through whom the father draws this imprisoned light. He is a miniature world, a mirror of all powers of the Heaven and Earth. In him the soul is the light and the body is the darkness.

End of the World—When all souls are released of all bodies, the world will come to an end.

His Ethics is based on renunciation of all worldly enjoyments. The worldly life is caused by evil and the good must not take part in its pleasures by avoiding idolatry, falsehood, greed, murder, want of charity, magic, hypocrisy etc. Man must not eat flesh, must not care for wealth, must live in peace and avoid bloodshed.

Mani in the eye of the Armenian Christians. —

The following is an extract from the reply given to Mehr-Nersih, the grand minister of Iran, by the Bishops of Armenia (See History of Vartan by Neumann.)

"As regards the epistles sent by thee, we call to mind that in former times, one of the Moghbeds, who was learned in your doct-

rine and whom you held to be something more than man, did believe in the God of life and he disproved and annihilated every position of your doctrine. It being found that nothing could be done against him by reasoning, he was killed by king Varamist (Bahram) "

The Moghbed referred to in the passage must have been Mani, who was hanged by Bahram. It shows that Mani was held in great respect by his followers, and that he defeated his opponents in argument on religion.

Mani as represented by orthodox Zoroastrians — In Dinkart Vol VI, he is accused of teaching contrary to the doctrine of Zoroaster. In Vol VII of the book it is said that the faith of Zoroaster shall suffer from three false prophets, first of whom is of white race (Mani or Christ), the second Mazdak and the third Muhammod.

His End — The Zoroastrian priests were his bitter opponents and the king had to support them. Mani declared his teaching to the reigning king, Shapur I. His brother Prince Parviz had already embraced Mani's doctrine, and the king himself was favourably inclined towards him. Through administrative consideration and to please Zoroastrian orthodoxy, he commanded Mani to leave Iran. Mani left with some of his followers, and for about twenty-five years passed his time in India, and Chinese Turkistan. When he returned to Iran he was arrested and imprisoned but released. In the reign of Bahman the first, he was again arrested and brought to the court and after a show of discussion on religion, he was sentenced to death, as heretic. He was hanged at the age of sixty.

Manism beyond Iran — Babylon was the centre of the Manist Head Bishop. In about 661 Samarra and became the chief place. Manism spread in the West as far as Europe and Africa, in the East, Chinese Turkistan, India and Tibet. It influenced Christianity and Muhamadism. Revival of Mani's teaching took place in the 11th century under the name of Euchites, Enthusiastes.

Mani and Bardesanes — Mani refuted the system of Bardesanes arguing that Bardesanes believed that the human soul is purified in this body, when really it was imprisoned and thus had lost its purity. Matter prevents the soul from salvation. If it was a means of emancipation, it would not have forced the soul through passion for sexual enjoyment, to reproduce and bind itself in a new human form.

Zaradusht, son of Khurragan and a native of "Nisa" or "Fasa" lived just after Mani and by modifying his views founded

a new school of thought. He did not go to the extent of contradicting Zoroastrian teaching and risking prison and death. He remained a Zoroastrian philosopher. His views in later times were expounded by the celebrated Mazdak. The date and place of his death are not known.

Mazdak, son of Bāmdād, according to some authors was a native of Tabriz, others place him in Fars (South Persia) and some in Khuzistan. All information concerning him is from hostile sources and should be accepted with extreme caution and scrutiny. He was well educated and at early age he was raised to the dignity of Mobedan-mobed or Zoroastrian high-priest and became the minister of the reigning king, Kūbad. As a student of philosophy he was a follower of Zoroaster, son of Khurragan, upon whose writings he commented. His aim was to philosophically treat and reform Mani's teaching.

His Philosophy—Mani has taught that the universe is formed by entanglement of the spirit in the prison of matter and that matter was the cause of such mixture and not spirit as taught by Zoroaster and other sages. Now the point open to discussion was the possibility of such mixture. Mazdak argued that since matter possessed neither intelligence nor will, it could not invade the realm of life. Therefore we must believe that spirit descended into matter. But we find the worldly life impure and unspiritual. The spiritual aspect of man appears to be weaker than the material. Hence we may assume that the worldly life is material and the union of the spirit which makes the matter intelligent and active was accidental and not intentional as depicted by Mani. He emphasized this point and formed a new school of thought. Further he argued that the imprisoned soul in matter had the attribute of intelligence and will. Therefore it must realize its unnatural state and strive to release itself and join its original source.

His Cosmogony—The material world is composed of three elements i.e. fire, water and earth. That which is produced of harmonious and pure compound of the elements is good and that which is unequal and polluted combination is bad. God, the supreme being is possessed of the attribute of the power of discernment, memory, intelligence and contentment (Indian *sānti*). These four powers direct the affairs of the world through seven sub-parts named as follows —

Salar, Peshkar, Matūr, Brone, Kardān, Dastūr and Kūdāk

These seven metaphors are seven natural forces responsible for the formation of the Universe. Under these there are twelve qualities in all animate things i.e. Caller, giver, taker, bearer,

eater, mover, riser, killer, striker, digger, comer and goer or becomer.

Through these qualities man finds the seven and gaining them turns towards the four divine attributes and finally attains emancipation.

His Ethics like Mani's is based on renunciation of the worldly possession. Being an ascetic himself he preached the same. He prohibited eating of flesh, killing harmless animals, war and bloodshed.

His Socialism and Communism—There was great famine in the reign of King Kubad. Hundreds of people were dying from scarcity of food and corn was stored by land-owners who wanted to sell at high prices. None cared for the sufferings of the poor people and no one was bold enough to inform the King of the real condition of his subjects. At last Mazdak who was the high-priest and minister went to the King and requested permission to ask a question. His request was granted. Mazdak said, if a man bitten by a serpent is at the point of death, and another man possesses the antidote but does not help the snake-bitten man, what would the King think of him. Kubad replied that such a man is a murderer and deserves severe punishment. Next day again Mazdak asked the King if the King's captive (subject) is dying of hunger and the guard who must look after him does not give any food and lets him die, what would he think of him? Kubad said such a guard was a murderer. Then Mazdak related the situation of his subjects, in which there was scarcity of food and cruelty of aristocrats. Afterwards he went to the people and allowed them to plunder all magazines of stored-up corn, including those of the King himself. After that he preached the doctrine of equality of wealth and other enjoyments of the world. He said that the wealthy are the warp and the poor the woof. These two should join and co-operate for the welfare of the whole community. Every individual must have sufficient to live upon. Five things are the cause of misery to human beings. These are greed, anger, need (poverty), jealousy, and sense of vengeance. Sexual relations and worldly rank he thought have nothing to do with religion. They are social inventions. Theft and some other crimes are also necessary stages arising from ignorance and need. His argument with the King has much resemblance with a similar dialogue between a Chinese sage and his king. The sage asked the king the difference between killing a man with a stick and killing him with a sword. The king replied that both were the same. Thereupon, the sage related that

while his people were dying of hunger, his horses were well-fed and were fat.

In politics Mazdak had his ideal state somewhat resembling Plato's. Unfortunately we do not know it in detail. He was a revolutionist who wanted to revolutionize not only religion but also philosophy and politics. He had made good progress, and if he had not connected himself directly with the administration, probably he would have succeeded in his great reform.

His downfall was due to the following causes —

- (i) Opposition and jealousy of priestly class,
- (ii) Enmity and hatred of aristocrats,
- (iii) His interference in the right of succession to the throne.

King Kubad favoured his teachings and had a very high regard for him, and for this reason he had to face rebellion and suffer deposition. He rescued himself from the prison and after three years recovered the throne. This time he was careful in changing his attitude towards Mazdak and remaining neutral. In the meanwhile the King had grown old. He had several sons and one of them, the eldest was Mazdakist. Khusrao was the favourite of his father. He showed himself an orthodox Zoroastrian and thus secured the sympathy of the priestly class and aristocrats. Kubad appointed him as his heir-apparent and was supported by all nobility. Mazdak and his followers tried to secure the throne for the eldest. They were prepared to the extent of deposing or murdering the old king. Khusrao and his party informed the King of the Mazdakite conspiracy, perhaps with much exaggeration. Kubad who had once suffered deposition, imprisonment, and banishment, could not allow himself a repetition of the same. He permitted prince Khusrao to deal with the Mazdakites as he thought best. In consequence of such permission Mazdak and most of his followers were slaughtered. It is not certain that Prince Khusrao after ascending the throne further persecuted Mazdakites. He was himself a student of philosophy and inclined towards Mani's doctrine. His enmity with Mazdak and his followers was more for the throne and the empire. If there was any further persecution of Mazdakites probably it was due to the agitation of the priests and fear of retaliation by them. Followers of Mazdak continued in Iran when they were once again persecuted by the Islamic Khalif. It is supposed that Khurramiyya and Ismailiyya movements were the reappearance of Mazdakism in the form of Islam. Mazdak announced his teaching in about 487 A. D. and was executed in 528-9 A.D. at the age of 68.

The missionary activity of his followers reached the Roman Empire and China. Emperor Anastasius the first, is supposed to be a Mazdakite. In Cyrene an inscription was found in 1823, in which Mazdak's name is included as a philosopher and law-giver with Pythagoras, John, Epicurus and Christ.

Iranian Wisdom Literature—We find a number of works in Pahlavi comprising ancient myth, parables, proverbs, maxims, questions and answers on religion, morals, virtue and vice. Very few authors are mentioned. Among them are the following—

Burzoe—A physician and philosopher from the college of Gunde-Shahpur. He lived in the reign of King Khusrav the first, travelled to India and remained there for some time. He studied Sanskrit, and on his return translated the celebrated Pañcatantra into Pahlavi.

Bukht Afrid, (See Dinkart) author of a short treatise in Pahlavi (still extant) and a commentator and teacher of the Avesta. He was one of the Paoryotkæshas (philosophers) in the court of the King Khusrav Anushirvan. Among his sayings mentioned in the Dinkart is the following—

“That every individual is created by God to oppose the Evil in this world.”

Revival of Orthodox Zoroastrianism—Simultaneously with Christian missionary activity in the East, when Iran was honey-combed with various sects and schools of philosophy, a band of enthusiasts appeared, whose object was to revive the orthodox form of early Zoroastrianism. It was a difficult task and support of the state was necessary. Some Parthian princes, and even the King, were inclined to collect and compile the fragments of the scattered and neglected sacred texts, but the internal unrest and revolt and external wars with the Romans, prevented them from accomplishing the desired object. In the meanwhile Ardashir, a prince of Fars revolted, defeated and killed the last Parthian Emperor, named Artabanus. After settling with his internal enemies and firmly establishing himself on the throne, he turned his attention towards religious reforms. A large number of Zoroastrian priests were assembled by his command, who seriously took up the task of the compilation of the sacred Avesta. Orthodox Zoroastrianism became the state religion and was supported by the dynasty till their fall in 651. Numerous books were written in Pahlavi, the spoken language of the time. The following are some of the celebrated authors and writers on theology, tradition and morals.

Ardai Viraf—A high-priest in the reign of Ardeshir, first monarch of the Sasanian family, has given an elaborate description

of the enjoyments of Heaven and miseries of Hell Nothing further is known of him.

Tansor, a high-priest of the Sasanian period, is supposed to have collected and compiled the scattered fragments of Avesta

Mehr-Nush, a High-priest and Premier in the reign of Yazdagard the second, is celebrated for his proclamation to Armenian Christians on behalf of the King, in which he gives a fair description of Zoroastrianism as understood and followed in his time

Adarbad, a high-priest in the reign of Shahpur was a zealous worker in promulgating his faith among heretics and non-believers

Adar Farbag, son of Farrokhzad, Nishapur, son of Mah-dat, Datahuramazd, Atromitro were the known sages and theologians of their age Vazarg-Mitro is narrated by Firdusi and other historians as the minister and the philosopher in the court of King Khusrao-Anushirwan His maxims and sayings are given in the Shah Nama

SEX AND SAINTS.

MR. DHIRENDRALAL DAS, M A

When William James expounded the theory of sub-conscious motivation of religious experience he appeared as something of a defender of faith to the theologians and religious thinkers of the time. The enthusiasm for the sub-conscious was due to its being mysterious. Being beyond consciousness and hence scientific verification, it was just the hypothesis that religious people, whose beliefs were being threatened by the rising positivism of the day, were groping for.

"We have, in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes."¹ Nothing could be more assuring than the above assertion from a veteran of science.²

But now that the concept of the sub-conscious which, when James delivered his Gifford Lectures, was obscurely understood by most thinking people, has been developed in its full psychical contents, those who once ardently welcomed it, have been utterly disillusioned. The sub-conscious, or the more usual terminology,—the unconscious, is not regarded today as anything outside the psyche or the personality. It is no supernatural medium through which God the supersensible communicates himself to an individual. It is a psychic stratification—the realm of various impulses, desires, and emotions that lack the quality of consciousness. Religion, or more precisely the religious experience, is due to the workings of these unconscious impulses, which are of one clay with conscious contents. What is more distressing to the believers is that these impulses that determine religious experience are mostly regarded as sexual in character. The proposition that religion is sex disguised has been so often enunciated from so many quarters that it is beginning to be a commonplace of psychology.

¹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 515

² Of course, it was Myers who propounded the hypothesis, before James, he drew the distinction between superluminal and subluminal selves and showed that art, religion, mysticism and similar facts of human nature originated in the sub-conscious. Still it was only when the eminent Psychologist of the time adopted the concept that it could make an extensive appeal.

For the proper understanding of this attitude reference has to be made to contemporary psychology. The outstanding outlook of present-day psychology is what is called conative. Animal and human natures are understood in terms of instincts or innate impulsive forces. Man is born with certain inborn urges that are at the bottom of all actions, thoughts and desires that constitute his variegated mental life. "Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses," says McDougall, "and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind, it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clock-work whose main spring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn."¹

One natural consequence of this tendency has been that all facts of mental life that do not deserve the status of instinct themselves are derived from one or more instincts. Religion, according to a large number of psychologists, is one such experience. While some like McDougall, Lauba, etc., trace it to the emotions of awe, reverence, admiration and such other feelings, Freud, Havelock Ellis and others consider it as an expression of sex repressed.²

1 *Sumul Psychology*, p. 44

2 There are some, however, who maintain the existence of an original religious instinct. In his "*Study of Religion*" Jastrow, writes: "The certainty that the religious instinct is, so far the evidence goes innate in man, suffices as starting point for a satisfactory classification, and more than a starting point is not needed" (pp. 100-101). In the same work he says: "Others, since Schleiermacher's time, have defined the religious feeling differently but the definite assumption of religious instinct in man forms a part of almost every definition of religion proposed since the appearance of Schleiermacher's discourses" (p. 153). Jastrow seems to have taken it for granted that there is a religious instinct. Similarly, Rutgers Marshall in his '*Instinct and Reason*' holds that religion at least is an instinct in the making.

"Religious activities like the expressions of all true instincts seem often to be spontaneously developed in man. The masses of mankind do not have to be urged to the expression of religious feeling, rather it is true that rationalistic or other barriers must be raised if we are to prevent the expression of religious force that is found in man in varying degree."—(*Instinct and Reason*)

In the course of a paper entitled *The Instinctive Basis of Religion* read before the 19th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Starbuck maintained that the two cosmoaesthetic and teleoaesthetic senses constitute the ultimate religious instinct of human nature.

In the *Idea of the Holy*, R. Otto defends *a priori* character of "The Numinous" (by which he understands the religious feeling)

In recent years great advance has been made in the department of psychiatric researches in the continental countries. The study of psycho-neuroses has revealed the role of sex in mental life and induced the belief that sex is a great motive in all mental alienation. It has been urged that religion, as it finds expression in the lives of saints and mystics, is a deviation and hence is to be traced to those deep-seated stirrings that activate in the life of the psychopaths, and not to any celestial fire.

"What do the Christian mystics want?" says Leuba. Were we to ask them that question, they would give us the traditional answer. But it should not be assumed that it would name fully and exactly the forces that drive them on. The motives assigned for action are often justifications for promptings very imperfectly understood. We are all distressingly like the unfortunate asylum patient impelled in and out of season to wash his hands. He washes them 'because they are dirty'. Yet the psychiatrist is aware of other promptings hidden to patients.

"The mystics say that they want God. That is a convenient traditional way of naming their goal. But what is it that urges them on, what do they really want when they want God?"¹ And the answer that the psychologist offers is "The behaviour of the mystic like that of every body is instigated by innate tendencies to action and by needs that express themselves in forms determined mainly by experience."² The tendencies referred to are mostly sexual. One strong warrant of classing religious emotion with neurosis emanates from the fact that ecstasies, trances and amorous outbursts that mark a mystical career have glaring affinity with erotical symptoms met with in persons labouring under sex repression. As in the asylum, so also in the monasteries the absence of instinctual satisfaction or 'frustration' is responsible for those psychic occurrences. Saints repress down into the unconscious their sex desires as they are in painful conflict with their ethico-religious goal, but "the instinct presentation develops in more unchecked fashion if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence, it ramifies like a fungus, so to speak, in the dark and takes on extreme forms of expression."³

What happens is this. The libido consequent upon repression finds in God the substitute for the original object the flesh.

1 *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 116

2. *Ibid*

3 *Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud*, Vol IV, p. 87.

Mysticism or religious longing is the same libidinal attitude, with the only difference that the spiritual object has been substituted for a secular one. The above theory implies that an instinctual impulse, charged with affect and energy, must work out its fulfilment and that, saint or no saint, none can get rid of the racial urges. With the help of the conceptions of repression and unconscious this thesis is made out.

We agree that the conative conception of mind is highly satisfactory, but it must be said that instincts understood in their racial import do not exhaust the nature of man. Instincts are not the only original impulses with which a man is born, there are individual conative tendencies over and above the racial ones. "Human beings begin their lives", says Mr Bartlett, "with certain tendencies to action and feeling ready to come into operation the moment appropriate conditions are established. Some of these tendencies are common to all men or at least are very widely shared indeed, and these we call instinctive. Others possess a more individual character. In the course of their development they play a large part in building up those interests and specialised abilities which constitute a man's personality and are the most ready means of differentiating him from others. These tendencies are best known as 'individual difference' tendencies".¹ Whether we agree that these tendencies operate in every human being or not, there can be no doubt that some possess, in addition to the racial tendencies, tendencies of high affective-conative charge towards a particular direction. These mould and give meaning to their lives. Their lives are incapable of being compassed within one general formula. These are men of genius.

A study of those who are acknowledged as religious geniuses will disprove the hypothesis of the sexual etiology of all religious lives. Just as the saints were born with common instincts of the race, they had also imbedded in them a strong disposition which may be called religious. This disposition may be found varying in details in different saints, but the common feature may be described as "a tendency of the individual spontaneously to fix the attention beyond and above the reality of the senses. This tendency is accompanied by an attitude of mind, that of striving for profounder realities leading to a spirit of renunciation of immediate material enjoyment in order to obtain a felicity of more lasting and universal character".²

1 *Psychology of Primitive Culture*, p. 13.

2. *De Sanctis' Religious Conversion* p. 259.

The religious career of a saint is the result of this disposition 'with its accompanying impulse', that grows in strength and eagerness as his life progresses in years. A critical study of the lives of those who are regarded as saints will prove that their religious history is merely the history of a spiritual instinct. This thesis we shall examine with reference to a few great saints. We begin with Buddha.

Although a vast mass of legends has clustered around the life of Buddha, a tiny biographical history has been isolated from them by scholars like Oldenberg and Thomas. It is authoritatively acknowledged that glimpses of spiritual life appeared in the early years of Buddha. "In the *Majjhima*, Buddha in describing his strivings before enlightenment says that while practising austerities he remembered that at the time when his father the Sakyan was working, he was seated beneath the cool shade of a rose-apple tree and attained the first trance"¹.

It was no spiritual atmosphere in which Buddha was brought up. Thus he describes his luxurious life, 'I was delicate, O Monks, extremely delicate, excessively delicate. In my father's dwelling lotus pools had been made - in one blue lotuses, in another red, in another white, all for my sake'².

But these pleasures could not hold him for long for they were out of tune with his natural bent. He reflected on the frailty of earthly pleasures, delicacy and majesty he was endowed with. And as he reflected on them all the elation in youth utterly disappeared³.

The discontent was rising from day to day. We read "Now before my enlightenment while yet a bodhisatta and not yet fully enlightened, I thought, oppressive is life in a house, a place of dust. In the free air is abandonment of world. Not easy it is for him who dwells, in a house to practise a completely full, completely pure and perfect religious life. What if I remove my hair and beard and putting on yellow robes go forth from a house to a houseless life"⁴. The growing unrest led to the grand renunciation which was followed by six long years of continuous spiritual strivings. Gautama passed through diverse austerities. He described this period in the following way "Then I thought if I were to refrain altogether from food. So the

1. THOMAS, *The Life of Buddha*, p. 44

2. *Anguttaranikāya*, 145

3. *Ibid*

4. *Majjhimanikāya*, 1, 240

divinities approached me and said, 'Sir, do not refrain altogether from food' Then I thought what if I were to take food only in small amounts as much as my hollowed palm would hold (He does so) My body became extremely lean The mark of my seat was like a camel's footprint Then I thought, it is not easy to gain that happy state while my body is so very lean Now having taken solid food and gained strength, without sensual desires, without evil ideas, I attained and abode in the first trance of joy and pleasure arising from seclusion and combined with reasoning and investigation" ¹

In this way he proceeded and at last with mind concentrated, purified, cleansed, spotless, with the defilement gone, he directed his mind to knowledge of destruction of *āśava*s Finally ignorance was dispelled, knowledge arose ² The remaining twenty years of his life Buddha spent in wandering, preaching, founding an order

Coming nearer in time to the life of Ramakrishna the greatest of the saints of modern times, we are provided with more light He was born in an ordinary Hindu family and grew up in a society having had no specific otherworldly touch He had the first trance of his life as early as his seventh year He described the incident to the disciples in the following manner," at the time I am speaking of I was only six or seven years I was passing across the corn field and taking 'Muri' (fried rice) from the 'Chubri' (a small basket) as I went It was the month of Jaistha or Āśāḍha A magnificent rain-cloud appeared in the horizon and was quickly enveloping the sky A flock of milk-white cranes was gliding along the blue sky Oh! how wonderful it was! I was filled with intense delight and swooned away That was my first trance" ³

In the following year a band of village folk was going to the temple of Visālīksi Thikur (Ramakrishna) was with them He went on singing a song in praise of the goddess No sooner had they passed the meadow than a strange event occurred The boy stopped singing, his limbs became stiff and tears began to run down his cheeks When he recovered his senses, he said that it was due to his meditation of the Holy Mother ⁴

After the sacred-thread ceremony his mystical disposition becomes outstanding The boy was left in charge of worshipping

¹ *Majjhimanikāya* 1, 246

² *Ibid*

³ *Līlāprasānga*, Vol. II, p 44.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 49.

Raghuvra, the household deity. Having been enfranchised to touch and worship the deity, the boy was filled with a novel ardour (*nava anurāga*). In the course of worship he had occasional trances and ecstatic visions.¹ He was then not more than nine. While he had a remarkable tendency in this direction he had little or no interest in learning to read and write. He disliked Arithmetic and could not make any progress in the *Pāthasālā* which he left in no time. Then he was taken to Calcutta by his brother Rāma-Kumāra who established a *Catuspāthi* there. Here again Ramakrishna was indifferent to his studies. Being once rebuked by his brother, he boldly replied, "I do not like to have that learning which aims at priesthood. I want the knowledge which provides illumination and perfects the life of a man."² Then he was only seventeen.

When by an unusual combination of circumstances he came to be the priest of the temple of Kālī, the vague spiritual longing found its definite channel, and we can see the figure of the saint with all its lineaments. He could not play the part of an ordinary priest going mechanically through the routine of worship. At Dakshineswar (near Calcutta) he was making spiritual preparation very strenuously. He was trying to deliver himself from bonds of all kinds. Sometimes he would go to the jungle near the temple at the dead of night and tear off his sacred thread and throw off his clothing. His yearning for Divine Mother became vehement. Speaking of the intensity of his emotion at that time, Max Muller wrote, "No mother ever shed such burning tears over the death-bed of her only child."³ The poignancy of his feeling will be apparent from the words of Ramakrishna. "Just as one wrings water out of a wet towel, my mind was being grinded for not having seen the Mother. I got restless and reflected that life was in vain."

From 1262 to 1273 B. S. stretches the period of Sādhana through different phases, such as Tantrī Bhāva Sādhana, Madhura Bhāva Sādhana, Vātsalya Bhāva Sādhana and Vedāntī Bhāva Sādhana after which came the spiritual tranquility and glorious enlightenment, he was seeking.

Similarly in his great disciple, Swāmī Vivekānanda, we find one original religious impulse forcing through life from start to finish. He did not imbibe this from the environment nor was it

1 *Lilāprasānga*, Vol. I, p. 111

2 *Lilā Prasānga*, Vol. II, p. 61.

3 *Life of Ramakrishna*.

a product of his education. While he was a mere stripling, Narendra felt interest in worship. One day Naren and a Brahmin boy-friend of his purchased clay images of Rāma and Sītā from the bazar. They climbed the stairs that led above the ladies' quarters up to the roof. The image was installed and the two sat in meditation. When the superiors came up the Brahmin boy fled. But Narendra remained as he was 'sitting in forgetfulness like another Mozart'. 'He was shaken from his meditation but he insisted on being left alone.' Thereafter the family often found Naren playing at meditation and such meditations often culminated in vision.¹

The small stir of boyhood became the insurgent will in youth. Speaking of Narendra in his college-days, Sir Brajendra Nath Sen wrote in an article in the *Prabuddhi Bhārata* in 1907, "When I first met Vivekānanda in 1881, we were fellow-students. Undeniably a gifted youth, sociable, free and unconventional in manners—somewhat peremptory and speaking with the accents of authority, possessing a strange power of the eye."

This was patent to all but what was known to few was the inner man and his struggles—the *stram und drang* of soul which expressed itself in his restlessness and Bohemian wanderings.²

"This was the beginning of a critical period in his mental history during which he awoke to self-consciousness and laid the foundation of his future personality. John Stuart Mill's *Three Essays on Religion* had upset his boyish theism and easy optimism which he had imbibed from the outer circles of the Brahmo Samaj.

"He asked for a course of Theistic philosophic reading suited to a beginner in his situation. I named some authorities but the arguments of the intuitionist only confirmed him in his unbelief.

I gave him a course of readings in Shelley,—Shelley's *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty* moved him. I spoke to him of a higher unity than Shelley had conceived—the unity of Param Brahman as the universal reason.

The sovereignty of universal reason and the negation of the individual as the principle of morals were ideas that soon came to satisfy Vivekānanda's intellect.

"But this brought him no peace. For the creed of universal reason called on him to suppress the yearnings and susceptibilities of his artist-nature.

1. *The Life of Vivekānanda*, Vol. I, pp. 41-42.

2. *Ibid* p. 58.

"He complained that a pale bloodless reason sovereign *de jure* but not *de facto* could not hold out arms to save him in the hour of temptation. He wanted to know if my philosophy could satisfy his senses, could mediate bodily, as it were, for the soul's deliverance. In short, he wanted a flesh and blood reality visible in form and glory" ¹

The above statement vividly presents the feverish searching for spiritual ideal which was different from a prosaic intellectual quest. The years that followed were marked by well-defined striving and surpassing spiritual zeal.

The life of Keshab Chandra Sen is also illustrative enough. He writes in his *Jivana Veda*, "In my eighteenth year religion first dawned, but when I was fourteen I left eating meat. Who taught me that meat was forbidden? One guide I knew, him I honoured, and I called him conscience. The conscience spoke to the boy and the boy made his renunciation. Asceticism began in my fourteenth year."

"Prayer to God was another early instinct in Keshab. It was entirely untaught. From the very beginning it was a spontaneous impulse. He never saw any one offer prayer to the unseen spirit God, his mother or any of his friends never spoke to him on the subject."

"The first lesson of the scriptures of my life", says Keshab "is prayer. No one helped me, I had not entered any religious society, I had not decided what faith to adopt" ²

More examples of the early rise of religion and its gradual growth throughout life may be multiplied. The Maratha saint Ram Das and the Sikh preceptor Nanaka exhibited religious vespining at an early age.

Two marks stand out in the lives of the saints we have mentioned above. Firstly, there is in each one of them a foregleam of the religious or mystical tendency in early age. Secondly there is a steady evolution of impulse throughout life—a life-long striving for the goal, which makes the conative continuity of life palpable. From the first characteristic follows the innateness of the impulse and from the second the conative character of the experience and its primacy in life can be concluded.

It has been said that educational and environmental factors are responsible for early genesis of religion. But this seems to be contrary to fact.

1. Quoted in *The Life of Vivekananda*, Vol. I, p. 172

2. *Life and Times of Keshab Chandra Sen* p. 21

3. *Jivana Veda* Ch. 1

The environment where Buddha was born and bred up was not, as we have seen, favourable to the growth of an ascetic life. How are we to explain the early trances of Buddha, Ramakrishna and Vivekānanda and the spontaneous prayer of Keshab except by supposing that the mystical disposition was a part of their congenital endowment? It cannot be said, religious ideas and practices impressed Goutama at an early age so as to stimulate trances and kindred behaviours, nor will it be true to say that he was born of highly religious parents. There was regal pomp and no spiritual placidity at home.

Similarly, the parents of Ramakrishna were as much or as little religious as nine out of ten Hindus are. He was born in an environment in which most Hindus are born, yet only one or two Ramakrishnas tower over hundreds of thousands of worldlings. The fact that there was a household deity need not strike us as having an extraordinary significance with regard to his life. Many houses have such a deity. As to education, it will appear from the above extracts from his biography that his parents, exceedingly doting as they were, far from giving him spiritual education of any kind, did not worry the child even about rudiments, they allowed him to play and sing at his will.

Neither was Vivekānanda born in a spiritual home. He belonged to a prosperous Hindu family of Calcutta and his father was a lawyer. Naturally, his father had no idea of bringing him up on any but modern lines. Yet he had early interest in sādhus and in worship which sometimes culminated in trances. These were, beyond doubt, a part of his mental make-up—the feeble beginning of the impulse that mightily swayed his life in future years.

Independent origin of Keshab's religious emotion is clear from his own words:

As the saints grow the impulse grows too in vigour and vitality and becomes defined and directed. Goutama married and was surrounded on all sides by pleasure and plenty. Yet life became oppressive to him. Without a native bias in the direction of spiritual upliftment he could not extricate himself from the joys of home and turn an ascetic. The long six years of unbroken austerities show the dominant drive of his life. Ramakrishna's peculiar dispositional interest is evident in his indifference to studies and the world. And in the strenuous endeavour in and through different modes of Sādhana is exhibited the conative impulsion—the tremendous will to realize spiritual ideal.

When Vivekānanda was living, modern ideals of life were opened up in consequence of the Western light and culture that well nigh flooded the land. But the life of a civilian, a doctor, a professor or a lawyer was not any stimulus to his activities. His student life, as we have seen, is marked by craving for truth—spiritual certainty, which was satisfied in a perfect monastic career. While the young men of that generation were exerting themselves for worldly distinction he was asking of whomsoever he had any regard for, "Have you seen God?"

So also the life of Keshab, full of spiritual zeal and unbroken activity, is a response to the irresistible call from the depths of the soul or, in psychological terms, a reaction to the inner urge. Religion with the saints was thus the flesh of their flesh and the bone of their bones and as much a congenital personal tendency as the instincts, i.e. the impulses that universally characterize the species, are. If we consider other types of genius, we meet with identical characteristics. Take the case of Mozart the musical prodigy. Musical tendency appeared at his fifth year, and was pervading all through his life.¹

The social theory has been put forward by Leuba while analyzing the lives of the Christian mystics. He says, "The ideals of self-renunciation, of chastity and of surrender to a living and righteous God constitute the essential acquisitions of their early years. Whatever particularity marks the mystics off from other persons is due to their education."²

This is an over-emphasis of the social factor. The father and mother of Suzo were temperamentally opposed to each other. While the woman was religious the man was a 'child of the world'. He was so intolerant of her emotion that he literally dwarfed her religious life. The man who could not tolerate religious fervour in his wife did not surely encourage it in his child. Suzo therefore must have developed the religious sensibility in spite of the father's opposition.

Even supposing that the ideals of chastity and renunciation had influence, the fact remains that not all, who came under their influence, developed mystical attitude. The very fact that the ideals should influence effectively some and not all, proves the innate characteristic of the individual to be so influenced. It

1 It is interesting to note in this connection that Stout has felt inclined to call this tendency an instinct. (*British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. III—Symposium on Instinct and Intelligence.)

2 *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 117.

is their native spiritual disposition that enables some to assimilate the ideals and make them the serious concerns of life "When we have accounted," says Bartlett, "for every thing we possibly can in terms of education there still often remains something left over, a group of temperamental characteristics distinguishing one individual from others."¹

The answer therefore to the question why life did not satisfy Suzo, why Suzo kept aloof from earthly companions, and yearned for divine comrade, why Catherine of Genoa at the full bloom of her years failed to enjoy worldly pleasures and for amusements, became sadder after having participated in them, why Mme Guyon dreamt of hell, burnt with the desire to become a martyr,—must be found in the innate dispositions of the saints and not in their environment alone.

They were not shut out from earthly ideals and sometimes they showed interest in matters relating to earthly happiness. Catherine of Genoa was given in marriage and was a mother in a hospital. But nothing could fill the void in her heart. Her whole being strained towards profound blessedness. When Mme Guyon entered into womanhood young people fluttered about her, and for the moment her attention was drawn to them. But all this could not prove of any lasting interest to her. Although she received in the admiration of her youthful consorts she was never able to 'follow her inclination with complete abandon'. She would at times go to the Church and beg conversion at the feet of the blessed Virgin. Although she fulfilled her conjugal duties and had several children, her heart could not rest there, she thirsted for the divine bridegroom and cried, "Oh, my God!" This is not you, you alone can give true pleasure," and she consequently led herself through series of penances and mortifications. From this it would be only natural to hold that environment only stimulated the inner will but did not create it. The fact that adverse circumstances could not quench the passion for God and that the spiritual interest overshadowed other interests of life goes to establish the congenital character of the impulse.

Is religion sex repressed? Psychologists of all shades of opinion have admitted the usefulness of the Freudian concept of repression. Indeed there can be no doubt that psychic phenomena signified by repression do really occur. It is an experience with every one that some thoughts and wishes disappear after a very

¹ *Psychology of Primitive Culture* p. 6.

short duration in the mental life. Although the concept has been widely acknowledged, no clear statement has been made as to what that is which represses a particular mental content. Repression, according to Freud, is one of the types of vicissitudes undergone by an instinct. That is simply characterising the process. If we are to understand the censor that stops the uprush of a repressed wish in its original form into consciousness as the same that had repressed it down into the unconscious, then it must be pointed out that Freud is guilty of prescientific hypostatisation. It is impossible to bring the censor that plays the dual role of repressing and censoring under any accepted category of present-day psychology. Hart says that the personality represses and Tansley holds, it is the mind.¹ But what is personality or mind except a name for the totality of tendencies of which the tendency repressed is also one? Scientific precision demands a more clear conception.

When it is said that saints repress their sex, that is undoubtedly a statement of an atypical phenomenon. The sexual impulse obtains its satisfaction in all men. There is no social taboo with regard to moderate sexual life. What leads to the denial of sexual happiness in saints? As we are to understand mind in terms of tendencies, the cause of repression must be sought in some one tendency or a cumulation of tendencies, congenital or acquired. It must be supposed that the ascendancy in mental life is possessed by some other tendency which puts sex into the background.

Without supposing the presence of a counter-tendency repression or suppression of another tendency becomes inexplicable. Now what is that counter-tendency in the saints? Surely it is no other than what has been described as a tendency to fix attention beyond the realities of sense. It is the spiritual impulse that has inhibited the sex because the former is more powerful than the latter. Religious lives therefore may exhibit inhibition of sex, but their religion is due to a distinct impulse that inhibits the sex and not to inhibition alone. We use the term 'inhibition' in order to preclude the pathological implications of the term 'repression'.

1 Regarding repression, Tansley says, "The possibility of this procedure depends upon the universal tendency of the mind to ignore, avoid or forget what is disagreeable to it." (*The New Psychology*, p. 119.)

It may be suggested that inhibition must have been occasioned by social agency. Here our answer, as may be anticipated, is that there are lives where there was no social factor operating and yet there was inhibition and that even where there was social influence inhibition occurred in the lives of some and not all

One other hypothesis, put forward by the psycho-analysts, is that of sublimation. Sublimation means driving an instinctual impulse through an entirely different conative channel. Sublimation is however understood in special reference to sex instinct. Sex is thought to be capable of being sublimated into religious or moral force. Havelock Ellis is of opinion that sex may be transmuted into an entirely new energy. According to the apostles of sublimation religious ardour is sex sublimated. Sexual instinct, according to Freud, is characterised by a high degree of plasticity so that the sexual elements may be transmuted into a by-way leading to an end of ethico-social value. The hypothesis of sublimation becomes clearly intelligible in the light of the conception of psychic energy or libido. Libido or psychic energy is that which supplies the instinctive processes. Sublimation consists in guiding the libido through a different outlet.

Here as before we ask, what is the sublimating agency? Driving of the psychic energy from its usual course along a different one certainly presupposes a force. Now what is the source of this force? The concepts of self and ego as psychical entities have long evaporated from the field of psychology. Hence the source of the force will have to be found in some tendency or tendencies. If then sex is sublimated (which is an extraordinary phenomenon), the presence of a vigorous tendency that sublimates shall have to be admitted.

As to the warrant of the concept of sublimation De Sanctis observes, "The fires of nature are not put out except by natural causes, that is to say, by illness or senility, but if these two conditions are absent we must surmise that the inextinguishable fire burns on, feeding itself not on the flesh but on the ideas".¹ But supposing that it does so, the question as to why it feeds on ideas instead of on the natural object flesh remains unanswered. There is nothing in the above words to refute the proposition that there is an independent impulse which is responsible for spiritualisation of nature. If there is sublimation at all, it must be effected by this.

1. *Religious Conversion*, pp 187-86.

Sublimation is the logical demand of the theory that any kind of emotional relationship, irrespective of the personality of the related, is motivated by sex. So the love for God is regarded as functionally identical with love for a member of the opposite sex. But this is unacceptable inasmuch as the specific cause of the purification of carnal desires in some and not all is left out.

Call it repression or sublimation, a repressing or sublimating impulse has to be assumed. Instead of repression and sublimation we think we should adhere to the old psychological concepts of inhibition and reinforcement. A psychological process of a high degree of intensity inhibits a weaker one and is at the same time reinforced by it.

Libido is the repository of psychic energy. Religion being the dominant spiritual urge drains off a large quantity of psychic energy and causes inadequate supply of energy to other instinct-processes Herd, Sex and Ego. There is thus inhibition by the powerful impulse with the result that the unexpended energy of the minor channels goes to reinforce the major channel. It is necessary to point out that in saints not only is sex inhibited but various other impulses also are enfeebled. Ego-instinct, for example, has no perceptible intensity in them. Far from satisfying their ego, their conduct is often such as impoverishes the self. The sacrifice of self-sense is a common attribute of all those who are spiritually advanced. Similarly herd-instinct is more or less atrophied in the saint. They love and live a retired life but do not suffer from a feeling of loneliness. These facts cannot be explained except by the Drainage theory.

Now reinforcing may seem to be identical with the process of sublimation. But the difference is real. Psychic energy in itself is neutral in quality.¹ The energy assumes the specific affective-conative complexion of the particular instinctive mechanism through which it flows. The said unspent energy remains amorphous in character. When therefore it goes to reinforce some one conative process it does not carry with it any 'dissociated' affect of the process which it was to feed. Thus, while sublimation consists in ideo-affective dissociation or transference connecting the dissociated affect with representations of social and moral value, reinforcement means the appropriation by an independent

1 We should use the term 'vital energy' instead of psychic energy because the energy that has not yet acquired any psychic character is miscalled such. The vital becomes psychic only when it courses through a psychic mechanism.

and powerful appetitive process of the psychic energy that could not flow through its usual channel (hence qualitless)

One more point. The affective similarity that exists between religious and sexual impulses has been the ground of identifying the two. But this does not seem to be a sound position. Although McDougall has connected one specific affect with a particular impulse he has at the same time enumerated a number of impulses that are not accompanied by specific affective qualities. Affective qualities are not as numerous as the conative. Take, for example, the sex instinct. On the conative side it is different from the parental instinct but on the affective side there is likeness in respect of a few elements. No one can deny that tender emotion accompanying the parental instinct is a part of the sexual instinct as well. Affectively both the mystic and the sexual attitudes may be called love, but from the point of view of conation one is reproductive operation and the other is far removed from it.

Before we conclude we must make one thing clear. Though we have enunciated an original spiritual impulse we are not in a position to explain with scientific precision as to why it is present in certain individuals. This is a problem which is yet to be fully solved. Let us conclude with the following observation of McDougall —

"There are many facts which compel us to go further in the recognition of innate mental structure, such facts as the special facilities shown by individuals in music, in mathematics, in language and other aesthetic and moral endowments. The question of the extent and nature of the innate endowments or innate mental structure remains one of the largest fields of work for psychology."¹

1. *British Journal of Psychology*: Symposium on Instinct and Unconscious.

REVIEWS

La Philosophie Comparee, by
PAUL MASON.—OURSSEL Publisher
Felix Alcan, Paris

This little book of 166 pages makes a plea for the recognition of the method of comparative studies in the discussion of philosophical problems. Without this method the author believes no philosophical criticism can be effective. Criticism, so far as it is not comparative is, he says, arbitrary. "Even philosophical criticism, although it may succeed in getting within an ace of the mind, shows itself artificial and ineffectual" (p. 41). The reason which he gives for the superiority of the comparative method is that it takes hold of the phenomena in themselves, without apprehending them in terms of something else. "For," he says, "in the criticism of a fact in the light of a principle is nothing but futile, the knowledge of two well-established facts, provided they are viewed so far as they are comparable, is equivalent to a limitation of the one by the other: their relative significance becomes clear" (p. 42). It seems therefore that we can never know the truth about anything if we view it in the light of a principle.

This is positivism more radical than anything that we find in Comte or Mill. But its aggressiveness is toned down considerably by the setting in which it occurs, for it is only in support of the claims of

the comparative method that this outrageously aggressive positivism is put forward. That method, however, can stand on its own legs and does not need the artificial proof afforded by a false theory.

The most interesting part of the book is the chapter on comparative Chronology where the author by comparing the three countries, namely, Greece, China and India, which he regards as representative of the whole world, establishes certain fundamental features in the development of philosophical thought. One of these is the simultaneous origin of philosophy in the 6th century B.C. in all the three countries. "The most surprising fact," the author says, "is the almost simultaneous appearance in the beginning of the sixth century B.C. of the earliest efforts in philosophical reflection in the West, in India and in China. We must see in this a datum independent of our appreciation and which, if one day it succeeds in explaining itself, will be justified in the light of comparative philosophy alone" (p. 58). Another is the occurrence of the stages of sophism and scholasticism in the progress of philosophical thought in all the three countries. It is thus clear, says the author, that sophism and scholasticism are essential stages in the evolution of philosophical thought.

The book is, on the whole, interesting, although its uncritical positivism takes away a good deal from its merit. The book has been

translated into English by F. G. Crookshank and is thus accessible to readers who do not know French.

S. K. MAITRA.

Two Dialogues of Plato—THE FIRST ALCIADAES AND THE MENO. A new translation by the editors of the Shrine of Wisdom. Price 4s. 6d. net. (Publishers—Aahlu 6 Hermon Hill, London, E. 11.)

This is a translation of two important dialogues of Plato. In Alciadaes the means by which the soul may arrive at a knowledge of its real self are pointed out. In the Meno, an attempt has been made to prove that the soul inherently possesses innate ideas of truth. The translation is quite lucid. Unfortunately,

a few mis-prints have crept in here and there, e.g., on page 15 'in which of his dialogues Plato especially makes the speculation of our essence his principle (for principal) design.' We hope these will be corrected in the next edition. There is also a short introduction in the beginning of the book. It would have been more helpful for the general reader if the Introduction had contained the salient points of each dialogue together with a critical estimate. The printing and get-up of the book are excellent.

JANUJA SINGH.

Vedāntasāra of Śaṅkara, Sanskrit Text, Edited with Introduction, English Translation and Comments by ŚWĀMĪ NIKHILĀNANDA. Published by Advaita Śrama, Mānvaṭi, Shimoga, Mysore, 1931. Price 1-4-0.

This little manual has always been patronized by the new students of the Advaita Vedānta-philosophy. It has been translated into several European languages and many times in English. Jacob's translation is well-known, but it does not

give the Sanskrit original. The volume before us gives the Sanskrit Text and English translation and the reader has to specially thank the translator for his valuable notes in English, which incorporate rich material derived from the several commentaries. The short introduction deals with the date of the author and the main problems of the Vedānta-philosophy. The price is within the reach of all. Students of Vedānta should be grateful to the author for the book.

R. D. VADLIKAR

Dṛg-Drśya Viveka. Text with English Translation and Notes by SWĀMI NIKHILĀNANDA, Published by Shri Ramkrishna Ashrama, Mysore, 1931 Price Re 1

Dṛg-Drśya Viveka or as more popularly known **Vākya Sudhā** is an inquiry into the nature of the 'seer' and the 'seen'. It is one of the numberless small works that present the Advaitic teachings in a versified form so that it can be easily assimilated. The booklet under review, consists of forty-six verses only. But on account of the succinctness and clearness of the discussion, especially on account of its method of approaching the core of Vedāntic teaching, it has assumed what are called *Prakarana Granthas* or introductory works. To understand the position which it has created for itself, one need only note that it has been commented upon by two great Sanskrit savants like *Brahmānanda Bhārati* and *Ānanda Jñāna*, that an attempt is made to ascribe its authorship to *Śaṅkarācārya* and that it has been already translated and annotated in more than four current languages.

As is usual with such works, the subject of this book is the identity of the individual self with the universal self. Its importance, however as is said above is due to the

logical value of the method that it has followed. What will appeal to the modern reader of this book is its direct approach to the central theme by beginning at its outset the epistemological discussion of the nature of the 'seer' and the 'seen'. By this method the self-effulgent character of the seer is at once brought within the grasp of the reader who is then prepared to admit the apparent nature of the distinction between the 'seer' and the 'seen' and the illusory character of the 'objective' creation. The utility and consequently the importance of the book is greater because in addition to this theoretical discussion of the nature of the 'seer' it has added, in the discussion of various *Samādhis*, the discussion of the practical way to reach this supra-relational experience of the subject or the Seer. We fully agree with the writer of the preface when he says that this small book of 46 ślokas is an excellent *vade mecum* for the study of higher Vedānta.

The annotator has spared no pains to bring the subject-matter of this manual of Vedānta within the reach of a beginner. To a beginner the notes, translations and the discussions showing inter-connections between various verses are simply invaluable.

S V DANDAKAR

Advaita Siddhānta, By Sādhu Śāntinātha — Published by the Author, pp. 10 + 139 + 11

This little book is a work on Advaita Vedānta written in highly

Sanskritized Hindi. In the short compass of a little over 150 pages, the author, Sādhu Śāntinātha has managed to give a closely reasoned exposition and defence of the

Advaita Vedānta as taught by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya. The numerous apt quotations from Sanskrit works on Advaita, most of them still unpublished and lying buried in private libraries, and the apposite references to leading Western writers on philosophy prove the depth and breadth of the author's erudition. It is extremely gratifying to note that his treatment of the subject is in accordance with the time-honoured and time-tested dialectical method adopted by classical writers on Hindu Philosophy — a thing which cannot be said of certain recent works which profess to expound Śrī Śaṅkara's philosophy to the modern mind. His work is characterized by a freshness and directness of exposition and an absence of the verbal wrangles and hair-splitting argumentation which disfigure not a few treatises on Vedāntic controversial literature of recent times.

Limits of space stand in the way of our noticing in detail the many interesting topics dealt with in the book. We shall content ourselves with a brief reference to the main contents of each chapter. The book opens with a reasoned statement of the Advaita doctrine of Experience as the One Self whose nature is self-luminous intelligence. Chapter II describes the nature of *Sat* (Existence) and its identity with *Cit*. In chapter III the nature of the objective world (*Jīveya*) is dealt with and the author comes to the conclu-

sion that the phenomenal world is *Anirvacanīya*, i.e. that it cannot be described as either real or unreal. Arrayed against this Advaita doctrine of *Anirvacanīya*, are (1) the *Asatkhyātis* of the Sūnyavādin, (2) the *Satkhyātis* of Rāmānuja, (3) *Sadasatkhyātis* of the Sāṅkhya (4) the *Ātmasatkhyātis* of the Viśiṣṭavādin, (5) the *Akhyātis* of the Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā and (6) the *Anyathākhyātis* of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. These theories of error (*Bhṛānti*) are stated and refuted in detail in Chapter IV which concludes with a defence of the *Anirvacanīyākhyātis* of Advaita. In this chapter the author incidentally dispels certain erroneous notions entertained about the Advaitic view that the phenomenal universe is *Mithyā*. In chapter V the nature of the relation (*Sambandha*) between the phenomenal universe and its noumenal background (*Brahman*) is considered at length and the conclusion is arrived at that the only kind of relation rationally possible is that produced by erroneous super-imposition (*Adhyāsa*). The problem of causality is then discussed and the book is concluded with a statement of the Advaitic doctrine of Nirguṇa Brahman. We heartily recommend this small booklet to all students of the Vedānta philosophy. We should like to suggest to the author that the book may be translated into Sanskrit and English so that it may reach a wider public.

R KRISHNASWAMI SASTRI.

Yoga Personal Hygiene, by Shri Yogendra, published by Yoga publishing Post Box 481, Bombay, 1931 Price Rs. 10/- net in India — pp. 300

The volume under review is Vol II in the Scientific Yoga Series in 12 volumes projected by Shri Yogendra, founder of the Yoga Institutes in India and America. The term 'Yoga' is a household word in India, but is looked upon with a mystic awe by Indians and foreigners alike. This is due largely to the disuse into which it had fallen during the dark ages of the Hindu culture. With the revival of this culture in India in the latter part of the 19th century and its study and appreciation by Indologists all over the world the cultural heritage of India received its due recognition resulting in a close study of ancient Hindu texts pertaining to all departments of knowledge. In the beginning some foreign writers who had no first hand knowledge of the Yoga treatises and the Yoga practices naturally "grossly misrepresented the practical Yoga" as Shri Yogendra remarks. Swami Vivekānanda, that great apostle of Vedānta, acquainted the foreigners and especially the Americans with the potentialities of Yoga as a means of self-culture but his writings and speeches were set more in a Vedantic perspective than in a Yogic one thus creating in the minds of the readers a feeling of reverence which was its due. It still remained for some one to take away the Yoga practices from their esoteric atmosphere and harness

them for the amelioration of human suffering and for teaching men the "method of right living upon a physiological basis." This cultural need has been very ably filled up by Shri Yogendra, the originator of the Scientific Yoga Series who is admirably fitted for the task. He has not only studied Yoga on its academic side but has practiced it and administered it in his Yoga institutes in India and America. The present volume augurs well for the projected Series. The material is presented in a lucid style without being encumbered with superficial technicalities which generally scare away a layman. The practices recommended in the volume were acquired at first hand by the author from a practical teacher of distinction, His Holiness Paramahansa Mahavadasji and were further revised in the light of his own experiences and those of his patients and students corroborated with the Sanskrit texts in the original and continued and compared with the knowledge of the Western sciences. The volume deals in 12 chapters with the methods of Yoga hygiene in respect of the care of the different organs and parts of the human body and is well illustrated. The volume is accompanied with a preface by Dr John W. Fox, A.M., D.D., who fully admires the method of presentation of the subject and the historical aspect of the material presented. Casually he informs us of the author's study in England and on the continent and his four years' work in America in 1919-1922, when he was associated with many

members of the American medical profession in connection with his studies which have now come to fruition. The Sanskrit glossary and Index at the end of the volume which are quite exhaustive leave

nothing to be desired. For particulars of the whole Series the attention of the readers is invited to the advertisement which appears elsewhere in this issue

P. K. GODE

**Karnama-i-Husayn (Urdu).
THE GOLDEN DEEDS OF IMAM
HUSAYN (English)**

These are two small collections of articles and verses on Imam Husayn. The Provincial Shia conference, Patna, had issued letters of request to eminent men in various spheres of life with a view to gather and publish views of people Non-Muslim as well as Muslim and these two brochures are the result. Religion by its very nature tends to colour the dry light of reason,

but the contributions in these collections are on the whole sober. Prof. Muhammad Habib of the Muslim University, Aligarh, shows a rare combination of religious sympathy and historical exactitude in his estimate of Husayn. "He is," says he "the supremest representative in our (Muslim?) history of virtue against brute force, of humanity and righteousness against the arrogance of godless political power"

M. T. PATWARDHAN

**The Parsee Heritage, BY MR
M. B. PITHAWALLA, MANAGER,
The Young Zoroastrian Circle,
Victoria Road, Karachi, - pp 20**

This is a short booklet written by Mr Pithawalla to goad the present generation of the Parsees to live Zoroastrianism in the true sense of the term. It consists of three small articles viz "O to live Zoroastrianism" and "Zoroaster our Polar Star" and "Iranian Character". The first article is a damning indictment of the present-day Parsees, who, Mr Pithawalla bewails, "do not live Zoroastrianism" (p 3). "The Parsees have not added even an inch to the moral and

spiritual height of the race" (p 3) though Zoroastrianism is a dynamic religion, it truly lived. According to Mr Pithawalla, Parsee priesthood also is in a deplorable condition (p 5). The spiritual knowledge of the present-day Parsees is almost nil (p 6). They have "no national culture and the race is physically least fitted to undergo life's stern realities" (p 7). The education of girls is also showy. The Parsees have "scanty literature of their own" and there are "hardly a dozen Parsee publications on sound philosophy and religion" in public libraries in India.

The Second article exhorts all Parsees to look upon Zoroaster as their polar star in the twentieth century. The Gathas are the very life-blood of Zoroaster and provide good material for the study of the spiritual life of Iran. Every Parsee must pitch his life to the high path of righteousness, which is Zoroaster's path and dedicate all his actions to him.

The third article deals with 'Iranian Character'. The term 'Iranian' connotes everything that was Aryan or noble in the human race having its cradle in central Asia. Zoroastrian culture is 35 centuries old and has played a most glorious part in the history of the world. Modern Persian culture is tinged with the old Iranian character. This article is concluded with a pessimistic note to the effect that the Parsees of India are at present undergoing degeneration and are

unable to stand the strain of racial competition, physical exertion, and moral bankruptcy.

Though we cannot join with Mr. Pithawalla in his wholesale indictment of the present-day tendencies in Parsee culture we fully appreciate the ringing note of sincerity which permeates the entire pamphlet. An attempt towards the revival of the spiritual life of ancient Iran is absolutely necessary at the present time and Mr. Pithawalla's analysis of modern Parsee character, though it may prove a bit unpalatable, has almost a Gandhian touch about it in point of fearlessness of statement and sincerity of tone. We hope Mr. Pithawalla's brethren will fully appreciate the force of the pamphlet and try to inculcate all that is best in the Zoroastrian philosophy and culture on the mind of the young generation of the Parsees.

P. K. GODSE

The Mysterious Kundalini,
BY DR. V. G. RELL, 3rd edn.
Price Rs. 3-8. Publishers Taraporewalla Sons and Co. Bombay.

That this book is written by a well-known doctor of medicine, that it has an introduction from the pen of an Anglo-Indian High Court Judge of the scholarly attainments and acumen of Sir John Woodroffe, that it is published by the premier Indian publisher of Bombay, that it has been favorably reviewed by the Western as well as the Eastern press, and last and best, in its short life of four years, the

third edition is called for, a good fortune that hardly comes even to the best sellers of vernacular fictions—all these facts go to show that, rather dry, scientific and obscure as the subject is, the book has already gained and is still more widely gaining the ear of the learned, and that a real interest in this recondite though valuable branch of self culture, is being awakened.

Publications like the present one, may aptly be called arches of the bridge joining Eastern culture to Western, and as such are most com-

commendable and welcome. But a century back, when, say, the generation of Macaulay was in the hey-day of its glory, a digest like this of the Hindu Hathayoga-pradīpikā, Śivasamhitā etc., would have been instantly and most unhesitatingly relegated to the waste-paper basket, not only by the Western scholar but by his Eastern pupil as well, since then however, and especially during the last forty or fifty years much water has flowed under the bridge, and slowly but steadily the sense has been growing in thoughtful minds everywhere, that the West is not so unquestionably and so universally and cock-surely superior, nor the East so utterly and despicably inferior, but that both are living halves of the same common humanity and that both might, by sympathetic and appreciative intercourse enrich each other and ennoble the life of the whole, that each has some valuable points to teach to and learn from the other. This mutual understanding has been brought about and fostered in the shady avenues of religio-philosophic study, away from the lime-light of politics and economics, by the loving labors of Vedāntists, Theosophists and kindred spirits, often in spite of literary prostitutes like the mother of 'Mother India'. The volume under review is a good specimen of the fruit of such labor. It is a worthy work of a child of the new East, at once lovingly proud of its ancient heritage, and confidently submitting its treasure to the acid test of modern science.

There is again, we believe, one more reason, why books like this should be closely studied by serious students of life and culture. Man's progress in knowledge along hitherto approved lines and with hitherto approved instruments seems already to have reached its utmost limit. His apparatus is improved and refined till it can be improved and refined no more. And yet the domain of the unknown looms as vast, man's unsatiated thirst for knowledge craves as much, and the shortness of his earthly span mocks him as pitilessly as ever before.

In these circumstances, in the ever growing multiplicity of special sciences, bewildered man seems to ask 'Can you give me better instruments of investigation?' 'Can you give me a longer and healthier lease of life?' And Hathayoga holds out this double promise definitely. Health, long life, and refined senses and faculties are among its lower achievements, and in its higher achievements man's knowledge and power will be practically boundless. Its main theme is briefly this —The highest synthetic power that fashioned and upholds the cosmos resides also in each individual man, but in most, in a dormant state. The correspondence between the macrocosm and microcosm, Hathayoga says, is a basic practical axiom, and not a poetical figure. Properly aroused, disciplined and raised stage by stage up to the cosmic plane of the microcosm, this power makes man master of superhuman powers and knowledge.

The author has set forth this theme very lucidly and by clear steps, and the peculiar merit of the learned and ingenious author is that he has shown in detail the exact correspondence between the Nādis, Cakras etc. of the old Yoga books and modern human physiology.

But many will hold, with the writer of this review, that at this day it is not enough only to prove Yoga fit for academic study. Now that enterprising youth is going in for all sorts and systems of physical culture like Muller's, Mackfadden's etc and rushing into the rash race (or craze?) for record-breaking in motoring, flying and what not, will not some young men and women of faith, self-control and perseverance come forward to undergo this discipline under proper guidance, fired by the noble aspira-

tion of experimenting on their own persons what this noble ancient culture can do for modern man. If the results shown in the persons of the pioneers are satisfactory, surely many others will join and the example might spread and expand till it becomes a distinctive factor in the physical, mental, and moral amelioration of the race. Only thus and only then shall the high claim of Yoga as the science—art of building up man into demigod be justified.

We would strongly recommend to the author the starting of a school of Yoga, in collaboration with kindred spirits like Swami Kuvayānanda. With these brief remarks, we heartily recommend Dr. Role's book for study, to all that are interested in the real constitution and possibilities of man.

D B LELE

The Heart of Bhāgavatam,
By Mr. SUBBARA Srinivasa Rao B.A.,
Ramarao-peta, Coconada, 1931—pp
viii + 179. Price Re 1-4-0

The book under review contains translation and explanation in English of 367 verses selected by Śrī Jayatīrtha Svāmi (1756-1806 A.D.) from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa to elucidate its central ideas. The selected verses are given in the original Sanskrit preserving the reference in each case to facilitate consultation with the source drawn upon and at the same time numbering the verses serially. The Selection consists of 30 chapters containing different

prakaraṇas such as *Brahmajudeta-prakiraṇa*, *Pravṛttakarmatyāgaprakaraṇa*, etc. A book which is planned not only for the use of the Bhāgavatas but also for the edification of the general public suffers by the serious omission of a table of contents which though wanting in the Sanskrit original is the *sine qua non* of every modern publication. The author will do well to make up this omission in his second edition and if possible add a topical index at the end adding thereby to the easy accessibility of the topics dealt with. Even as it is the book appears to be a good epitome of the best thought of the great Purāṇa which

had been the solace of many a distressed soul through centuries and which has materially democratized the teachings of Hindu religion and thus revitalized it at a time

when the fabric of the early Brahmanism had become extremely hollow and lost all its original vigor

P. K. GOUD.

The Way to Swarajya or a Word to Indian Leaders, BY SHRI UPASANI MAHARAJ (Sukori, Ahmednagar) 1931—, p. 42 + Preface, 8 pp

This little brochure contains the translation of the first two of a series of lectures delivered by Shri Upāsani Mahārāj on politics and published as part of *Sāi Vākya-sudhā* Part V. In the Preface, the translator Mr. V. P. Patil B.A., LL.B. Solicitor, Ahmedabad, provides for the benefit of readers a short sketch of the life of Shri Upāsani Mahārāj, who is regarded as a Guru by numerous people in India. Lecture I (pp. 1-15) ends with a pessimistic note that both the officers of the Sovereign and the leaders of nation have missed the Right Path for the Country's advancement. Lecture II (pp. 16-41) deplores the spread of 'irreligion' in the present generation and advocates such measures, as the establishment of religious schools etc. maintained by the State. Under the proposed Scheme the Brahmin population is to be 'looked upon (taken) as mere Servants of the Government for augmenting holy actions and for

adding to the store of *Punya*' (p. 28). The brochure raises many such controversial problems but the solution offered in each case is hardly convincing to a rationally minded reader who is not directly a pupil of Shri Upāsani Mahārāj. Owing to the impact of Western civilization and culture the old ideas about the relation of the individual to the society and the state have undergone material change. It is true there is a reaction now against the wholesale absorption of Western culture and philosophy even among the products of the new education. This is clear from the recent attempt to implant a theistic attitude in education made in the Senate of the Bombay University. To us, however, the scheme adumbrated in the present lectures for reviving religiosity among all classes on the old lines appears to be inadequate to meet the needs of the present generation. Any such scheme must look at facts from a fresh angle of vision and must take full stock of the new ideas with which not only India but the whole world seems to be possessed at the moment.

P. K. GOUD.

Le Voile d'Isis. (The Veil of Isis).—35th year, No 132 — December, 1930

This is a monthly Review of the "higher science." It studies the different traditions and various movements of spiritualism, both ancient and modern. The present number contains four articles, the first of which describes in detail certain astonishing agreements between the visions of occidental mystics and the traditional ideas of mysticism. M Guénon reviews not very favourably the new translation of the cabbalistic book, *Siphra'di-Tzenutha* by M Vulhand in the next article.

The Theodicy of the Cabbala forms the topic of the last instalment of M. Warrains' article. The different explanations of the relation between the Absolute and the Relative are given here in detail. The last article is an interesting translation of the "Barddas," (the Book of Bardism, Tradition of the Bards of the island of Britain). It contains dialogues between the Master and Disciple on topics like the origin and nature of man, his relation with God the Father and so on. At the end of the number appear a few book-notices. The journal should interest students of mysticism and spiritual science.

R. D VADFKAR

Aus Zeit und Ewigkeit (From Time and Eternity) Nos. 4 and 6 of the Fourth year, dated 1st July and 1st November 1930

The two issues of this periodical are published by the International Bureau (Information office) of non-dogmatic religious activities (Auskunftstelle für undogmatische religiöse Bestrebungen Mr. Otto Maria Saenger, Poststrasse 3, Leipzig O 1, Germany). This periodical which is bi-monthly, reports activities which try to spread a religion without dogma and is in German. There are articles and essays on the history of Christianity and other universal religions. But a major portion of the journal is reserved for the actual

movements, which it tries to unify. It brings out the common features of these movements, without disregarding the essential differences, because the journal does not prefer to be a partisan of a uniformity, which in view of the diversity of knowledge and sentiments has never existed. Man, knowing his own religious history and nature does not aspire to attain this uniformity, which is only a new form of dogma and infallibility, from which he tries to make himself free. He sees the religious valuations without his external surrounding. All souls feel in common a sense of responsibility before the Infinite and Eternal, which leads him to

social action and the love of the neighbour. Over and above this one shall follow his own proper vocation.—These are the ~~ideals~~ ^{ideals} which the journal wants to propagate. The management of the Bureau will be thankful to any journal, individual or institution, who will send them suitable communications for which they will receive the Bureau's bi-monthly in exchange.

R. D. VASBINA.

BOOK-NOTICES.

Health, a Journal devoted to healthful living edited by Drs. V Rama Rau and V Krishnarao, M B, B S—323 Thambu Chetty St, G T Madras. The special number of this very useful and nicely edited journal bristles with many interesting articles on Health, Maternal, Infant and Child welfare, written by experts and is well illustrated. Among articles, mention may be made of one on Healthy Life by Shrimant Pant Pratimdh, Chief of Aundh and the other on "Yoga and Health" by Shri Yogendra, the well-known author of the Scientific Yoga Series and the Founder of the Yoga Institute in India and America. Copies can be had also in Tamil, Telugu and Kanarese. Looking to the valuable material the price of annas four for a copy of this number in any of the four languages is very modest. Annual subscription for the magazine is Rs. 1-8-0 post paid for any edition and may begin from any period.

The Ramakrishna Mission, (Ceylon Branch)—Second Annual Report (1930-31)—Colombo, 1931.

The establishment of the Colombo Ashram of the Ramakrishna Mission is mainly due to the ceaseless efforts of Swami Avināśāna-

ndaji for over four years in spreading the message of religion among all classes and communities of Ceylon. The Report under review sums up the various social, religious and cultural activities of the Ashram during the second year of the existence of the Ceylon Branch of the Mission as a legally incorporated body. The Ashram is the chief spiritual centre of the Ceylon Branch and is conducted by the monks of the order of Shri Ramakrishna vowed to the ideals of renunciation and service of humanity after the ideals of the Swami Vivekananda, the illustrious Founder of the Mission. As the work of the Mission is steadily expanding its needs also are increasing. The immediate needs are, however few, such as funds for a permanent building for the Headquarters and for the maintenance of the Ashram and its educational activities. We trust the generous public not only of Ceylon but of other parts of India will respond to the appeal for funds contained in the Report and thus bless the entire work of the Mission which is done in a spirit of consecration and renunciation.

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENTS.

Baron Howen, (183 Boulevard, Madeline, Nice, France) writes under date 15th January 1932 —

" I find that mankind at present needs a Review to explain that sciences can be a help to expound the Philosophy of Religions, which are in reality the same. In this connection the remarks of the Theosophist, Madras, are worth noting. It observes "Much is said worth thinking over by those who strive after unity." I fully appreciate these remarks. It is only by finding fundamental points of similarity between the religions of the West and the East that we can get peace.

Those who have studied the Sufism, Vedic Scriptures and the Gospels will find the principal points of unity not only in the moral precepts but other fundamentals also. We find the conception of the Eternal almost the same in all religions. The *Ekam*, the Unborn, created the universe. He was inspired to do so by the *Kāma*, which is the Desire of living, the essence of the mind and life. It is the difference between the living and the dead.

The Vedic *Vishvakāman* is the only begotten son, which is in the "bosom of the father" (St John). The Vedic Agni and Soma offered themselves as a sacrifice and attained the highest heaven and also got the right to receive Sacrifices. Śākya Muni was a reincarnation. He gave up all to teach the Truth. The Mahomedans admit Moses and Jesus as prophets. They succeeded in adapting to the minds of the primitive people their morality, so difficult for savages to understand. It will thus be seen that Agni, Jesus, Mahomet, Buddha belong to all men (*vaśvānara*). The Holy Spirit, Agni and Śākya Muni descended to earth. They are the mediators and messengers between earth and heaven. It appears from these facts of religions that all truth has only one source, for such a similarity cannot be accidental. All religions are glasses of different colours through which we try to see the Sun of Truth, too bright for our eyes.

The priests of different religions tried to monopolise the Truth and created partitions. If Mahomet should admit "Ahlī Kitāb," why can we not admit the unity of all great religions by the help of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion of Poona?"

* * * * *

Prof. Dr. O. M. Lind, Ph.D., F.R.S., San Ricardo Alta 19, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba (West Indies) writes under date 20th December 1931 :—

"The object of the present communication is to manifest to you my intense interest for the subjects which are dear to your Academy. I would gladly see in you a revival of our ancient grandeur when the Vedas were sung and understood by all, when culture flourished on our soil even as the daily shining Sun instilled in the mind of our great grandfathers unending happiness and joy. Sane mind and sane body was not a chimera to us, and hypostasy was no secret to us. Where is that epic spirit of the primitive children of our race? I should be really glad to learn that it has not deserted us altogether and that your Academy is solicitous in proving it."

AN APPEAL TO SCHOLARS

(To Help The Scheme For The Preparation Of Jain
Religious Text-Books.)

Religious and moral instruction has now come to be recognized as a great factor in education, and an important agent in the building up of character, which is and ought to be the aim of all educational institutions. The Jain community, along with other communities, has keenly felt the necessity of such instruction, and has from time to time made various efforts in the direction of compiling a graded series of religious text-books to facilitate the assimilation of religious principles and the study of religious literature. But it must be regretfully admitted that such efforts have not yet succeeded in supplying the greatly felt need. I am, therefore, prompted to do what little I can in that direction by financing a scheme that will place in the hands of the young Jains religious text-books of the required standard, and have entrusted the work of compiling a graded series of suitable books on Jainism to Prof. H. R. Kapadia, M. A. (Bhagat-Wadi, Bhuleshwar, Bombay). Deeply read in Jain literature, Prof. Kapadia, I feel, is well fitted for the task and will be able to do full justice to the spirit of Jain culture. In the projected series he will deal with several subjects, such as Ethics, Metaphysics, Psychology, Ontology, Sociology, Logic, Philosophy, Rituals and so forth, of course in a way adapted to the intelligence and capacity of the respective class of readers. Since this series is mainly intended for Primary and Secondary Schools, it is to consist of twelve manuals.

In order that the labours of Prof. Kapadia in the field of Jain Religious Literature coupled with the necessary financial aid offered by me, may yield the desired results, I earnestly appeal to scholars to help in the achievement of the object we have all in view, by suggesting the method to be adopted, the Jain as well as the non-Jain works to be consulted, the subjects to be treated, the illustrations to be incorporated and so on. Thereby they will not only be obliging me personally, but also serving the Jain community. I, therefore, hope and trust that my appeal will be received in the best spirit and that response will come from both Jain and Non-Jain scholars in the form of useful and helpful suggestions, which will go a great way to ensure the success of our humble undertaking.

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BEING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

DR JAMES A. McWILLIAMS, S. J. *

I

Divergent philosophies must have some common starting point. Since this can hardly be other than the first-hand experience that antedate any theory or instruction, it should be enlightening to consider knowledge genetically as is coming to be the fashion and in particular to determine as correctly as may be the chronological order in which the original items of knowledge occur. What these initial steps were no one certainly can pretend to remember. And I think it will be conceded that in adult life when we become curious about the beginnings of our mental activity, the very progress we have made in knowledge is a hindrance in our attempt to recapture the actual order of the earliest events. The best we can do is to go on the principle that if a given experience did not need to be first it should not be set down as having been first. I shall try to adhere to that principle in what follows.

It is clear that we have to deal with what is called awareness. Awareness cannot be described without its having been experienced and then, happily, it does not need description. I venture however to assert that in our first conscious experience we do not distinguish subject and object, the self and non-self, much less the separate location of the various external sense organs in the body. The earliest events might therefore be expressed thus: there is awareness, there is sensation, experience. I admit that we may discover later that the awareness is a subject's awareness of an object, but in the beginning the awareness is innocent of any suspicion that it may belong to anybody or be about any thing. Yet we could hardly be said to have any experience at all unless there be some difference or contrast in the experience.¹ There is for instance the experience of seeing. But I cannot see without contrast. If I see and have always seen

* Director of Philosophy Dept., St. Louis University, and
President, American Catholic Philosophical Association

¹ I use the term "experience" in the sense of conscious experience.

only white, never a black, never a gray however faint, never the slightest variation, either chromatic or achromatic, if I have never experienced the beginning of the white awareness nor its cessation, why then I cannot be said to see at all. Another example is the atmospheric pressure, which, though very great, is not a conscious experience for us because we have never been without it. And so in general, to have one conscious experience without the slightest contrast or differentiation would, paradoxically enough, be the same as having no conscious experience. To experience is to experience a contrast. To know is to distinguish. The awareness of an "is," as against an "is not," is the beginning of knowledge. Being is known in its contrast with non-being. The merest beginning of awareness contrasts it with the absence of awareness. The first factor in knowledge is therefore being as opposed to non-being. That, I think, was the conclusion Thomas Aquinas arrived at when he wrote, "*Primo cadit in intellectu ens, Being occurs first in intelligence*" (Sum. Theol., I Q. xi a. 2.)

Another fact comes to light here. It is that some sort of plurality lies at the very beginning of our knowledge. While I do not mean (as some like Hegel to mean) that we can have a positive concept of absolute nothingness, I do mean that in every experienced contrast one awareness is either contrasted against the total absence of awareness, or it least is something which another awareness is not. Failure to recognize this led to the Eleatic impasse. Those thinkers maintained that we indeed know being, but they did not attend to the fact that being is known in contrast with non-being. Hence they asserted that being is one and undifferentiated, and denied the reality of the phenomenal world because it presents differences and contrasts. Another mistake of theirs, common also in our day, was to identify being with reality, and non-being with appearance, whereas both reality and appearance are being. The contrasts might be diagrammed correctly thus:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{being} \\ \text{non-being} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{reality} \\ \text{appearance} \end{array}$$

The insuperable difficulty of the Eleatics and other monists is that appearance (the phenomenal world), however deceptive it may be, is being. We experience diversity, and the very experience is diversity of being. The term "being" should therefore embrace both reality and appearance.

Let us, then, first consider the contrast between being and non-being. Our initial experiences have the character of extension, in the sense that the field of awareness can be divided into parts. By reason of the fact that each part is not the rest we are immediately presented with the opposition of being and non-being. Furthermore there are different qualities. These qualities we learn afterwards to group into general classes according to the customary five senses. The differences may not be very great between taste and smell, but as between colour, sound and feel, are so divergent as scarcely to have anything in common. And even within the range of each particular sense innumerable differences of qualities are distinguishable. All these experiences constitute a distinction between being and non-being. While each is being, each is something which the others are not.

There is one major distinction, very familiar in adult life, which must be quite astonishing when it first dawns on the child. That is the distinction between one's own person, I mean one's own body, and the rest of the world. Experimental psychologists, I think, admit that in the beginning the child does not know, for example, that its foot belongs to it, or that its mother is distinct from itself, for the simple reason that it is not as yet aware of a "me" as distinct from a "not-me." Everything is just an endless phantasmagoria of experiences. "In view of all we know about the new-born child," says Lindworsky, "we believe that he has first of all only a variegated multiplicity of impressions."¹ Countless diversities are experienced, but that between the self and the non-self is not the first in infant awareness. The genesis of this distinction must be found in the sense of touch. The only other sense that could supply a basis for it is sight, and that is lacking in the congenitally blind, who nevertheless learn to distinguish their own person from its environs. To instance a single example of how this distinction may come to light the act of striking is impulsive with the child, and is attended with a certain kinesthetic awareness, but sometimes (when an object is struck) a cutaneous sensation, even painful, occurs, at other times (when the child happens to strike itself) an additional cutaneous sensation also painful, occurs. From repeated experiments of this kind the child eventually makes the astonishing discovery of a self and a non-self. His world splits wide open into two worlds. Without the words to announce the discovery, there has come to light an "I" as opposed to an "it."

1 *Experimental Psychology*, p. 243 (Macmillan, 1931)

Intelligence may indeed be required to make this discovery, but certainly the child makes it long before it knows it has intelligence as distinct from sensation. Once however the distinction between self and non-self comes into awareness, we begin to regard knowledge in the subject-object relation. Thereafter further refinement of that relation can go on apace. Thus the seeing eye can be distinguished from the seen foot, one hand can be regarded as the feeling subject while the other is the object felt. But since all these perceptions are still united in consciousness, the ultimate subject retreats back as it were from the several bodily members to view them all as its objects, or rather it transcends them as something not confined exclusively to any particular member.

II

Only after the distinction between the ego and the non-ego has come into awareness can the question of reality and appearance arise. But, given a subject and object, then the distinction between reality and appearance concerns the status of the *object*. About the object we can raise two important questions: (1) does the object exist when I am not aware of it? and (2) is it conscious? Many experiences suggest the first question. An object which a child sees and holds has existence as truly as its own body, but if the object slips away it immediately ceases for the sense of touch, and though still held in sight, finally vanishes for that sense too. On its return it first exists in sight, but has no existence in touch until it is in contact with the body. Another experience is that of force. Force is a primitive experience unlike any other kind and must be experienced to be known. A toy balloon responds to my efforts, a chair less so, a door-post not at all. Some invisible objects have considerable force, as the wind, or an object encountered in the dark, some visible objects have no force, as a beam of light. Such experiences as these antecedent to all metaphysical subtleties, raise the question about the existence or non-existence of the objects of our awareness. Reality comes to mean a being which exists without our perceiving it, and appearance a sensation without an external object.

Many other experiences suggest the same distinction. An image in the mirror has no existence to the sense of touch. The hand held for a time in cold water can still feel the cold after the hand is withdrawn. Visual after-images may be made to

room about where the other senses tell us there is no such object, and can best be perceived in the dark. Then there are revived sensations, sights, sounds, feels, tastes, odors can be recalled and made to co-exist with the very objects which actually here and now affect our senses. In the case of the child no small joy is produced by freely combining up these past sensations and superimposing them over the present untice sensations. A sofa becomes an airplane, a rug is a lotus leaf in a limitless sea. But the child knows which of a sensation has external object, which has not. In the same way it may soon learn that its dream states can no more have real objects than it freely induced make-believe states have. Otherwise it could never, even in adult life, know which was which, nor so much as suspect a difference between them. All this is only saying that a child has not the degree of naive realism that is often ascribed to it and though it lacks the sophistication of later years is by no means a stranger to the questions so solemnly discussed by its elders. My point, however, is that we may be able to learn much from a consideration of how the materials with which we philosophize have been accumulated.

Let us now take up the second question: is the object conscious? Having learned that some objects may have no external existence, we can go on to regard even those that are here and now bombarding our senses as suspect. We can do this even with our bodily members. We then ask ourselves whether the only thing that really exists is awareness. We can consider even the awareness of an awareness, and so on. But in this retreat from the object to the subject there is always a residue of awareness that we cannot blot out. We can persist in this perversity to the point of wondering whether anything but awareness is possible, and on that ground we may feel inclined to refuse existence to any object that is not conscious. Thus, too, is a very early conceit. The child beating the ground after a fall, as Newman somewhere remarks, is under the impression that everything is conscious. But just as by a simple process of reasoning we distinguish our own body from the rest of the world, and discover which objects are make-believe, so can we also discover which have consciousness. When we have reached this point in our mental development, we become aware of a marked distinction between two types of experience, the sentient and the rational. This last distinction I take to be essentially irreducible, and such as to set the soul of man apart from that of all other animals. Experimental psychologists are no strangers to this difference.

and either battle against it or admit it.¹ My point here is that if for one cause or another I choose to ignore that distinction, I have no way of determining which objects of my experience are real, which apparent, and I have become a phenomenalist or an idealist or a monistic realist.

It seems to me that it is just because we are human beings that we can play these tricks on ourselves. If our experiences were all sensitive as with the brute animals, or all intellectual as with the angels, we could not originate various broods of philosophies. But because we can play fast and loose with our two kinds of cognitive experiences we become perplexed by our own game. Continued satisfaction can be had only by recognizing all the factors of awareness, and giving each such a place as will not exclude the others. I must not ignore knowledge in order to assert knowledge. With that proviso, I shall in the remainder of this paper merely indicate another distinction which, at least to the reason of mature years, naturally and easily arises from the data of first-hand experience.

III

Beings as we experience them are not only multiple they are fleeting. They come into existence and pass out of existence, and in both their coming in and going out their being stands stark against their non-being. But such change is unintelligible unless there be an unchangeable Being back of it all. Change and plurality betray a finiteness which calls for a Being containing the beingness of them all without their limitations. From this it also follows that the many cannot be parts of the One: he cannot be their sum, nor can the One acquire anything by the continual coming into existence of the others. The first-hand objects of our knowledge, because they are many, cannot themselves be the ultimate Being. He must be distinct from them. But no less is it true that they lead us to that ultimate Being so all-embracing that they add nothing to him, for he already was

1. One of those who admit the distinction is C. Lloyd Morgan. Cf., for example, *Mind*, October 1931, Vol. XL (New Series), p. 402 ff., especially parts 4 & 7. This eminent psychologist even goes so far as to deny the principle, "*Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*." But he could have spared himself that denial had he attended to the usual acceptance of the principle, namely that "There is nothing in the intellect which was not in sense", although in a totally different manner.

all they are and far more. As from a roaring sea we pass into a quiet harbor, so from the tumult of creatures we pass at last to the knowledge of God. Yet by the very fact that the knowledge of the world led us to the knowledge of God, we cannot reject either knowledge without rendering the other meaningless and invalid. The only way out is to admit no existence of the changing and the many except as entirely dependent on the One and unchanging. The world, including myself, displays an inherent lack of necessity to exist. The fact of its existence, in contrast to its non-existence, is therefore conditioned on the will of another. The actuality of the world is no more, nor less, than its pretence to be self-existent because only on the supposition of its self-existence is it forced to the conclusion that it is contradictory and unreal. If knowledge is to be valid at all the world must be taken as real but not self-existent, not absolute, but essentially related, and hence brought into existence by another.

From an altogether different angle the same goal is reached. Man experiences in his moral life that the supposition of his total independence is incompatible with morality. On the same supposition religion likewise vanishes. Man's need for religion, which is the same as his need for God, is evidence of his dependence, his creaturehood. Just as to argue the world out of existence is to renounce knowledge, so to identify the soul with God is to renounce morality and religion. The soul knows that there is a super-reality, and that all other realities are dependent on him and lead to him. The reasoning process required for this is

so simple that we are sometimes deceived into thinking we did not reason it out at all. Men may differ about the nature of that Being but no man is long without the thought that there must be such a Being. Yet it is likewise a matter of experience that when man has come to this conviction he can still have the desire to be supreme himself. If, in rebellion against that knowledge, he follows that desire, he becomes unreligious. If, relinquishing the desire, he follows his knowledge, he discovers that, as his knowledge, so also his will finds its completion in God. His will then becomes not an enemy to his knowledge but its ally.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE, AS ILLUSTRATED BY ZOROASTRIAN WRITINGS

DR SIR JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI

The object of this paper is to notice, and draw the attention of my readers, from a Persian point of view to, an interesting and instructive book, entitled, "Psychology of the Religious Life," by Prof. George Malesher Stevenson (1911), who illustrates his views by references to the scriptures of different peoples and to various other writings. Among these, he now and then refers to the Zend-Avesta, from which he quotes passages on the authority of the Sacred Books of the East. One may differ, here and there, in the matter of his inference, but we greatly admire his work, an interesting volume of about 400 pages, a very suggestive

Our author divides his work into four parts, three of which he names "Conflicts," thus reminding us of the writers of the Pahlavi Bundehesh (1st The Origin of the Creation) who divide his work into what he calls "aidab" (Pers. aidab ایداب, conflict).¹ Mr. Stevenson's introductory chapter is on "The Sense of Conflict." The first three parts are on the conflicts in (a) regard to feeling and emotion, (b) to Action and (c) in Religious Thought. The author begins his introductory chapter on "The Expressions of the Sense of Conflict" by saying, that "the labour and duty of understanding religion fall partly to psychology" and that "the aim of a psychological study of religion is to explain, after the manner of science." The author represents his purpose (p. 2) as that of grouping "broadly the features of religion and to connect them with the acts of mind that give them form. As in the consideration of this question, one's attention is to be drawn long "upon the various forms of the conflict within the religious mood," our author at first gives "the projections of this inner conflict outward upon Nature and the world of

1 Chap. VI. I agree with Justi (Bundehesh, Text and Translation p. 14) who reads the word as 'aidab'. Dr. West (S. B. E. Vol. V, p. 25 and page 23 n. 3) reads it as 'kharah' meaning invasion, which meaning is not much far from conflict. (Vide my 'Bundehesh' p. 24 n.).

spirits" He says "In the religious life there is an inherent struggle The presence of the Supremely Impressive makes the self and other men and all the common goods of life objects at once of value and contempt Reverence calls forth both hope and fear, both rejoicing and dejection. And yet men naturally see this conflict not as wholly in themselves, but at least in part as without the parts and powers of the world appear to be in mutual strife"

This statement reminds us, as said above, of the conflict in *Conflict in Nature* Nature, referred to in the Pahlavi Bundahish We will speak of this conflict in the words of Dr. West (Bundahish S. B. E. Vol. V, Introduction, p. XXIII) "The work (Bundahish) commences by describing the state of things in the beginning, the good spirit being in endless light and omniscient, and the evil spirit in endless darkness and with limited knowledge Both produced their own creatures, which remained apart, in a spiritual or ideal state, for three thousand years, after which the evil spirit began his opposition to the good creation under an agreement that his power was not to last more than nine thousand years, of which only the middle three thousand were to see him successful By uttering a sacred formula the good spirit throws the evil one into a state of confusion for a second three thousand years, while he produces the archangels and the material creation, including the sun, moon and stars. At the end of that period the evil spirit, encouraged by the demons he had produced, once more rushes upon the good creation, to destroy it The demons carry on conflicts with each of the six classes of creation, namely, the sky, water, earth, plants, animals represented by the primeval ox, and mankind represented by Gayōmard"

As Prof. Stratton says, "it is difficult, if not impossible, to say where this conflict ceases to be physical and assumes a moral tone If everything marked by a feeling of friendliness or of hatred is already within the circle of morality, then the tension of the world is presented even in these (i.e. Egyptian and Greek) myths as ethical in a simple way, since it is a contest between forces that stand for social union or disruption But the moral motive of the strife is clearer in the religions that see the world of spirits divided into those who sympathize with human life and whose aim for men is the same as man's purified aim for himself, and into a host of spirits doing what they can to thwart our plans and to harass the gods who are our help" (p. 4) "A clearly conceived devil, as in much of Christianity or in the Parsee

Religion, is in conflict with a spirit of goodness..... The religion of Zarathushtra with its polar opposition of right and wrong, is closely related to the Vedic religion where the antithesis of good and evil is far less pointed. The influence of the Evil one is felt not so much in pain and outward misfortune, as in temptation" (p 7) Zoroaster was submitted to a similar temptation and he withstood it. As said by our author, "Zarathushtra must meet and vanquish the hell-born Angra Mainyu 'From the regions of the north, forth rushed Angra Mainyu, the deadly, the Daeva of the Daevas,' but he was met by the Holy one chanting the sacred words 'The Will of the Lord is the law of holiness,' and using also carnal means—stones big as a house, supplied to him by the Spirit of Goodness. Angra Mainyu commands the Teacher to renounce the law of God and promises him that he will become a ruler of nations. But answering 'No,' the Holy One completes his victory in a solemn prayer, beginning, "This I ask thee teach me the truth, O Lord (Vend XIX, 1)"

Then, our author proceeds to show that, in spite of the conflict, "the refinement of the sense of harmony and discord brings other things to pass. In the subtler moods of the religious fancy, the evil and the good are bound together by the closest tie, often springing from the same source" (p 8). For example, "in the Persian legend, the Demon, Azi-Dahaka—hideous, most fiendish, three-mouthed, three-headed—has two wives Savanghâch and Erenavâch, the fairest of all women, the most wonderful creatures of the world" (Gos yasht 14)

"For the Persian religion, the Good Mind and the Evil have still their separate realms, and upon Responsibility of choosing what is right man there is the responsibility of choosing aright between the rival powers (Gatha XXX, 1-11) The ever-present fiends must still be smitten, especially when night comes over the land. Then Sraosha, the never-sleeping guardian of the works of Mazda 'protects all the material world with his club uplifted from the hour when the sun is down' (Srosh Yt II) (p 11)" In this connection, our author speaks of the regulation, that a surgeon, in order to be duly certified, should at first practise not upon a faithful but upon a worshipper of the demons, as "a prudent regulation."

Again, instead of a conflict, we see, at times, a new "representation of a discord of contradiction, between man's condition now and his life at some distant epoch. Often the present miseries of the world are contrasted with a happy existence which men once had upon the earth " This is illustrated (p 12) by the

case of the golden age of Yima (Jamshed) when "hunger and thirst, old age and death, hot winds and cold, remained from the world for a thousand years, until Yima began to delight in falsehood, when the divine glory was seen to depart from him thrice in the form of a bird (Zamyâd Yt 7, Vend Ch II) But the Deliverer, the Shoshyant, the Beneficent one was to come in the end (Vend XIX 5)"

But in spite of the short-comings of their own state, conditions or places, in general, human beings Love for everything that is one's own "love their own sky". Our author illustrates this from the first chapter of the Vendidad, wherein, one after another, 16 cities are named with failings or evils of their own, but still liked by their people as the best places in the world Mazda said to Zarathushtra "I have made every land dear to its dwellers, even though it had no charms whatever in it, had I not made every land dear to its dwellers, even though it had no charms whatever in it, then the whole living world would have invaded (ie crowded) Airyana Vaêgô" (p 14) We are reminded of this view by the following story — It is said that certain men complained to God of their miseries and afflictions, and of, what they in comparison thought to be, the happiness and pleasures of others God directed all these men to place their miseries, griefs and afflictions before themselves at their feet in groups or lots, and then asked them to exchange or choose their lots with those of others as they liked But, looking at the lots of others, everybody liked his own lot or group and preferred to continue in his own previous condition and lot with which he was familiarised They saw that everybody had some evil or misery to contend with in this life So, it was better to stick to their own lot with which they were familiar

Prof Stratton's first chapter of the first part is entitled "Appreciation and Contempt of self." Men have been generally "described as delighting in their own attainments" But there are also, on the other hand, some persons who are of "the self-depreciating, the self-distrustful type" "Yet in any well-developed religion, it is customary to discriminate, and it is rare that a society or even an individual commends or condemns without reserve all that may be called the self" For example, the Zend-Avesta passes "no condemnation on many of the fundamental instincts of the individual, while there are others, (other religions) notably of India, which find little or nothing in man that is worthy of respect, and in which the chief labour of the faithful is to kill

their deepest natural powers. The Parsee could without shame pray for happiness and long life on earth, with wealth and many children, and for life after death. He was urged to cultivate his ordinary powers of intelligence, as well as those higher activities of intuition, which more especially lead to the divine." (p. 22) This points to "the contrast which is found between the spirit of much of Indian religion and that of ancient Persia."

Such different feelings towards the self, support or suppress other ideas, for example, those of predestination or personal freedom. "The belief in pre-destination and the contrary conviction of personal freedom and responsibility would seem to have some of their springs in this same region—the doctrine of freedom issuing in part from the feeling of self-value, while the sense of degradation, of worthlessness, gives colour to the belief that all men's acts are fatally impelled by some power without." (p. 26)

"These contrasting emotions influence not alone one's theory of the will or personal efficiency, they are of importance also for the picture we make of human destiny after death. The opposition in the feelings we are considering tends to find expression in contrary doctrines regarding the future life. The sense of personal worth or worthlessness is reflected in the belief in immortality or in the final extinction at least of consciousness. A readiness to believe in ultimate extinction is a sign of self-depreciation, while the opposite feeling—that in some way this self of mine is treasured, is essential to the world—supports the idea that death is but a superficial experience, and that in spite of it the individual soul lives on" (p. 30). "The sharp imagery of the ancient Persian" illustrates his belief in personal worth and freedom of will.

This idea of Mr. Stratton of one's self, i.e. of one's good actions, being "treasured", is illustrated by a passage in the *Dibācheh* of the Parsee *Āfringāns*. I will quote here what I have said on this subject in my article on the *Afringan*¹—"The following words in the recital of the *Dibācheh* draw our special attention—'Pa ganj-i-Dadā Ahura Mazda rayomand khorehmand Ameshaspandān bērešid,' i.e. 'May these (celebrations) arrive to the treasury of the Brilliant and Glorious Ahura Mazda and the Ameshaspands.' What is meant is this: The worshipper has to pray with a view to ask for God's blessings over all. His prayers are to go to the treasury (*ganj*) of God, from which there may be a general distribution to all. The influence of even one individual worshipper is far-reaching. His prayers spread their influence

Actions being
'treasured'

1. The Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsees, p. 363.

round about, in his household, in his city, in his country He is to pray, not for himself but for many round about him The words of the *Āfringān* point to what Herodotus (Book I, p 132) says of the ancient Persians, that they prayed not only for themselves but for the whole community, at the head of which stood the King "

"The souls of the *daeva*-worshippers and of the righteous must alike cross the fateful Chinvad Bridge, where a maid distinguishes the evil from the good The spirits of the evil fall into the depth of the dark, horrid world of hell, while the good come to the presence of the heavenly gods, to an undecaying world, the golden seat of Ahura Mazda (Vend XIX 29-32, 47) Or according to another account, the blessed soul is met by his conscience, as a beautiful maid, and moving through fan-scented airs towards the south, reaches the three heavens - of thought, of word, and of deed - and passing through them enters the fourth heaven, of endless light The wicked soul, conducted through stench unspeakable is met by a foul hag, his conscience, and passes through the three hells, of thought, of word, and of deed, to the fourth hell of endless gloom " (Yasht 22) (p 32).

This view of the Zend Avesta stands as an illustration of
Expectation of a definite personal continuance "the expectation of a definite personal continuance" as "opposed to the belief in final unconsciousness or absorption, and the desire for such an end."

Again this feeling of self-appreciation or self-condemnation affects a man's view of his relation with God Some go to extremes One set of persons with "moral self-reliance" seeks no help from God Another set, not discerning "any reality whatever or any

1 Dr Cheyne calls this "a very noble allegory" He says "Heaven and Hell are not primarily the localities appointed for souls after death, the one is 'life', 'the best mental state', the other is 'life's absence', 'the worst life', a high doctrine which is embodied in a very noble allegory, in the Vendidad . Conscience in fact, according to the fine allegory appears to the soul of the deceased man and conducts it to its place " (The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter, by Revd Dr Cheyne, 1891, pp 398-99—The Bampton Lectures of 1889) Dr Haug thought that this allegory suggested to Prophet Mahomed "the idea of the celestial Huri" Dr Cheyne says —"At any rate this Zoroastrian allegory suggested the Talmudic story of the three bands of ministering angels who meet the soul of the pious man and the three bands of wounding angels who meet the bad man when he dies (Ibid p 437)

efficiency in one's own efforts, sees God as the sole form of all existence" (p 35) But, between these two extremes of religion—neither of which leaves any inter-relation between man and God, since in each case one of the related terms has disappeared—there are many forms of faith. The Parsee faith is of this kind. "The reverant Parsees could pray that they might themselves become gods, might become Ahura Mazdas (Gatha XXX 9-S B E Vol XXXI, 34) " "That the soul and its Ideal are related to each other as are friends" is illustrated by the Zend Avesta wherein "we find the prayer that helpful grace may be given as friend bestows on friend" (Gatha XLVI, 2).

The second chapter of his first part which is entitled "Breadth and narrowness of sympathy," is thus begun by Prof. Stratton "The value which we have in our own eyes is bound intimately with our feelings toward our kind. And yet in no simple way, for with some men, self-love and a disregard of their fellows are but the inner and the outer border of the same mental fact. With others, the appreciation of themselves first teaches them the worth of men, while with still others, it is only from the rich attributes which they prize in their associates that they come to see themselves as having worth. One may thus have an opposite attitude toward his neighbour and toward himself, or there may be no such contrariety in the feelings with which he looks inward and without. In passing from self-regard onward to the sympathies, we come closer to religion's citadel and life. For reverence is by its very nature, a bond which unites man to powers which lie more central to the world."

Now the narrowing of this fellow-feeling is of different grades: (a) In some extreme cases, the narrowing of this fellow-feeling drives people to solitary wilderness. Those are the extreme ascetics. (b) In some cases, men are driven to "a small company of kindred minds." This is illustrated by the case of monasteries of monks and nuns, where, in spite of all the good that they do, there is lurking a belief "that the common social ties are a fetter to the soul." (c) Then the next class is that of people who think that people "of like faith and of like conduct are fit companions for the soul." These are fraternities like the Masonic Fraternities. But their sympathy is principally confined to their fellow-members. "The social bond has here been given depth, but at the cost of breadth." (d) "The human sentiment" then advances to the class of people of the same faith. Among the Parsees it goes beyond the pale of religion. Prof. Stratton says on this point.

"The strong humanism of the ancient Persians' Faith is shown Humanism of the Persian Religion It led to its spread. by their making the spirits of men the final restorers of plenty and righteousness on earth. They looked to one man in particular, a son of Zarathustra, to be born in the distant future and to upbuild the fallen world. He is to be the great Soshyant, the Beneficent One, but all the faithful among the dead are in their own degree, like him and are called Saoshyants, allies of the Benefactor. And even the present maintenance of the world is due to the watchfulness of these human spirits. The faithful souls of the men of all nations maintain the sky, the water, the earth, the cattle, the child in the womb (Farvardin Yasht, 1, 17, 21). That charge, which in the Hebrew hymn is committed to the angels to watch over men, and bear them up lest they dash their foot against a stone (Psalm XCI, 11 ff) is here assigned unambiguously to spirits who once were men. These sustain both animate and inanimate creation, thus bearing constant witness that men are worthy of having entrusted to them some of the responsibilities of gods. The fire of human fellowship gleams from the other world to this, and adds its kindly light. The Parsee was not limited in his religious appreciation to those of his own blood or to his political friends. Even among the to., even among the kith and tribes of the Turanian, he believed that piety was to be found, and to thither as well as to the saints of his own people, the Aryan looked with reverence. 'We worship the Fravashis of the holy men in the Aryan countries. We worship the Fravashis of the holy men in the Turanian countries,' declares the ritual song " (pp 41-42). It seems according to Prof Stratton that this spirit of broad sympathy seems to have led to the spread of Zoroastrian Faith in surrounding countries.

We have so far treated the questions of our feelings towards ourselves and our fellow-men. But, "besides the stir of feeling towards ourselves and our fellow-men, religion affects, and is affected by, our attitude towards possessions and pleasures, toward marriage and government, towards all that hard system of reality which is often called 'the world.' Allegiance to an unseen rule cannot fail to leave its impress upon our loyalty to what is seen, religion cannot for ever remain a fact apart and without influence upon the common attractions of life. These must either be made legitimate, connected to spiritual use, or, in worshipping, we must turn our back upon them as rivals of the highest. The extremity of the renouncing temper appears in various forms of asceticism, and is found more wide-spread than many know " (p. 63)

So, Professor Stratton then speaks, under the head, "The Acceptance or Renouncement of the World world accepted or renounced," of this kind of thoughts of renouncement, among various people—several tribes of America, the Chinese, the Jews, the Brahmins and Jains of India and the Buddhists. As instances of what he calls "the vagaries of religious self-denial," he refers to "those odd dilutions of *Askesis* where fish is substituted for flesh on Friday, or where for a season fashionable ladies refrain from attending balls. From such faint and border instances renunciation passes out into clear absurdity, as, where for religion's sake, a man gives up his beloved reading of Greek, or where the sect of the 'Abecedarians' condemn a knowledge even of the alphabet, since all human learning, of which the alphabet is the foundation, is felt to be a hindrance to the progress of the soul." As an illustration, I may refer to the case of Abu Farī, justifying the fact of the great Akbar, not knowing even reading and writing.

Then, Prof. Stratton passes to the people of "the opposite attitude" like the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman, who "accept the world", and among whom is found "the feeling that whatever is in accord with plain morality may be freely used and enjoyed." Taking the ancient Persians to be one of such people, he says (p. 68) "Mazdaism is generally unrenouncing. Life is pronounced to be the greatest good, greater even than purity." Zarathushtra prays that king Vishtāspa may be long-lived, as long as an old man can be, and that he may fulfil the duration of a thousand years, ere he comes to the all-happy blissful abode of the holy One (Vishtāsp Yasht, 1, 5). Here is no yearning for release, no complaint of the weary burden of existence! Spiritual benefits and the blessings of common life are permitted to mingle in gay confusion. 'The first place where the earth feels most happy' is where the faithful stand prepared to sacrifice and pray to Mithra and Rama Khāstra. The second place of great happiness is that 'whereon one of the faithful erects a house with a priest within, with cattle, with a wife, with children, and good herds within, and wherein afterwards the cattle go on thriving, holiness is thriving, fodder is thriving, the dog is thriving, the wife is thriving, child, fire, every blessing of life is thriving' (Vendidad Chap. III, 1-3). Nor was this acceptance naive

1 Prof. Stratton here follows Darmesteter's rendering of the phrase "vaidiō mashaia aihi zānthem vahishtā" viz.—"Purity is for man next to life, greatest good" (S. B. E. IV, p. 55-Vend. Chap. V. 21.)

and unreflecting. The opposite ideal was consciously rejected. ' Verily, I say unto thee, O Spitama Zarathushtra ! the man who has a wife is far above him who begets no sons, he who keeps a house is far above him who has none, he who has children is far above the childless man, he who has riches is far above him who has none And of two men, he who fills himself with meat is filled with the good spirit much more than he who does not do so; the latter is all but dead ' (Vend IV, 47, 48) Apparently, one of the worst things that can be said against the 'ungodly Ashemaogha' is, that he *does not eat* (Vend. IV, 49). It is significant that a conquering nation like that ruled by Cyrus and Darius and Xerxes should thus in its great religious canon praise the rugged materials of warrior strength" (pp 68-69)

Prof Stratton refers to a passage of the Meher Yasht (s 121 ff) which seems to point to some kind of renunciation, but he rejects it saying "But this is far from the prevalent spirit of the worship" (p 68). But the translation of the passage is doubtful and one is not certain about the use of the *upāzan* referred to therein. Then, as seen above, in Zoroastrianism, there is very little conflict between the world and the spirit. The world-acceptance, not the world-renunciation is the teaching of Zoroastrianism

In the 5th chapter of the first part, Prof. Stratton treats the question of "Opposition of Gloom and Cheer" Opposition of Gloom and Cheer In its attitude towards this question the Zoroastrian religion was like the Greek, which was "a cheerful religion," and, in which, a man "enjoyed the world about him" and enjoyed "the conversation and disputes of men" An ancient Greek was a "boyant humanist to the core, delighting in all the tone and beat of life, he was not to be depressed by anything in this world or in the world beyond He was not unmindful of the future but the future was distant and unreal compared with the riches now within reach" There was gladness, though touched with solemnity

"The Persian, who also was like the Greek in many ways, showed in his scriptures a joy not unbroken, yet deep and wide The sense of evil, though strong, was not yet overpowering, it was lightened by assurance of coming victory A thought to which allusion has already been made, shows in the form of creed

1 Our author follows the very free rendering of Darmesteter (S B E IV, p 46), who supports the above statement of the Vendidad with an appropriate quotation from the Sad-dar (83) (Hyde 25) which says "In other religions they fast from bread, in our we fast from sin"

their confidence in the divine; the day would come when the great Deliverer, the child of Zarathushtra, would complete his father's work, conquering the foes of man and of God, and renewing the whole earth in goodness. Here mood wavers, at first depressed, it rises in the end, and remains confident. The Parsee's joy is further reflected in a kind of psalm to the holy Zarathushtra, who first thought what is good, in whom was heard 'the word of holiness, who was the lord and master of the world,' 'in whose birth and growth the water and the plants rejoiced', 'in whose birth and growth the waters and the plants grew', 'in whose birth and growth all the creatures of the good creations cried out, Hail! Hail to us' for he is born, the Athravan, Spitama Zarathushtra" (Farvardin Yasht, 88 ff). In its large outlines such a faith lays no such stress on evil as is often said. The world here is of a happy outcome. The feeling of joy is no longer single and unmixed, it has tried its strength by overcoming pain, and retains thus in memory."

In his 8th chapter of the first part, Prof. Stratton speaks of

Ceremonial and its
Inner supports

"Ceremonial and its Inner supports" "Many of the great things of religion come of humble stock. This is true of its external acts."

The ceremonies in their origin are at first what are termed "cheap and childish." In the Zend Avesta, "the parings of nails, the combings of the hair, must be buried with 'fiend-smiting' words, carelessness in this regard is a 'most deadly deed whereby a man increases most the baleful strength of the Daēvas as he would do by offering them a sacrifice' (Vend XVII 6)." And again, it is said that by rubbing with the feather of the raven, Vārengana, one may curse his enemies, and none can smite him or turn him to flight. "The feather of that bird of birds brings him help, it brings unto him the homage of men, it maintains in him his glory" (Behram Yasht 35, 44). Or the utterance of certain words may have a direct and magic influence, they become 'fiend-smiting and most healing' (Vend X). The sacred hymn may thus be efficacious of itself."

Then from these small peculiar beliefs, these things of humble stock as their origin, arise solemn ceremonies, full of devotion to God. "Rites and objects finally become far more of religious than of magical character. And then we are in the presence of true ceremonial. The Persians, Herodotus tells us, and in telling, contrasts them with the Greeks, 'build no altar, kindle no fire, when about to sacrifice. With them there is neither libation nor flute nor garlands nor sprinkled barley. But when

one wishes to sacrifice to a particular divinity, he encircles his head-dress usually with myrtle, and takes his offering to some spot that is undefiled, and there calls upon his god. The sacrificer may never seek blessings on himself alone, but he prays that it may be well with all the Persians and with their king. For with good fortune to them will come his own, (Herodotus I, 132)" (p. 137).

But, at times, "true ceremonial," which has its advantage, is carried to details of endless ceremonial, wherein, as it were, "the gods themselves are pushed quite into obscurity. Here we find them at times forced to obedience by the rite or depending upon human observances for their strength. And the more utensils and materials used in service are themselves objects of adoration." This is, at times, carried to such an extent, that it seems that "the essential feature of magic has returned to crowd out the religious element." In such a procedure the gradation is something like the following —

1 Magic

2 Elevation to a proper standard of Religion with acceptable ceremonial

3 The details of endless ceremonial again degrade the procedure to the state of magic

In the case of ceremonies, they admit of grades of interpretation. "Throughout religion ceremonial acts may be performed with the greatest difference of interpretation—the same external fact serving as the garment for ideas and feelings that wax and wane and yield to one another."

For example, take, "the sacred meal", (cf. the chashni حاشنی) of the Parsis. "Often in early society it seems to be a rude way of making some desired spirit enter into the eater, by devouring that in which the spirit dwells. But later, losing this rude character, it becomes as with the Chinese or the Zoroastrians, not unlike a family reunion at the table, an occasion when gods and men express their common interest and bond. With still others, it is a symbol that man is dependent for all that is good and necessary, upon the bounty and spiritual strength of God" (p. 140). We must try "to understand the motives which bring and maintain formal observance in religion." At times, the origins of ceremonial observances may seem to hinder perception but at times they may help perception.

We must remember that "careful ceremony is not kept for religion only, but appears whenever an act seems of special significance and can be so ordered as to express and celebrate its

spaciousness of meaning. The inauguration of a President, the coronation of a King, the opening of Congress, or Parliament, is universally given an outward dignity by formal ways that in a measure are quite superfluous, judged by their bare common usefulness. Yet all these things live on, not because men are stupid followers of custom, because the customs themselves give something that is needed. In some instances there is even a hidden utility in the act — as in having a fixed time or period, whatever it may be for 'calls' (p 141). Our author seems to justify the proper observance of ceremonies on the ground of ordered discipline, as opposed to mere whims. The act gives "a mental rest in the knowledge that some things at least are not left to be guessed."

"In religious observances, whether they are or are not technically of the ritual, there are all those motives and much beside. If it seems unfitting that the approach to kings should be helter-skelter, how much more the approach to one who rules the world. Here is the rarest, the most important situation in all life and should be so enacted as if it were like nothing else. There is therefore a sentiment favouring what is apart, so that men may show, in mere manner and form of speech, in garments, and in specially prepared surroundings, that common things are set aside. And yet this is not a matter of sentiment merely. The special and uncommon setting changes the current and character of one's ideas. The very escape from besetting circumstance, is nothing more — yet with a simplicity that soothes without distraction — helps to take the fetters from the mind. So it seems reasonable to guard the associations of the church, keeping them so that the very place is unaccustomed to what is trivial.

"There is much larger gain if in addition to this more general influence of externals, they give the mind, thus stimulated and set free a definite leading toward truth. Any religion at its best always attempts this. The ritual aims not to stir the feelings in general, but to unite them with thoughts of God. The rite does not remain on the sensuous and muscular side of faith, but moves over toward the intellectual as well. It does not move entirely away from the active side even when the worshipper seems to have little to do but to observe the priests and acolytes, the processions, the genuflections, the crossings, and movements of sacred symbols. The observer's own response to this, by lip and thought and sympathy, makes him by an inner initiation an active participant in the rite. In so far as men really enter into the ceremony, they are themselves co-actors in the presentation of the mystery."

Our author criticises an observation of Prof. Darmesteter in the matter of ceremonies Prof Darmesteter (S B E Vol. IV, Vend Introd p LXXXV) while speaking of the ceremonies, especially the ceremonies in honour of the dead, says "The first object of man is purity (yaozdão) 'Purity is for man, next to life, the greatest good' Purity and impurity have not in the Vendidad the exclusively spiritual meaning which they have in our languages" Then proceeding further, he says "This notion or feeling, out of which these ceremonies grew, was far from unknown to the other Indo-European peoples what was peculiar to Mazdeism was that it carried to an extreme, and preserved a clearer sense of it, while elsewhere it grew dimmer and faded away As to the rites by which the Druj is expelled, they are the performance of myths There is nothing in worship but what existed before in mythology What we call practice is only an imitation of gods As man fancies he can bring about the thing he wants by performing the acts which are supposed to have brought about things of the same kind when practised by the gods" (Ibid p LXXXVII). Our author thus criticises Darmesteter's view

"There has been an attempt to explain all the forms of worship by supposing them copied from the practices described in stories of the gods But if, as seems probable, the actions of the gods are suggested by the most impressive forms of human action, the details of myth then are quite as truly an imitation of the heroic acts of men and rite thus finds its pattern in human conduct Something of this thought is present in the theory that makes ritual the *source* of myth rather than its product "Ceremony in religion finds, in its turn, its origin and strength in many ways (a) In some cases the rite may be an earthly repetition of divine action recounted in a myth (b) In other cases there is the thought of influencing in an imitative way the course of nature" Eg, in China, in the spring, they fed orphans, in autumn the aged (c) "Often ceremonial is but the persistence in religion of the ways of approach and petition of great officials — of courtly audience, of bringing tributes by a subject people to their liege, of appeasing by gifts and by show of humility the anger of their lord"

Our author thus speaks further of the observance of ceremonies "The prescribed and communal way of acting must find a further warrant, finally, in the spirit which it fosters among those who unite in the act itself (ie to speak in Parsee phraseology, among hamdin [𐬐𐬀𐬎𐬌] i.e. co-religionists and basteh-

More personal and familiar ceremony is also of importance. Solemn rites — like those of baptism, of marriage, and of burial — are part of the search for the help, protection, or blessing of the spiritual world upon occasions momentous for the individual. Such times are felt to be too significant to be passed lightly by, the entire family, the friends, the neighbours wish or must be induced to enter into them. At the lowest, there is a gathering with murmurs and incantation to ward off evil, at the highest, and even far below the highest there is sympathy and generous symbolism, and a confession of how weak man is alone, and trust in the near aid of the all powerful God."

1 Vide my paper on the prayer-wheels and rosaries, in my *Anthropological Papers*, Pt II, pp 85-109 and my "Memorial Papers", pp 55-67

There are some who are out and out "staunch ritualists who will rarely do an act of common helpfulness, and again those whose only religious utterance is in acts of good-will, and who feel an aversion from any thing that savours of religious form." These are what are called "activists." In many religious communities, however, the two types of activity are closely joined—rites supplemented by practical beneficence, and good deeds by rites" (p 119)

"The wish to serve God by deeds useful to one's fellows, rather than by acts which are symbolic and which move more directly from man to God is very difficult to disentangle fully, but it can at least be justly understood." "Respect for unshowy human beings (e.g. strangers, beggars, orphans), which religion comes to enjoin, grows so great with some that it crowds out all the other contents of reverence, and religion now becomes purely a service of humanity. As ritual may crowd out the gods, so morality, adopted and sanctioned by religion, may likewise crowd them out. The rivalry which exists for so many, between serving God and serving men, is probably the cause of the jealousy which appears between ritual and moral action. Man feels it to be God's will that less weight should be given to purely divine rites and more to human benefaction. Yet there is no absolute conflict between ritual and moral interest."

One cause of coolness toward religion is the fact of the "general impatience with whatever hinders freedom. And ritual often does seriously hinder freedom by becoming trivial and punctilious." Thus, it is said that too much of priestly ritualism was one of the causes which led Persia to Islam on the fall of Yazdazard. "Islam, by its milder observances, brought in this way relief to the Persians from the extravagance of the Magian ritual with its dread of polluting the fire and the earth."

EXISTENCE AND VALUE

H D BHATTACHARYYA, M A, B L, (P, R S)

I

VALUE AS QUALITY

One of the significant changes in modern philosophical controversy is the altered attitude towards the problem of Realism vs Idealism. So long as the Cartesian tradition dominated philosophical speculation the Intellect was regarded as the all-important faculty of the mind, and even when that tradition broke down, the succeeding age became 'Hegel-ridden' and the thinking faculty managed to retain much of its former privilege and prestige. The half-hearted attempt of Kant and Fichte to reverse the Greek order of Theoretical and Practical Reason did not succeed, and not only in the system of Descartes but also in that of Hegel, Will was included within Intellect and its importance in philosophical construction was minimized or ignored. The intellectualistic mode of thought could firmly secure its position because it was thought that inter-communication was possible only through intellectual symbols and that philosophy could become a universal science only if an intellectual medium of intercourse could be assured. Even when it was borne in upon the mind that spirits could not be known in the same way as things, the mode of ascertaining their existence and nature was relegated to some intellectual faculty — to notion, for instance, in the system of Berkeley, and to speculative thought in the system of Hegel. Moreover, the concept of the Self as a spectator and of consciousness as a search-light thrown upon thoughts and things inevitably tended to set up the epistemological position with which we are all familiar, namely, the relation of subject and object, the knower and the known. The affective and volitional equipment of the spirit suffered a necessary neglect in the prevailing atmosphere of intellectualism, and such appeals as reality might make to feeling and conation through appreciation and purposiveness were unheeded.

We shall not trace the futile attempts made to carry out under these conditions the Indian and Greek injunction 'Know Thyself'. Suffice it to say that the Ego found it impossible to recognize this neat dichotomy of existence into subject and object

The concrete fulness of spiritual life could not be divided by a hatchet into a subjective half and an objective half, each known in its entirety without reference to the other. The object got implicated in the subject and the subject failed to realize its punctual character as the *focus imaginarius*, divested of all objective reference. But intellectualistic metaphysics, which, in spite of Hegel's stricture upon Understanding, continued to swear by the cognitive relation, could not proceed beyond the problems as to whether the object or the subject was the basic principle of existence and how the one gave rise to the other, as also how the two entered into cognitive relation. The Cartesian dualism survived, though vanquished, both in realism and in idealism, and it is only now¹ that philosophers are waking to the situation that possibly reality is psycho-physical throughout and so the interrelation of mind and matter is possibly a pseudo-problem in view of the fact that the two together make up a single reality. But so long as mind and matter retain their distinctiveness in thought and being, speculation is bound to be dominated by some kind of correspondence theory. Even when a disbelief in the possibility of knowing extramental reality in its true nature slowly crept in, the existence of this reality remained unchallenged, and to the conflict of realism and idealism was added the controversy between presentationism and representationism, ontological being and phenomenal appearance. Idealism itself was constrained to admit that human knowledge was not a self-contained whole: neither Berkeley nor Leibnitz could advocate individualism without reserve and each had to provide himself with a way of escape from the uncomfortable consequences of a solipsistic philosophy through the medium of God.

The solution offered to the impasse of thought in extreme individualism by Berkeley and Leibnitz has furnished a pattern to all subsequent idealistic thought,² and whether divine activity or divine thought was regarded as the ground of the uniformity of finite experience, the mind of the Absolute replaced the objectively real by supplying the basis of universal validity and thus fulfilled the same function as the extramental matter of realism did. As a matter of fact, the analogy was so great that even the distinction between reality and appearance, with which we are

1 Eg Lloyd Morgan in *Emergent Evolution* and Stout in *Mind and Matter*.

2. H. Wildon Carr was making an experiment to build up a solipsistic philosophy. See his *Theory of Monads, Leibniz, and especially Cogitans Cogitata*.

familiar in Realism, turned up in Idealism also. Some of the idealists, like the Cairds and Green, thought that there was no essential distinction in kind between finite and infinite modes of thought, and followed in this not only the tradition of the main line of post-Kantian speculation but also the Kantian suggestion about the Consciousness in general. There might be some difference of opinion as to whether God's life of thought was eternal or temporal, but there was no doubt in the minds of these thinkers that whether human knowledge could grow in time and get a fuller and fuller revelation of divine thoughts or whether it could grasp these thoughts in a single act of intuition *sub specie aeternitatis*, it was a copy or replica of the thoughts and relations of the divine mind and that possibly, even corresponding to the externality of space in finite minds, there was something in the relation of the Divine thinker to His thoughts. The divine mind might supplement human thoughts and link together fragmentary human experience into an organic whole, but not in such a way as to supersede them or to alter their character altogether. Conversely, it is possible for the human mind to annul its finitude and to arrange its thoughts after the pattern of the Infinite. A quotation from John Caird¹ will suffice to illustrate this point. "As a thinking being, it is possible for me to suppress and quell in my consciousness every moment of self-assertion, every notion and opinion that is merely mine, every desire that belongs to me as this particular self, and to become the pure medium of a thought or intelligence that is universal—in one word, to live no more my own life, but let my consciousness become possessed and suffused by the Infinite and Eternal life of spirit." It is the same categories that operate in thought and being, and man, by virtue of his rational faculty, can enter upon his spiritual heritage by removing the contradictions which all lower forms of knowledge involve.

As against this ideal realism we have, on the other hand, a kind of ideal idealism where the finite thoughts are viewed as refracting divine thoughts in such a way as to suggest that what is in the mind of God² is fundamentally distinct from what is in finite minds and that the fragmentary and temporal experiences of finites must be radically transmuted before they can be harmonized into the eternal spiritual life of God. We need not refer in

1 J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 237

2 We are using the terms God and the Absolute interchangeably in this paper.

this connection to those idealistic theories which consider the Absolute to be impersonal in character and therefore totally different from finite minds, but even when the spirituality of God is not denied, its character may be conceived to be so far removed from finite spirituality that there can be no comparison or correspondence between the two. Bradley¹ is the great exponent of this line of thinking, and in his system we hear very little of that self-revelation and self-communication of God which meets us in the pages of the Cuirds and Green. No one can, of course, pretend to prove exactly what God's thoughts are, but if a theory deliberately follows the *via negativa* in reaching out to God and distinguishes human thoughts from divine in a radical fashion, it is debarred thereby from instituting any comparison between them. To hold that finite thoughts are somehow preserved in the Absolute and to believe at the same time that human knowledge is riddled with contradictions in such a way that reality cannot own it without radically altering its character can lead to only one conclusion, namely, that the correspondence between finite and infinite thought is negligible, possibly non-existent, and that from the imperfect thoughts of man no direct access to divine mind is possible. Mysticism, if not agnosticism, is the inevitable result of such speculations — only that the mystic vision here vouchsafed may not amount to any revelation at all.

Reverting now to our discussion regarding the pre-eminence accorded to cognition in epistemology, we are faced with the fact that through cognition the qualities of reality are supposed to reveal themselves. Now, whether we believe that in knowledge of extramental realities we are scanning the attributes of matter or that we are prying into the mind of God, it is essential that we should ascertain the characters of the reality revealed to human experience. To what extent are the contents of our minds counterparts of the characters of objective existence? Students of philosophy will readily remember the long controversy about the character of primary and secondary qualities — as to whether both exist in extramental reality, and, if so, in what form. Realism tended to think after Locke that primary qualities alone were real in the sense that their refraction during passage into mind was negligible whereas secondary qualities were riddled with subjectivity to such an extent that even if in reality there were

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 183. See Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, pp. 281-2.

something corresponding to them, its character was so fundamentally different that the correspondence could never amount to a copy, faithful or remote. It is indeed true that in modern realistic thought the crude conception of primary qualities has undergone radical alteration and a veritable non-man's land in the form of a world of logical entities or sense-data, lying behind materiality and mentality alike, has been created, still, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, in spite of the strictures of Berkeley and the doctrine of Relativity, has not vanished either from philosophy or from popular thought. As distinguished from the realistic position, Idealism has been faced with greater difficulty regarding primary qualities than regarding secondary ones, and has tended on the whole to think that while it is conceivable that something akin to the apprehension of secondary qualities exists in the mind of God, the primary qualities are represented in His mind in the shape of relations towards and among His thoughts which by refraction assume the form of spatiality in finite minds. Thus the extreme otherness or opposition which the Absolute Spirit evolves and experiences in its own mental life is the basis of the sense of materiality in us.

Matters have been complicated in recent philosophy by the introduction of the concept of tertiary qualities or values. The idea of values is not new but their number and interrelation have been differently conceived from time to time. By common consent, however, the True, the Beautiful and the Good are supposed to be ultimate values and other values have been regarded as contributory or instrumental thereto¹. Do these tertiary qualities belong to reality in the same way as the primary and secondary qualities do? Do we cognize their existence in reality in the same way? As this opens up the whole question of the nature of values, no offhand answer is possible, but taking it for granted that values are qualities, it is still permissible to ask whether these are intrinsic qualities of reality or mere categories of thought imposed upon reality by the apprehending mind. The intellectualistic standpoint admits of either interpretation of qualities, for, as we know from the philosophy of Kant, the attributes of nature need not all be physically present - they may be partially caused by mental activity operating according to its fundamental laws of apprehension. Whether pure intellect can impose these categories of value we shall discuss later, what we

1 J. S. Mackenzie in his *Fundamental Problems of Life* (p. 79) enumerates the intrinsic values as Truth, Reality, Benevolence, Power, Beauty and Joy.

want to point out is that there is no intrinsic difficulty in conceiving of these so-called tertiary qualities as impositions of thought rather than as revelations of objective characters

Let us accept for the sake of argument, however, that these tertiary qualities are resident in things and are not merely thought into them. As soon as we consider them as qualities, we are bound to enquire how far they agree with other qualities of things in their nature and how they are to be distinguished from these other qualities. There is, first of all, the question whether these tertiary qualities are found in things just as extension is found in matter which is unthinkable without it, or whether there is a propensity in things to realize these tertiary qualities by a process of emergence or establishment of new relations.¹ Does reality evolve these values, as Alexander would say, or are they characters of reality from all eternity, as Pringle-Pattison would hold². If we are to admit the ubiquity of values as that of existence, we shall have to abandon the concept of quality altogether in spite of the reciprocal interpenetration of the two, unless we admit at the same time that reality is that which is valuable and value is the primary attribute of existence and is a part of the definition of reality from the objective standpoint. But unless we define Value itself very carefully, as also the relation between substance and quality, we are bound to be landed in difficulties. It is quite conceivable, for instance, that values are not qualities belonging to any core or substance but that the substance itself is an assemblage of qualities or universals. Hume advocated the view that the Lockean supposition of an unknown and unknowable substratum was a mistake and that a substance has no being apart from the being of the qualities that assemble together and persist through time in a more or less unchanging fashion. At the opposite extreme of thought, again, we have Plato according to whom a phenomenal being is the meeting point of the universals or Ideas which then manifest themselves as so many qualities—the particularity of a thing consisting in the number and organization of the ideas so represented, as Gilbert of Poitiers would

1 See in this connection D. I. Evans, *The Status of Values in New Realism*, p. 118 et seq. See also Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 75.

2 Alexander, *Space, Time and Destiny*, Vol. II, p. 226 and ff., Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 239. Alexander is inclined to treat them as values and not as qualities. See p. 244, Vol. II. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 493.

say', — Matter, when not regarded as mere nothing, supplying a homogeneous substratum which however does not suffice to explain the diversity of character possessed by different things. On neither supposition would it be necessary to suppose that, in addition to qualities or universals, there is any being or substance, or if a being be assumed at all, it would be so diaphanous and uniform that it would hardly have a character of its own and will be identical with the category of substance, which is itself a fundamental character and not a reality, as Kant has pointed out. Or, as Bradley points out, the process of abstraction may remove from Nature everything that can be suspected of being psychical and thus set up the essence of the world in the shape of a bare skeleton of primary qualities²—the *that*, as it were, of which the other qualities are *whats*. But whether qualities or universals serve as the stuff of reality, it is hardly possible to hold that values supply that stuff—rather, values are regarded as embellishments of reality, howsoever conceived, and it is with this aspect of Value that we are now concerned.

We have moved far away from the time when Plato maintained that every thing was a manifestation ultimately of the Idea of the Good. But though ontologically we have abandoned this ubiquity of goodness or value, it is still possible to ask whether epistemologically it is not possible to invest every object with a value by throwing upon it the hue of satisfyingness or the fulfilment of interest, desire or conation. Taking 'good' to mean good for any interest whatsoever, perhaps that is not impossible—only we must not think that 'good' has a moral significance in all cases. But the realistic theory assumes that the word 'good' or 'valuable' can be adjectivally used in respect of reality and not merely attributively ascribed to it either as a category of thought or as an imposition under temporary needs.³ Realism has not shrunk from the position that such a realistic account might involve the

1 See the present writer's article on *Individuality* in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol II, p 150

2 Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p 490

3 Urban makes this useful distinction between adjectival and attributive. See *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol XIII, *Value and Existence*, p 460. He does not use the latter word, however, in a volitional-affective sense—for him value is an objective, having an independent status by the side of being and reality. See his *Knowledge of Value and Value Judgment*, *ibid*, p 680, also his *Ontological Problems of Value* in the same Journal, Vol XIV p 312

multiplication of values without any necessary connection with one another except that they all belong to reality, just as the different qualities of a physical object might all inhere in one and the same substance without implicating one another. Idealism has generally tried to connect them through an Absolute Spirit or Over-personal Will,¹ although it too could not lay down a generally acceptable formula regarding their hierarchy.² It should be noted however that the multiplicity of secondary qualities is due to the multiplicity of the apprehending organs and that their unification in a single object is due to obscure mental laws, if the tertiary qualities manifest a similar multiplicity and are yet supposed to be unified in reality, we shall have to assume that these qualities are revealed to different mental faculties and their unification is due to a similar obscurity. There is a further complication that while secondary qualities admit only of quantitative difference when they are of the same kind,³ the tertiary qualities have no fixed gradation even when they are of the same kind. Martineau's attempt to arrange the springs of action in a hierarchy⁴ has not been repeated in subsequent ethical literature for the simple reason that the order may be reversed, under circumstances, in the case of at least some of the motives of action. About the mutual relation of the three main values — Truth, Beauty and Goodness, — it would be enough to refer to Schelling, Hegel, Croce and Weiss to show that it could be differently conceived, and although in poetic thought Truth, Beauty and Goodness have all been unified and even identified, the conclusion rests upon such uncertain psychology that only faith can believe in their unity and identity, — witness, for instance, the extreme concern of the Idealists to prove that evil that seems to be so true is not really so, and that the good alone is true.

The fact is that reality as a whole is beyond good and evil, just as it is beyond true and false, beautiful and ugly.⁵ In a sense, reality is a construct in which we wish to satisfy the rational, aesthetic and moral interests of our life, and nothing that brings about conflict between experience and experience, will and will,

1 Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, p. 352, Mackenzie, *op cit.*, p. 83, Pringle-Pattison, *op cit.*, Lecture XII

2 Croce, *Aesthetic* (Eng. Tr.), p. 384

3 Bosson and William James vehemently contest this

4 Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 266

5 Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 489, 519 (Reality is one) p. 551

taste and taste, can be ascribed to reality as a whole by a constitution like ours. The primal law of being is identity, and so nothing that contradicts itself can be ascribed to reality. This is the considered opinion of both Leibnitz and Bradley and both had to accept a view in which evil had to be denied its being in reality as such. In Bradley a harmony of thought and purpose just as in Royce a complete fulfilment of all significant ideas, is the sign of reality as such.¹ If errors were equally possible with truth, evil with good, and ugliness with beauty, without raising any conflict in the mind, both would have been ascribed to reality as such. did we not have at one time the compartmental theory of truth according to which a thing could be scientifically or philosophically false and yet religiously true? The place of religion has now been taken by mysticism and we are still faced with two truths—the truth of thought and the truth of intuition, but as we have now learnt to place implicit reliance upon the necessity of coherence—the only necessity probably of human nature—we no longer take a double truth as a possibility in the real when it appertains to the same aspect of our being. But we are far from all final comparison of different values and deciding which one is the sole character of reality as such. there is always the possibility that so long as the present constitution of man persists, reality will continue to be viewed in all the aspects in which the psycho-physical organism of man is interested, and consequently invested with values that are regarded as objectively pluralistic in character, as Brogan points out.² We have already referred to the fact that the number of these values is not fixed, for philosophers are not agreed about the ultimate values of life—it would be sufficient to refer to Croce, Mackenzie, and Munsterberg, not to mention the different garbs in which the three

1 Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 476 ('In the end, will and thought are two names for two kind- of appearance. Neither, as such, can belong to the final Reality, and, in the end, both their unity and their diversity remain inexplicable'), p. 155, p. 159 ('We must believe that reality satisfies our whole being. Our main wants - for truth and life, and for beauty and goodness - must all find satisfaction') See Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 231. Royce and others *The Conception of God*, p. 10, p. 186, p. 209.

2 Brogan, *Objective Pluralism in the Theory of Value in The International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XLI, p. 289 (Brogan thinks that the primal value-category is not good and bad but better and worse and that the relational character of values need not necessarily force a transition from objective pluralism to subjectivism).

classic values appear from time to time¹ or the different views that have been held regarding the relation between intrinsic and ultimate values, some holding them to be identical and others different²

What we are driving at, however, is this that whatever be the character and number of the attributes of worth that we ascribe to reality, they do not really belong to it as a whole. We have seen already that there is no sense in which reality can be said to be true. Equally so, there is no sense in which it can be called good or beautiful. An analysis of the three valuations generally made by us will reveal the fact that those three major values have well-defined applications. When we talk of beauty we generally refer to phenomena of external nature—to sounds and sights in their interrelations among themselves. No book on Aesthetics can deal with the beauty of the soul as such when it deals with human problems and finds in poetic justice something akin to aesthetic perception, the physical phenomena through which such justice is meted out remain as an abiding background. Because beauty involves balance and harmony we are tempted to extend the description to such souls and human happenings as possess this balance, but it is well to remember that the extension is only analogical and that beauty is primarily sensuous in character. Reason has a secondary function in the perception of beauty in spite of the fact that taste can be formed by personal endeavour and environmental influence through the creation of new interests: no one who does not appreciate the beauty of a picture or a building will do so simply because he finds on measurement that it conforms to the rule about golden section. Similarly, good is primarily the attribute of human volitions and any extension of the category to the external world can only be done analogically. To think of Nature as conserving all moral values, or as facilitating moral action, or as educating and perfecting human souls through its opportunities and obstacles alike, is identical with obliterating all distinctions between Nature and Spirit and holding an animistic, if not spiritualistic, view regarding the essence of Nature, to be found in most idealistic speculations. At present the quarrel

1 See, for instance, H. W. Wright's *Objective Values* in *The Int Jour Eth*, Vol. XLII, in which coherence of intrinsic character, joint efficacy and aesthetic harmony replace truth, goodness and beauty (pp. 256-7). Also Campbell, *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 285.

2 See Eaton, *The Austrian Philosophy of Values*, p. 369, also, Clarke, *A Study in the Logic of Value* p. 231. See also in this connection a critical discussion of Bosanquet's theory in Piell, *A Study in the Theory of Value*, p. 244 f.

between Idealism and Realism seems to have veered round to this problem regarding the degree of beneficent act and intention to be ascribed to Nature in connection with the evolution of higher consciousness and greater moral worth. Nature is really neither hostile nor favourable—it is beyond good and evil, or below that distinction, but it supplies a neutral tool to volitional agents to make or mar their destiny. The moral indifference of Nature to human aims and achievements is so great and its destructive forces work so wantonly and without warning that only irrepressible optimism and unflinching faith can regard it as possessing a moral intention. The evil that Nature has done in the past has been forgotten and the good achieved in course of centuries has been remembered, and this has given rise to the belief that the quality of goodness belongs as much to Nature as to Spirit (accepting for the nonce that Spirit is wholly moral, which is far from the truth.)

If beauty belongs to nature and morality to spirit, truth belongs to neither apart. To think of truth and error as objective elements of the real, as Neo-Realism has done¹, is to misconceive their nature entirely. To think of them, again, as characters of mental states, as Idealism has done, is equally one-sided. Truth is the value to be ascribed to human thought in relation to things, whatsoever be the nature of the things to which thought is supposed to correspond. Idealism substituted for material things an objective system of thoughts in the mind of God and the doctrine of coherence made thoughts self-contained and self-validating, in either case a reference beyond is a necessity and no thought by itself guarantees its truthfulness, although as a state of the mind it simply is. In a coherent system each acts as a check for the rest, but none is valid without a transgredient reference. We are not taking into consideration the idealistic contention that without a mental apprehension neither beauty nor goodness nor truth is known to exist and that therefore, as Alexander points out, a compresence of subject and object is a necessary condition of the existence of these tertiary qualities. Alexander himself vetoes that values are mental by saying that they are still properties of the object,² and Taylor, who draws the conclusion that the values are not really 'transcendentals' but

1 See Holt in *New Realism* p. 372, and in *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 269. For criticism, see Verda, *New Realism in the light of Scholasticism*, Chap. IX, also Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. I, p. 39.

2 Alexander, *Space Time and Destiny*, Vol. II, p. 243. See in this connection, Clarke, *A Study in the Logic of Value*, p. 165 f.

refer to forms of a personal activity, takes care to point out that values are not "psychic additions" but are *found* in reality.¹ Human knowledge is supposed by him to discover gradually the values that are inherent in reality

What we wish, however, to emphasise is that Reality as a whole can in no sense be thus qualified. Reality simply *is* and exists only in so far as it fulfils the need of coherence or harmony. We do not know why the nature of man should demand coherence and harmony, nor can we be sure that coherence belongs objectively to Reality as such, but it is not improbable that the symmetrical organism of man with its rhythmic functions sets a limit to human thought in relation to the character of the real. Even then the different coherences that human nature demands cannot be made to cohere among themselves, with the effect that not only are the different values not commensurable but they are very often in conflict with one another.²

The processional character of the world creates an additional difficulty, for it proves that the truth or beauty or goodness that the world possesses is not final in character and that the value it contains is liable to modification for better or for worse in course of time, unless we arbitrarily decree that the world is absolutely equational in character and neither improves nor deteriorates, which means denying reality to time and reducing chronological to dialectical evolution. If we take time seriously, we shall be obliged to judge the world not by its achievements but by

1 Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. I, Chap. 2. For a discussion of Taylor's view on the subject, see the Symposium on *Actuality and Value* in Supplementary Volume X of the Aristotelian Society (*Indeterminism, Formalism, and Value*).

2 Laird in *The Idea of Value*, p. 353 f., comes to the conclusion that "all values are probably commensurable, although it is improbable that the principal species of value are arithmetically commensurable *inter se*." Alexander in *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 300 thus concludes: "Thus truth and error, goodness and badness, beauty and ugliness, are all realities among the sum total of reality. Now truth we have seen is reality as possessed by mind, and hence in this sense the other values are parts of truth and truth is all-inclusive, because its object is reality." Some take the Holy to be the supremest value and consider the rest as manifestations of this category. See Smuts, *Holism and Evolution* (1st ed.), p. 221, also Franks, *Metaphysical Justifications of Religion*, p. 114 (Smuts, however, understands by Holy the whole-making tendency of the Real while Franks uses it in Otto's sense of the term). Mackenzie (*Fundamental Problems of Life*, p. 83) says, "The complete or ultimate Good would thus be found in apprehending the Truth that Love and Power give Reality to Beauty and Joy."

its tendencies, and then the difficulty would be to find an objective standard by which we can judge whether the world is progressing or receding in its march. Is the world becoming worse day by day or better? Is it working off its ignorance and ugliness and evil, or doing just the reverse? Do the untrue, the ugly and the bad characterise reality as much as their opposites do? If not, in what form do they belong to reality? It has often been pointed out that in this matter the quality of beauty has an advantage over the other values in that it is not dependent upon any process — rather it is an instantaneous grasp of the relations of parts and is thus distinguishable from goodness which, being a quality of an action, involves the notion of time. As Mackenzie points out, a good man is good only when he is acting¹ — the extension of the meaning to character and disposition is only an extension from effect to supposed cause. True, certain forms of aesthetic enjoyment depend equally upon a temporal process, as music and dance, but in static forms of art, as Urban points out, "the object of the worth-feeling is always primarily the content expressed by the presentations thus ordered, although there may of course be a secondary worth-judgment upon the instrumental value of the form as such, its adequacy to represent or express the object, or to secure and retain the aesthetic repose"². To call Reality good would be to arrogate to oneself the right to judge of it for all times taken together, whereas to assert the superiority of one moment of reality over another would be to change the worth-category from good to better, for which Biogan pleads. Besides, the comparison would be between aspects or phases of reality and cannot apply to reality as a whole. As Lotze acutely points out, the ascription of a quality to reality brings it under a class, of which reality then becomes one of the many possible representatives, but there is no sense in talking of possibility or impossibility regarding reality as a whole, which is not a numerical unity and cannot therefore be subsumed under any higher class. Speaking of God,

¹ Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 14. Cf. the same writer's *Fundamental Problems of Life*, p. 83. "Of the three great values, goodness is the most directly under our control, to seek it strenuously is to find it, Beauty can only be realised in a limited way, and Truth, in any complete sense, can only be reached by a slow and gradual process. Hence Goodness can be regarded as yielding a direct imperative, Beauty is found rather than consciously achieved, and Truth is pursued through what may be an endless quest." See Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 352f.

² Urban, *Valuation: its Nature and Laws*, p. 228. See also his article on Value in *Ency. Brit* (14th Ed.), XXII, p. 962, ii, 11, 17-21.

he remarks "There cannot before him or above him be a store of predicates, possible or significant in themselves, among which He has to choose those which serve to constitute His own being. Rather this whole realm of ideis and the possibility of individual things deriving their predicates there from is itself the consequence or the creation or the own true nature of the Divine being."¹ This would make the values, not the attributes but the essence of God or reality, as the Upanishads and Vedānta make them to be.²

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not say that aspects of reality do not possess values of different kinds, attributively ascribed to them by the apprehending mind in a tacit or overt manner. Had that been so, the experience of value would have disappeared entirely. What we do say is this: that such ascription is legitimate in the case of the parts but illegitimate in the case of the whole. It is one more case of the fallacy of composition—in fact, a fallacy of both non-observation and mal-observation in addition. Just as it is true that a whole may possess a value which is not possessed by the parts separately, so also it is true that the parts may possess a value which is not reflected in the whole. In the ordinary idealistic theory of value there is a curious intermingling of the two ideas of causality and possession, i.e., it is alternatively supposed that the presence of values in the parts proves that the whole makes their existence possible, either because it causes these values to appear in the parts or because the parts participate in the values which it possesses as its own attributes. We have already said that about a progressing world no finality of judgment is possible. All idealists who have done so have tacitly believed that perfection has been eternally present in the world and that the temporal process is more or less illusory. But by so doing they have thrown insurmountable difficulties in the way of relating eternity to time and evil to goodness in the realm of thought, feeling and action.

Let us analyse as a typical case the concept of truth. Reality, when opposed conceptually to Unreality, may appear to possess the attribute of being true as distinguished from the falsehood of the Unreal. But as in the totality of things Unreality has no place outside Reality there is no sense in talking of Reality being true, for we cannot conceive of the possibility of its being untrue or

¹ Lotze, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 79

² The Upanishads and Vedānta make Truth (*satya* or *jñāna*) and Bliss (*ānanda*) and Consciousness (*caitanya*) the essence of Brahma and not its attributes.

not agreeing with itself in any aspect or at any time¹ There being nothing outside the totality of reals, no criterion of truth can take into account any transcendental factor in relation to reality as a whole (As Alexander says², "Reality is not true nor false, it is reality"). All that can be done, therefore, is to seek a criterion that shall in no way go beyond reality in any way, and such criterion has been sought, as has been observed before, in harmoniousness or coherence by Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce and other idealistic writers. Apart from the fact that much of the so-called harmony of the real might, after all, be a pious fiction and that it is quite conceivable that a greater harmony could have been achieved, it is only about the parts that we can ask whether they are harmonious or coherent with the rest, and such harmony as we can find or conceive to be the character of the real we are to accept with natural piety as an ultimate datum and it sets for us a standard behind or beyond which it is not possible for us to go. Harmony or coherence or consistency gives us only a formal truth in which each testifies to the necessity of the rest, but it is difficult to hold that this formal necessity of a cohering whole marks out truth from falsehood³. Reality as a whole cannot have any transcendental reference and unmanental harmony only lays down the formal conditions of the truth of the parts in so far as coherence and truth are identical. Regarding reality as a whole, the theory of Thatness of Suchness (Tathatā or Bhūtatathatā),⁴ as propounded by Asvaghosa, who emphasises the ultimateness, the indescribability and the factuality of the Real, is a greater approximation to truth than, for instance, the view of Alexander that "the world actually or historically develops from its first or

1 Alexander, *Space, Time and Destiny*, Vol. II, p. 258

2 *Ibid.*, p. 237

3 H. W. Wright in *Objective Values* (Int. Jour. Eth., Vol. XLII, p. 258) says — "To treat the unity and coherence of the world as something existing independently of the response of human intelligence to the world is surely to falsify the plain facts. This unity and coherence is a relation among existing things which comes to light through the co-operative activities of associated human thinking. And its value consists, not in the simple fact that unity and system wherever discovered throw the human mind into a worshipful attitude, nor in the fact that a world governed by uniform law is a workable, predictable world, but rather in the fact that the coherence of character and mutual implication which existing objects reveal render them capable of description and explanation by more and more comprehensive concepts." See also Laird, *The Idea of Value*, p. 244

4. Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Chap. VII.

elementary condition of Space-Time, which possesses no quality except what we agreed to call the spatio-temporal quality of motion " (S T D II, p. 45), and it agrees with the Upanishadic view that Reality can be described only by the juxtaposition of contradictory qualities, or the coincidence of opposites, to use the language of Nicolaius Cusanus

On one conceivable hypothesis, however, we might think of the possession of value as quality by Reality, viz., when we regard it as passing from unreality to reality, from non-existence to existence, casually referred to in the Vedas and combated in the Upanishads so vehemently.¹ But such transition from absolute non-existence to existence is an object of pseudo-thinking only — what is really intended is that there is a transition from chaos to cosmos, from vague homogeneity to definite heterogeneity, from the indeterminate to the determinate, from the potential to the actual. But on the latter supposition it is difficult to defend the hypothesis that reality as a whole gains in value or acquires a character which it did not originally possess. The epigenetic or emergent theory does not make it quite clear in what the new value of reality consists, for a reshuffling of the materials of reality does not create any value which reality did not in some form possess before. To assume that it does is to suppose that time brings into being a fact which reality did not include at the beginning, which means that we were not at first dealing with the whole of reality but with only one stage of it. As a matter of fact, in many widely separated fields of speculation every change has been regarded as a fall or degeneration and man's spiritual effort has been directed to annul the differences that time has brought about. Certain types of Idealism, feeling this difficulty of conceiving how any new value could be possessed by reality, have fallen back on the hypothesis that although the Absolute does not begin to possess any new quality as idea it may bring into being this new fact that a world of finite spirits, capable of sharing the thoughts and feelings of the Absolute,

1 For a discussion of the whole problem regarding the relation between Existence and Non-existence, see R V X 129, Ś P Br. 6 1 1 1, Taitt Br. 2 2 9 1, Ch Up 3 19.1, Taitt Up, II 6-7, Br. A Up 2 3 1, Ch Up 6 2 1, See the references under *Agre* in Jacob's *Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and Bhagavadgita*, p. 14. See also Bolvalker and Ranade, *Creative Period*, p. 382, D. ussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 128 *et seq*, Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 81 f.

emerges into being and appreciates the facts of the Absolute life¹ But this means that reality is not valuable to such an extent at the beginning as it subsequently *becomes*, which makes history the touchstone of truth and time its progenitor But Idealism wishes to retain at the same time the belief that reality and perfection are inseparable, which would reduce epigenesis to preformation of some type The recognition, on the other hand, of the position that truth is a kind of correspondence between thought and thing would necessitate a dissociation between Truth and Reality and confine the former to certain aspects of the latter

This means that values must ultimately be reserved for relations *within* the whole We shall discuss in our next paper the theory of Value as Relation Suffice it to say at present that we do not accept the view that objective relations are themselves valuable without reference to sentient beings affected hedonically or volitionally by them Value as an objective quality is fraught with so much difficulty that its adjectival use in analogy with the ascription of primary and secondary qualities to reality has been contested strongly in philosophical literature, and that by two classes of thinkers² The idealists think that such use allies the values with the real whereas values are ideal in character, asserting not so much what *is* as what *should be* or is worth existing The voluntarists, on the other hand, think that the values are not empirical qualities which things wear in public like the primary and secondary qualities and that the more closely they are examined the more clearly do they appear to be either modes of attitude or impulse, and thus motor or sensory *qualia* which are localisable within the body³ The assumption of the objectivity of values as qualities has also brought into existence a psychological monster, namely, 'objective feeling', for it has been felt that no ordinary mode of apprehension is sufficient to give us the value-quality of things and that the feeling of pleasure or pain must be credited not only

1 See Lotze, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, Chaps III and IV, Thomas, *Lotze's Theory of Reality*, Chap XII, Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p 315 (The influence of Lotze on Pringle-Pattison is manifest throughout *The Idea of God*) See Campbell, *Scepticism and Construction*, p 292 *et seq.*

2 Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp 76-77, Perry, *General Theory of Value*, pp 28-34, pp 288-9 See Eaton, *The Austrian Philosophy of Values*, Chap VIII, in this connection

with appreciation but also with knowledge.¹ We need not refer at length to the fact that values attach not only to existents but also to assumptions, to the no longer and the not yet as much as to the now, and that the undefinable quality of value postulated by Moore² must be supposed to belong to them all in the same sense and apprehended in the same way. The very fact that some values are felt and others judged makes uniformity in this matter an insuperable task. We conclude, therefore, that the apprehension of the value-quality does not necessarily prove that this quality is objective or inherent in reality.

1. See Clarke, *A Study in the Logic of Value*, Chap. II (with Appendix), Perry, *op cit*, p. 32.

2. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 6

MĀYĀ IN VEDĀNTA · WHY IS IT CALLED SUCH ?

Prof KOKILESWARA SASTRI, M A

According to the Vedāntic theory, no cause exhausts its nature in its effects or the changes which the former successively produces or undergoes. No effects can, either collectively or individually (समष्टि or व्यष्टिरूपेण) entirely manifest or express the nature of the cause, or in other words, the cause cannot be resolved into its effects, or the sum-total of the effects does not constitute the nature of the cause. The cause evolves the changes, it lives in each of its effects, it supports them, but cannot be identified with any of them. The cause, because it is universal, cannot be confined to any particular effect, but passes beyond it to other effects —

न कारणस्य कार्यान्मत्वम् (ब्र भा , २।१)

In its explanation, the author of the *Saṅkṣepasāṅiraka* points out that, as the universal cause is present in other particular effects also, any of the particular effects cannot restrict it to itself only —

“ कार्यस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य, कार्यान्तरेष्वपि वर्तमानेन कारणाधर्मेण सम्बन्धाभावात् ” ।

The effects are, in fact, its modes of activity which but imperfectly and incompletely reveal or represent the nature of the cause —

“ अथ मन्यमे सुवेदेति ‘ दम्न ’ मेवेति नूनं त्वं वेत्थ ब्रह्मणोरूपं, यदस्य त्वं यदस्य देवेषु ” (केन २।१)

“ न केवलम्-याम्नामोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य अस्य ब्रह्मणोरूपं त्वमन्यं वेद, यदस्य अधिदैवतोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य देवेषु वेत्थ त्वं तदपि नूनं दम्नमेव वेत्थ ” (भाष्य) ।

[“ Whether in cosmic or psychic objects, the manifestations of Brahma are all limited. These objects, therefore, represent the nature of Brahma very inadequately. Brahma cannot be known in its full form in any of these particular manifestations ”]

The cause, therefore, cannot be the sum-total of its effects, but something *more*.

When the changes appear in the cause, they are sustained by it, and they ultimately merge in it.

The Causal Reality is thus the bond of unity of its effects and is distinguished (अन्य) from them —

“अविभक्त विभक्तेषु, विभक्तमिव च स्थितं” (गी. 13 16).

“यदा भूतपृथग्भावमेकस्यमनुपश्यति” (13 30)

[“ It is undivided in different bodies, still it appears to be different in different bodies ”]

[“ All the various classes of beings abide or are centred in the One—in the self ”]

In fact, the effects or the changes are but its reactions produced in the Causal Reality in consequence of its relation (मर्ग) with the external environment.—

“भूतमात्रासर्गास्तु अस्य भवति”

“सर्गाभावे च तत्-कृतस्य विशेष-विज्ञानस्य अभावात्” (ब्र भा 1 4 22)

“उपाधि-समर्क-जनित-प्रबुध्यमान-(Aroused)-विशेषात्मानं”

(वृ भा 2 1 20)

[“ It (Self) comes into relation with the external elements ”]

[“ In the absence of its relation with the external objects, it cannot have its particular states stimulated by them in it ”]

[“ Its particular states or activities are excited or stimulated in it in consequence of its connection with the things which set a limit to it ”]

We find thus that no actions can be produced in an object in the absence of an operative cause (कारक), for, it is the operative cause which stimulates particular activities in an object

Now, Śankara informs us that what is produced by an operative or stimulating cause (कारक) cannot be the real nature or the essence of a thing, these are its modifications or predicates (विशेषण), and these predicates are the effects of the thing, and these are changeable —

“न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं । सतोविशेष कारकापेक्ष, विशेषस्तु विक्रिया” (तै 2 8)

and “विषयादिसाधन-सम्बन्धवशात् . अनवस्थित सम्पद्यते” (तै भा 2 8),

The relation between the cause or the nature of a thing and its effects is this —The effects produced are all व्यावृत्त or mutually exclusive of one another, but the cause remains identical with itself अनुगत behind each of these effects which it permeates or includes within itself

“सर्वादेव अवस्थासु प्रत्यभिज्ञावलेन अन्वयविच्छेददर्शनात्” (ब्र भा 2 2 22)

[“ In and through its changing series of states, the real cause without break, runs on connected with each state, whose identity is easily recognized ”]

It is the cause or the real nature of the thing which pervades its states or qualities which are its predicates, and these predicates which we call effects fall far short of, and are incomplete

expressions of, the real svarūpa of the thing Take the following passage —

“कृत्स्नो हि असौ स्वेन वस्तुरूपेण गृह्यमाण । अस्मिन् हि प्राणायुपाधिकृता 'विशेषाः'
प्राणादि-कर्मज-नामाभिधेया .. . एतानि कर्मनामानि न कृत्स्नात्मवस्त्ववयवोत्तकानि ”
(बृ मा, 1.47).

[“ In its essential nature, the self or the cause, is complete. But the certain particular activities are produced in it in consequence of its relation with the conditions or limitations (उपाधि) of Prāṇa and others But these particular activities by which we generally designate it cannot express the full nature of the Self ”] Those who restrict the infinite Ātmā to any of its activities or predicates — which are its incomplete expressions — and think them to be the real and complete nature of the Self do not know what the Ātmā really is. But we usually, in this way, take the world of nāma-rūpas as the complete manifestation of God's nature But this is wrong. It is done by us under the influence of Māyā.

We shall now proceed to collect the passages where and how Śaṅkara has found occasion for declaring the Unreality (मायामयत्व) of the world of nāma-rūpas —

(1) “ दृष्ट-नष्ट-स्वरूपत्वात्.... .स्वरूपेण अनुपाख्यत्वात् ” (ब्र सू भा 2.1.14).

We have seen generally that the effects or the nāma-rūpas cannot be independent entities ; for, they cannot appear separated or divided from their cause The names and forms are the modifications or transformations of the causal reality. These modifications we call as effects The modifications or changes are the characteristics (स्वभाव or स्वरूप) of all nāma-rūpas (vide ब्र भा 2.3.7). But these modifications are perpetually changing. They have no independent and self-sufficient svarūpa—स्वरूपेण अनुपाख्यत्वात्) The names and forms are seen one moment and vanish in the next, they are, therefore, perishable, not constant (अनित्य) * Śaṅkara declares these characteristics of the changing nāma-rūpas as दृष्ट-नष्ट-स्वरूप . Elsewhere he characterizes them as “ कदलीस्तम्भवदसारं ” What persists in these vikāras, what is constant behind these modifications is the being of the causal reality, which finds its expression in them ; and these forms are not to be perceived apart from the being of the causal reality—व्यतिरेकेण अभाव But as the being of the causal reality lies hidden from our view, we take these modifications of nāma-rūpas, these vikāras, as self-sufficient entities. We forget that the vikāras cannot be self-sufficient 'things'—“ न हि वस्तुदृष्टेन विकारो

* प्रतिक्षणप्रत्यक्षात्.....कदलीगर्भवत्सारम्—मु भा , 1.2.12

नाम कश्चिदस्ति" (ब्र. सू. भा. 2114). Looked in this way, separated from the underlying, hidden, causal reality, the modifications of changing nāma-rūpas must be unreal, false

(2) "मायासात्रमेतत् . यत् परमात्मनः . अवस्थात्रयात्मना
अवभासन रज्जा इव सर्पीदिभावेन" (ब्र. सू. भा. 219)

Under the influence of Avidyā, we reduce the underlying Reality into its three states—सृष्टि-स्थिति-लय, in which it appears. Or, we entirely reduce the underlying individual self into three successive states, namely—waking, dreaming and dreamless slumbering states—which it undergoes daily.

We forget the independent existence of the underlying self which, without being affected by them accompanies these states. By ignoring or forgetting the Reality of the ever-present, underlying, hidden Brahma of which the process of the world of nāma-rūpas is a gradual manifestation or appearance, and by severing the connection of the world with the underlying Brahma, we always come to exclusively occupy ourselves with the continuous process (परिणामि-नित्य) merely, imagining a kind of causal relation among the changing antecedents and consequents (क्रिया-फलत्मक) among them, or a relation of means and ends (साध्य-साधनात्मक). But it is a law of phenomenal or scientific causality—here the cause is *external* to the effect. In this way, forgetting the real cause which lies deeper down, we fix our look upon these changing nāma-rūpas alone and call some nāma-rūpas as the cause and some others following the former as its effect. But the modifications or vikāras when thus severed from their connection with the underlying self and looked upon as something having independent reality, cannot be real in themselves; we erroneously call that to be real which is unreal.

"आत्मस्वरूपात् 'अन्यत्' .. 'वस्त्वन्तरं' . स्वप्न-माया-मरीच्युदकवदसारम्"
(ब्र. भा. 351)

"सतोऽन्यत्वे' अतुल्यम्" (छा. भा. 632)

["The nāma-rūpas, when separated from the Ātmā and regarded as something self-sufficient and as an independent entity (वस्त्वन्तरं), as something quite another (अन्य) from the Ātmā,—become as unessential as a dream, as an illusion, as the appearance of water on the shining surface of a desert"] ["When looked upon as something quite other than the sat (ie the underlying Reality), the vikāras become false."]

Thus, under the influence of our Avidyā, we take the effects separated from, outside of, the causal reality underlying them and working among them, as something *other* (अन्य). Śaṅkara would call it a wrong view. This view arises either by separating

Brahma altogether from the world of nāma-rūpas as an unknowable and unknown something (as has been done by Herbert Spencer), or by entirely reducing the nature of the cause (Brahma) to the nāma-rūpas, taking the latter as all-in-all and ignoring the separate life of the underlying Brahma altogether, (as the Pantheists of the types of the vṛttikāra do), — this is reducing the cause to the effects, against which Sankara has raised his warning voice, thus—

“न कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं (अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्य-कारणयो)” — ब्र सू भा २।१

(३) ह्रस्वरूपावशेषऽपि, इतरेतरव्यभिचारान् असत्यत्वे सर्वत्र अव्यभिचारान् ह्रस्वरूपस्य सत्यत्वम्” (मां भा ७)

[“The changing states (of consciousness) are always variable, liable to perpetual transformations — one state continuously supplanting the other state — but what invariably runs through them all is constant. The variability is the mark of their unreality and persistence is the mark of reality.”]

Consciousness is present in each state (of our consciousness), because consciousness is common to all its states. One state excludes the other, but none of the states can exclude consciousness which is present in each of these states. Thus the states being variable are unreal, but consciousness is constant and is therefore real.

Compare in this connection the remark —

“अन्यथाभवत्यपि ज्ञातव्ये, न ज्ञानुरन्यथाभावोऽपि, वर्त्तमानस्वभावत्वात्” (ब्र सू भा २।३७)

We find the following observation elsewhere — सर्वत्र द्वे बुद्धौ सर्वरूपलभ्येते समानाधिकरणे, सन् घट, सन् पट इत्यादि, तयोर्धेयानि बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति, न तु सदबुद्धिः” (गी भा, २।१६).

[“Every fact of experience involves two-fold consciousness (बुद्धि) — the consciousness of the real (सत्—universal) and the consciousness of the unreal (असत्—particulars). Now, that is said to be real of which our consciousness never fails, and that to be unreal of which our consciousness fails”]

Hence, what is fleeting must be unreal, and what is constant must be real.

In this connection, I would draw our reader's attention to the following definition of unreality —

“यद्विषया बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति तत् — ‘अमत्’ (गी भा २।१६)

also “यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरत् — ‘अमृतं’ मित्युच्यते” (तै भा, २।६)

“अतः विकारोऽमृतं”

“That is ‘unreal’ of which our consciousness fails i.e. which is fleeting, not constant.”

"That is 'false' of which the character, determined as it is, fails i.e. which changes in its pre-determined character, therefore, change-ability is falsehood."

We find, therefore, that change-ability is the mark of unreality

(4) There is another way in which Śankara has declared the world as an unreality. Brahma is the sustaining ground (अधिष्ठान) of the world of nāma-rūpa. If the world of nāma-rūpa is taken as a mask concealing the sustaining ground Brahma, if our view is fixed only upon the nāma-rūpas, such a world Śankara would call to be unreal —

"नाहं प्रकाश सर्वस्य योगमाया-समावृतं वृद्धांश्यं नाभिजानान्" । (गी भा 7 25)

["I am not manifest to all, veiled as I am, by Māyā, the deluded people know not my real nature (svarūpa)"]

The causal reality always lies hidden from view and it is the changing nāma-rūpas (vikāras) which are always perceptible to us — प्राकृतविषयविकारविज्ञानेच्छन् (कठ 2 12) It is for this reason that Śankara in several places has defined the changing differences of the world as visible and Brahma which is beyond modifications as invisible —

"दृश्यं नाम विकारो, दर्शनार्पत्वात् विकारस्य । न दृश्य

अदृश्य — अविकार । अविकार च ब्रह्म" (तै भा, 2 7)

Thus when our view is fixed exclusively upon the changing names and forms which conceal Brahma, and when in this way they are looked upon as something other (अन्य) than Brahma, they become unreal, false. But if we can take these nāma-rūpas as ब्रह्म-लिङ्ग — as expressing the characteristics of Brahma, then such a world of nāma-rūpas cannot be characterized as unreal, because such a world would help us to realize the Absolute Reality — Brahma —

"ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायन्वेनैव विनियुज्यते न स्वतन्त्र-फलाय" ।

स्रष्टृत्वादि नामरूपनिर्वहणाभिधानादेव

'ब्रह्मलिङ्ग' मभिहित" (ब्र सू भा, 1 3 41).

How does the world of nāma-rūpa conceal the Absolute Reality? Śankara explains it in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra* (1 3 1) thus —

Brahma is the ground (आयतन) of the differences of nāma-rūpa. When we reduce the ground entirely to the world of names and forms, the ground to our view loses its independent existence and takes the form of the world, as is present now in the form of nāma-rūpas. In this way, Brahma becomes सप्रपञ्च i.e. something composite — "दृश्य 'विक्रियात्मक' सावयवं च स्यात् (क भा)" That is to say Brahma would now appear as an aggregate or sum-total of the

differences of nāma-rūpa merely This is his विशिष्ट-रूप. When this happens, only the names and forms are present before us and not anything else This erroneous view Śankara explains thus in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*—

“केनचिदसृष्टस्वभावमपि सत्, नामरूपकृतकार्यकारणोपाधिभ्यो विवेकेन नावधार्यते, नाम-रूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी, तदा सर्वोऽयं ‘वस्त्वन्तरास्तित्व-व्यवहार’,—अस्ति चार्थः ‘भेदकृतो मिथ्याव्यवहार’” (351)

“सप्रपञ्चत्वं ब्रह्मण प्रसज्येत” (ब्र सू भा 3.2.21)

[“When the Absolute Reality which is always unaffected by anything cannot be discriminated by us from the adjuncts of the finite material and psychical elements produced by the nāma-rūpas, then it is that our view becomes naturally fixed exclusively upon these finite names and forms, and all these differences of names and forms appear to us as so many independent entities Thus arises our erroneous view of the differences of the things of our practical life,” “and in this manner the underlying Reality is taken as a composite whole.”]

But if, instead of such a view, we can feel and recognize the presence of Brahma everywhere in the world, if the objects are not looked upon as something *other than* Brahma but as manifestations—expressions—of the nature of the highest reality, this, according to Śankara, is the real view of the world The idea of *anyatva* (अन्यत्व) would be supplanted by the idea of the presence of Brahma in all things—as the expression of Brahma everywhere. This is the correct view of the world—

“यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या, परमतत्वात् ‘अन्यत्वेन’ निरूप्यमाणे नाम-रूपे . ‘वस्त्वन्तरे’ तत्त्वतो न स्त तदा परमार्थदर्शनगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते” (Ibid, 351)

also “सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थता दर्शयति” (ब्र सू भा, 1.4.11).

“परिणामश्रुति ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था” (ब्र. भा, 2.1.27)

[“All the Śrutis describing the creation of the world of names and forms, all the Śrutis describing the changes or modifications—are to be taken only for the purpose of the knowledge, through them, of the nature of the Absolute Reality”]

(5) The differences of nāma-rūpas are called *Māyā*, since these are all described as आगन्तुक (accidental), in as much as they are produced by some stimulating cause (कारक), in the absence of which they do not appear—

“आगन्तुकेन नाम-रूपेण” (ब्र भा, 4.4.5.)

As the differences of names and forms are आगन्तुक (āgantuka) or accidental, they appear for a time, work for sometime and then disappear and are supplanted by others, in connection with their

external causes. But the *real* nature of a thing is not of such a character, — it is constant, abiding in its own *svarūpa* or nature which is uniformly the same, as Sankara declares—

“ आगन्तुक हि वस्तु निराक्रियते, न स्वरूपं ।

न हि आगन्तुक कस्यचित्, स्वयमेदत्वात् ” (ब्र. सू. भा. 2.37)

[“What is due to some external cause which stimulates it or brings it into being, can be easily repudiated, but not so with the real nature of a thing. The Self is eternally abiding in its own nature and as such, it cannot be got rid of.”]

I can put aside the notion of reality of all other things, but I can never be relieved of the sense of my own reality. The differences of *nāma-rūpa* are the result of the activity of something beyond them, they change their forms with the change of their stimulating cause (कारक-व्यापार). This changeable character of their forms marks them, according to Sankara, as *unreal*.

In this connection, we must note an important fact. These particular differences which are produced by the action of some accidental (आगन्तुक) cause, must have a ‘nature’ underlying these particular differences. For, Sankara tells us in another connection, the production being a sort of activity, it implies the *agent* of this activity—

“ उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति ।

क्रिया च नाम स्यात्, अकर्तृका चेति—विप्रतिषिध्यते ” (ब्र. सू. भा. 2.118).

[“An activity is there, but there is no one who acts,—is contradictory ”]

We cannot, therefore, conceive of activity without thinking of something which is active, and activities are referred to definite centres to which they belong and do not fly to and fro. If you resolve the centre entirely into its activity, it would have no nature or character of its own, in virtue of which it maintains a continuity between its past and present. A reference to that which is other than itself (i.e. its कारक) implies a reference to its own self or its own nature (स्वरूप). Thus this two-fold relation, to self and to other-than-self i.e. स्वरूप and वाच्यरूप is essential to all objects (vide ब्र. सू. भा. 2.217).

(6) The world of *nāma-rūpa*-विषय we represent to us in terms of our own mind and the senses (अन्तःकरण etc.). The one involves the other, for, both are of the same nature. Sankara tells us—

‘विषयसमानजातीयं कारणं मन्यते श्रुतिः, न तु जात्यन्तरं । विषयस्यैव स्वात्मप्राहकत्वेन संस्थानान्तरं कारणं नाम । सर्वविषयविशेषाणामेव स्वात्मविशेषप्रकाशकत्वेन संस्थानान्तराणि कारणानि ” (ब्र. भा. 2.4.11)

["The *śruti* regards our subjective senses as of the same nature with our experienced objects, and not of different essence. The senses are but another form or phase (स्थान) which the experienced objects have assumed with a view to come to a comprehension of their own nature as the objects of senses. For the manifestation of, or with a view to give expression to, what infinite wealth the objects contain in their own nature,—the objects have taken the forms of the subjective senses "]

The *Mundaka* also states the same thing in a different way—

“ दर्शन-श्रवण-मनन-विज्ञानायुपाधिधर्मैराविर्भूतं सत् लक्ष्यते हृदि गुहाया — अन्तःकरणकोषे — सर्वप्राणिनां ” (2 2 etc 9) —

["In the inner and exterior senses of the finite Self, its nature is expressed through the cognitions of sight, hearing, reflections and intellect—“आत्मस्वरूपोपलब्धिरस्थानत्वात्” — which are the places of its expression "]

We thus find that there is no difference in kind between the physical and the organic world. The same reality is present in two different aspects, which are distinguishable from each other, but *essentially* identical. It appears then that whenever our outer senses and our inner sense (अन्तःकरण) are more and more developed, the aspect of the world (विषय) will change its feature. The world, therefore, as it appears to us *at the present moment* cannot be taken as rigidly fixed and final in its form. The appearances of the world, as we take it, must therefore be *unreal*. Our knowledge works with the subject-object relation—“अयमहमिति विप्रयेण विषयिण सामानाधिकरण्योपचारात्” (ब्र भा 1 47), or in other words, we are concerned always with *adhyāsa*, as Śaṅkara would say. Our thought cannot go beyond this relation. It attributes ‘what’ to ‘that’. But this is not the true nature of the Reality. In this way, in Śaṅkara-vedānta, such relative view, of the empirical world may be called unreal.

Now, all these arguments can be brought to a focus, and the conclusion arrived at as the result of this discussion points to the fact that there is an Immutable and Eternal Principle behind the process of the world. The changes going on in the world are not mere capricious variations — नापि अप्रवृत्तिः, उन्मत्त-प्रवृत्तिर्वा ” (ब्र भा, 2 1 33), nor the dances of mad energies, but an advancement, a methodically gradual progress—“उन्नेतृत्वरमाविस्तरत्वमात्मनः.” (ऐ आ भा) which the mundane process involves. This regularity (रचना-ब्र भा) proves the presence and working, throughout the process, of such a principle and it is deeper than any such process, for, the process is always changing in its elements.

It is that transcendent Principle behind it which is finding its expression in the process. It is wrong therefore to separate the latter from the underlying Principle, taking the process of nāma-rūpa itself to be all-in-all. Such a view is an unreal view, according to Sankara. Sankara thus summarises his final opinion—

"As a player (नट) taking on successive characters upon himself, enacts on the stage the parts of each of these characters in succession, but yet retains his own distinct character, so the underlying causal Unity (मूलकारणमेव), retaining its own distinct identity, realises itself successively in each of the changing effects produced" (ब्र. सू. भा. 2 1 18 and 1 3 19)

Compare also—

"परमेश्वर एव तेन तेनात्मना अवतिष्ठमानस्त त विकारं सृजति"

It is He who assumes all these forms, but He does not become changed by these assumed forms under which He appears. For, Sankara quotes here the lines—

"य पृथिव्या तिष्ठन् पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति etc etc" "इति माध्यक्षाणां भूतानां प्रवृत्तिं दर्शयति" (ब्र. भा., 2 3.13)

It is His immanent activity directing and controlling (यमयति) the process of the world and guiding it in its upward progressive path.

This is the true significance of the term Māyā as applied to the nāma-rūpas in the Sankara-vedānta, and of the term Māyāvi applied to the Supreme Reality, who in connection with the nāma-rūpas appears in various forms.

Herbert Spencer's conclusion that 'we know only the manifestations, but what is manifested is unknown and unknowable to us'—is entirely opposed to Sankara's idea. In Mān-dūkya—bhāṣya Sankara tells us that it is the manifestations which enable us to realize the nature of what is manifested, to a certain extent. Were there no manifestations, the underlying Reality would remain quite shut out from our knowledge and would itself be unreal.—

"कार्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारणब्रह्मज्ञानार्थं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां तच्चेदसद् भवेत्, न तेन सबन्ध-धीरिति कारणमपि असदेव स्यात्"—

It is the manifestations that throw light upon what is manifested; they do not serve any independent purpose or use—
'स्वतन्त्रफलम्'

The names and forms, to the ordinary people, appear, no doubt, as concealing Brahma and therefore to be something quite other

(अन्य), existing on their own account, but the truly initiated know all the while that Brahma itself expresses itself in them,—

“ब्रह्मस्वरूपावगमाय आकाशाद्यवयवमयान्तं कार्यं प्रदर्शितम्” (तै 2 6)

[“The effects beginning from the ether and ending in the sheath composed of *anna* are to lead to the apprehension of the nature of Brahma Only for this end, the evolution of the effects is described”]

(7) The fact stands out very clear before us that urged on by the infinite within, the world is constantly moving towards the realization of an *End* and this end is the transcendental Brahma itself. For this, the finite world ever keeps on transcending its finitude until it will reach its own end. The world is a sort of self-working system with Prana—the vital principle, for its maintenance. It is composed of several members among whom functions are distributed, so that each member with the co-operation with other members exercises its own function in the place allotted to each, and the unity of the whole system is maintained by the vital principle—Prana. We would quote the whole passage here—

“तास्मिन्नात्मनस्त्वे सति नित्यचैतन्यस्वभावे मानसिद्वा वायु (10 प्राण) सर्वे प्राणभूतक्रियात्मकाः, यदात्रयाणि कार्ये-करणानि यस्मिन्नोक्तानि प्रोक्तानि च, यतः सूत्रमनन्तं सर्वस्य जगतो ऽवधारयन्तु, स मार्तारश्वा प्राणिना जेष्टालक्षणाणि अग्न्यादित्यपर्जन्यादीनां ज्वलन-दहनभिवर्पणादिलक्षणानि दधानि ‘विभजान्’ । सर्वा हि कार्ये-करणं विक्रियाः नित्यचैतन्यस्वस्वरूपे सर्वोत्पदभूत सत्यव भवति” — ईशा भा. 4

[“It is because the *Ātmā* whose nature is eternal intelligence is continually present (behind), it has become possible for the *Mātarisvā*—the *Prāṇa* which is the essence of all activities of those who possess life and in which, as the substratum, all the material and psychical elements are woven as warp and woof, and which under the designation *sūtra* sustains the whole world, —to allot and to distribute various functions of burning, lighting and raining to the respective objects viz the fire, the sun and the clouds and to allot various functions to the living beings also” “All the physical and psychical activities (of the world) are maintained, because there exists *behind* them the *Ātmā* whose nature is eternal intelligence and which is the ultimate ground of all”]

I should like to point out another important fact in connection with what has been stated just in section (6) above. We have shown there that the object (विषय) and the subjective senses (इन्द्रिय etc. अन्तःकरण) are essentially of the same nature. Matter and mind are not antithetical and independent substances having nothing in common. If they were absolutely opposed to each

other, how could the subject be aware of the object? Consciousness, which is a unity, involves the knower and the known and must therefore *transcend* them and at the same time *express* itself in the two—

“अध्यात्माधिदेवतयो परस्परोपकार्योपकारकत्वात् एकस्य सत्यस्य ब्रह्मण मस्यानविशेषौ” (बृ मा., 5 5 2)

“ममैव उभयरूपेण-क्षेत्र-क्षेत्रज्ञरूपेण-स्थितं विद्धि” (गीता. 13 2, नीलकण्ठ)

It is thus that the subject is capable of knowing the object, and the object also is capable of coming into relation with the subject. As the same spirit works in both the subject and the object, the object does not, in reality, resist or oppose, but conforms itself to the subject and there is adaptability between the two. As the object or the system of things expresses the Self behind it, it has been possible for our mind to know it, and that nature can respond to the forms of our knowledge, and that nature serves the purpose (परार्थ) of the spirit. Thus we find that the elements from the inorganic world are absorbed by the organic beings which become constituents in their life—“भूतानां जरीरारम्भकत्वेन उपकारात्” (मधुविद्या in बृ मा.) If we take the object not as परार्थ, i.e. not serving the purpose of the Spirit, and not mutually benefitting each other (“परस्परोपकार्योपकारकत्वात् ‘मधुत्व’म्”—बृ मा.) but as *opposed* and *independent* entities, Sankara would declare it to be *unreal* and *false*.

TAOISM AND VEDĀNTA.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

It is a special Divine Ordinance, so to say, that Asia is the mother of all world-religions from probably the morning of History. And it has been generally seen that after an approximate period of five centuries one great Saviour of mankind has appeared in some part or other of the Asiatic continent and has deluged the land with spirituality. Buddha and Christ, Sankara and Mohammed, Rāmānuja and Caitanya, Rāmakṛṣṇa and Vivekānanda have descended among us, when irreligion prevailed in a lineal succession from time to time to found the Kingdom of righteousness on earth. But about 5th century B.C. probably the greatest tidal wave of spirituality has passed over this chosen Eden of God, as that century witnessed the descent of four world-teachers, each of whom was destined to be the founder of a Religion in India, Buddha, the Enlightened One, in Persia, Zoroaster; in China, Lao-tze and Confucius. Of course, Moses in Asia minor, Kṛṣṇa and Rāma in India and many more unknown to history have preceded them. But of all countries of the world it has fallen to the lucky lot of our Blessed Bhārata-Bhūmi, by a unique providential dispensation to produce the greatest number of spiritual giants. In the course of our present study we shall discuss the philosophy of Lao-tze, the oldest known Chinese Prophet and compare notes with Vedānta. Lao-tze has exercised a most potent influence over Chinese thought and culture, and with Confucianism and Buddhism it is also one of the three living religions of China even today.

There is no place in modern China but has one or more of Taoist Temples and at the head of all of them stands the Taoist Pope, the Vice-regent of God on earth. Like the Dalai Lama of Tibet and the Catholic Pope of Rome, Taoist Pope is named Chang or the Heavenly Teacher. He owns a palace where he has all the comforts and luxuries of an actual sovereign. He is a great exorcist and can ward off evil spirit by spells and incantations. Some of them he has bottled up in big jars and has kept in long rows in his palace.

This remarkable thinker of China was born in sixth century B.C. in the third year of the Emperor Ting-Wang of the Cho Dynasty, in the hamlet of Chu-Jhren, in Li-county belonging to

he Ku-province of the Chu State, lying in the East of what is now the province of Honan. His family name was Li which means plum tree. For according to a tradition the master Lao was conceived under the influence of a star. When he received the breath of life we cannot fathom, but once, when asked, he pointed to the plum-tree under which he had been born and adopted it as his surname. His proper name was Er, meaning ear as he had a long ear, which is a sign of super-human wisdom. "Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa had such long ears" said a scholar to me once. Generally the eyes are drawn to the holes of the ears but look to the likeness of Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa and you will mark that his ears are so situated that their tips, and not the middle, are at right angles to the eyes. Lao-tze's appellation was Po-young viz Count of the positive Principle or Prince Positive, representing manliness and valour. His posthumous Title was Tan, which means long-lobed, long lobes mean a sign of virtue. But people called him simply Lao-tze or the old-philosopher and Lao-Er or old child for according to another tradition it is said "We don't understand whence came the musical sounds that were heard but he kept his marvellous powers concealed in the womb of his mother for more than seventy years and when he was born the hair of his head was already white and so he was given the designation, Lao-tze". The above mentioned traditions were inscribed in 586 A. D. by the Emperor Wang-Ti on the stone-tablet of the temple, built in memory of Lao-tze in his birth-place. The great Hindu Rṣi Sukhadeva, Revealer of Śrīmat Bhāgavatam is credited to have such a miraculous birth as he also came out of his mother's womb, quite a grown-up Child, with, of course, aged wisdom, and just after his birth he wandered from home to homelessness, out of burning Vairāgyam to realize the Truth. Lao-tze also is frequently known as Lao-chun or the ancient Sire, master or prince. His followers, the Taoists speak of him as Tai-shang i.e. the greatly Eminent One. Such a title of honour has been conferred on all spiritual geniuses of the world. Gautama was called Buddha or the Enlightened or the Awakened One, and Jesus was called Christ, or the Anointed One.

Lao-tze was one of the recorders at the Royal Court of Cho and was specially in charge of the secret archives as the state historian. He spent most of his life in Cho. When he foresaw the decay of Cho he departed and came to the Frontier. The custom-house officer Yin-Hi said, "Since it pleases you to retire I request you for my sake to write a book". Thereupon Lao-tze wrote a book named Tao-Teh-King of two parts consisting of five

thousand and odd words in which he has discussed the concept of Tao and its attributes. Then he departed, no one knows where he died

Lao-tze is a historical reality and not a myth as a good many are inclined to suppose. Sze-ma-chien the Herodotus of Chinese History has embodied a brief account of about 248 words of Lao-tze in first century B C in his famous Historical Records. Besides him, Lieh-tze, Chwange-tze, Han-Fi-tze, Lin-an and many other authors have frequently mentioned and quoted Lao and have left elaborate commentaries on his book. Confucius, who was fifty-three years younger contemporary of Lao-tze met him and their conversation also has been handed down to us.

Tao-Teh-King is the Vedas of the Taoists, and is the oldest known record of China. There are sixty-four editions of Tao-Teh-King. It has been commented upon by twenty Taoists, seven Buddhists and thirty four literati. It is no popular book, yet has gained, nevertheless, universal admiration and acceptance of the vast masses of Chinese people. Taoism came into prominence under the government of the Han Dynasty and it is recorded that emperor Ching in the second century B C issued an imperial decree that Lao-tze's book on the Tao and the Teh should be respected as a canonical Book or King, hence its title Tao-Teh-King. It is an indispensable book for the study of comparative thought, so the Western scholars have long ago been interested in it, though China's next-door neighbour (India) does not know any thing of it.

The first translation was made by the Roman Catholic Missionaries in Latin. The first French translation was made by Professor Stanislas Julien and the second by C De Harlez. Chalmer's translation is probably the first translation in English and second by James Legge which is incorporated in the Sacred Books of the East edited by the Sâyanâcârya of Europe. The third translation in English was done by Major-General G G Alexander and the fourth by Dr. Paul Carus of Chicago and so on. The German translation was first done by Victor Von Strauss and the other by Reinhold Von Plaenckner. Here, in passing I humbly submit that the Scholars of Indian Vernaculars should take up in right earnest the task of translating the classics of other countries by which alone we can enrich our Indian languages which are still in infancy in comparison with other occidental languages in the absorption of modern as well as ancient wisdom of the world. Tao-Teh-King exercised a strong influence on Tolstoy who contemplated making a Russian translation of it.

The fundamental principle and corner-stone of Lao-tze's Philosophy is contained in the word Tao. It is a general and very comprehensive term and existed in vague form long before him as an old doctrine. It is an untranslatable word like Vedic Brahman and presents a close analogy with Buddhistic enlightenment, Christian Logos, Kabbalistic Ein-soph, Zoroastrian Ahura-Vaayo, Neoplatonic Nous, Islamic Allah, Alexandrian Gnosis, Uigund of German mystics and the Jewish Jehovah, Egyptian nuk for nuk and the Yr Hen Ddihenydd of the Druids. Robert K. Douglas, sometime Professor of Sinology of Oxford University calls attention in his book "Society in China" to the strange resemblance, if not coincidence, of Tao with pre-Buddhistic Brahman and believes he finds traces of Brahmanical influence in the Tao-Teh-King and argues that Lao-tze was a descendant of one of the western nations of the Chinese empire which may have been in connection with India since olden times. "It is impossible to overlook," reiterates the learned professor, "the fact that Lao-tze imported into his teachings a decided flavour of Indian Philosophy." In support of Brahmanical origin of Taoism Su John Woodroffe in his "Sakti and Sakta" makes mention of Father Weiser, a French missionary of China, who has written a book to show that Taoism is an overflowing current of the Upanisadic river of Philosophy. It is an undoubted verdict of History that the Himalayas, in stead of being a barrier have always been highways for the transmission of Indian thought and culture from the very hoary antiquity. Even now Tibet, the great repository of Indian culture is called by the Tibetans Chota-Chin or smaller China. The Zoroastrian scriptures, Zend-Avesta, Vendidad, Yast and others recorded about this time show a tangible influence of the Vedic thought. It must be remembered here that the Avesta is of post-Vedic origin. The Japanese Scholar, Okakura in his "Ideals of the East" mentions a Chinese tradition which even says that Lao-tze once came to India.

The word Tao has been interpreted in many ways like Vedic Vāk (or Latin vox) which was in the beginning according to the Bible also. Like Platonic Idea, Aristotelian Form and Kantian purely Formal, Tao means great form or image. Like Buddhistic Nirvāṇa Tao is called Abyss of non-existence, void or vacancy, and noiselessness or emptiness. Tao is the symbol of Absolute Rest, a mystic trance, a sufistic transport, and an Hindu ecstasy (Samādhi). It is also called the Ideal, the Abstract, the Universal like the Buddhistic Dharma or Norm. In a word it is the form of the formless. Just like the Vedāntic Paramātman and Jīvātman,

Tao is of two kinds, the Absolute and the Relative. In the former, the Tao is Eternal, and Immutable, the "Divine presence which can be on the right hand and at the same time on the left hand and which is bodiless and immaterial." The relative Tao is individualized in the living creatures, specially in man. This Tao or Eternal reason (in Vedāntic phraseology Cit or Cosmic Prajñā) is identified with mysterious abyss of existence. As the mystery of existences it is called the Ineffable or Nameless. It is the root from which every thing proceeds and to which everything returns. Although the cause of all things it is itself the causeless. In Vedānta also Brahman is called Svayambhu and Aja—Causeless Cause, uncreate creator, causa sui beyond nama and rupa (name and form) avangmanaso gocaram—beyond mind and words.

The commentator Chwang-tze says that there is Tao, the way of Heaven and there is Tao, the way of man. Practising non-assertion (in the words of the Gītā—*akarma*) and yet attracting all honour is the way of Heaven, asserting oneself (as the Karta and Bhokta is Jiva in Vedānta) and being embarrassed thereby (by *karmaphala*) is the way of man. It is the way of Heaven that plays the part of Lord and it is the way of man that plays the part of servant.

Again he says, that Tao is one, yet it requires change. It is sameness in difference, just as in Vedānta Brahman in Pāramārthika or Absolute state is changeless and One without a second, or Advaita and Brahman in Vyāvahārika or Relative state is changing and many. Tao is the world-former, not the world-creator. Vedānta also prefers the word, *Ṛsti* or projection to creation. Tao like Brahman is not the action but the law, yet it is not merely immanent, but supernatural and prenatal. It is omnipresent in the world, yet would exist even though the world did not exist. Again Chwang-tze says "If you hide the world in the world so that there was no where to which it could be removed, Tao would be grand Reality, the Ever-enduring Thing." This Chwang-tze is the Śāṅkara of Taoist China for his commentaries are famous in China as those of Śāṅkara in India. Again he says, that when the body of man comes from the special mould (the ever-enduring thing) there is then even occasion for joy but this undergoes a myriad of transformations. Does not this also afford occasions for joy incalculable? Therefore the wise man enjoys himself in That from which there is no return or possibility of separation i.e. Tao, and by which all things are preserved. The sage considers early death or old age, beginning or ending all to be good and in

the other men imitate him. How much more will they do so in regard to *That itself* on which all things depend and from which every transformation arises. Ultimate reality being indefinable and beyond any concept and precept, Vedānta also describes it as *Tat* or *That* and Chwang-tze also calls *Tao* as *That itself*. Shall I launch too bold a conjecture if I say that Chinese *Tao* is a corruption or rather a derivation of Vedic *Tat*?

Here Chwang-tze describes just like a Brahmin *mām* who has identified himself with *Tat* (Brahman) that is beyond change. But thereby *Tao* is not a logical abstraction. For he says that *Tao* has emotion and sincerity. It may be handed down by Teachers but may not be received by the scholars. It will be apprehended by the mind but it cannot be perceived by the senses. Keuoprim-ah says also that 'manasavedam upayam' etc. It is to be affirmed by mind and it is *Indivābit* or beyond the reach of sense. *Tao* has its root and ground in Itself. "Before there were heaven and earth, from of old, there It was securely existing. From It came the myriads of existence of spirit. From It the myriads of existence of god. It produced heaven. It produced earth. It was before the Primordial Ether." The reader will see in this description and definition of *Tao* the strange coincidence of the Vedantic conception of Brahman. Like Brahman-sakti of Vedānta the Taoists call *Tao* as the world-mother. The *Tao* is a principle, not a personal being. It is an omnipresent feature of reality, a law fashioning thing and event. Yet It is not-personality It and use It as the synonym of God. Vedānta also describes two aspects of Brahman, *Saguna* and *Nirguna*. The *Saguna* aspect is Personal and the *Nirguna* is impersonal.

Like the metaphysical ethics of Vedānta the ideal of Lao-tze ethics is that through the *Tao*, the crooked shall be straightened the imperfect shall be made complete the lowly shall receive abundance as said is the valleys naturally and without any effort of their own fill themselves with water. Thus the *Tao* resemble water having no fixed form. It demand the surrender of personal ambition and all selfish striving for virtue is simply the imitation of the *Tao*. In a word the ideal of morality consists in realizing the simplicity of the ineffable, nameless or un-namable *Tao*. Lao-tze never tires preaching to act non-action. But he says non-action is not inactivity as in the *Gītā* it is said, 'Yogah karmasu kausalam', i.e. Yoga is the secret of work. To work you have the right, not to the fruits thereof. Here Yoga means *niskarmya* or selfless work being an instrument of the Cosmic Plan without motive or attachment. Just like a Vedāntist Lao-

tze explains non-action as desirelessness. Man is requested not to have a will of his own but to do what is according to eternal and immutable order of Tao. Lao-tze's ethical ideals resemble closely the Karma-Yoga of Vedānta. Chwang-tze, Lao-tze's most accomplished disciple characterizes non-action as follows: "non-action makes one the lord of all glory, non-action makes one the treasury of all plans, and the lord of all wisdom. He fulfills all that he has received from Heaven but he does not see that he was the recipient of any thing. A pure vacancy characterizes his mind. When the perfect man employs his mind it is like mirror. It conducts nothing, it anticipates nothing, it responds but does not retain." This is exactly the ideal of a Jñāni or *Sthitaprajña* in the *Gītā*.

Lao-tze further defines his ethics as wending home or reverting. 'Returning is the Tao's movement' he says, and by reverting homeward is meant rest, quietude, stillness, tranquility, peace and equanimity. The *Gītā* also explains yoga as *samātvam* or evenness of mind without like or dislikes. Again Chwangtze says, "Sadness and pleasure show a depraving element in virtue, joy and anger show some defect in their course, love and hatred show a failure of their virtue. It is the nature of water, when free from admixture, to be clear, and when not agitated, to be level. Quietude of the saint is the condition of purity." Hence it is said to be guileless and pure, free from all admixture, to be still and uniform without undergoing any change, to be indifferent and not self-asserting, to move and act like Heaven (Tao) unattached is the ethical ideal of Taoists. Vedānta also says that ideal morality is to go beyond the pair of opposites, to be indifferent to happiness and misery, loss and gain, praise and blame, heat and cold etc. As the Brahman is same to all, the *Sthitadhī* sage is same to all.

The natural result of Lao-tze's philosophy and ethics is the ethical ideal of the recluse, the solitary man or the superior sage. The followers of Lao retired from the world, lived in caves and forests like the Yogis and Rsis of India and practised the virtues of Tao. The list of Taoist hermits in China is very long. They spend their lives in secluded retreats, shut-in by mountains, sheltered from the burning sun by the thick foliage of trees, trying to rise above love and hatred, pain and pleasure and to attain original purity and simplicity of Tao. Even now there are to be found Taoist hermits in the caves of the Mountain of a Hundred Flowers. Their arms are crossed against their breasts and their nails and the hair are grown so long that they curl around their necks like the matted hair of the Hindu ascetics. Some of them are over three

hundred years old according to some Chinese writers. Taoism has monks and nuns who wear yellow caps. The wearing of yellow robe as the insignia of renunciation is purely Indian in origin. The above description reminds us of the Indian gymnosophists who were taken even to Greece. The Essenes of Jerusalem, and the Theraputes of Alexandria are descendants of Indian sages. Those Chinese ascetics may most possibly be the lineal descendants of them, who knows?

Chwant-tze, the renowned follower of Lao-tze was a great Taoist ascetic. He realised Tao and interpreted the master's ideas in his lucid and elegant style. He considered the world as a dream. He says "How do I know that love of life is not a delusion? when people dream they do not know. When they awake they know it is a dream. And there is a great awakening after which we shall know that this life was a great dream. Does this not sound like the utterance of one who is a true Jñānayogi or Vedāntist? For the fundamental doctrine of Vedānta is that Brahman alone is real and the life and the world are a dream. *Brahma satyam Jagat mithyā*."

There is a very interesting story told of Chwang-tze himself on his death bed. At the last moment he requested his weeping relatives to leave his body uninterred. He said "I shall have heaven and earth as my sacrophagus, the sun and the moon shall be the insignia where I lie in state and all creation shall be mourners at my funeral." When his friends implored him to withdraw his request because the birds will mutilate his corpse he smiled and said "What matters that? Above are the birds of the air, below are the worms and ants, if you rob one to feed the other what injustice is there done?" Lao-tze says that as the wise merchant hides his treasures deeply as if he were poor, the noble man of perfect virtue assumes an attitude as though he were stupid. Vedānta also enumerates the lakṣaṇa of a Brahmajñāni in just the same way.

Tao is the Absolute Truth. Describing a man of truth or Tao Chwang-tze says that the spirit of such a man goes forth in all directions flowing on without limit reaching to heaven above and wreathing around the earth beneath. Vedānta also says a knower of Brahman becomes Brahman, *Brahma hi Brahmaniva bhavati*. He again says that Tao is the Divinity in man and to realise Tao means to become one with Tao. In Vedānta also to know Brahman is to become Brahman for each soul is potentially divine.

The Tao-man has nothing to accomplish and they do not lay plans to attain anything (cf. *Gītā*, (1) *Yam labdhvā cāparam*

lābham manyate nādhikam tatah i.e. having obtained which man regards no other acquisition superior to that (2) Yogi is sarva sankalpa-sanyāsī i.e. renouncer of forming fancies and making plans) They might make mistakes but they have no occasion for repentance (cf. Gīta-Duḥkheṣvanudvighnānānah i.e. not anxious, in misery) They might succeed but they have no self-complacency. Being such they could ascend the loftiest heights without fear. They could pass through water without being made wet by it. They could go into fire without being burnt (cf. Gītā, Atman is akledyam and adahyam) For he ascended to and reached the Tao. Chwangtze says that the true men of old did not dream when they slept, had no anxiety when they awoke and did not care that their foods will be pleasant. Their breathing became deep and silent (cf. Patañjali's yoga-sūtras. Samādhi is not only the cessation of mentalations but of breath too) They knew no fear of life or hatred of death. Entrance into life occasioned them no joy, the exit from it awakened no resistance. Composedly they came and went. They forgot fear of death and return to their state before life. Fire cannot burn them who are perfect in Tao, no water can drown them, neither cold nor heat can effect them injuriously. Neither bird nor beast can hurt them. They are equally tranquil in happiness and calamity. Lao-tze declares that the sage is above death when he is one with Tao. In Vedānta also the knower of Brahman alone is the conqueror of Death, and the master of fearlessness. Death and life cannot write any change in the knowers of Tao. Though heaven and earth were to be overturned and fall they would occasion him no loss. Lakṣmī the great Brahmanānī Janaka said, when his palace was on fire: "If the whole of my Kingdom Mithilā is burned to ashes it cannot hurt me at all." All others change but the Tao-men never change. "The mysterious quality of Tao is that though you can look at it you can't see it" says Lao-tze. So we name it Equilibrium. We may listen to it, but we cannot hear it, so we name it Inaudible, we try to grasp it but we do not get hold of it and we name it subtle. It cannot be made the subject of description so we call it One. Vedānta also describes Brahman as Adṛśyam, agrāhyam and susūksmam and so on.

Lao-tze calls Tao as the mother of all phenomena and even the father of god. The Taoist abyssmal stillness is just like Vedāntic samādhi. Concentration and breathing exercises are considered to be helpful in the path of Tao. Lao-tze says when one gives undivided attention to the vital breath and brings it to the utmost degree of pliancy he can become as tender as a

baby "When man" he says, "has cleansed away the most mysterious sights of imagination he becomes flawless like Tao. The breathing of such men came from their heels. While men generally breathe from the throat."

"The holy man possesses no fixed heart, he universalises his heart as he makes hundred families' heart his heart." Just like the Vedantic Trinity of Brahman, Īśvara and Avatāra, the Taoist Trinity are called, the perfect Holy one, the Highest Holy one and the greatest Holy one or Lao-tze. Taoism does not believe in creation of a creator but like Vedānta believes in cosmic projection or evolution of which Tao is the starter. Lao-tze believed in the re-incarnation and immortality of soul, which are also the two fundamental doctrines of Vedānta. He said, "He who has but does not perish has everlasting life." Again he said "the Tao that can be reasoned is not the Eternal Tao, the Name that can be named is not the Eternal Name" and Chwang-tze also said, "The principle of Tao cannot be enunciated but what is enunciated is not It." One of the Vedāntic classics—Kena Upaniṣad, says "avyajātam vijānatām vijñātam avijānatām" and "Tat-viditāt Anyadeva Aviditādadhī" i.e. "It is unknown to those who know and known to those who do not know" and

"It is distinct from the known and above the unknown." Lao-tze summarises his conception of the opposite pairs like Vedānta thus: "To be and not to be are mutually conditioned, the difficult and the easy are mutually definitioned, long and short are mutually exhibitioned. Above and below are mutually cognitioned, the sound and voice are mutually coalitioned as well as Before and After are mutually positioned." Therefore the holy man abides by non-assertions and conveys by silence his instructions." Lao-tze calls Tao as the mysterious mother of every form. Describing the noumenal existence of Tao he says "Thirty spokes unite in one nave and on that which is non-existent i.e. on the hole in the nave depends the wheel's utility. Clay is moulded into a vessel and on that which is non-existent i.e. on its hollowness depends the vessel's utility. By cutting out doors and windows we build a house and on that which is non-existent i.e. on the empty space depends the house's utility. Therefore it is the non-existent (Transcendental) Tao in the things which renders them useful, so the holy man attends to the inner and not to the outer and abandons the latter and chooses the former." The parallel Vedantic maxim is that Everything is Brahman and Brahman is everything for the Visible has come out of the Invisible.

Lao-tze says that Tao is forever and aye the unnamable form of the formless, the image of the imageless and the transcendently abstruse. In front its beginning is not seen, in the rear its end is not seen. About Holy Tao-man he says "How they are cautious like men in winter crossing a river, how reserved they behave like guests, how illusive, they resemble melting ice, how simple, they resemble unseasoned wood and how empty, they resemble the valley. Knowing the Eternal Tao means Enlightenment and not knowing it causes the passions to rise and that is evil." This Taoist conception of evil is like the Upanisadic 'mahatī vinasti' or supreme Loss. Contrasting himself with the worldly men Lao-tze said, "The multitude of men are happy, so happy as though they are celebrating a great feast. They are as though in spring-time ascending a tower. Alas! I alone remain quiet like one that has not yet received any encouraging omen and like unto a babe that does not yet smile. Forlorn am I! Oh, so forlorn, it appears that I have no place where I may return home. The multitude of men all have plenty and I alone appear empty." So different was Lao-tze from the vulgar that he said "I seek sustenance not from men but from my mother (Tao)." He who follows Tao becomes Tao. Tao is the Absolute but when it creates it becomes namable.

We can do no better than present the reader in the following with some apt and select passages from the Tao-Teh-King of Lao-tze which will read just like the classical teaching of Vedānta. "One who knows others is clever but one who knows himself is enlightened." (Cf. *Ātmānam viddhi* or know thyself, of Vedānta) "one who conquers others is powerful but one who conquers himself is mighty—such is the virtue of discrimination." "Unity is the root of order. Heaven through oneness has become pure. Earth through oneness can endure, mind through oneness their souls procure. Valleys through oneness repletion secure."

"The Tao-enlightened seem dark and black as the solidest virtue seems not alert. The purest chastity seems pervert. The greatest square will rightness desert. The largest vessel is not yet complete. The greatest form has no shape concrete." "The greatest perfections seem imperfect. The straightest line resemble a curve and the greatest sage will as apprentice serve." "The things are sustained by Yin and Yang, the positive and negative principles of existence."

"Going forth is life and coming home is death. So Tao does not belong to the realm of life or death. Yet it is the mother of

the world. The virtue and signet of the mysterious Tao is gone who knows, does not talk and one who talks does not know. Therefore the sage keeps his mouth shut and the sense-gates closed like a little child" (cf the Upanisadic doctrine "Mouna-iva Brahma" i.e. Brahman is silence. And also the story of Rāsahā and Bahvā),—"who's bones weak and sinews tender and who does not know the relation between male and female. Venomous reptiles do not sting him. Fire's heat do not seize him. Birds of prey do not strike him. He is inaccessible to amity and enmity, profit and loss, favour and disgrace. Alas! misery rears on happiness and happiness underlies misery." [The Vedāntic classic, Śrīmad-Bhagavad-Gītā also says that the knower of Brahman is above the dual throng] "Assert non-assertion. Practice non-practice. Taste non-taste. Requite hatred with goodness. For the holy men do not to be desirous. He learns not to be learned. The teaching of knowledge is that to know the unknowable is elevating and to know the knowable is sickness."

Tao-tz' propounds the essentials in this way "True words are not pleasant and pleasant words are not true. Good are not contentious and the contentious are not good."

[cf Kathopaniṣad anyat sreyo anyat utaiva preyo or one is good and quite different is the pleasant, they are wide apart and mutually exclusive.]

"The wise is not learned, the learned is not wise. The Holy man hoards not. The more he does for others the more he owns himself. The more he gives to others the more he acquires himself."

"There is a Being that is all-containing which precedes the existence of Heaven and Earth. How calm and incorporeal it is! Alone it stands and does not change. Everywhere it goes without running a risk. I don't know its name, when obliged to give it a name I call it Great." It is interesting here to note that the root-meaning of Vedāntic Brahman is Great (Bṛhatvāt Brahman).

In the above short analysis of Taoism we have seen that the fundamental principles of Vedānta coincide with those of Taoism. And by such comparative studies of other Religions and Philosophies of the world we are sure to find out that principles of the Vedānta are implied in them also. Vedānta has never separated philosophy from Religion and Religion from life and only the modern age with its anatomical scrutiny has done so the other day. The common bases—the foundations of all philosophies and religions are all imbedded in the catholic and synthetic bosom of

Vedānta The whole philosophical and religious thought not only of past and present but of those yet to come in future can be beautifully harmonized in Vedānta and reinterpreted in a quite unique way by its light. Vedānta is the oldest religion of the world and its sacred scriptures, the Vedas, are the most ancient known record of the human race. The philosophy of the Vedas, otherwise known as Vedānta contains the highest truths of the Tao-Teh-King and the Triptaka, the Qabala and the Koran, the Talmud, and the Testament, and so on. In the life and teachings of Rāmakṛṣṇa and Vivekānanda, the twin souls of renascent Vedānta we have seen how all the philosophies and religions of the world can be wonderfully synthesised in a new way. All religions and philosophies have propounded an isolated aspect of that All-comprehensive thought-system of which Vedānta is the full-fledged whole.

HIGH VALUE OF AVIDYĀ.

REV. J F PESSEIN, S J

We are here faced either by a doctrine of a high metaphysical value, or a ridiculous nonsense.

A good deal of confusion arises from the fact that Sankara uses the term Avidyā in two different senses. It is the context that shows in what sense it should be taken.

He takes sometimes Avidyā for Prakṛti, Māyā, Bija-śakti, Avyakta I 4 3, I 3 19, I 3 19, Gītā VIII 20, IX 7 10, XIII 23 29 34, XIV 3

Some times it is used in the sense of Nescience I 1. 4, I 4. 3, I 3 19, I 3 1, II 2 2, II 1. 14, III 2 11, A Valli, 1, Gītā XVIII 50 66, XIII 2, XIII 26, I 4 6

Avidyā, Nescience, is a wrong apprehension of the nature of an illusion. Something is perceived but its nature is misunderstood. "It is the mutual super-imposition of the Ātman and the non-Ātman." When in the twilight a man mistakes a pillar for a thief, it is Nescience, it is wrong knowledge, but not utterly false. His knowledge is right in so far as he is conscious of a reality, it is wrong in the sense that instead of super-imposing that reality on the pillar he attributes it to the thief.

Let us see what is the import of Nescience when Brahman is its object. Sankara staunchly maintains the doctrine of the unity of Brahman. Before creation he is one without a second. He is equally emphatic on the principles that the existent cannot come from the non-existent, that the effect must pre-exist in the cause, creation being only the manifestation of what already exists.

Hence he is confronted with a very great difficulty in stating what sort of existence the world had in Brahman, its cause, previous to creation.

This pre-existence of the universe in Brahman is called variously, Prakṛti, Avyakta, Māyā, Avidyā, Bija-śakti.

Our Philosopher must state his doctrine in such a way as to save both Brahman's unity and the pre-existence of the effect in its cause.

The common interpretation is that Sankara attributes Prakṛti to Brahman and in the same breath negatives it that the Bija-śakti is a mere creation of Nescience.

What would think a beggar of a man who would take back immediately the dole he has just given him? Is Sankara making a fool of himself, and his reader? Only a mad man would build a house for the pleasure of destroying it.

There is no way to escape this indictment if we hold that the denial is meant to negative entirely what has been attributed.

The key to the solution of the riddle lies with the rule that Sankara lays down for the teaching of Brahman: "There is the saying of Sampradāya-vids, which runs as follows: 'That which is devoid of all duality is described by *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*, i.e. by super-imposition and negation, by attribution and denial.'" Gītā XIII 13.

Brahman is therefore defined by *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* combined. Hence *apavāda* is but a correction, not an utter negation of what has been attributed by *adhyāropa*.

If *apavāda* were meant to negative entirely what has been super-imposed by *adhyāropa*, there would be no description of Brahman who would be a mere blank. Moreover, *adhyāropa* would have no purpose with a view to hold by the principle that the effect pre-exists in the cause. Sankara teaches that even in Brahman the Prakṛti, the mānasa or archetypes of creation and that this statement entails forfeiture of Brahman's unity. The *apavāda* is brought in to correct the wrong view that Prakṛti exists in Brahman as a distinct entity.

So we can easily understand what Sankara intended discarding by *apavāda*: it is plurality itself as plurality, but not the thing signified by the multiplicity of names or attributions.

His statement that the Prakṛti or Prakṛti is a creation of Nescience is but an *apavāda*, a correction, not an utter denial. If this Prakṛti were a sheer non-unity to which nothing corresponds in Brahman, it would be *asid*. But Sankara says that it is neither *sat* nor *asid*. It has therefore some sort of existence. "Belonging to the Īman as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as being, nor as different from it, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world" (II 1 14). "By that element of plurality which is a fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of the entire apparent world with its changes and so on, while in his true and real nature he at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe" (II 1 27). "*Māyā*,

Prakṛti, is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not" (143)

"Name and form can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from Him, Un-evolved but about to be evolved"

He explains himself better in other places, (145) wherein he states that the effect before creation existed identical with its cause (II 1 17)

"Prior to creation, this universe was Brahman Himself here spoken of as "non-being" "That created itself by itself Brahman spoken of as 'non-being created Himself by Himself' " Such being the case, Brahman is called "Su-kṛta" the cause par excellence, the self-cause" (T Up An Valli VII)

"The Omniscient created the universe with name and form, one with Himself, as the material causes. Atman creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe" (At Up 1 2)

From all this it appears that Sankara is pursuing an expression which ever escapes him

Here the Christian teaching will come to the help of Sankara and define with more clarity what he had but imperfectly expressed. We are as keen and explicit as Sankara in upholding God's unity or simplicity. We are in agreement with him that, if any multiplicity of attributes, names, archetypes (*nāma rūpa*) be imagined to exist in God as realities, they are mere creation of our ignorance. For as such viz distinct realities they are false, they have no existence at all.

Still we hold that it is not wrong to give to God such attributions, provided we keep it in mind that, though those attributions are not in Him as multiple, the thing signified by the attributions does really exist in Him equivalently and eminently as His simple homogeneous essence.

Cheese and butter are not found in milk in the form in which we see them on the breakfast table, yet they exist in milk, not as distinct entities, but as one, as the homogeneous substance of milk.

The attributions thus understood, some Muslim Philosophers call "distinction of reason". The Christian Divines, with greater dogmatic precision call them 'Distinctions of reason *cum fundam in re*' i.e. distinctions of reason having their ground, their *raison d'être* in the thing itself, for they are not mere distinctions of reason to which nothing corresponds in the object.

The statement that, in Sankara's mind, the Prakṛti or *Biṣa-sakti* is a distinction of reason *cum fundamēto in re*, is corroborated by the fact that the Prakṛti is only a power of Brahman. (Gītā XII 29 Sayana on An Valli, I)

Since Prakṛti is an attribution like all other attributions or qualities, there is no reason for making it the object of a different treatment from the other attributes. All other qualities are generally held to be in Brahman not after our way of conceiving them, viz as distinct realities, but after God's way of being, i.e., in identity of substance, likewise Prakṛti must be held to be in Brahman equivalently as one and the same as his impartible essence.

Hence Prakṛti cannot be said to be either existent — for as such, as distinct from Brahman it would entail duality — or not existent at all, for in that case there would be no material cause of creation. It exists therefore and our way of expressing its existence "is a distinction of reason having its *raison d'être* in the nature of Brahman."

The author of this article has been much surprised at the stand taken in this matter by two scholars whose discussion appeared in this Review, the one contending that *Avdyā* means only *Biṣa-sakti*, the other, only Nescience. Let us hope that this article will open the eyes also of Fr. Johannes, S. J., who in "The Light of the East" maintains that the *Biṣa-sakti*, being *Avdyā-kalpita* is utterly non-existent.

THE VOW OF CELIBACY

PROF V K. GOKAK, M A

(Being the translation of a few stanzas from the celebrated epic of Ratnākaraṣaṇi, one of the ancient poets of Kārṇāṭaka)

No doubt ! Most men might lead the rigorous life
Of *Brahmacharya* safe, from women far,—
But in the midst of passions if they live
And live untouched by them in purity,
Then is it true life, for 'tis difficult
To lead a life of simple holiness
Ev'n as to walk upon a sabre's edge
If one would take the penance on oneself
And make a vow to keep it,— then incline
To gazing on a maiden's loveliness,—
It is the *Brahmacharya* which the steed
Of kings observes ! For what of it is there
When one will pine in secret when one sees
A girl's bright face,— a captive to her eyes ?
If ever one has mind to learn and live
The principle, it should be clutched as firm
As some strong, struggling snake in one's fierce grasp,
And if the hold is loosened, then the vow
Will bite the man who held it, as the snake !
But disinclined once for this principle,
Not slightest remembrance of it should chafe
And linger in the heart The noble life
Of *Brahmacharyas*, firm as adamant,
Withstands the magic of alluring eyes
What though fair women come and kiss and cling
And hold them in a fast embrace ! The heart
Of men whose thoughts have kept their purity
Will stand unshaken 'Tis the plantain leaves
That will be wet with water, not a petal
Of lotus, girt with waves on waves, shall wear
A sea-drop on its bloom !

REVIEWS.

Six Ways of Knowing, by
Dr D. M. DUTTA, M. A., Ph. D.,
Published by George Allen and
Unwin, London.

Dr D. M. DUTTA is one of those few Indian who have shown keen interest in the study of Indian system of Philosophy in its original garb under Pandits who are justly considered to be great repositories of the traditional Indian culture. The *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* occupies a very unique place in the field of Vedāntic literature and it is a mere common place to expatiate on the great merits of this famous work which is regarded almost as a classic. A careful study of this book is of inestimable value in any important treatment of the Vedānta system of Epistemology and its study is indispensable to those who should like to work in Indian Logic, but its value has not hitherto been fully appreciated by the educated scholars of India, firstly on account of the concise terseness of its style and the difficulty of the subject, and secondly because of the technicalities of the Nyaya method with which the work bristles, which has enhanced its difficulty. Dr Dutta, we are very glad to observe, has brought the main portion of the work under contribution and it is impossible to exaggerate the value of this portion of the book for students of Indian Logic. The painstaking, unbiassed

and for the most part accurate discussion which the book under review contains on various methods of knowledge is rarely to be met with in any other modern work on the Vedānta system, and we are sure, Dr Dutta's book will prove not only a valuable authority to scholars but an enlightened guide to general readers as well. The most notable feature of the work is perhaps its comparative study of various topics with the modern Western views and the author's achievements in this direction entitle him to highest honours. But the author has done much more. Having collected various important data under convenient chapters, he has subjected them to an extensive analysis which throws significant light on many an abstruse idea which he expounds with rare ability and defends in his book. The book is well-written and the language is elegant and easy, but there is in the work one serious drawback which it is necessary to bring to the notice of the author. There are hardly any quotations from authoritative texts which if done judiciously, will have enhanced the value of the work ten-fold.

There is at present over-production in the field of Vedāntic literature and every class of writers has come into the field with the supply of information peculiar to his own view-points, but our author is un-

doubtedly one of those few who have studied the subject with sufficient detachment to make a special pleading for this or that side, at the same time with a rare sympathy that has lent clearness to his discussion and depth to his outlook. The author is a close student of Indian Philosophy, specially the Vedāntic logic in the original. A few samples of his interpretation of some of the most abstruse subjects of Logic will, we hope, convince one of the truth of this statement.

In one of the earliest chapters of the work the author discusses the nature of *Antahkarana* and shows that it is a creation of Ajñāna—the primal, beginningless descent, through an identification with which the self gets individuated. The self appears as limited and circumscribed by Ajñāna and this congenital Ajñāna presents a resistance to the unthwarted freedom of the self and through its stress the *ātman* assumes an objective attitude creating a breach in one whole of *'astanya'*—a dualism of self and not-self—'me' and 'not-me'. Henceforward *ātman* behaves as the *aham* or limited ego that has accepted the limitation of *Antahkarana*. This limitation creates the consciousness of 'other', a not-self, that has to be known. In making the object of knowledge, it creates also a want which for satisfaction calls forth action. By appropriating his particular Ajñāna, one *jīva* realizes his distinction from another and forgets his unity with pure consciousness, underlying all. This

॥ अथासौ.

Is the mind (अन्तःकरण) *Indriya* or not? Is it an instrument of knowledge of this subject? The author shows here, there is no necessity for calling *मनः* as इन्द्रिय, for no medium is necessary for external perception which is directly revealed to it. The mind, according to Vedānta, has parts (not like Nāyaika's *Ānu*-infinitesimal-partsless, indivisible substance as the atoms). In Western Psychology, mind is conceived both as a subject and an object. In self-consciousness the mind becomes its own object. But in Vedānta, mind as subject is the *Ātman*, the self,—and the mind as object is the *manas* or *antahkarana*.

The author then goes on to examine the Western view that in perception, mind does not go out to the object, but only receives the stimuli coming from the object. In this view our knowledge of the external world can at best be an inference, representationalism being the only logical conclusion of such a theory of perception. The author in this connection brings in the famous *Gestalt* school of modern Psychology in which its advocates seek to show that the form of the object as we perceive it is not a subsequent construction out of piecemeal atomic sensations but the form is given in experience as a *whole* structure and it is by subsequent analysis that we arrive at the elements—the local processes in the sense-organs or in the cortical centres cannot explain psychic wholes. This whole is not constructed out of many simple separate stimuli but obtained as a

whole from the very beginning. According to Vedānta also, antahkarana receives the perceived object as a *whole* by assuming its form,—the mode of the antahkarana (वृत्ति) having the form of object may be compared to Psychological *Gestalt*. Space as *imaged* and space as *sensed* are not one and the same as Alexander seems to think. Hence, images cannot be identified with physical objects. We are, says the author, thus forced to conclude that images can be classed neither with the purely psychical—the self—nor with the purely physical, such as tables and trees. We must place them in a region midway between the two. The antahkarana with all its modifications might be considered as belonging to this region. It serves as the mediating principle through which the subject knows its object.

The next Chapter (IV) deals with the nature of the self in perception and the author comes to to show, as the result of his discussion the self-revealing character of the self and in this connection he passes under review the three different theories held respectively by the Vedānta-Paribhāṣa, the Vivaraṇa and other Vedāntists—known as the theories of अक्षरं यत्, चिदात्म and परमाणुत. In all these cases, when the object comes into connection with the self, the self reveals its own nature as caitanya. It is in virtue of this characteristic of Caitanya, an object appears and the subject knows. A self-shining principle is demonstrated in every act of

knowledge. But here the question occurs, if the subject and the object are really the self-manifesting Caitanya—the 'object' appearing signifying in reality that the Universal Consciousness underlying the object reveals itself as the object—how is it that the self sometimes perceives its object and sometimes not? The true answer is that the Antahkarana must go to the object and take its form and thus it does in order to remove the differentiating factors which created a division between the subject and the object, or in order that the veiling the object from the subject be removed, or the subject may be tinged with the form of the object. It shows therefore that the object is immediately known in the form the antahkarana takes and not in any other form. It is only the immediacy of the self which imparts immediacy to the subject and the object.

Chapter V deals first with the two stages of perception. The first stage is the undifferentiated *sensum* which subsequently becomes *संज्ञा* or differentiated perception proper through the attribution of universal relation etc. Here the author gives us the views of the Baddhas, the Mimamsakas, of the Nyaya, and of the Vedānta. To an indeterminate presented something, we attribute, say, *Potency* (शक्ति). The Baddhas, like Kant in the Western world, hold the view that it is we—our intellect—which supplies relation, universality etc. which do not exist in the subject itself. But according to the Nyaya and the

Mīmāṃsā, the object is presented first as unanalyzed, uninterpreted relation and we then discover what is given in the object which the latter unfolds (realistic view), whereas the Idealists hold it is the mind which contributes what is not present in the object (Bhāṭya). The Vedāntists really say that the substantive—adjective relation is absent in the first stage. The author here incidentally notices the view of the extreme section of Advaitists to whom *sat* (सत्) is only taken in the Nirvikalpa stage, to which our imagination applies differences which then become *विभक्तम्*. The author, however, remarks that this view is not advocated by Śaṅkara who, in the view of our author, holds a realistic position in perception. "In every act of perception," says Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṭya*, "we are aware of the external objects like the pillar, pot, cloth etc." (2-3-38).

Now, in the next section, we find a brilliant exposition of the important Nyāya theory of *अर्थोक्तिः प्रत्यक्ष* in its three-fold characteristics, viz the *Sāmānya* Laksana, *Jñāna*-Laksana, and *Yogyā*-Pratyakṣa. In perceiving, say, a pot, we perceive the universal potness (the generic properties of pot) as characterizing the particular pot. The perception of the universal potness amounts to the perception of all pots as possessing this universal. In perceiving a particular, we virtually perceive all particulars of that class. Thus we get the immediate knowledge of objects not presented to sense. The perception of illusory objects also

falls within, and can be explained by, the theory of *Jñāna*—*Laksana*. We know that a tortuous long object is a snake, so that when a similar appearance is presented by a rope, this pre-existing knowledge functions and we perceive a snake.

The author here compares the Western instances of "a-simulation" or "complication" with the Nyāya theory, viz the unperceived elements are not a mere revival of past ideas as in *memory*, but a consequent perception thereof.

Finally in this chapter, the author deals with some account of "Relation". *Samavāya*—is the constitutive relation that exists between attributes or actions and their substance, between the whole and its parts between a universal and its particulars. In perceiving a thing, says the Naiyāyika, we perceive a particular, its attributes, its actions, its universal and also the relation of *Samavāya* riveting together all these independent entities. Śaṅkara in criticizing this theory, shows and establishes the view that these are not at all discrete entities but aspects which are not distinct from the substance. A thing cannot be viewed "as a mosaic of independent entities". It is one whole which presents the different aspects of attributes, universals etc. under different *व्यवस्था* (organisations). Now the question arises whether a relation is external or independent of the terms related, or whether the dependent existence of a relation and the Subsistence of it is the plausible view. The

author brings in here also some Western view about relation and shows the only tenability of the view given by Śaṅkara. The Chapter is concluded with a discussion of the self-revealing character (स्वतः प्रकाशत्व or स्वतः प्रामाण्य) of knowledge and in this connection he criticizes the Nyāya view of अनुव्यवसाय and the Bhatta view of ज्ञानता.

The subsequent three chapters give some account of the methods of similarity (उपमान), Inference (अनुमान) and Non-perception (अनुपलब्धि). The absence of a thing — अभाव — is perceived by us by a special method of knowledge known as अनुपलब्धि. But the consideration of *space* at our disposal stands in the way of doing adequate justice to these very valuable sources of knowledge which the author discusses.

We would conclude this rather lengthy review of the contents of this important book by giving our readers some very necessarily brief account of the last chapters of the work viz. the relation which exists between the words or the sentences and their meanings.

Different syllables compose a word and the words compose a sentence. Now, as the syllables are not sensed together but produce their sounds successively one after the other, how then to perceive a word as a whole? This question has been elaborately discussed in different schools of philosophy, as it has given rise to the famous theory of *sphota* (स्फोट). You cannot say that all the syllables are remembered by the mind simultaneously, for in that case the differ-

ence between the words, say — tip and pit — must be accounted for. Here the *order* in which the letters differ cannot be remembered, if the syllables are remembered *together*. The Naiyāyikas suggest a solution by showing that each syllable leaves its impression and the accumulated impressions of past syllables give us the meaning. But are the syllables remembered in their order? How then are they grasped simultaneously? The theory of *sphota* seeks to solve these difficulties. There is, its advocates hold, a partless, unitary symbol in which there is no question of succession. This unitary, indivisible symbol is revealed gradually through the different syllables uttered, which is grasped by a single act of consciousness. Śaṅkara is not in favour of this *sphota* theory, as it is meant for the *verbal series* only and not applicable to other temporal and spatial series, such as line of ants, army of soldiers etc. According to the Vedāntists, we have the knowledge of wholes which preserves the internal relations among component members which our intellect is capable of synthesizing. Then there is a very good discussion about the question whether a word primarily means a Particular or a Universal. Suppose a table is before us. We can in the first instance apprehend it merely as an undifferentiated sensum — a pure particular — and then when some similarities that are common to all objects of that name are apprehended, it is then an object of knowledge and called a table. When the universal meant

by a word is known, the particular subsumed under it is known by implication. A particular as known at this moment cannot persist to be the same particular the next moment, because of the physical and mental environment, which particularized the first impression into that particular is constantly changing and cannot repeat. Only the meaning of a term remains the same everytime it is used and thus the term cannot mean a particular.

In considering the relation of the meanings and the sentence, the two famous theories known as *शक्तिज्ञान* and *अवितमिषान* have been thoroughly explained, but we regret space does not allow us to bring their significance here for the benefit of our readers whom we refer to the original work itself which, we doubt not, repays a careful perusal.

Lastly, some idea of *Sabda-bodha* has been given. In a mechanical mixture, two constituent substances lying side by side would acquire no new properties, as there is no mutual interpenetration among them. But it is otherwise in a chemical combination, where the elements, having mutual affinity, interpenetrate and there is production of a new property that was not present in the constituents. This analogy holds good in the mental world also. Two ideas combine where there is mutual affinity between them. There must be a want, a feeling of incompleteness—a fellow-seeking, as the author beautifully expresses, and there must also be compatibility (*युक्तता*) on the part

of the fellow to satisfy the want. These are called *आफता* and *योजन* by Indian thinkers. The universal meaning of a word being too incomplete and too indeterminate, the sense of expectancy for factors that can make the idea complete and determinate is aroused. There is a third condition—proximity (*असक्ति*) between two words for combination.

The book is concluded by examining the validity of some arguments which are generally advanced against authority as an independent method of knowledge (*युक्त*). A particular knowledge may come into conflict with some other knowledges, that is no reason why the method should be discarded forever. Other methods, such as perception and inference, also sometimes conflict equally with the fact that authorities conflict. Knowledge carries with it an inherent guarantee of its own truth and makes its validity self-evident and it does not require to be certified externally.

One defect, among its various excellences which we have noticed in the work has been pointed out above. The book is, to our view, incomplete with respect to the absence of any discussion about the Vedāntic Problem of Error which finds a place in the *Vedānta-Pāra-bhāṣā*—the main themes of which, as observed by us, have been laid under contribution by the author. Considering the measure of success with which our author has carried out the main portion of his self-imposed task, we hope

a separate work, dealing with the Problem of Error on which so much has been written by various

Sanskrit authors, will be published by the author at no distant date

KOKILESWAR SASTRI

(1) *The Life of Rāmakrishṇa*,
(2) *The Life of Vivekānanda and the Universal Gospel*, by Romain Rolland, Translated by E. F. M. Smith and P. D. (Cantab), Published by the Advaita-Prasaram, Mayavati, Almora, Himalayas (3) *Influence of Indian Thought on the Thought of the West*, by Swami Ashokananda

1. The Rāmakrishṇa-Vivekānanda Mission deserves highest praise for the publication of the two incomparably valuable biographies of the two great Saints of India, written by M. Romain Rolland, the great mystic, an able critic, and a writer of world-wide reputation. He regards both these volumes as "Studies of Mysticism and Action in living India, and has interpreted the lives of the two mystics in the most sympathetic and rationalistic way imaginable. "It requires a mystic," as is aptly remarked by Tukarāma, "to understand the real greatness of a mystic and his work." The Indians will always feel grateful to Romain Rolland for the signal service he has done to India in general by publishing his two studies in Indian Mysticism at a time when India and her problems are occupying the minds of the great thinkers of all nations in the world. Both the volumes are marked by erudition, remarkable powers of lucid exposition, keen insight into the workings of the human heart, accuracy and

and correctness of judgment, and warm and sympathetic appreciation of everything that is great and true.

In this first volume on Svāmī Rāmakrishṇa the first few chapters are devoted to a very vivid account of the different stages in the spiritual life of Rāmakrishṇa, who first began his spiritual life as a worshipper of the image of Kālī, was later haunted by the all-absorbing desire to find out the truth beyond the appearances, and after years of earnest struggle and suffering, had the vision of the Mother. He was later guided by a Brahmin nun in his mystical life, but the highest peaks were ascended only with the help of another spiritual teacher, Totāpurī, the great Vidāntist, who ultimately became the disciple of Rāmakrishṇa being surpassed by the latter in the science of the Spirit. The account of the combat between Rāmakrishṇa and Totāpurī, who were regarded as embodiments of Love and Reason, and the ultimate conquest of Love that enabled Totāpurī to realize that even Māyā was identical with Brahman, is very interesting. The personality of Rāmkrishṇa with all the peculiar physical, moral, and spiritual features, is very vividly described by Romain Rolland in the following way —

"Rāmkrishṇa was a small brown man with a short beard and beauti-

ful eyes, ' long dark eyes, full of light, obliquely set and slightly veiled,' never very wide open, but seeing half-closed a great distance both outwardly and inwardly. His mouth was half open over his white teeth in a bewitching smile, at once affectionate and mischievous. Of medium height, he was thin to emaciation and extremely delicate. His temperament was exceptionally highly strung, for he was super-sensitive to all the winds of joy and sorrow, both moral and physical. He was indeed a living reflection of all that happened before the mirror of his eyes, a two-sided mirror turned both out and in. His unique plastic power allowed his spirit instantaneously to shape itself according to that of other, without, however, losing its own *festal Beauty*, the immutable and infinite centre of endless mobility. " His speech was Bengali of a homely kind with a slight though delightful stammer, but his words held men enthralled by the wealth of spiritual experience, the inexhaustible store of simile and metaphor, the unequalled powers of observation, the bright and subtle humour, the wonderful catholicity of sympathy and the ceaseless flow of wisdom."

In chapter IV is described in a rightly sceptical spirit Rāmakrishna's absolute identity with Brahman or the Nirvikalpa Samādhi that he enjoyed continuously for six months. We may think such a phenomenon almost miraculous and not truly mystical. The one essential sign of all mystic stages is the presence of self-consciousness

While this condition of Rāmakrishna, when he was not conscious, and had to be fed per force by his nephew, seems to be more abnormal than spiritual. One cannot but express a similar doubt as regards the psychological truth of the experience of the identity of all the religions as attained by Svami Rāmakrishna. One can easily understand how a great Saint that had obtained the highest spiritual experience unity and his experiences confirmed by similar or identical experiences in the case of other saints or founders of other religion.

But it is psychologically impossible for one that has once attained the Highest, to come down and re-live the life of different founders of religion and pass through all the stages of spiritual life, that they had undergone. Such accounts cannot but be regarded as mythological. Similarly, Svami Rāmakrishna might have had visions of the different prophets, such as Mahomet, Christ, and Buddha, but the phenomenon of these persons in his vision entering his heart and disappearing there, cannot but be interpreted as metaphorical. The identity and unity of all the religious experience can be realized without re-living the lives of the founders of other religions. In the chapter that follows, we have an account of the pilgrimage of Rāmakrishna to the holy city of Benares, where he had the vision of that City of God as " a condensed mass of spirituality" and realized the identity of Siva and the Mother Kālī. He was also brought

in intimate contact with human misery, and set the example of the most humble service of man by cleaning the house of a pariah. He firmly believed in the infinity of God, and was ready to receive enlightenment from all seekers after truth. The two chapters on 'the Builders of unity' and 'Rāmākṛishṇa and the great Shepherd', are as if two chapters in the social and spiritual history of northern India at the time of Rāmākṛishṇa, and serve as an essential background to set off the picture of the mystic whose life the author is depicting. The lives and the mission of the various Leaders of Thought in India are described here in a very vivid, though brief, and accurate manner, so far as they go. The grounds of the difference of opinion, as regards the influence of the teachings of Rāmākṛishṇa on Keshavachandra Sen, are clearly stated by the publisher in Note II. In the next chapter is given an account of the great disciples of Rāmākṛishṇa, the chief and the most beloved of whom is Nārāyaṇ better known to the world as Vivekānanda. Rāmākṛishṇa's relation to his wife has been a subject of much controversy and adverse criticism. The marriage was of two souls, entirely spiritual, and having nothing carnal about it. Rāmākṛishṇa's readiness to abide by the wishes of his wife testifies to his magnanimity, but it may be remarked that married life is in no way incompatible with the mystical life. As for Vivekānanda, Rāmākṛishṇa realized in him the vision that he

had in the early stage of his spiritual life, wherein he had seen a great sage taking care of a child. The story of the conversion of this champion of Reason is fascinating, though miraculous. It is not argument but actual physical contact that makes Vivekānanda lose all consciousness of himself and of the world about him, and is thus convinced of the truth of spiritual life. On three critical occasions in his life we are told how all his doubts about the reality of spiritual life were removed by such an intimate contact with the Master whose touch made Vivekānanda feel a kind of electric shock and lose all his consciousness in an ecstatic trance. His experience of absolute identity of the Mother Kāh with Brahman and of himself with Brahman was attained in a similar fashion. This method of convincing a religious aspirant of the truth of spiritual life strikes us as very strange, and cannot be easily accepted even by the most religious-minded. We refuse to believe that Mysticism has anything to do with mesmerism or hypnotism. Ecstasy of the mystic is entirely different from the hypnotic trance: the one is a supremely inward self-conscious state, attained by one's own strenuous efforts, while the other is something like a stupor, or temporary benumbing of consciousness superimposed on the subject by an external agency. To compare a mystic in an ecstatic condition to a reservoir of electric power, giving a shock to all persons that touch him, is to entirely misunderstand the real

nature of mystical experience which cannot be transmitted in a series of electric shocks. We may doubt whether the transmission of the highest spiritual experience without personal efforts on the part of the aspirant, is at all a psychological possibility. We cannot for a moment deny the supreme spiritual greatness of Rāmakrishna. We have only to submit that the account about the Nirvikalpa Samādhi of Rāmakrishna, given by his biographers, is a serious misinterpretation of the phenomenon. Such a transmission of spiritual experience was forbidden to Vivekānanda even by Rāmakrishna himself, as the latter regarded it a dangerous pleasure for even a mystic of Vivekānanda's calibre. Rāmakrishna insisted upon a synthesis of contemplative and active life, and urged Vivekānanda to realize this perfect aim of human life. He rightly insisted upon the realization of God in the service of man, which forms one of the fundamental principles of Rāmakrishna Mission. The magnanimity of his soul is quite evident from his remark that he would willingly be reborn even as a dog if thereby he could be of help to a single soul (p. 294). Rāmakrishna suffered terribly from the disease of the cancer of the throat, and Romain Rolland rightly remarks that his bed of agonies was no less a Cross. But even in this condition of his body, his mind was as blissful as ever, and he incessantly conversed with his disciples, particularly with Vivekānanda. He transmit-

ted (?) all his spiritual power to Vivekānanda and entrusted him with the work of carrying out his mission. "To-day I have given you my all and am now only a poor fakir, possessing nothing. By this power, you will do immense good in the world and not until it is accomplished will you return" (p. 312). He passed away while he was in ecstasy. "He was the living synthesis of all the spiritual forces of India, the spirit of the Upanishads living in a human form."

2. The volume on Vivekānanda is divided into two parts: one containing the biography, and the other the Universal Gospel. Vivekānanda was physically and morally a direct antithesis of his Master. While Rāmakrishna was essentially a contemplative, Vivekānanda was energy personified. "His athletic form was the opposite of the fragile and tender, yet wiry body of Rāmakrishna. He was tall (five feet, eight and a half inches), square-shouldered, broad-chested, stout, rather heavily built, his arms were muscular and trained to all kinds of sports. He had an olive complexion, a full face, vast forehead, strong jaw, a pair of magnificent eyes, large, dark and rather prominent, with heavy lids, whose shape recalled the classic comparison to a lotus petal. Nothing escaped the magic of his glance, capable equally of embracing in its irresistible charm, or of sparkling with wit, irony, or kindness, of losing itself in ecstasy, or of plunging imperiously to the very

depths of consciousness and of withering with its fury. But his pre-eminent characteristic was kingliness. He was a born king and nobody ever came near him either in India or America without paying homage to his majesty. Two conflicting tendencies,—the desire to conquer and the desire to renounce everything for God,—were struggling for supremacy in his heart, and this struggle was constantly renewed in his life. After the Christmas consecration of 1886 at Antwerp, he spent his first few months in edifying his brother Sanyāsins at Baranogore Math by his discourses on Science, Comparative Religion and Philosophy. He could not resist “the call of the forest” and wandered alone or with a companion throughout the length and breadth of India, and came in intimate contact with untold sufferings and miseries of his country-men, which melted his tender heart and made him dedicate his life to the service of man. It was in 1892 that he heard of a Parliament of Religions to be held at Chicago, and decided to attend it. In 1893, he publicly declared his desire to conduct a mission to the West. The account of his journey to America, and his impressive speech at the Parliament that took America by storm, is most inspiring. Many devout souls were attracted towards him, and he did not spare himself in explaining the principles of Vedānta in a number of lectures, and in instructing various disciples in the practical Yogic processes. In all his lectures and talks, he emphasised the neces-

sity of tolerance and religious universalism, the synthesis of Science and Religion. Still greater victory awaited him in England. All his prejudices against the English were transformed into love and admiration when he actually went to England and lived there for a few months. He found in them a nation of heroes. M. R. R. rightly remarks that “The great Hindus have always found among the English their most valiant and faithful disciples and helpers.” J. J. Goodwin, Margaret Noble (Sister Nivedita), and Mr and Mrs Sevier made a gift of their lives to Vivekānanda and his mission. He realized and highly appreciated the great work done by the great thinkers and Sanskrit scholars in Europe, and paid a glowing tribute to the two savants, Max Müller, and Deussen, in his interview with them. He returned to India after his spiritual conquest of the West, and was received with the same pomp and *clat*, with the same feelings of jubilation and respect with which the Romans received their Victor. One’s heart is filled with noble emotions when one reads the author’s descriptions of the grand receptions and of the stirring speeches wherein was delivered the message of energy, hope and faith, of oneness of the universe, and of the immediate necessity of self-less service or whole-hearted worship of the only God in India, viz. the helpless, down-trodden masses. Though Vivekānanda was very patriotic, and did his best for the uplift of his

country, we are told that "he always kept a naked sword between himself and politics, and would have nothing to do with the nonsense of politics." Even when he founded the Rāmākṛishṇa Mission in 1897 for the service of man and the cultivation of art, industry, science, and especially for the spread of the Vedāntic philosophy expressed and lived by Rāmākṛishṇa, he clearly mentions that the "Mission would have no connection with the politics." If God can be realized, even according to Vivekānanda, only through the service of man, and if politics is one and perhaps the most effective way of ameliorating the miserable condition of one's people, it passes one's understanding why some mystics should be afraid of politics. This their dread of politics can be explained only by supposing that the passion of rationalism they regard as narrow and limited. But if after realizing the highest ideal one can engage himself in all kinds of social reforms, one cannot understand why there should be such a scrupulous avoidance or even abhorrence for politics. That politics and mysticism are not antagonistic is proved by the lives and preaching of many Indian and European mystics. The last few years of his glorious life were spent in training Indian and European disciples, organizing the Mission, starting various centres of philanthropic work, and visiting holy places. He established one Math at Almora in the Himalayas, and on his way back to Kashmir, he

had the vision of Śiva and the Mother Kālī, and learned to recognize God in every-thing dreadful or sweet. After a short sojourn to Europe, he spent the last days of his life in supervising the work of the Math at Belur founding new Reviews and Journals, introducing strict discipline among his disciples, instructing and training them in the methods of meditation, and the service of man and the realization of God. To the last moment of his life he worked very hard for the good of his country and of humanity in general, and like his Master, suffering acutely for some time, he passed away in an ecstatic trance.

In the second part of this volume are treated the various aspects of the Gospel of Universal Religion preached by Vivekānanda. Both Science and Religion aim at Freedom, Mayā is nothing but Relativity, the Illusion is also Real, All is Truth. The universe has its origin, sustenance and end in Truth, which is identical with Freedom. Even more herculean efforts are necessary for the achievement of spiritual freedom from the bondage of the Senses than are required for the attainment of political liberty. There are four Paths or Yoga- to the freedom of the Spirit, Karma (work), Bhakti (love), Raja, and Jñāna (knowledge) Yogas. Our soul is the lever to move the universe and it is essentially identical with God, religion consists in realizing this identity. All paths are equally noble, and all ultimately lead to the same goal.

- (a) Karma-Yoga enables one to understand the real secret of Work: it commands one to work incessantly and give up all attachment to work. The only true duty is to work as free beings, and give up all work to God. The greatest men in the world are the nameless silent workers, "the unknown soldiers."
- (b) The second path to freedom is Bhakti or Love. It must be absolutely disinterested and unbounded. All established religions result from selfish love; real Love of God or inspiration is not contradictory of reason, but the development of it. The way to intuition is through reason. All love must be for the good of the universe, perfectly unselfish. Such love is God. This path, however, is full of dangers, though it too leads to ecstasy or freedom.
- (c) Rāja-Yoga is a science of the attainment of freedom through various stages of the control of the mind and body. It is systematically explained by Vivekānanda in his Essay on this subject.
- (d) The fourth path to freedom is Jñāna or knowledge. It glorifies reason to the highest degree. Vivekānanda emphatically asserts that it is better that the mankind should become atheist by following reason than blindly believe in authority. Both science and religion aim at helping us out of slavery by finding the

Unity. Like science Vedānta also accepts the principle of Evolution, that the explanations of things are to be found within their own nature, but it further adds that every evolution presupposes an 'involution'. Something cannot be produced out of nothing. The energy that ultimately becomes a perfect man cannot come out of nothing. The problem of the interrelation of spirit and matter, gives rise to various metaphysical systems. The Vedānta explains this problem by the doctrine of *Māyā*. How does the Absolute become mingled with the Relative? It has never been mingled. You are this Absolute, and have never changed. All that changes is *Māyā*. All evolution consists in removing this *Māyā* or Screen between the Absolute and the individual soul, which are identical. Real individuality consists in realizing its real nature which is the Absolute.

All religions are efforts to realize God, the Universal Unity. Man progresses from lesser truth to higher truth. Universal brotherhood can be achieved by recognizing this great truth in all religions, and not by establishing secular institutions, or religions. One can remain absorbed in Brahman only for a short time. The rest of his time should be spent in the service of man. All knowledge is missionary in its nature and hence the necessity that a mystic feels for the spread

of his knowledge of God among his fellow-men, with no idea or desire to proselyte. Spirituality cannot be taught. 'Religious propaganda and tolerance presuppose ego-centric philanthropy of some kind.' Each man should be free to realize the Self in his own way. The universal religion must make a Hindu a better Hindu, and a Christian a better Christian.

Vivekānanda's life was a synthesis of all human forces, of reason and faith, of contemplation and action. Service of the needy, distressed and down-trodden, is, according to him, the essence of Religion. His influence on all great persons and institutions of his time was immense, and has been recognized by such great persons as Mahatma Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghose. Though his speeches and writings inspired the masses in Europe and America, the aristocratic hierarchy of the philosopher in the West remained unaffected by them. We have therefore to thankfully acknowledge the great service that M. R. R. has done to the two great Saints of India by explaining their Philosophy in a systematic way, and thus securing for them a permanent place in the mystical and philosophical literature of the West.

3. In the second part of his book on Vivekānanda M. R. R. has tried to prove in his foot-notes and appendices as well as in the text that certain spiritual and philosophical principles that are claimed to be exclusively Indian were not un-

known to the mystics of the West. This has led to a number of foot-notes on the part of the publisher to express his difference of opinion. The brochure "The Influence of Indian Thought on the Thought of the West," by Swami Ashoka nanda, presents the case of Indian priority, and of the indebtedness of other nations to India in certain fundamental philosophical and religious principles, in a very scholarly and admirably convincing manner, so far as it goes. It must, however, be admitted that the various analogies that have been pointed out by M. R. R. in certain modes of life, expression, and thought of the Eastern and Western mystics are worth-noting. M. R. R. states in one place that the question of superiority of one nation over another is immaterial in the realm of Mysticism. Of the three theories that are advanced to explain the analogies in the different branches of knowledge in Indian and Western nations, those of borrowal and common origin have to be rejected as partial and prejudicial views that cannot be historically proved, and we have to accept the last and the only reasonable Theory of Independent Parallelism of Thought,¹ and believe in the truth of the simultaneous, spontaneous, and independent occurrence of these ideas and experiences to both the mystics and philosophers of the East and the West.

K V G

1 *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, by Prof. R. D. Ranade, M. A., pp 104-5

Scepticism and Constructive Philosophy 'Bradley's Sceptical Principle as the Basis of Constructive Philosophy, by Charles A. Campbell, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1931 Pp xxiv + 322 — 12s 6d

In the firmament of philosophy Bradley shines as a star of the first magnitude. The rays of his subtle dialectic have penetrated the depths of many an abstruse problem in philosophy and illuminated the way leading to their satisfactory solution. His bold and searching criticism has, to a great extent, cleared the ground of unsound and illogical beliefs and opinions, however pleasing to sentiment and useful in practical life, and exposed the hollowness of dogmatic theology and vulgar materialism. No serious student of philosophy in these days can afford to ignore Bradley's criticism of pluralism and realism, pragmatism and idealism. But Bradley's claim to a place of honour among philosophers is based not only on his work as an acute and fearless critic but also on his work as a profound and constructive thinker. The negative and sceptical aspect of his philosophy is sometimes unduly emphasized and the positive and constructive aspect ignored, as being insignificant and even inconsistent. But we hold that for a proper understanding and appreciation of Bradley's comprehensive philosophy, both the aspects must be considered together. No aspect taken in isolation can give us the true picture of Bradley's philosophy as a whole. Bradley's

positive contribution to philosophy is of great value and it is suggestive of the lines along which its underlying principles can be worked out. It is consistent with the best traditions of Idealistic thought and is inclined towards mysticism. It is incorrect to speak of the 'Sceptical Principle' of Bradley, or to suppose that he is an advocate of Scepticism as an ultimate metaphysical theory. Such an incorrect view, we fear, is taken by the author of the book under review. It is no wonder that Bradley should be looked upon by some as a great sceptic, if we remember how even Sankara was regarded by some as 'a Buddha in disguise' or Spinoza as 'an impenitent atheist'!

The book is divided into eight chapters. In the first two chapters, the author following the lead of Bradley and taking his stand on the principle of non-contradiction, arrives at the conclusion that Reality is Supra-rational, and un-attainable by thought, which is relational and discursive. His attack against Bradley's doctrine of the Degrees of Truth and Reality (which he rejects as being quite incompatible with his fundamental principle) is far from being convincing. We consider that Bradley's doctrine of the Degrees of Truth and Reality forms an integral part of his philosophical system, which saves it from dogmatic scepticism, and which in conjunction with his theory of Immediate Experience, brings it nearer to higher mysticism. The author agrees with Bradley and says that there is a

valid significance in describing Reality in terms of 'self-constant,' 'one' and 'all-inclusive,' but arguing against him he urges that "the term 'experience' is not applicable to Reality, or at least not with the positive significance which Bradley reads into it" Here again we feel that Bradley's theory that Reality is Experience, it is Spiritual in character, is satisfactory and seems to follow the best Idealistic tradition

The third chapter entitled 'The, Noumenal and Phenomenal Truth' is meant to be taken as an attempt to bridge the gulf between Skepticism and Construction. Noumenal Truth, Truth in its ideal or ultimate form, being beyond finite intellect, *constructive philosophy* has to concern itself with 'phenomenal truth,' only, "and its highest achievement lies in the articulation of final phenomenal truths." These final truths are 'intellectually incorrigible, though not 'intellectually satisfying' As distinguished from provisional truths they are inescapable of revision or modification under the conditions of finite experience. It may be remarked that, as Bradley says, Reality lives in appearances, Ultimate Truth also lives in phenomenal truths, any separation of the one from the other is, for Bradley, the result of *abstraction*, which, however convenient in practice, is, in theory, indefensible. Bradley may admit duality but dualism never

In the last five chapters the author has endeavoured to show that the central purport of his

thesis that Reality is Supra-rational, to which he is inevitably conducted by the epistemological argument, is verified and confirmed in a striking manner by other arguments based on the experience of self-activity, moral and religious experience. He considers that analysis of moral freedom, moral obligation and moral valuation, and also of religious experience offers very substantial evidence in support of his metaphysical scepticism. The experience of genuinely 'open possibilities' at the moment of volition, and the experience of the 'effortful act of will' against the line of least resistance furnishes the most significant, positive assurance of our freedom. By effort of will he does not mean physical or intellectual effort. Mr Campbell has no patience with scientific or philosophical determinism which ridicules freedom of 'open possibilities'. He entirely disagrees with Spinoza for whom the conception of freedom 'provokes either laughter or disgust', with Bradley and Bosanquet, who do not give him any genuine kind of freedom. Freedom, which is necessarily implied in all moral responsibility, praise and blame, is not to be confused with 'freedom of enlightenment'. The author holds that the idealist is right in urging that the freedom which is one with self-expansion and self-realization is antithetic not to 'submission to law' but to arbitrariness and caprice. He does not take the 'principle of indeterminacy', recently intro-

duced in science, in support of his theory of freedom, which may be called libertarianism or indeterminism. The author's firm conviction is that the self and its freedom are at least *our* ultimate realities, possessing final phenomenal truth. His final conclusion in the matter is that the 'Ought' is meaningless without 'freedom' and that "the 'ought' is rooted in the very nature of self-conscious experience the recognition of the 'ought', because it is the recognition of freedom, is also the recognition that Reality is not rationally or intelligibly continuous."

The chapter on the Principle of Moral Valuation affirms that "The one thing to which value can ultimately be ascribed is *will energy*. The validity of the conception of will energy presupposes the validity of the conception of Reality as not intelligibly continuous." The criterion of moral valuation confirms the Supra-rationalist doctrine. The author has given two very apt illustrations to show how selfish interest and confusion of thought disturb and distort our judgment in estimating the moral worth of individuals and how with the removal of these disturbing factors we revise and even reverse our original judgments about them. Just consider "the fluctuations in the British people's moral estimate of the great Indian patriot and mystic, Gandhi the contrast in the attitudes of the British public towards the individual German soldier during and

after the War respectively." The author brings the chapter to a close by rejecting the current axiological doctrine that Truth, Beauty, Goodness are intrinsic values. He does not assign to Truth and Beauty a value-status co-equal with Moral Goodness. Moral goodness alone is supremely and intrinsically valuable, others are at most only its typical expressions. We can with greater propriety speak of the Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Humanity than of the Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

As regards the value of evidence based on religious experience in support of the supra-rational character of the Absolute, the author frankly states that it is not so convincing as the evidence based on moral experience. Its cogency is conditional, it will be clear to those who believe in the autonomy of religious experience and who recognize serenity of soul and moral fervour as two of its integral features. These two features contradict each other upon a *prima facie* interpretation of their objective implications. The author rules out the plausible attempt at reconciling the apparent contradiction by way of the conception of a *Finite God*, incapable of doing justice to the first feature viz a serenity of soul. The Finite God can be but a temporary halting place for religion. The real solution lies in the frank acceptance of the supra-rational character of God's Perfection. Bradley's Absolute is the philosophic counterpart of the God of Religion.

We heartily congratulate Mr. Campbell for the very valuable contribution he has made to recent philosophical literature. Were we asked to recommend two books of outstanding merit, indispensable for a full, critical study of Bradley's philosophy, we shall unsuitably mention Mr Campbell's *Scripturism and Construction*, and Mr Muirhead's *The Platonic*

Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy. After reading the book under review, we feel justified in expecting Mr. Campbell to put forth his best critical and constructive effort, and bring out a comprehensive work on the philosophy of moral life and religion, for which he is so eminently qualified.

N. G. DANGLE.

Ellora, A Handbook of Veral (Ellora Caves) by Shrimant Bala-subh Pant Pratinidhi, B.A., Chief of Aundh, with a Foreword by R.D. Ranade, M.A., and 89 Half-tone Illustrations, Published by D.B. Taraporewalla & Sons, Kitab Mahal, Hornby Road, Bombay

This is an entertaining and instructive book on the world-famed Ellora Caves. The illustrations are excellent. The Chufsalub's own contributions make the work doubly interesting; they are so realistic. His notes regarding the modes of

dress and ornaments are most instructive and thought-provoking; they serve to turn the angle of vision in regard to those Caves to an altogether new point, and what has so far been a subject of more "antiquarian" interest has become now a subject of very much more "human" interest, and one feels justified in the hope that the book under notice will tempt many more persons to visit the highly inspiring relics of antiquity than have done so hitherto.

Ganganath Jha,

The Upanishads (The well-known ten, *Īśa-Kīśa-Kātha-Mundaka-Mandukya-Aitareya-Taittiriya-Cāṇḍogya-Bṛhadaranyaka* and the *Śvetāśvatara*), Published by V. P. Vaidya, B.A., M.B.A.S., N.S. Press, Bombay, 1932, Price One Rupee - pp (v + 87 + 12)

This is a revised edition of the Upanishads based on an earlier edition published in Bombay nearly half a century ago. Mr Vaidya informs us in the Prefatory Note that the earlier edition was prepared by Pandit Jayakrishna Jee-

vanrām, a renowned scholar and interpreter of Vedāntic literature, on the basis of more than half a dozen reliable MSS. He also made use of the unwritten source of information viz the Veda Pāṭhis (reciters) who have carried down the text as preserved by memory. The present editor, who was then a student, had also a hand in the preparation of the press-copy of the earlier edition. It will thus be seen that Mr. Vaidya, being acquainted with the material and manner of the earlier edition was the best qualified

scholar to bring out a revised edition of the earlier text of these Upanishads and we are glad to find that he has fulfilled our expectations very ably. The text being printed in bold thick type so characteristic of the Nirṇaya-Sagar Press and the book being restricted to the pocket-size, this edition will prove a veritable *vaḍe mecum* for all lovers of the Upanishads. The Upanishads are the bed-rock of Indian Philosophy and one can ill afford to ignore them if one is desirous to know the true spirit

of Aryan Philosophy and Culture which permeate our thoughts and actions at the present time in spite of the lapse of centuries which have seen the rise and fall of empires. We recommend the present edition to every lover of the Upanishads and trust that before long Mr Vaidya will have reason to bring out a third edition of these Upanishads. The get-up of the book is also neat and the price very moderate for a volume of more than 100 pages.

P K GODE.

The Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad, edited by Y Subrahmanya Śarmā, Adhyātma Prakāśha Kāryālaya, Bangalore City, 1932, Price As 6, foreign 9d

This is the first volume of the projected series of Śaṅkarācārya's Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya, undertaken by the Adhyātma Prakāśha Kāryālaya, Bangalore City. The object of the publisher in bringing out this edition is to place in the hands of the reader "the plain text of Śaṅkara's works, unenumbered by commentaries and sub-commentaries, but provided with such aids to study as a beginner is likely to need in appreciating the original". From the plan of the present edition of the Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad, one can say without the slightest hesitation that the intended series will be a real success and will be hailed by all students of Śaṅkara with feelings of gratitude for the learned editor. Among the many important features of this edition, the following may be specially

mentioned as being calculated to help the reader on to a genuine and intelligent understanding of Śaṅkara's Commentary. Prose order of each Mantra in the original Upaniṣad, foot notes dealing with various points of interest in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, summary of the Upaniṣad as interpreted by Śaṅkara, the Mādhyandina version of the Upaniṣad differing in some points from the Kāṇva version which Śaṅkara himself has followed, index of important words occurring in the Bhāṣya, and extracts from other works of Śaṅkara bearing on the vexed problem of **ज्ञानमयसमुच्चय**, touched upon in **Mantra No 11** of the Upaniṣad.

The typography and the general get-up of the book are excellent. We earnestly hope, that the editor will bring out before long the other volumes of the series on the same lines as those followed in the present edition.

M. V. PATWARDHAN.

Saptapadārthi, By D. GURUMURTI, M. A. (HONS.), Published by the Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras

In his introduction to this work, which comprises the text, its transliteration in Roman characters, a translation and notes, the writer shows that it is one of the early attempts at synthesizing the two disciplines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika—a manual written towards the end of the period of the great commentators. The author further discusses the principles employed in fixing up the dates of Indian texts and shows how they are inadequate and unsatisfactory. The result is that we are not able to fix up the date of the work under review with any measure of certainty. With regard to the syncretism of the two schools, it may be said that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are allied systems and hence the tendency to syncretism was present in the schools from their very inception. But so far as a conscious and deliberate attempt to fuse together the two systems is concerned, the *Saptapadārthi* deserves to be given the first place as the earliest known model of the syncretist school. The author follows the history of the syncretism of the two schools right up to its latest phase, and shows wherein lies the importance of the present manual. "Śivāditya's account of the seven categories fixed for all later time all

that was of imperishable value in the Vaiśeṣika works upto his time, while the doctrine of reasoning as embodied by him represents the essence of the Nyāya teaching which Bhāṣarvajña and Udayana developed, until the time Gaṅgeśa took it up and gave it a new turn in his immortal work the *Tattva-Chintāmaṇi*."

The author next gives a clear exposition of the most important doctrines of the schools. He records that Śivāditya's contribution to the system is a twofold one, in the first place he gathered in himself all the tradition of the two systems and gave it in a succinct and masterly compendium, and secondly he made a new departure in harmonizing the two systems into a synthesis, and thus set the fashion to all succeeding followers of the systems.

After a discussion of the question of the date of Śivāditya, an analytical outline which gives the whole text at a glance is given, and then come the text, translation and notes.

The book on the whole is a very useful addition to the texts of standard Sanskrit works, and has a very attractive get up. The sketch of the history and doctrines of the schools is in particular of very great value to a student who desires to be initiated into the philosophy of the system.

C. R. DEVALHAR,

Svādhyāya Jñāneśvarī, (studies and texts) By KESHAV RAMCHANDRA OCHAPKHANE, M. A., LL. B., Price Re 1-4. (Jñāneśvarī Granthamālā, Sangli, S. M. C.)

This book of two hundred pages is an attempt to present the thought of Jñāneśvarī, a Marāṭhī commentary on the Bhagavadgītā by a thirteenth century Mahārāshtrīyan Saint Jñāneśvara to the young Mahārāshtrīyans of the twentieth century. Hence the author has attempted to put a modern garb on the old material. He illustrates his arguments from the latest scientific discoveries and thus shows to the young readers that the thought, of the Jñāneśvarī, though presented some six hundred years before has not yet grown old. In fact, to quote Jñāneśvara, like golden flowers it is as fresh as ever.

He deplores the present state of the faithful as well as the sceptic. The former are blind and self-centred while the latter are negligent of the hidden treasures. He wants to lay open these treasure and make them his own because he anticipates a brilliant future for the philosophy of Jñānadeva. He believes that its knowledge is essential even in these days.

Mr Ochapkhane has made an intensive study of the Jñāneśvarī.

He is also known for his deep interest and sound study of theosophy. Therefore there is nothing strange, that his thoughts should very often turn to 'Krishnaji' who is giving his messages through the Sart Bulletins, whenever he wanted to correlate the thought of the old thirteenth century mystic with the thoughts of the late-ct, if possible, living thinkers. Of course he has attempted to draw a parallel between Jñāneśvara and Bergson, the famous living French thinker. But it is to Krishnaji that he every now and then turns. We must frankly admit that his comparisons are not sufficiently convincing. The book, however, is extremely suggestive and will surely create an interest in the ideas of the Jñāneśvarī.

But unfortunately the method of presentation followed is bewilderingly clumsy and certainly very unsatisfactory from the point of view of young readers for whom the book is intended. We wish the book were presented in a more readable form.

S. V. DANDEKAR

The Mystery of the Mahābhārata, BY N. V. THADANI, M. A., -Volume I, Published by the Bharat Publishing House, Karachi; Price Rs 12.- pp 432.

The book under review is a unique attempt to interpret the Mahābhārata "as a picture of pure

Philosophy,' the great battle of Kurukṣetra (Field of Action) from 'कृ' imperative of कृ 'to act') being a conflict between the system of Vedānta with Action as the ultimate end, on the one hand, and the systems of Yoga and Sāṅkhya with Knowledge as the supreme end on

the other. This method of interpretation comprising letter analysis wherein each letter expresses an idea and an energy of life, the learned author claims to be old and to have the sanction of the Ancients.

The present volume ends with the Gods of the Vedas, leaving the treatment of the Mahābhārata for another volume to follow. "The Gods hymned in the Vedas," says Mr Thadani, represent great energies of life, Heart, Buddhi, Mind and Ether etc. Soma represents 'Mind' energy in connection with the senses of knowledge, Rudra, mind with the senses of Action, Agni, Buddhi with the senses of Knowledge, Indra, Buddhi with the senses of action. Yajña (sacrifice), understood as 'Purusha' or self-less creative action, will be a key to the correct understanding of the whole Vedic literature.' In chapter IV he emphatically tells us that the incarnations are but personifications of ideas and theories of life. In Chapter III, perhaps, taking his cue from modern Biology, he traces the origin of all life to the Cell, generalized into Brahmānda, the process of development being exactly the same in the microcosm as well as the macrocosm. He identifies the unmanifest with super electric energy residing in the Heart, Buddhi the manifest, residing in the head with Heat symbol-

ized as the Sun, Mind with electric energy symbolized as the Moon and Ether as the magnetic energy, and thus presents a beautiful picture of this world with numerous quotations to support his contention.

One can hardly agree to all what Mr Thadani says. His is indeed, the righteous indignation at our misfortune of not having an access into the 'esoteric' meaning of our Sacred Books. But to have *Pseudo Scientific explanations*, instead, is but a poor substitute. The Mystery of the Mahābhārata even after his learned explanations remains to us a mystery, more confounded. It is to be much regretted that a man of Mr Thadani's calibre should not have realized that material conceptions do not apply to what is immaterial, which baffles all human attempts at its expression, as the Upanishad says यथा वाचोऽनिवर्तते अथाय मनसा नह. We can only point to it by mere negations नति नेति or can realize it through our actual Anubhava (Experience).

Again, the method of interpretation consisting of letter analysis followed by the author is spurious and will lead the unwary reader to find the same theory of creation in any book in Sanskrit. All the same, we should welcome the attempt as it comes from a mind so sincerely bent upon the discovery of Truth.

GANGA SARAI.

Neo-Hinduism, BY D. A. ATHALYE, Published by Messrs D. B. Taraporewalla, Sons and Co., Bombay—pp 220; Price Rs 5-8-0

The book under review is an accurate and concise account of the life and teachings of Svāmi Vivekānanda, the protagonist of the great Śaṅkarācārya. The author has rendered a singular service by bringing out this small volume, as it provides an ample opportunity to the readers who are unable to go through the bigger volumes, to get a true glimpse into the ancient Vedāntic thought and culture as

expounded by the Svāmi, which even today raises our head high into the eyes of the world

The merit of the present volume lies in the author's judicious choice of excerpts from the works of the great Svāmi and in introducing these with his very apt, forcible and convincing remarks, which at once, provide a beautiful setting to the former. Even a novice will not encounter any difficulty in understanding the true significance of Svāmi's great teachings. I do congratulate the author for bringing out such a handy volume

GANGA SARAI

The Garden of the East, BY N V THADANI, Published by the Bharat Publishing House, Karachi

It is a great pleasure to read this charming book of verses "The Poems", as the author is careful to tell us in his preface, "associated with the names of different poets, are not translations or renderings, they are rather intended to recreate the spirit and idea of each master of song in a new form, with just enough of the original atmosphere to be reminiscent." Needless to say these verses based remotely on selections from Firdausi, Umar Khayyam, Nizami, Hafiz and S'adi are more poetical than the originals. Persian poetry might change the verbal garb but it has ever been the same from poet to poet and century to century. The scanty raw

material of Persian thought has been converted into finished poetry by the genius of Mr Thadani who has done for other poets what Fitz Gerald did for Umar Khayyam. The Garden of the East is instinct with life which one misses in the original. Quite astonishing for an Indian is Mr Thadani's command of English Language and rhythmic effects. In reading his Farhad and Shiraz one feels as if one is reading a poem by an Englishman of great poetic gifts, for one hears echoes of Spenser and Keats. But however great the pleasure one derives from this book one cannot help regretting that such gifts should go to enrich the literature of a language that is not the poet's mother-tongue.

M. T. PATWARDHAN.

The Memoirs of St Peter or The Gospel according to St Mark, Translated into English Sense-lines by James A Kleist, S J, Ph D, Professor of Classical Languages at St Louis University, U S A, Published by the Bruce Publishing Co, Milwaukee, New York and Chicago, pp xiv + 216, Price 2 50 dollars

The Science and Culture Series, to which the volume under review belongs, is not confined merely to the publication of Catholic literature but also literature containing discussions of problems of universal interest such as Experimental Psychology etc. Under the able editorship of Dr Joseph Husleim, S J, Ph D it has already made splendid progress, having published more than half a dozen volumes.

The present volume with six best illustrations contains, besides the English translation, a Chapter called "Introductory Sketches" (39 pp of good critical matter) which is a sort of critical and scholarly introduction to the Gospel of St Mark dealing with many of the Marcan questions in a lucid and scientific manner. In the present translation of the Marcan Gospel the use of English sense-lines is neither a novelty nor an innovation. In the days when the Second Gospel was composed, the form of literary expression used was known as colometry, and the General Editor informs us that

the nearest English equivalent of this form is obtained by a translation in sense lines each line crystallizing just a single thought and no more. It is thus a traditional form of presentation current in the Apostolic and post-Apostolic ages. The style of St Mark was characterized by simplicity, freshness, charm and picturesqueness and may be studied for its own sake apart from the question as to how far his narrative is a direct reflection of historic events. St Mark was not a scholar and had no affectation of the Schools. He was a plain man of the people. He gives us the preachings of Peter with a fidelity which is characteristic of all true discipleship. The title of the present volume viz "The Memoirs of St. Peter" has also a historic precedent. It is the one given to the Gospel according to St Mark by Justin the Martyr quite in conformity with the early witnesses from the 2nd to the 4th Century.

In the Foreward the author promises to continue his Marcan Studies and give us a few more volumes for readers as general as also for Biblical Scholars. We await with eagerness especially the last of these projected volumes on the *Theology of St Mark* dealing with the questions of higher criticism and of the ethical and religious import of the Second Gospel.

P K GOPE,

BOOK-NOTICES.

Words in Rgveda, being an attempt to fix the sense of every word that occurs in the Rgveda, Vol I, by Prof V K. Rajawade, M. A., Printed at Shri Ganesh Printing Works, Poona, 1932 — pp 368, Price inclusive of Postage. Rs 12 or 17s 6d

Scholars interested in Vedic Studies are already familiar with Prof Rajawade's articles, that have been appearing in several Oriental Journals since 1919, discussing the meanings of many words in the Rgveda. The volume under notice is a continuation of these studies in a more permanent form, pursued with a zest and candour, typical of the author of the volume. Prof Rajawade's method in the study of the Vedic words is to treat every word as a suspect. He asserts his independence without showing

slavishness to any authority ancient or modern. It is a Herculean task to solve the riddle of the Rgveda but Prof Rajawade's efforts in that direction in spite of a failing eye-sight and old age should serve as an eye opener to the younger generation of Sanskrit professors in India who appear to rest on their oars under a fond belief that a correct interpretation of the Rgveda has been brought within the pale of certainty.

We understand from the Introduction that the University of Bombay has given substantial pecuniary help towards the publication of the present volume. We trust that the University will encourage such research work in future instead of scattering its resources on research that never comes out of the embryonic stage.

P. K. GODE

Journal of the University of Bombay; Published for the University of Bombay by Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 53 Nicol Road, Bombay

Organizing and encouraging research is one of the fundamental functions of a University, and this Journal is one of the latest, though a tardy, recognition of that fact by

the Bombay University. Better late than never. At long last they have seen it fit to issue this Journal as the organ of the the University. It is proposed to issue some six numbers of this Journal every year. Two of these (Nos 1 and 4) will be devoted to History, Economics and Sociology, two others (Nos 3 and 6) to Arts and Law, and one each to the

Physical (No. 2) and Biological (No. 4) Sciences. We are afraid the scheme does not give any explicit recognition to Philosophy and allied subjects, unless it is proposed to include them under Arts and Law. That our fears are not without grounds will be apparent from the fact that none of the Editorial Board is a man of pure Philosophy.

We are indeed not competent to judge the intrinsic merits of the articles appearing in the first number before us. But so far as the formal aspects of the material appearing are concerned, we can safely say that the Journal well promises to be one of a high standard of scholarship and research. Reviews are a good feature, and Summaries and Abstracts of Theses will provide the learned public material to judge the quality of research work done under the direct or indirect auspices of this University.

There is one of the aspects of

the Journal, however, on which we would offer an adverse comment and that is the arrangement of its publication. We notice that though the Journal has been printed at the Karnatak Press and the printing work has been done on the whole satisfactorily, the Journal has been published by Messrs Longmans for the University. We fail to understand the motive behind this arrangement. Establishment of a University Press and starting of a Publication Department are ends which our University must accept as her ultimate objective to realize sooner or later. And from this point of view we feel that the University should have taken this task of publication upon herself, or else if the University thought that too early (she should have at least entrusted the same to some competent Indian Publisher).

We wish the best of lucks to this Journal.

D. D. VADEKAR.

Śrīmad-Bhāgavatānu-Kramanī
—or an Index to Śrīmad-Bhāgavata, compiled by Pandit T. R. Krishnacharya and published by Madhva Vilās Book Depot, Kumbakonam, 1932—pp 187

Pandit T. R. Krishnacharya the celebrated Editor of the Kumbakonam edition of the Mahābhārata needs no introduction to the readers. Himself a follower of Śrī Madhvācārya the Pandit has devoted 45 years of his life to the publication work. Besides his edition of the

Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata he has prepared *Indices* in Sanskrit to the *Mahābhārata* (Price Rs. 12) and to the *Bhāgavata* (Price Rs. 4). Another useful compilation of his is the *Concordance to the Mahābhārata* (Price Rs. 67).

The Index to the Bhāgavata under notice contains a synopsis of the Bhāgavata story, together with an alphabetical index of leading topics, places and persons. An Index prepared by a scholar of the reputation and attainments of Pandit T. R. Krishnacharya is

bound to prove a valuable and indispensable guide to all students of the Bhāgavata. The Index is very neatly printed, a characteristic

common to all the works of the Madhva Vilāsa Book-Depot. No library should be without a copy of this excellent compilation.

Modern India Thinks, a symposium of suggestions on problems of modern India compiled by Keshavjee R Luckmidas, Published by D B Taraporewalla and Sons, Bombay, Price Rs 6

Mr Luckmidas aptly describes his book as a symposium of suggestions on problems of modern India. Even a cursory perusal is enough to show that the compiler has selected his extracts with care and discrimination. They fairly represent some of the salient features of the modern Indian Thought, and the compiler can very well claim that there is no single extract in his book which is not calculated to stimulate the interest of the reader.

We wish, however, that the book contained extracts bearing upon the

problem of the inter-relation and assimilation of the different religions that have come to stay in our land. Whatever body the future India may assume, its foundation will have to be laid on the harmonious synthesis of its different religions. We also feel that it would have added to the value of the book if either the compiler or the writer of the foreward had analyzed the extracts and indicated definitely the light which they throw on the problems of modern India.

In any case we heartily commend this publication to the attention of those who have pledged or mean to pledge themselves to take part in the Renaissance that is coming in upon us.

The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, Vol IV, No 2, 1932, Published by W E. Bastian & Co, Colombo, Ceylon—pp 218, Price Rs 1 50

Messrs. Bastian and Co. are to be congratulated on bringing out the present number of the Buddhist Annual which conforms to the very high standard of printing, publishing and editing, which is a characteristic of this firm. The publishers started the publication of such annuals in 1920 and we are glad to note that they have continued the same uninterrupted dur-

ing the last twelve years. The volume under review contains not less than 40 contributions in prose and verse in appreciation of Buddhist philosophy and culture, besides more than 60 illustrations including a colour plate illustrating the tale of queen "Vessa Mitta," the beautiful consort of King Kosambi, who was ordered to be put to death by being thrown to the flames but who by the miracle of her Soul force comes out unscathed. The contributors who are both Buddhists and non-Buddhists being selected from all parts of the

world, the annual has succeeded in developing a thoroughly international outlook in dealing with the salient aspects of Buddhism. We are of opinion that such annuals owing to

their excellent manner of introducing useful material for thought have more cultural value than some of the costly illustrated weeklies that flood our reading rooms nowadays.

Pīyūṣa—Patrikā, edited by Pandit Hari Shankar Omkarji Shāstri, Nadiad—Vol I, Nos 1-7 Annual subscription for sympathisers—Rs 5/- and for others Rs 3/- only

Pandit Hari Shankar Shastri is to be congratulated for having started this new Sanskrit Magazine for the regeneration of Sanskrit learning and in particular for the publication through its pages of ancient works of importance pertaining to the Veda, the Vedāṅgas, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta. A few pages will be devoted each month to

articles written in Hindi. Illustrations in half-tone and colour form a special feature of this magazine. The Editor has already enlisted the active co-operation of shastris well-versed in their respective branches of learning as is evident from a mere glance at the contents of the parts before us. The printing and get-up of the magazine are quite in keeping with the ambitious plans of the editor to rehabilitate the traditional learning of the Shastris. We wish the journal a prosperous career and a very wide circulation among all lovers and patrons of Sanskrit learning.

SĀQĪ,—Vol 1, No 2 (July 1932) edited and published by F. Fathullakhan, Secunderabad, Deccan—Annual subscription Rs 6 (Inland), 12s (Foreign). Single copy—10 as

The present number of this newly started journal appears to indicate a catholicity of cultural interests as will be seen from its contents. The number contains

two half-tone reproductions of Japanese paintings, two good poems and articles such as "The Russian Drama," "The Divinity of Man," "Some features of Japanese paintings," "Sultan Salah-Ud-Din." Among contributors, besides the Editor, mention may be made of O Jinarajadas, M A (Cantab) and Mohd Mujib, B A (Oxon). We welcome this new periodical to the ranks of high-class journalism.

The Indian Literary Review, Published by Messrs D B Taraporewalla and Sons Hornby Road, Bombay

This is a monthly journal of Books published by the well-known

firm of Messrs. Taraporewalla and Sons, Bombay. The journal is indispensable to all book-lovers as it has an attractive way of introducing best books on all subjects in the quiet of a study room. Short

and elegant reviews of new publications keep a reader in touch with all that is passing on in the world of books, no matter what the idiosyncrasies of the reader are. The educative value of such a journal cannot be denied especially in view of the enormous number of dull catalogues of books which bewilder a modern reader.

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6 Shillings, \$ 1.75

Gokhale Mandal Samachar,
Vol I, No 1, edited by N D
Gokhale, B A, 681 Budhavar
Peth, and printed at the
Ganesh Printing Works,
Poona City.

This is an official bulletin of the Gokhale Raste Mandal Poona, started under the patronage of Sardar Madhavrao Raste. The bulletin proposes to serve as a medium of communication among

different members of the Gokhale family, which claim many notable personalities in its history from the celebrated Bapu Gokhale of the Peshwa period of the Maratha history down to the late Mr G K. Gokhale, the Founder of the Servants of India Society of Poona. The Mandal proposes to make strenuous efforts for the economic, social and educational amelioration of all members of the Gokhale family. This is a laudable attempt at family organization on a very large scale and if the scheme is carried out successfully in the spirit in which it is planned, it is well worth copying by other big families in the Maharashtra. In the days when disintegration of the family is much deplored by all aspirants after national solidarity, such experiments of a constructive nature are highly commendable.

Datta Bhakta Rahaya by
Sadashiv Krishna Phadke,
Pauvel Price Rs 3

This is really a valuable publication for the devotees of Sri Datta. The author, however, tells us in his introduction that the aim of the book is to bring back, if possible, the Godless reader to the throne of God. The book consists of three parts—(1) Sri Dattopaniṣad (2) Sri Datta-Muktāvalī (3) Sri Datta-pañcamrta.

In the first part the author takes up the position of an average educated man and attempts a rational and critical examination of the doubts

and difficulties that follow in the wake of the acceptance of the Avatār of the Mahāyogi Sri Datta. Should the first part succeed in bringing the rationalistic reader back to God, the second part is eminently calculated to strengthen his belief by making him familiar with the lives and teachings of some of the famous devotees of Sri Datta. The third part offers the sweet pudding in the form of the out-pourings of the hearts devoted to Sri Datta to such of the readers as have successfully travelled through the pages of the first two parts.

Review of Philosophy and Religion

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